Opinion
Case No. 20-23340-TPA
2021-05-28
IN RE: Todd Elliott KOGER, Debtor Todd Elliott Koger, Movant v. Wilkinsburg School District, Respondent
Rosemary C. Crawford, Crawford McDonald, LLC, Allison Park, PA, Pro Se.
Rosemary C. Crawford, Crawford McDonald, LLC, Allison Park, PA, Pro Se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Thomas P. Agresti, United States Bankruptcy Judge
A number of years ago, a now-retired and highly respected member of this Court was confronted with a Chapter 11 plan confirmation process that involved numerous objections and extended over a period of 13 years. In her Opinion ultimately confirming the plan, she referred to the process as resembling "Whack-a-Mole" – a term used colloquially to "denote a repetitious and futile task – each time an adversary is ‘whacked’ it only pops up again somewhere else." While the repetitious and futile tasks in that matter all occurred within the context of a single bankruptcy case, the Court here is faced with a variant form of the same theme.
See , In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp ., 2013 WL 2299620 *2 at note 8 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 24, 2013) (Hon. Judith Fitzgerald).
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1344. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (C), (K), and (O) .
As will be discussed further below, the present bankruptcy case is the seventh one filed since 2004 involving 3 different debtors, in all of which the same parcel of real property, and unpaid real estate taxes owed on it, have featured prominently. Moreover, that same overall theme has carried over into this case, with the Debtor repeatedly changing his position and argument when a prior version of his position has been effectively challenged. Just as the seemingly endless plan confirmation process in the Pittsburgh Corning case had to eventually reach a conclusion, so too here the fate of the property, at least as far as bankruptcy protection goes, cries out for similar finality.
Presently before the Court for determination are a number of motions filed by the Debtor, entitled as follows:
(1) New Motion (as Ordered) to Redeem Property; to Determine Redemption Amount (if any); to Set Aside Lien/Judgment; to Cure; and Stay Sheriff Sale # 29 DEC 20 No. GD 05-01165 (Postponed to 6/7/21) , filed at Doc. No. 44;
(2) Emergency Motion to Postpone the April 15, 2021 Hearing to Redeem Property; to Determine Redemption Amount (if any); to Set Aside Lien/Judgment; to Cure; and Stay Sheriff Sale # 29 DEC 20 No. GD 05-01165 (Postponed to 6/7/21) filed at Doc. No. 51; and,
(3) Omnibus Motion: (1) to Redeem Property 11 U.S.C. 722, Bankruptcy Rule 6008, and/or other; to Redeem Property at Lien Amount (without Legal Fees Added); and/or (2) if Necessary to Convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 to Redeem Property Pursuant to Section 1322(b)(2) "Time Payments" -- Sheriff Sale # 29 NO. GD 05-01165 filed at Doc. No. 55.
These various motions (referred to collectively hereinafter as "the Motions") are confusing, redundant, and include multiple requests for relief within a single document. They have also evolved over time as the Debtor made various filings which seemed to change the exact nature of the relief he was seeking. For that reason, it would be difficult to grant or deny the Motions as would normally be done. Instead, the Court will approach this matter in a slightly different manner addressing and deciding each of the items for relief sought by Debtor, without necessarily trying to ascribe each such item to a particular one of the Motions .
See Orders issued on April 13, 2021, April 16, 2021, April 20, 2021, and April 28, 2021, Doc Nos. 52, 59, 66, and 69, respectively, for efforts by the Court to deal with the various filings made by the Debtor. The Debtor, who is acting pro se , has been treated with a procedural leniency that would not have been afforded to a party being represented by legal counsel.
The issues raised in the Motions all center on efforts by the Respondent Wilkinsburg School District ("WSD") to have property located at 515 Kelly Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pa. ("the Property") sold at a sheriff sale for non-payment of real estate taxes and the Debtor's counter-efforts to prevent such sale from happening. Before turning to those issues, it is first important to have an understanding of the history leading up to this moment. This includes prior bankruptcy filings by this Debtor and related parties, the state court proceedings that have culminated in the approaching sheriff sale referred to above, and the present bankruptcy itself.
Prior Bankruptcy Filings
Relevant here are a number of prior bankruptcy filings made by this Debtor (SSN xxx-xx-xxxx) by his son (SSN xxx-xx-xxx), and by Kellie Dillard (SSN xxx-xx-xxxx), who appears to be the wife or significant other of the Debtor. Contributing to the difficulty in sorting out these prior filings is that the Debtor and his son both have the same name – Todd Elliott Koger. Apparently the Debtor sometimes goes by Todd Elliott Koger, Sr. and his son by Todd Elliott Koger, Jr., but that has by no means been consistent, and frequently the "Sr." or "Jr." designation has been omitted in filings with the Court. The Court herein will refer to these two individuals as "Debtor" and "Debtor's Son" to avoid any confusion.
The following is a list of relevant bankruptcy case filings that have been made in this Court over the prior 17 years, along with a brief explanation as to the representations made therein about the Property:
To be discussed here are only prior bankruptcies that involved the Property in some way. The Debtor also filed two earlier bankruptcies before the Property was acquired and thus those cases are not relevant herein and are not part of the discussion. See , Case No. 92-20178-JKF filed on January 15, 1992 and Case No. 98-22744-BM filed on April 3, 1998.
• Case No. 04-24229-BM was filed by Kellie Odessa Dillard on April 1, 2004. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value of $5,000 and identifies Debtor Kellie Dillard as the sole "owner."
• Case No. 05-23146-BM was filed by the Debtor on March 16, 2005. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value of $5,000 and identifies the Debtor as the sole "owner."
• Case No. 07-25165-BM was filed by the Debtor's Son on August 17, 2007. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value of "less than $10,000" and shows Debtor's Son as the sole "owner."
• Case No. 10-27397-BM was filed by the Debtor on October 18, 2010. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value of $6,000 and describes the Debtor as "Joint Owner (Son and Kellie Dillard)." The Debtor filed a motion to avoid a tax lien on the Property in the case on December 20, 2010, alleging that it included excessive legal fees and impaired his exemption. See , Doc. No. 18. In that motion the Debtor described the Property as his "homestead." On January 20, 2011, Judge Bernard Markovitz (previously of this Court and now retired) entered an order denying the motion with prejudice. No appeal was taken and the bankruptcy case was closed shortly thereafter.
• Case No. 12-21075-JAD was filed by Kellie Dillard on March 2, 2012. The
Debtor's Son was 11 years old at the time this case was filed. A form was filed along with the petition that purports to grant Kellie Dillard a general power of attorney to act for Debtor's Son, although it was not notarized and appears to be dated August 15, 2008. Surprisingly, no one seems to have questioned whether an 11- year old could properly be a debtor based on such a questionable power of attorney form. The case was dismissed on September 28, 2007, without a discharge due to the failure to obtain credit counseling.
petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value of $6,000 and describes Kellie Dillard as "Joint Owner (with Son and Son's Father)".
• Case No. 16-21143-CMB was filed by Debtor's Son on March 29, 2016. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value shown of $16,000, and the value of the Debtor's Son's portion is shown as $16,000 also, which would seem to indicate he was the sole owner. However, in response to the question whether anyone else has an interest in the Property the block marked "At least one of the debtors and another" is checked. Under the item that asks for a description of the nature of the debtor's ownership it states "Grandfather bought it for me."
• Case No. 20-23340-TPA, the current case, was filed on November 27, 2020. The petition lists the Property in Schedule A with a value shown of $20,000. The Debtor is identified as the sole "owner."
It can thus be seen that the ownership of the Property has been represented in inconsistent ways since the first of these relevant bankruptcy cases was filed in 2004 up through the present case, with the Property ownership variously being attributed to Kellie Dillard, to the Debtor, to the Debtor's Son, and to all three of these individuals jointly. It is also fair to say that in all of these bankruptcy cases the Property was the principal asset listed, and that claims appearing to involve unpaid real estate taxes on the Property were prominently featured. Discussion will now turn to the history of the Property and the claim involving WSD and its effort to have the Property sold at sheriff sale.
Misrepresentation as to the ownership of property is no small matter in bankruptcy since debtors are required to file petitions and schedules under penalty of perjury. See, Fed.R.Bankr.P. 1008 .
Property and State Court History
The Property appears to have been purchased from the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in 1999. The Debtor has been relying on a document he refers to as a "Bill of Sale" to support his contention that the Property is actually owned by Debtor's Son. See , Doc. No. 44 and the attached exhibit. However, this document is weak proof of that, at best. In the first place, the document is not a Bill of Sale, but rather an "Addendum to the Sales Contract." While it does indicate that a "Todd Elliott Koger, Jr." is submitting the offer, the purchaser's signature is of Todd Elliott Koger only – no "Jr." indicated. It is hardly surprising that Debtor's Son would not have been in any position to sign any document at that time since he would then have been only about 3-years old. There is no indication anywhere in the document that the purchaser was a minor or was being represented by a parent or guardian. Furthermore, the Court has not been presented with any deed for the Property, which would obviously be the best contemporaneous evidence of who actually purchased the Property. Thus, based solely on the evidence presented by Debtor in support of the Motions the most the Court can conclude is that the Property was acquired by someone in 1999 from HUD.
On July 28, 2005, WSD filed a municipal lien against the Property for unpaid taxes. On July 12, 2006, WSD initiated a writ of scire facias in state court seeking to foreclose on the Property due to non-payment of taxes. WSD obtained a default judgment, but it was later stricken due to improper service. On December 5, 2011, WSD had the writ of scire facias reissued. On January 12, 2012, the Debtor filed a response to the writ seeking to dismiss it, and WSD responded a week later. For reasons which are not clear to the Court, the matter then went dormant until 2016 when activity in the case resumed.
On December 29, 2016, WSD filed a motion to strike and enter judgment. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the Debtor's filings, and entered judgment in favor of WSD and against Debtor in the amount of $2,972.54. On January 30, 2017, the Debtor appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which subsequently transferred the case to Commonwealth Court on February 23, 2017. On July 10, 2019, the Commonwealth Court issued an opinion and order affirming the trial court and holding that: (1) Debtor's argument that there was no jurisdiction over the Property because Debtor's Son owns the Property and he was never served had been waived due to the Debtor's failure to develop the argument in his appellate brief, and because the original record supported that the Debtor is the owner of the Property; and, (2) Debtor waived the argument that the long delay between the original filing of the writ by WSD and the judgment against him that followed violated his due process rights because he never raised it until in his appellate brief. See , Wilkinsburg School District v. Koger , 2019 WL 2997462 (Pa. Comm. Ct. July 10, 2019). On December 17, 2019, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Debtor's nunc pro tunc petition for allowance of appeal.
Sometime in July, 2020, WSD filed a praecipe for a writ of execution on the Property in the state court. On October 9, 2020, the Debtor filed a motion to set aside the judgment, open the judgment, and strike the sheriff sale. On November 16, 2020, the Debtor then filed an emergency petition for review in mandamus, which petition was denied on November 23, 2020, by the state court. The Debtor then filed the current bankruptcy case on November 27, 2020. On April 12, 2021, the Debtor filed a motion in state court seeking reconsideration of the November 23rd Order. The Court understands that a hearing on that motion for reconsideration had originally been scheduled by the state court for June 1, 2020, but at the recent hearing in this Court it was reported that the hearing date has been moved to July 6, 2020.
Relevant History of the Current Bankruptcy Case
Debtor's current bankruptcy case was filed under Chapter 7 on November 7, 2020. On December 1, 2020 a Notice was issued scheduling the Section 341 Meeting of Creditors for January 4, 2021. See , Doc. No. 16. On December 10, 2020, the originally-appointed Chapter 7 Trustee rejected her appointment to that position due to a conflict of interest. The current Trustee was then appointed. A Notice was issued on December 11, 2020, rescheduling the Meeting of Creditors for January 19, 2021. See , Doc. No. 26. The Meeting of Creditors was held on January 19th and the Trustee issued a Report of No Distribution that same day. See , Doc. No. 33 and preceding unnumbered docket entry. On March 10, 2021, an order was entered discharging the Debtor. See , Doc. No. 35.
In a typical no-asset Chapter 7 case the entry of a discharge order would be followed within a couple of weeks by the entry of a final decree and the closure of the case. In the present case, however, on March 13, 2021, the Debtor made his first attempted filing concerning the Property, but it was dismissed without prejudice by the Court due to some procedural infirmities. See , Doc. Nos. 37, 39. That was followed on March 22, 2021, by the Motions filed at Doc. Nos. 44, 51. An initial hearing on the various matters raised in those Motions was held on April 15, 2021, following which the Court gave the Parties an opportunity to file briefs. Even though the Court's order following the April 15th hearing contemplated only briefs, the Debtor then filed the Motion at Doc. No. 60 on April 16, 2021, adding reaffirmation to the menu of relief he is seeking.
Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly what the Debtor's ultimate aim is in making all of these filings, perhaps the best indication of his current goal can be gleaned from a "proposed order" that he unsuccessfully attempted to file on April 26, 2021, and that the Court subsequently accepted for filing as an amended proposed order for Doc. No. 44, as noted in its April 26, 2021 Order. See , Doc. No. 69. That amended proposed order provides:
AND NOW , on this the _____ day of _____, 2021, upon consideration of the Debtor's "REQUEST TO REAFFIRM" IS GRANTED . To resolve this issue between the parties: The debtor shall pay the "priority" amount of the "tax debt" of $2,973.00 (without the "nonpriority" attorney fees associated with the incorrect naming of the property owner in state court). "REVERSE APPLICATION OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE."
Doc. No. 70 (emphasis in original). A second hearing in this matter was held on May 11, 2021, and the Court now issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order which will deny the relief Debtor is seeking and permit the pending state court proceeding to continue.
Legal Discussion
Several somewhat ancillary matters can be dealt with quickly before the Court turns to a discussion of the main issues raised by the Debtor. First, in his filing at Doc. No. 51 the Debtor sought a postponement of the April 15th hearing to allow time for the state court to consider his motion there seeking reconsideration of the November 23, 2020 state court order. Such relief is obviously now moot since the April 15th hearing was actually held, and furthermore since it appears the state court still has the motion for reconsideration presently before it and has scheduled a hearing on it for either June 1st or July 6th.
Second, in his filing at Doc. No. 60 the Debtor raised the possibility of conversion of this case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 "if necessary." See, id. at ¶5. At the May 11, 2021 hearing the Debtor was advised that it was not the Court's role to determine whether such conversion should occur, but that it could only be done upon the request of him. See, 11 U.S.C. § 706(c) . The Court then inquired of the Debtor whether he was affirmatively seeking conversion or not, and the Debtor would not provide a direct answer. Accordingly, the Court indicated that the Debtor's pending request for conversion "if necessary" would be dismissed, without prejudice to being refiled as a separate new motion unconditionally seeking conversion.
Having disposed of these preliminary matters, the Court may now turn to the remaining issues raised by the Debtor. The original contention of the Debtor was that he had a right to "redeem" the Property. Though the Debtor now has shifted his focus to "reaffirmation," the question of redemption has not been formally withdrawn and still needs to be addressed. The Bankruptcy Code does recognize a right of redemption that may be exercised by a Chapter 7 debtor. See, 11 U.S.C. § 722 . There are, however, a number of conditions and restrictions attendant to such right, among which, and most relevant for present purposes, is that the right of redemption only applies with respect to "tangible personal property." Id. Since the Property involved here is real property, not personalty, Section 722 does not apply.
The Debtor seeks to avoid that result by contending that he is not the owner of the Property, but is the putative heir of the owner (who he contends is Debtor's Son), and thereby has a security interest in the Property which constitutes personal property and allows for redemption. The only case cited by the Debtor in support of this argument is In re Pittman , 549 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016). The Court has reviewed that case, however, and it has nothing whatsoever to say about a presumptive heir thereby having some sort of security interest in property of a current owner that can be the subject of a redemption under Section 722. Furthermore, the law is clear that during the lifetime of a property owner a presumptive heir of that owner has no interest in the owner's property. As stated long ago by the U.S. Supreme Court:
Again, the Court must note that this position is contrary to Debtor's Schedule A wherein he asserted under penalty of perjury that he is the sole owner of the Property. See , Doc. No. 1, Schedule A, Item 1.1. That might itself be sufficient to act as a judicial estoppel precluding the Debtor from now taking the opposite position that he is not the owner of the Property, but the Court will overlook that issue and proceed to analyze Debtor's argument.
The heir, during the lifetime of his ancestor, has no right, claim, title, or interest, in the ancestral estate. It is a mere naked expectancy, liable to be defeated at the will of the ancestor at all times; and in no just sense, a possibility of interest, a right in the thing itself.
Comegys v. Vasse , 26 U.S. 1 Pet. 193, 220, 7 L.Ed. 108 (1828). See also, e.g., In re Thompson , 2013 WL 5461843 *3 (M.D.N.C. September 20, 2013) (siblings of bankruptcy debtor who were "next of kin and presumptive heirs" of the debtor had no interest in bankruptcy estate and thus lacked standing to pursue motions to dismiss, stay, and intervene in bankruptcy case); In re Estate of Long , 410 Pa.Super. 607, 600 A.2d 619 (1992) (named beneficiary in a will does not thereby have a protected property interest, but rather a mere expectation). Debtor's request to redeem the Property must therefore be denied.
As indicated above, Debtor has now shifted his focus to reaffirmation rather than redemption. Reaffirmation in bankruptcy allows a debtor to voluntarily elect to retain, or reaffirm, a prepetition debt that would otherwise be dischargeable by agreeing to pay all or part of the debt. The reaffirmation process is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) and its requirements must be strictly followed because reaffirmation is not favored. See, e.g., In re Bellano , 456 B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
It is far from clear that reaffirmation would even be applicable or effective in this case to forestall a sheriff sale of the Property since it is the Court's understanding that such sale is based on a lien on the Property held by WSD and not on the Debtor's personal liability for the underlying debt. But even assuming that reaffirmation would theoretically be available to provide the relief the Debtor seeks, the requirements for pursuing a reaffirmation have not been met.
Section 524(c)(1) provides that a reaffirmation agreement must be made before the granting of a discharge. In this case, the discharge order was entered on March 10, 2021, but the Debtor did not even raise reaffirmation until he filed Doc. No. 60 on April 16, 2021. It is also clear that reaffirmation contemplates an agreement between the debtor and the affected creditor – not some unilateral right to reaffirm that the debtor can invoke as he chooses. Here, there is no reaffirmation agreement between the Debtor and WSD, and quite to the contrary the Court understands WSD to be opposed to any reaffirmation as requested by Debtor.
Finally, Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4008 requires that a reaffirmation agreement shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors, and that it be accompanied by a statement, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 524(k)(6) , which explains how the debtor can afford the reaffirmation without an undue hardship. The first time reaffirmation was raised by the Debtor was more than 60 days after the January 4, 2021 date that was first set for the meeting of creditors, and the Debtor has not supplied the statement required by Section 524(k)(6) . For all of these reasons, the Debtors requested reaffirmation will be denied.
Rule 4008(a) does provide that the Court may, at any time in its discretion, extend the 60 day time limit. The Court chooses not to exercise such discretion here because even if that were done the reaffirmation would still not be permitted for the other reasons noted herein.
The Debtor has also raised as an issue what he calls the "Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ... in reverse." The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when a state court loser seeks to have a federal court review and reject the state court ruling, and it deprives the federal court from having the jurisdiction to do so. See, e.g., Cason v. Johnston , 845 Fed.Appx. 203, 204 n.3 (3rd Cir. 2021). The doctrine would thus seem to be applicable here in that this Court may not review and reject the July 10, 2019 Commonwealth Court decision in which the Debtor was the loser on the issue of who is the owner of the Property. Be that as it may, the Debtor disregards that point and takes the offensive by arguing that it is actually the state court which somehow violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by finding the Debtor to be the owner of the Property when, according to the Debtor, this Court has ruled previously that it is actually the Debtor's Son who owns it.
Leaving the question aside as to whether there is even such a thing as a reverse Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Debtor's argument must fail in any event because there is no prior judgment of this Court holding that the Debtor's Son is the owner of the Property. Debtor's theory seems to be that if the Debtor's Son filed a bankruptcy case listing the Property in his assets, and no one objected, then that somehow qualifies as a bankruptcy court ruling as to the ownership of the Property. The Debtor has cited no authority in support of such argument and the Court rejects it.
It seems highly unlikely to the Court that there is such a thing as a reverse Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The basis for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that the statutory grant of federal court jurisdiction limits appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments solely to the U.S. Supreme Court, not to lower federal courts. See , Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp ., 544 U.S. 280, 292, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The doctrine thus says nothing about a state court's jurisdiction to consider matters previously decided by a federal court. Such issues along that line would most likely be analyzed under principles of res judicata or full faith and credit.
The Debtor's Son has filed two bankruptcy cases in this Court. Case No. 07-25165 was dismissed even before a Meeting of Creditors was held and no discharge order or final decree was ever entered. Additionally, the subject of the ownership of the Property never arose as an issue in the course of this case. Case No. 16-21143 did result in a discharge order and a final decree. However, as was noted above, the description of the ownership of the property in the petition in that case was ambiguous, with the Debtor's Son stating in Schedule A that the property was owned by him and "another." Again, the issue of the ownership of the Property never came up in this no-asset case and the final decree merely states that the estate had been fully administered and the case was closed. The Court therefore concludes that even assuming the state court was obliged to follow a prior ruling from this Court as to the ownership of the Property, that there is no such ruling that ever found the Debtor's Son to be the owner of the Property, and that therefore a state court decision on that issue is not invalid on the basis that it failed to do so.
The Debtor has also failed to explain how the other relevant bankruptcy cases in which the ownership of the Property was stated as something other than the Debtor's Son being the sole owner (see discussion, supra ) should be treated under his reverse Rooker-Feldman theory. The Debtor's reverse Rooker-Feldman doctrine theory faces another insurmountable obstacle as well. Essentially, the Debtor is arguing that the ownership of the Property as resting with Debtor's Son was established as a matter of res judicata by prior decision of this Court and that the state court was bound by such decision. However, Pennsylvania state court civil procedure requires that res judicata, as an affirmative defense, must be pleaded or it is waived. See, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a), 1032(a) ; Enterprise Rent-a-Car Company of Pittsburgh, LLC v. Koger, 2016 WL 6702882 *2 (PA. Super., November 15, 2016) (well settled that res judicata is waived if not raised). There is nothing of record to show that the Debtor ever raised res judicata as a defense in the state court action – it was certainly not mentioned in the Commonwealth Court opinion issued in 2019 – so the Court must conclude that any such possible defense that Debtor may have had was waived.
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As a final point, the Court noted at the recent hearing that the automatic stay remains in place as long as the case remains open and relief from stay has not been granted. Both the Debtor and WSD are subject to the stay, and perhaps both have engaged in activity in the state court since this case was filed that may be a violation of the stay. The Court makes no finding in that regard as to any past actions of the Parties and will grant relief from stay going forward so that the state court action can be completed without any fear of a stay violation. In the Court's view, the remaining dispute between the Parties is best resolved in state court since it is most familiar with the relevant facts and the applicable state law. This bankruptcy case has already achieved a discharge of the Debtor and should be concluded in due course.
AND NOW , this 28th day of May, 2021 , for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that,
(1) The Debtor's request for a postponement of the April 15, 2021 hearing is DENIED as moot.
(2) The Debtor's request for a conversion of this case to Chapter 13 "as necessary" is DENIED , without prejudice to being refiled in a new motion which affirmatively seeks conversion, without condition or reservation.
(3) The Debtor's request to redeem debt owed to WSD related to the Property is DENIED.
(4) The Debtor's request to reaffirm debt owed to WSD related to the Property is DENIED .
(5) The Debtor's request for this Court to hold any state court judgment as to ownership of the Property as being invalid because contrary to a prior judgment by this Court as to that same question is DENIED.
(6) The Debtor and WSD are both granted relief from the automatic stay for cause for the purpose of taking any action under or related to the pending state court action concerning the Property.
(7) Unless otherwise prevented from happening due to an appeal of this Order or another matter subsequently arising, this bankruptcy case will be completed and closed out hereafter according to the Court's normal practice and procedure for a no-asset Chapter 7 case in which the debtor has been discharged.