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Komolov v. Segal

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Dec 27, 2012
101 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

Opinion

2012-12-27

Alexander KOMOLOV, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. David SEGAL, et al., Defendants–Respondents.

Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York (Scott T. Horn of counsel), for appellants. Kathryn Bedke Law, New York (Kathryn L. Bedke of counsel), for respondents.



Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York (Scott T. Horn of counsel), for appellants. Kathryn Bedke Law, New York (Kathryn L. Bedke of counsel), for respondents.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., ACOSTA, RENWICK, RICHTER, ROMÁN, JJ.

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered March 7, 2012, upon reargument, insofar as said order dismissed the conversion claims for failure to state a cause of action, deemed an appeal from judgment, same court and Justice, entered May 29, 2012, dismissing the conversion causes of action (CPLR 5501[c] ), and so considered, said judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the judgment vacated.

Contrary to plaintiffs' claim, we did not decide in the prior appeal (96 A.D.3d 513, 947 N.Y.S.2d 14 [1st Dept.2012] ) whether the complaint stated a cause of action for conversion; hence, law of the case does not require reversal of the judgment currently under appeal.

The motion court did not impermissibly act sua sponte in changing the grounds for dismissal of the conversion claims; rather, it was reacting to the arguments made by plaintiffs in opposition to defendants' motion to reargue ( see Marx v. Marx, 258 A.D.2d 366, 367, 685 N.Y.S.2d 224 [1st Dept.1999];Goldstein Affiliates v. Len Art Knitting Corp., 75 A.D.2d 551, 427 N.Y.S.2d 233 [1st Dept.1980] ). In any event, the court had discretion to reconsider its own prior interlocutory order ( see e.g. Kleinser v. Astarita, 61 A.D.3d 597, 878 N.Y.S.2d 28 [1st Dept.2009] ).

Accepting the complaint and the materials submitted on the various motions as true, as we must on a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, we find that they show that plaintiffs have a claim for conversion of the Picasso and Vlaminck paintings but not for the jewelry ( see e.g. Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49–50, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96, 860 N.E.2d 713 [2006] ). The complaint and the affidavits show that on February 4, 2008, defendant Mohamed Serry purchased a Picasso glasswork at the Original Miami Antique Show and had it shipped to his office/gallery; in or about June 2008, plaintiff Komolov purchased from defendants a Picasso painting on glass known as “ Portrait de famille ” and depicted in the record on appeal; that Komolov's office was located next to defendants'; in March 2010, while Komolov was away on a business trip, defendants Serry and Segal told nonparty Selvin Paz to remove “ Portrait de famille ” from Komolov's office, place it within defendants' company's control, and not to return it to Komolov; and on or about March 16, 2010, Komolov tried to pick up “ Portrait de famille,” but Serry told nonparty Raul Giansante not to release it to Komolov.

The complaint and the affidavits also show that in May or July 2008, Komolov bought from defendants a Vlaminck painting known as “Night View” and depicted in the record on appeal; at the beginning of March 2010, Serry told Giansante and Paz to remove the Vlaminck painting from Komolov's office, which they did; and on or about March 16, 2010, Serry told Giansante not to release to Komolov anything that Komolov wanted to retrieve.

However, with respect to the jewelry, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the element of “[defendants'] dominion over the property or interference with it, in derogation of [plaintiffs'] rights” ( see Dobroshi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 65 A.D.3d 882, 885, 886 N.Y.S.2d 106 [1st Dept.2009],lv. dismissed14 N.Y.3d 785, 899 N.Y.S.2d 117, 925 N.E.2d 919 [2010] ). Neither Giansante nor Paz said he removed any jewelry from Komolov's office. While Komolov said the jewelry was taken from his office while he was away, he did not say by whom, and he could not have had direct knowledge because he was not present when the jewelry was removed.

In addition, with respect to the sapphire ring, plaintiffs failed to show “legal ownership or an immediate superior right of possession to a specific identifiable thing” ( Messiah's Covenant Community Church v. Weinbaum, 74 A.D.3d 916, 919, 905 N.Y.S.2d 209 [2d Dept.2010] ). The complaint alleges that defendants converted a sapphire ring, but the photograph attached to the complaint shows merely a sapphire (i.e., a gemstone). The affidavits give no further details about the ring.


Summaries of

Komolov v. Segal

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Dec 27, 2012
101 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
Case details for

Komolov v. Segal

Case Details

Full title:Alexander KOMOLOV, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. David SEGAL, et al.…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Date published: Dec 27, 2012

Citations

101 A.D.3d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
957 N.Y.S.2d 99
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 9165

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