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noting that, since the U.S. Constitution did not preclude the state legislature from empowering county officers to make arrests in neighboring counties within the state, a state law violation would not support a claim under § 1983
Summary of this case from Hopper v. RinaldiOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-2443-KHV
June 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Randall Kratzer brings suit against Kevin Kufahl (a deputy sheriff for Jefferson County, Kansas) and the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners. Specifically, Kratzer alleges that defendants deprived him of due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by arresting him in Douglas County — outside Kufahl's jurisdiction in Jefferson County. This matter is before the Court on defendants' Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings (Doc. #20) filed February 28, 2002. For reasons stated below, defendants' motion is sustained.
Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Standards
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., is governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Mock v. T.G. Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 528 (10th Cir. 1992). Such a motion should not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers., Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, the Court assumes the truth of plaintiff's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Shaw v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 965, 968 (10th Cir. 1987). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint is not whether he will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of his claims, he must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Factual Background
The factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint may be summarized as follows: On September 3, 2000, Kufahl arrested Kratzer at Lawrence Memorial Hospital in Douglas County, Kansas. At the time, Kufahl was acting as deputy sheriff for Jefferson County, Kansas and as an employee of the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, Kansas.
Plaintiff alleges that because Kufahl's jurisdiction was limited to Jefferson County, Kufahl and the Board of County Commissioners violated his due process rights by arresting him in Douglas County.
Analysis
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; plaintiff must allege (1) that he was deprived of rights secured to him by the Constitution and (2) that the person who deprived him of his rights did so under color of state law. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). I. Deputy Sheriff Kufahl
Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1983 because he merely alleges that Kufahl did not comply with a state statute, K.S.A. § 22-2401a(1). Section 1983 ordinarily provides a basis for redressing violations of federal law done under color of state law, and not simple violations of state law. See Jones v. City County of Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)). Kratzer agrees with this proposition, but he asserts that under Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990), Kufahl violated his due process rights under the Constitution. In Ross, the Tenth Circuit stated that "a warrantless arrest executed outside of the arresting officer's jurisdiction is analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause," id. at 1354, and that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless arrest without probable cause is "presumptively unreasonable." Id. at 1354 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981)).
K.S.A. § 22-2401a(1) states that law enforcement officers employed by consolidated county law enforcement agencies or departments and sheriffs and their deputies may exercise their powers as law enforcement officers: (a) anywhere within their county; and (b) in any other place when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person.
In Ross, a deputy of the Adair County Sheriff's Department arrested plaintiff, a Cherokee Indian, on tribal land which was subject to exclusive federal or tribal criminal jurisdiction. Congress had expressly granted criminal jurisdiction over tribal land to some states, but Oklahoma had not received an express grant or otherwise obtained criminal jurisdiction over the parcel in question. Accordingly, Oklahoma and Adair County law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest plaintiff.
In the instant action, plaintiff does not dispute that the State of Kansas had jurisdiction and that the appropriate county officer could arrest him. He merely alleges that a Jefferson County officer could not arrest him in Douglas County. Even assuming, however, that Kratzer's arrest outside of Jefferson County violated K.S.A. § 22-2401a(1), such a violation by itself will not support a Section 1983 claim. See generally Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1155 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1997) (arrest warrant relying entirely on confession of self-confessed co-conspirator violates Oklahoma law but does not violate United States Constitution) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979)).
Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2001), is persuasive on this issue. There, a Lake County Forest Preserve officer arrested plaintiff outside of the forest preserve in violation of the state statute which authorized forest preserve officers and set the boundaries for their jurisdiction. See id. at 526. The Seventh Circuit held that although the officer had violated state law, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. It reasoned:
A violation of state statute is not a per se violation of the federal Constitution. The federal government is not the enforcer of state law. (citations omitted). We have applied this principle consistently in the context of state laws governing criminal process, (citations omitted) and see little reason to treat state laws governing police jurisdiction differently. It would not violate the Fourth Amendment for the Illinois Legislature to empower preserve officers to make arrests outside the district's physical boundaries. It is difficult to see why an officer engaging in the same underlying act necessarily would.
Id. The Seventh Circuit distinguished Ross, noting that it involved the ability of an Oklahoma officer to arrest a Native American on tribal trust land where the state had not assumed criminal jurisdiction; whereas "[t]he present case concerns the jurisdiction of officers acting between political subdivisions of the same state." Id.; see also United Keetoowah Band Of Cherokee Indians v. State of Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 1991) (Ross explicitly addressed only the application of Oklahoma criminal law in Indian country).
In addition to Ross, plaintiff's other authorities are distinguishable. In Rambo v. Daley, 851 F. Supp. 1222, 1224-25 (N.D.Ill. 1994), and Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 311 (E.D.Pa. 1968), police officers crossed state lines to arrest a suspect. In Jacobs v. Port Neches Police Dep't, No. 1:94-CV-767, 1997 WL 470354, at *3 (E.D.Tex. June 16, 1997), the police officer was acting outside his municipal jurisdiction within the same state, but plaintiff also alleged that he lacked probable cause to stop him, engineered a "set up," and had no warrant or consent to search the trunk of plaintiff's car. The Jacobs court did not hold that a police officer who acts outside his municipal jurisdiction is liable for unlawful arrest under Section 1983.
The Sixth Circuit reasoning in Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1995), is also persuasive. In Pyles, plaintiff was arrested in Kentucky on a misdemeanor charge of supplying alcohol to a minor. Plaintiff claimed that the arrest was defective because a Kentucky statute "permit[ted] an officer to make certain warrantless misdemeanor arrests only when the misdemeanor [was] committed in his presence." Id. at 1214. The arresting officer had not seen plaintiff give alcohol to a minor and plaintiff claimed that he therefore lacked statutory authority to make the arrest. The Sixth Circuit held that the officer could not be liable under Section 1983 unless the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights were violated and that her rights under Kentucky law, including her right to be arrested only when she committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the arresting officer, were not grounded in the federal Constitution and would not support a Section 1983 claim. Id. at 1215. The Sixth Circuit noted that "[a] state ought to follow its law, but to treat a violation of state law as a violation of the Constitution is to make the federal government the enforcer of state law. State rather than federal courts are appropriate institutions to enforce state rules." Id. at 1216 (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988)). Like the officers in Pasiewicz and Pyles, Kufahl apparently lacked statutory authority to arrest plaintiff. The United States Constitution, however, does not preclude the Kansas legislature from empowering county officers to make arrests in neighboring counties within the State of Kansas. The state law violation therefore will not support a claim under Section 1983. See Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 526; Pyles, 60 F.3d at 1215; see also Jones v. City County of Denver, Colo., 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff did not have cognizable claim based on warrantless arrest unless federal law required arrest warrant). The jurisdiction of state law enforcement officials who act within limited regions of the state is a creature of state law, not a constitutional principle enforceable under Section 1983. Accordingly, defendants' motion is sustained as to Kufahl.
Because plaintiff's claim against the Board of County Commissioners is based solely on Kufahl's conduct, defendants' motion as to the Board of County Commissioners must be sustained for this reason as well.
II. Board of County Commissioners
Plaintiff alleges that the Board of County Commissioners is liable under Section 1983 because Deputy Kufahl arrested him outside of his jurisdiction. In order to state a claim against a county under Section 1983 for the action of one of its officers, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a county employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a county policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. See Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Absent an underlying constitutional violation by one of its officers, the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County cannot be liable under Section 1983. See Apodaca v. Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Dept., 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).Even if plaintiff could somehow establish an underlying constitutional violation, plaintiff has not alleged that a custom or policy of the County caused his constitutional violation. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under Section 1983. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell , supra). Similarly, plaintiff has not alleged that the County's failure to train, supervise, or discipline its employees caused the alleged constitutional violation. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. Even if the County failed to train its officers, a municipality can only be liable if the failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants. Id. at 392. Accordingly, the Court sustains defendants' motion as to the Board of County Commissioners.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings (Doc. #20) filed February 28, 2002 be and hereby is SUSTAINED.