Opinion
23A-CR-892
07-29-2024
Trent D. Kreegar, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT SAMUEL J. BEASLEY MUNCIE, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL ANDREW A. KOBE SECTION CHIEF, CRIMINAL APPEALS INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court The Honorable Thomas A. Cannon, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 18C05-2109-MR-6
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT SAMUEL J. BEASLEY MUNCIE, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL ANDREW A. KOBE SECTION CHIEF, CRIMINAL APPEALS INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Kenworthy, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a jury trial, Trent Kreegar was convicted of murderfor the death of his grandfather. He appeals his conviction, raising two issues: 1) did the trial court give incorrect instructions to the jury on the law of self-defense; and 2) did the State prove by sufficient evidence Kreegar's actions caused his grandfather's death? Concluding the trial court's instructions were correct statements of law and sufficient evidence supports the conviction, we affirm.
Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] Kreegar lived with his grandfather, Robert Huffman. Kreegar was in his late-twenties and weighed around 120 pounds. Huffman was sixty-seven and weighed around 245 pounds. Huffman had knee replacements, diabetes, and vision problems. His mobility was limited, and he was sometimes unsteady on his feet. He worked on projects around his house but required frequent breaks. In fall 2021, Huffman began working on his deck, which required the use of a wheelbarrow.
[¶3] On the evening of September 4, 2021, Kreegar purchased some vodka. Huffman did not approve of Kreegar's drinking, and they had fought about it before. So when Kreegar returned home, he consumed the vodka while sitting in his car in front of Huffman's house. A few hours after Kreegar returned, Huffman went out to the car. He was not happy to find Kreegar drinking, but eventually returned to the house while Kreegar remained in the car.
[¶4] After a few more hours, Huffman came back outside. He yelled at Kreegar about his drinking, opened the driver's side door, snatched Kreegar's car keys, and dragged Kreegar out of the car. The two began fighting. Huffman tackled Kreegar to the ground and, while on top of Kreegar, restrained his arms. Kreegar testified he thought Huffman was going to kill him and believed Huffman "need[ed] to become unconscious" so Kreegar could get away. Tr. Vol. 3 at 238. Kreegar planted his knee in Huffman's ribs and pushed Huffman off him. Huffman rolled to the side and Kreegar was able to free himself. Kreegar put his arm around Huffman's neck and pulled "as if [Huffman] were going to go unconscious." Id. at 230. But Kreegar's actions had no effect on Huffman, who continued to struggle against Kreegar. Kreegar released Huffman and scooted quickly away. As Huffman was on his hands and knees trying to get up, Kreegar found Huffman's steel wheelbarrow, lifted it above his head, and "let it fall on [Huffman]." Id. at 235. The side of the wheelbarrow dented where it hit the back of Huffman's head, and a wooden handle broke off.
[¶5] When Kreegar saw Huffman was still moving and trying to get up, he kicked Huffman in the ribs, then picked up a cinder block and used it to "nudge[]" or "tap" Huffman. Id. at 243-44. As Huffman rolled over, Kreegar stomped on him three times.
[¶6] Believing Huffman was finally incapacitated, Kreegar went back to his car and smoked two cigarettes. He planned to leave before Huffman woke up but because he was covered in dirt, he first put his clothes in the washer and took a shower. When Kreegar left the house, he saw Huffman was not moving or breathing. Kreegar called 9-1-1 and was instructed to begin CPR. During the call, he told the operator, "[H]im and I got into it, and he lost." Tr. Vol. 4 at 32; see Ex. Vol. 6 at 2 (audio of 9-1-1 call at 0:00:29-0:00:35).
[¶7] When officers arrived a few minutes later, Kreegar ran up to them and said his grandfather had been lying on the ground for thirty to sixty minutes and needed to go to the hospital. Resuscitation attempts were made but Huffman was pronounced dead after twenty minutes.
[¶8] Forensic pathologist Jolene Clouse conducted Huffman's autopsy, which revealed large lacerations on the back of his head and abrasions and contusions on his face, neck, shoulder, and torso. Blunt force trauma caused twenty to twenty-five rib fractures, extensive soft tissue damage, and brain bleeding. The rib fractures were located on Huffman's sides and back and accompanied by hemorrhaging, indicating they were not from CPR. Dr. Clouse testified it was "[e]xtremely unlikely" Huffman was able to move after sustaining such severe rib injuries because they would have been "extremely painful, and it would prevent him from breathing." Tr. Vol. 3 at 111, 147. Huffman's cause of death was reported as "[t]raumatic blunt force injuries to the head and torso." Ex. Vol. 6 at 48. Dr. Clouse explained the injuries to Huffman's ribs made him "unable to breathe - leading to asphyxia or absence of oxygen." Tr. Vol. 3 at 114.
[¶9] The State charged Kreegar with murder and Level 3 felony aggravated battery. Kreegar testified at his jury trial, claiming he was afraid Huffman would kill him during the altercation. The trial court gave the jury five instructions on self-defense, including two over Kreegar's objection to them as incorrect statements of the law. The jury found Kreegar guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for murder only and sentenced Kreegar to fifty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction.
No Reversible Error in Instructing the Jury on Self-Defense
[¶10] A claim of error in instructing a jury is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). But when, as here, the defendant challenges the instruction as an incorrect statement of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 554 (Ind. 2019). If we find the challenged instruction to be erroneous, "we presume the error affected the verdict, and we will reverse the defendant's conviction unless the verdict would have been the same under a proper instruction." Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, reversal is required "if the jury's decision may have been based upon an erroneous instruction." Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 303-04 (Ind. 2020) (quotation omitted).
[¶11] The trial court gave five instructions touching on Kreegar's self-defense claim, Instructions 9 through 13. Kreegar objected only to Instructions 10 and 13, but we also set out Instruction 9 because jury instructions are "to be considered as a whole and in reference to each other." Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted).
[Final Instruction No. 9:] It is an issue as to Count 1, and Count 2, whether Trent D. Kreegar acted in self-defense. A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what the person reasonably believes to be imminent use of unlawful force.
A person is justified in using deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Trent D. Kreegar did not act in self-defense.
[Final Instruction No. 10:] To prevail on a claim of self-defense, the defendant must prove the following:
1. That he was in a place where he had a right to be.
2. That he acted without fault, did not provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence; and
3. That he had a reasonable fear or apprehension of death or serious bodily injury.
Once the defense of self-defense has been raised by the defendant, in order to negate that claim the State has the burden of disproving one of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt....
[Final Instruction No. 13:] When danger of death or great bodily harm ceases, the right of self-defense ceases with it.Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 180-81, 184.
Instruction 11 instructs the jury Kreegar's belief in the need to act in self-defense must be "reasonable and in good faith" and Instruction 12 instructs the jury it is allowed to consider what Kreegar knew about Huffman's reputation and character for "peace and quietude." Id. at 182-83.
[¶12] Instruction 9 sets forth the statutory definition of self-defense, and Kreegar concedes it is an accurate statement of the law. See Appellant's Br. at 21; see also I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019). But Kreegar claims Instructions 10 and 13 are incorrect statements of the law because they do not encompass the language from the statute allowing a person to use deadly force to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. See Tr. Vol. 4 at 82 (defense counsel objecting to Instruction 10 and explaining "what we believe paragraph three in instruction 10 should say [is:] that he had a reasonable fear or apprehension of death or series [sic] bodily injury, or that he reasonably believed in the need to prevent the commission of a forcible felony"); id. at 84 (defense counsel objecting to Instruction 13 and explaining "I think that there is a fuller statement . . . that more accurately fits the facts here[:] when the danger of death or serious bodily injury, or the need to prevent the commission of a forcible felony ceases the right of self-defense ceases with it"). Kreegar now claims the omission was confusing and misled the jury.
Kreegar testified only to acting out of fear Huffman was going to kill him during the encounter. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 3 at 217, 225, 235, 247. Nonetheless, he argued in closing that Huffman committed the forcible felony of confinement when Huffman pulled him from the car and then tackled him to the ground, and the trial court instructed the jury on the definitions of "criminal confinement" and "forcible felony." Tr. Vol. 4 at 90-91.
[¶13] Instructions 10 and 13 are a summary of Indiana case law pertaining to self defense. Kreegar claims Instruction 10 "improperly modified the burden of proof . . . by requiring [him] to prove that he reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury[.]" Appellant's Br. at 21. But the three elements set forth in that instruction track the long-established elements of self-defense as stated by the Indiana Supreme Court. The common-law rule of self-defense states:
One who is without fault, and in a place where he has a right to be, and is there unlawfully assailed, may, without retreating, repel force with force, and go even to the extent of taking the life of his adversary, if in repelling his assailant he used no more force than is reasonably necessary in his own self-defense.Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 745 (Ind. 1895). Even after Indiana enacted a statutory definition of self-defense, the Indiana Supreme Court has continued to recognize these elements of a self-defense claim even though they do not appear in the statute: "When self-defense is asserted, the defendant must prove he was in a place where he had a right to be, 'acted without fault,' and reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily harm." Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Millerv. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699-700 (Ind. 1999)). Our Supreme Court has interpreted the self-defense statute to mean a person must be in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm to justifiably use deadly force-no matter the circumstances in which the force is deployed. Instruction 10 imposes the exact burden of proof our Supreme Court has articulated.
[¶14] Similarly, Kreegar claims Instruction 13 "lowered [the] State's burden in order to defeat [his] self-defense claim." Appellant's Br. at 21. But Instruction 13 also finds support in the common law. See Fuentes v. State, 952 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) ("When danger of death or great bodily harm ceases, the right of self-defense ceases with it.") (quoting Schlegel v. State, 150 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind. 1958)), trans. denied. Instruction 13 incorporates the elements of a selfdefense claim and explains their parameters. It does not affect the burden of proof.
[¶15] Although Instructions 10 and 13 do not contain language concerning use of deadly force to prevent a forcible felony, they are correct statements of the law and-especially when considered in conjunction with Instruction 9 which does include the language-the jury was properly instructed. Cf. Carson v. State, 686 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997) (instruction stating a person "may use deadly force only if he reasonably believes the force is necessary to prevent seriously bodily injury or harm to himself or another" was an incorrect statement of the law requiring reversal because the jury was not instructed that prevention of a forcible felony is also a justification for the use of deadly force), trans. denied.
Sufficient Evidence Supports Kreegar's Conviction
[¶16] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a "deferential standard of appellate review, in which we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]'" Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is "not necessary that the evidence 'overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'" Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).
[¶17] Kreegar was charged with murder. A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). In addition, our criminal justice system recognizes causation is usually an essential element for imposing liability. Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 672 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (citing Burrage v. U.S., 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014) and Paroline v. U.S., 572 U.S. 434, 446 (2014)). "Causation refers to the general principle that when an offense is predicated upon a certain result, the State must prove the defendant's action brought about the result." Id. Whether a person's conduct actually caused an injury is a question for the fact-finder. See Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 999 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied.
[¶18] Kreegar argues the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt his conduct caused Huffman's death. He selectively highlights portions of Dr. Clouse's testimony to support his assertion that Huffman "exposed himself to a source of compressive force sufficient to fracture his ribs when he tackled [Kreegar] and crashed on top of him." Appellant's Br. at 15.
[¶19] In making his argument, Kreegar focuses on evidence he believes is favorable to
his position and asserts "there is no evidence in the record, whatsoever" to show Kreegar broke Huffman's ribs. Id. at 16. But contrary to our standard of review, this position asks us to reweigh the evidence and ignore the evidence supporting the verdict. Most importantly, Kreegar testified he put his knee into Huffman's ribs to push Huffman off him, held a wheelbarrow over Huffman's head and "let it fall" on him, and then kicked Huffman in the ribs:
Q And was this a love tap or were you - did you really kick him?
A Yes. I kicked him, yes.
Q And what were you hoping to accomplish?
A That it would keep him from moving.
Q You're still pursuing incapacitation, correct?
A Yes.Tr. Vol. 3 at 235, 240-41. Kreegar also choked Huffman, stomped on his head, and "tap[ped]" him with a cement block. Id. at 244. Dr. Clouse reported Huffman's cause of death was rib fractures as a result of "[t]raumatic blunt force injuries to the head and torso" that left Huffman "unable to breathe-leading to asphyxia[.]" Id. at 88, 114. Kreegar claims Huffman fell on him with such force that Huffman broke twenty to twenty-five of his own ribs, but Kreegar himself suffered virtually no injuries from being tackled by Huffman. And Kreegar testified Huffman continued to fight after the tackle-pinning Kreegar's arms down and yelling at him-yet Dr. Clouse testified Huffman's rib injuries would make it hard for him to move and breathe.
[¶20] We must decline Kreegar's invitation to reweigh the evidence. Based on the evidence most favorable to the verdict-most significantly, Kreegar's own testimony-we conclude a reasonable jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt Kreegar's actions caused Huffman's death.
Conclusion
[¶21] The trial court properly instructed the jury on the law of self-defense and sufficient evidence supports Kreegar's murder conviction.
[¶22] Affirmed.
May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.