Opinion
Index No. 150315/2019
10-05-2022
Norma Knopf, Plaintiff, v. Frank M. Esposito, DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, NATHANIEL H. AKERMAN, and EDWARD S. FELDMAN, Defendants.
Berry Law PLLC, New York, NY (Eric W. Berry of counsel), attorney for plaintiff. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., New York, NY (Edward M. Spiro of counsel), and Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, NY (Anthony P. Badaracco of counsel), attorneys for defendants Dorsey & Whitney LLP and Nathaniel Akerman. Michael H. Sanford, nonparty pro se.
Unpublished Opinion
Berry Law PLLC, New York, NY (Eric W. Berry of counsel), attorney for plaintiff.
Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., New York, NY (Edward M. Spiro of counsel), and Dorsey & Whitney LLP, New York, NY (Anthony P. Badaracco of counsel), attorneys for defendants Dorsey & Whitney LLP and Nathaniel Akerman.
Michael H. Sanford, nonparty pro se.
Gerald Lebovits, J.
This decision resolves several discovery motions brought by plaintiff Norma Knopf against defendants Nathaniel H. Akerman and Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, and nonparty Michael H. Sanford, as part of Knopf's Judiciary Law § 487 action against Akerman, Dorsey, and other former attorneys of Sanford. This action, in turn, is one chapter in the long and complex litigation between Knopf and Sanford over loans Knopf and her late husband made to Sanford in 2006 and which Sanford failed to repay.
BACKGROUND
Knopf has alleged in the current action that Akerman (then a Dorsey partner), along with defendants Frank M. Esposito and Edward S. Feldman, wrongfully conspired with Sanford-and a then-special master in the Appellate Division, First Department, nonparty Melissa Ringel-to help Sanford evade an October 2015 First Department escrow order and thereby shield millions of dollars from the Knopfs.
In particular, in an appeal in the First Department arising from the litigation between the Knopfs and Sanford, the Knopfs had obtained an order in October 2015 requiring that Sanford put into escrow the proceeds of a planned sale of a penthouse apartment owned by one of Sanford's companies. The escrow order sought to preserve those proceeds so that they would remain available to satisfy an anticipated judgment in favor of the Knopfs against Sanford and the company that owned the penthouse.
On January 12, 2016, Akerman and Feldman had an ex parte telephone call with Ringel, in which she told them that the October 2015 escrow order had been dissolved by a November 2015 First Department motion order-one issued on a different, separate appeal in the Knopf/Sanford litigation. Sanford used Ringel's statements in the January 12 ex parte call to ensure that he could close on the sale of the penthouse apartment without having to deposit the sale proceeds into escrow.
At the time of the January 12 call, Sanford was also being represented by defendant Frank M. Esposito-Ringel's husband. The Knopfs have alleged that Ringel agreed to tell Akerman and Feldman that the October 2015 escrow order had been dissolved in exchange for a $55,000 bribe to Ringel and Esposito (disguised as fees paid to Esposito for legal services rendered). They have further alleged that to cover up this bribe, defendants made false statements and material omissions in state litigation and in federal litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, in violation of Judiciary Law § 487. Ringel and Esposito have also been indicted by a New York County grand jury for wrongdoing arising from the January 12 call. That prosecution is pending.
A few weeks after the call, Sanford also retained the law firm of Dechert, LLP. As part of that retention, Sanford was represented by then-Dechert partner, and former First Department Justice, James M. McGuire. While serving on the First Department, McGuire had employed Ringel for three years as his principal law clerk.
See generally Knopf v Esposito, 803 F Appx 448 (2d Cir 2020); Matter of Pursuit Holdings (NY), LLC, 2021 WL 163083 (Bankr Ct, S.D. NY Jan. 15, 2021).
Defendants previously moved to dismiss the complaint in this action. In March 2021, this court denied in part the motions to dismiss. (See Knopf v Esposito, 2021 NY Slip Op 50250[U] [Sup Ct, NY County Mar. 4, 2021].) Defendants appealed to the First Department, and Knopf cross-appealed, from different aspects of this court's order on the motions to dismiss. (See NYSCEF Nos. 315, 318, 321, 327 [notices of appeal].) In November 2021, the First Department granted Knopf's sealed motion to transfer the perfected appeals and cross-appeal to the Appellate Division, Second Department. (See Knopf v Esposito, 2021 NY Slip Op 74689[U] [1st Dept Nov. 18, 2021].) Also in November 2021, the Court transferred sua sponte a fourth perfected appeal, taken by Akerman/Dorsey from this court's order denying their motion to disqualify Knopf's counsel. (See Knopf v Esposito, 2021 NY Slip Op 74690[U] [1st Dept Nov. 18, 2021] [transfer order]; NYSCEF No. 566 [notice of entry attaching order and transcript of decision delivered on the record]; NYSCEF No. 567 [notice of appeal]). The appeals and cross-appeal remain pending in the Second Department.
A fifth appeal, taken by Sanford in March 2019 from an order entered in one of the actions brought against him by Knopf, remains pending in the First Department. Despite being granted several extensions of his deadline to perfect that appeal, most recently until September 6, 2022 (see Knopf v Sanford, 2022 NY Slip Op 62349[U] [1st Dept Mar. 3, 2022]), Sanford has failed to perfect timely.
The status of those appeals (and cross-appeal) is somewhat unclear, because the Second Department does not appear to have docketed the appeals/cross-appeal on NYSCEF following their transfer. But the Second Department has not yet issued any decisions on appeal.
Discovery in this action is ongoing during the pendency of the appeals. Now before this court are (i) Sanford's motion to quash nonparty subpoenas served by Knopf (mot seq 010); (ii) two motions to strike brought by Knopf against Akerman/Dorsey (mot seqs 011 and 012); (iii) a motion for sanctions and a motion for leave to supplement the record, each brought by Knopf in connection with the motions to strike (mot seqs 013 and 016); and a motion by Knopf to compel Sanford to respond to a document subpoena (mot seq 014). This court has also been asked to determine whether certain communications among defendants and Sanford, provided to this court for its in camera review pursuant to motion sequence 008, must be produced to Knopf.
Motion sequence 015 was Sanford's request for this court to issue an order to show cause permitting him to seek to block a nonparty deposition. This court declined to sign the proposed order to show cause because that deposition had already occurred. (See NYSCEF No. 872.)
The in camera review issue is discussed below in Point I. Sanford's motion to quash is discussed in Point II; the motion is denied. Knopf's motion to strike Akerman/Dorsey's answer as a spoliation sanction (mot seq 011), and the related motion for Part 130 sanctions against Akerman and Dorsey (mot seq 013), are discussed in Point III; the motions are denied. Knopf's motion to strike Akerman/Dorsey's answer for their asserted failure to provide discovery (mot seq 012), and the related motion for leave to supplement the record on that motion (mot seq 016), are discussed in Point IV; the motions are denied. Knopf's motion to compel (mot seq 014) is discussed in Point V; the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
DISCUSSION
I. This Court's Rulings on Documents Submitted for In Camera Review Pursuant to the Court's Order on Motion Sequence 008
On motion sequence 008 in this action, Knopf moved to compel defendants to produce to this court for its in camera review all communications among themselves and Sanford for the period June 22, 2017, and August 11, 2017, inclusive. This court granted that motion over defendants' objection. (See Knopf v Esposito, 2022 NY Slip Op 50021[U], at *4 [Sup Ct, NY County Jan. 14, 2022].) Defendants then submitted those communications to this court as directed. Having reviewed the submitted documents, this court concludes that no communication at issue contains information relevant to the claims or defenses in this action. Defendants need not produce those communications to Knopf.
II. Sanford's Motion to Quash Phone-Records Subpoenas (Mot Seq 010)
On motion sequence 010, Sanford moves to quash two March 2022 subpoenas that Knopf served on AT & T for the records of two phone numbers belonging to Sanford for the period December 29, 2015, through February 4, 2016. This period covers the time from when Sanford became aware that the First Department motions panel denied his request to vacate the escrow order to when Sanford hired Dechert, McGuire's law firm, for an initial retainer of $500,000. (See Knopf v Esposito, 2021 NY Slip Op 50250[U], at *2). The motion to quash is denied.
Sanford also seeks to quash a third March 2022 subpoena served by Knopf. But that subpoena was issued by Supreme Court, Suffolk County. (See NYSCEF No. 786 at 17.) This court lacks authority under CPLR 2304 to quash the subpoena.
Sanford argues that the subpoenas are barred by a November 2019 contract between himself and Knopf. Under the contract, Knopf agreed to cease any efforts to enforce her March 6, 2019, judgment (awarded in Knopf v Sanford, Index No. 113227/2009) as against Sanford personally. (See NYSCEF No. 786 at 23.) Sanford agreed to be deposed by Knopf about any personal information he had on how Akerman and Feldman came to have Ringel's direct number at the First Department. (See id.) And Knopf committed, in that deposition and after, to refrain from investigating Sanford's "assets, company, financial interests, resources, personal life, family and/or ancestors... foregoing in any manner or in any current or future lawsuit or proceeding." (Id. at 24.) Sanford contends this provision bars the Knopfs from seeking to obtain Sanford's phone records through the subpoenas at issue on this motion. This court disagrees.
The subpoenas do not seek information barred by the terms of Sanford's contract with Knopf. The contract imposed those restrictions to prevent Knopf from later attempting to find, and pursue, assets held by Sanford (or his transferees), to allow Knopf to collect on the March 2019 judgment. The restrictions must be read in the context of that evident purpose. That Knopf might use the phone records to assess the accuracy of Sanford's testimony at his November 1, 2019, deposition about whom he talked to when with respect to the January 12 call does not mean that this information goes to the nature, location, or custody of any Sanford-related assets that might be used to satisfy Knopf's judgment.
Additionally, even if the contract did, as written, shield Sanford from inquiries into his phone records, Sanford waived that protection. During his November 1, 2019, deposition, Sanford repeatedly answered questions about the circumstances that led to the January 12 call; and about how he came to receive Ringel's direct number from Esposito and pass that number on to Akerman. (See NYSCEF No. 795 at 3, 4, 8-9 [deposition transcript].) Sanford may not pick and choose which questions from Knopf he chooses to answer about his telephone conversations with third parties between December 29, 2015, and February 4, 2016.
III. Knopf's Motions for Spoliation and Part 130 Sanctions (Mot Seqs 011 and 013)
On motion sequence 011, Knopf moves under CPLR 3126 to strike Dorsey and Akerman's answer as a sanction for alleged spoliation of evidence. (NYSCEF No. 656.) On motion sequence 013, Knopf moves for sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 against Dorsey, Akerman, and their counsel for assertedly making false statements in opposing motion sequence 011. The motions are denied.
A. Knopf's Motion for Spoliation Sanctions (Mot Seq 011)
The evidence at issue consists of emails that were potentially sent to or from Akerman in the period shortly before or shortly after the January 12 call, were not preserved by Akerman, and were later deleted by Dorsey under its normal document-retention procedures. It is undisputed that Akerman's usual practice was to preserve emails related to his representation of Sanford (by saving them in an Outlook subfolder rather than his inbox folder); that Akerman failed to undertake this step for at least a few of his Sanford-related emails; and that Knopf was able to obtain those emails from other sources. Knopf hypothesizes that other, similar emails existed in the relevant period that Akerman did not preserve; that Akerman was under a duty to preserve those other emails; and that the failure to satisfy this duty should result in spoliation sanctions. This court disagrees.
Knopf grounds Akerman's asserted preservation obligation on three sources: a March 10, 2016, email from Knopf's counsel to Akerman and Feldman; a March 13, 2016, litigation hold notice sent by Knopf's counsel to Akerman; and an April 5, 2016 document subpoena. (See NYSCEF No. 695 at 4-5.) This court is not persuaded that these communications sufficed to impose a preservation obligation on Akerman.
The March 10 email and March 16 hold notice reflect on their face that they relate to an action Knopf was then contemplating that arose from Sanford's failure to put in escrow the proceeds of the penthouse-apartment sale. (See id. at 4.) But when Knopf brought that action on March 20, 2016, she did not name either Dorsey or Akerman as defendants. (NYSCEF No. 725 at 4.) It is thus unclear why that action should give rise to a preservation obligation binding nonparties Dorsey and Akerman. With respect to the April 5 nonparty subpoena, it sought production of documents at a hearing then scheduled for April 7-only two days later, not the 20 days required by CPLR 3120. (See NYSCEF No. 664.) It is also undisputed that the hearing for which the documents were subpoenaed was never actually held. This procedurally improper nonparty subpoena is a thin reed on which to load not only a document-preservation obligation, but also case-dispositive spoliation sanctions.
Given this conclusion, this court does not reach Akerman's argument that the subpoena did not trigger a preservation obligation on his part due to the subpoena's having been improperly served. The issue of service is discussed further in this court's analysis of motion sequence 013, infra.
Knopf's spoliation motion suffers from the further defect, as noted above, that she has not established that any (other) emails sent or received by Akerman in the relevant period were destroyed when they should have been preserved-she has instead provided merely theories for why there likely were such emails. And, even assuming that these emails once existed, Knopf has not shown that the emails were not obtainable from their senders or recipients.
No basis exists in these circumstances to impose spoliation sanctions on Dorsey and Akerman, let alone the drastic sanctions that Knopf seeks. Nor does this court agree with Knopf's assertion (see NYSCEF No. 763 at 14) that some of the Akerman/Dorsey arguments in opposition to the motion are frivolous so as to warrant sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.l.
B. Knopf's Motion for Part 130 Sanctions (Mot Seq 013)
Knopf asserts that in briefing motion sequence 011, Akerman and attorney Edward Spiro (acting on Akerman's behalf) each falsely represented "that Akerman did not receive a subpoena duces tecum which was served by Knopf on April 5, 2016." (NYSCEF No. 743 at 2.) Knopf therefore moves for Part 130 sanctions against Akerman and Spiro. This court does not agree that either Akerman or Spiro made material false statements of fact, as Knopf contends.
Akerman submitted (and Dorsey relied on) an affidavit as part of the opposition to Knopf's motion to strike on motion sequence 011. In that affidavit, Akerman argued, among other things, that the April 5 subpoena directed to him did not give rise to a document-preservation obligation because it was not properly served. And Akerman represented that notwithstanding Knopf's affidavit attesting to service on him on April 5 (see NYSCEF No. 664 at 4-5), he did "not recall ever having received the subpoena at or around the time it was allegedly served." (NYSCEF No. 741 at ¶¶ 3-4.)
Knopf argues that this representation (and thus also the parallel statements by Dorsey) was materially false because the record indisputably reflects that Akerman had a copy of the subpoena in his possession on the morning of April 6. (See NYSCEF No. 743 at 4.) The difficulty for Knopf's argument is that no necessary inconsistency exists between this fact and Akerman's representations about service.
That is, it is undisputed that Knopf's process server delivered a copy of the subpoena on April 5 to a man employed by the building in which Dorsey's New York office is located. Akerman has represented (in prior deposition testimony and in a supplemental affidavit filed on motion sequence 011) that the subpoena was not redelivered on April 5 either to Dorsey or to him directly, but instead retrieved from the building office by a Dorsey employee. (See NYSCEF No. 740 at Tr. 120-121 [deposition testimony]; NYSCEF No. 758 at ¶¶ 4-5.) On this account, which Knopf does not dispute, Akerman's statement that he did not recall receiving the subpoena "at or around the time it was allegedly served" on the individual working in the building office is consistent with his receiving the subpoena much later in the day on April 5 or early in the day on April 6. To be sure, read in this light Akerman's statement in his initial affidavit is carefully worded, perhaps to the point of intentional ambiguity. But that is different from the statement's being false -an important distinction for purposes of Part 130 sanctions.
Additionally, only three days after he filed that initial affidavit, Akerman submitted a supplemental affidavit, providing a detailed clarification of what he was representing to have happened when. (See NYSCEF Nos. 741, 758.) The underlying deposition testimony-given weeks earlier-was also filed with the Akerman/Dorsey opposition papers. (See NYSCEF No. 740.) And Knopf had a full opportunity to respond to these arguments in her reply on motion sequence 011, of which she availed herself. (See NYSCEF No. 763 at 2-6.) Akerman's statements on motion sequence 011 thus did not risk materially misleading either Knopf and her counsel or this court. Knopf's request on motion sequence 013 for Part 130 sanctions is denied.
IV. Knopf's Motions to Strike Dorsey and Akerman's Answer for Failure to Produce Documents, and for Leave to Supplement the Record on the Motion to Strike (Mot Seqs 012 and 016)
On motion sequence 012, Knopf moves again under CPLR 3126 to strike Dorsey and Akerman's answer-this time for failing or refusing to produce Dorsey's full records of outgoing calls made on January 11, 2016 (that is, the day before the ex parte phone call between Akerman, Feldman, and Ringel that underlies this action). Knopf also seeks on that motion to compel Dorsey to produce those records. On motion sequence 016, Knopf seeks leave to submit additional materials in support of the request to strike or compel. The motions are denied in full.
Knopf also raises the possibility that the request to strike could be grounded on asserted spoliation of the records by Dorsey. But Knopf has not shown that the records were not only in Dorsey's possession, but also then lost or destroyed notwithstanding an extant preservation obligation.
A. Knopf's Motion to Strike under CPLR 3126 (Mot Seq 012)
Knopf's motion to strike the Akerman/Dorsey answer-the second such motion filed in quick succession-suffers from several procedural and substantive shortcomings.
As a procedural matter, the request to strike does not arise from a failure to respond to a properly noticed discovery demand, or a refusal to comply with a discovery order entered by this court. Instead, Knopf sent a letter to Akerman/Dorsey's counsel on April 22, 2022, demanding immediate production of the records at issue; and the two sets of counsel exchanged emails on April 26 and 27. (See NYSCEF Nos. 720, 721, 723.) Knopf then moved to strike on May 2, 2022. (NYSCEF No. 708.) These discovery-related interactions do not provide a sufficient foundation for Knopf's moving to strike without first moving to compel.
The required good-faith affirmation filed by Knopf's counsel states only that "[f]ollowing April 25, 2022," Knopf's counsel emailed Akerman/Dorsey's counsel to request a pre-motion conference about that request. (NYSCEF No. 709.) The affirmation does not reflect efforts by Knopf to obtain the records or resolve the parties' disagreement about those documents before threatening motion practice.
This procedural shortcoming is exacerbated by the timing of Knopf's demand for the records and her motion to strike. That is, Knopf's April 22 letter states that what prompted the letter was counsel's examination of four pages of phone records produced by Dorsey (largely from January 12, but with some calls from January 11 and 13). (See NYSCEF No. 720 at 1.) But the letter also acknowledges that these pages were produced by Knopf on August 4, 2021, more than eight months earlier. (See id.) Neither that letter nor Knopf's motion papers explain the delay in seeking production of additional Dorsey phone records-nor why, having delayed for so long, Knopf then sought production of those records "immediately." (Id. at 2.) Knopf's motion papers also do not reflect any efforts to obtain the Dorsey phone records from the phone carriers before moving to strike.
In reply on motion sequence 016, Knopf submits emails from August 2022i.e., months after Knopf moved to strike-reflecting that T-Mobile, the corporate successor to Sprint (one of the two phone carriers used by Dorsey's New York office), did not have records for that office. (See NYSCEF No. 905.) Knopf does not indicate whether she ever sought those records from Verizon, Dorsey's other carrier. This is notable given that Dorsey's own internal emails from 2018 indicate it obtained the phone-records excerpt by making a request to Verizon, rather than a request to Sprint/T-Mobile.
Further, Knopf has not provided anything beyond speculation to believe that Dorsey is in possession of the records to begin with. Multiple attorneys at Dorsey (or serving as counsel to Dorsey) have represented that Dorsey is not; and this court is unpersuaded by Knopf's attacks on the veracity and credibility of those representations.
Knopf's request on motion sequence 016 for leave to submit additional materials in support of motion sequence 012 is dealt with in Section III.B, infra.
For this same reason, Knopf's alternative request to compel Dorsey to produce the phone records is also denied.
Regardless, Knopf has not shown that the substance of these records is sufficiently important that a failure or refusal to produce them warrants the drastic relief of striking the Akerman/Dorsey answer. Knopf asserts that the records would likely show that Sanford did not provide Ringel's telephone number to Akerman in a telephone call placed to or from a Dorsey line; the records therefore would show (Knopf says) that Sanford gave Ringel's number to Akerman by email. That showing would, in turn, increase the likelihood that Sanford sent Akerman a now-deleted email before the January 12 call in which Sanford used Ringel's name. (See NYSCEF No. 724 at 2-3.) Even on this theory, though, these records would provide at most part of one step in a much longer argument directed to a collateral issue. They have only limited relevance-which may be why Knopf waited so long to seek their production.
B. Knopf's Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record on Motion Sequence 012 (mot seq 016)
On motion sequence 016, Knopf seeks leave to supplement the record in support of her motion to strike or compel. These proffered supplemental materials consist chiefly of an affidavit from a client of Knopf's counsel, Christopher G. Hall. (See NYSCEF No. 863 at 4 n 2 [affirmation in support of motion]; NYSCEF No. 864 at ¶ 1 [affidavit].) Hall's affidavit states that he "worked in telecommunications for over 30 years," and that the "companies [he has] been involved with provide and manage voice and data solutions for businesses." (NYSCEF No. 864 at ¶ 3.) Hall's affidavit critiques Dorsey's position that it does not have a copy of its complete phone records for January 2016, and that the phone records for January 12, 2016 (and parts of January 11 and 2013) were provided by its carrier on request; Hall suggests that Knopf is instead correct that Dorsey has had a full microfiched copy of those records all along. (See id. at ¶¶ 8-10.) Knopf asks this court to consider the Hall affidavit and related documents in support of the motion to strike or compel (mot seq 012). The court declines.
Hall is a client of Knopf's counsel. That raises questions about the impartiality of Hall's proffered opinion. But even putting aside the issue of impartiality, Knopf has not established on this motion that Hall has the requisite knowledge or experience to offer an expert opinion on issues relating to the Dorsey phone records. And the Hall affidavit is speculative in any event.
Moreover, neither that affidavit nor Knopf's motion papers satisfactorily addresses the contemporaneous Dorsey internal emails indicating that Dorsey administrative staff had obtained the phone-records invoice by requesting the records for January 12, 2016, from Verizon. (See NYSCEF No. 895.) At most, Hall appears to be suggesting that those emails are telling a false story about how Dorsey obtained the excerpted records for January 12 that Dorsey later produced. But for that to have happened, either Dorsey submitted phony "internal emails" on this motion; Dorsey administrative staff lied to their own superiors and firm attorneys about where the January 12 records excerpt had come from; or those same staff members and attorneys collaborated to gin up an internal fiction about the source of the records. Neither Knopf nor Hall provides any basis to conclude that the emails were fabricated. Nor do they explain why Dorsey might have sent emails back and forth in 2018 to create a false cover story-particularly given that the source of the records excerpt, as distinct from its content, was of interest to no one at the time (or for years afterward).
In short, this court does not find the supplemental materials that Knopf puts forward on this motion to be probative or helpful to the court. Knopf's motion to supplement is denied.
V. Knopf's Motion to Compel Sanford to Provide Subpoena Responses (Mot Seq 014)
On motion sequence 014, Knopf moves to compel Sanford to respond to a document subpoena that was served on Sanford and to which he did not object. Sanford did not file any papers in response to the motion. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Subpoena request nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are granted in full without opposition. Request no. 2 is granted as to (i) the parties in this case; (ii) any attorney at Dorsey & Whitney, LLP; (iii) any attorney at Dechert, LLP; and (iv) the February 7, 2019, conversation between Sanford and Knopf's counsel Eric Berry, and otherwise denied. Request no. 3 is denied. Request no. 7-which is not discussed at all in Knopf's affirmation in support of the motion to compel-is denied without prejudice because this court cannot, on the current record, discern any need for, or relevance of, the documents sought in that request.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that defendants need not produce to Knopf the communications with Sanford that defendants provided to this court for in camera review pursuant to the court's order on motion sequence 008, entered January 18, 2022; and it is further
ORDERED that Sanford's motion to quash the nonparty subpoena served by Knopf seeking Sanford's phone records (mot seq 010) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Knopf's motion under CPLR 3126 to strike Akerman/Dorsey's answer as a spoliation sanction (mot seq 011) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Knopf's motion under CPLR 3126 to strike Akerman/Dorsey's answer for failure to provide discovery (mot seq 012) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Knopf's motion under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for sanctions against Akerman and Dorsey (mot seq 013) is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that Knopf's unopposed motion under CPLR 3124 to compel Sanford to respond to a document subpoena (mot seq 014) is granted in part and denied in part, as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that Knopf's motion to supplement the record on motion sequence 012 (mot seq 016) is denied.