Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2894, Section "N"
July 26, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant RPM Pizza, Inc.'s Motion for Rehearing. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident between Plaintiff Angela Smith Knight ("Knight") and Leonard Jones ("Jones") on August 31, 1998. Jones is an employee of Defendant RPM Pizza Inc. ("RPM"), a Domino's Pizza franchisee, and the accident allegedly occurred while Jones was delivering pizzas. On June 4, 1999, Knight executed a release which discharged Jones and his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), from liability in return for payment of $10,000. The release was on a pre-printed form, referred specifically to Jones and Allstate, and contained general language discharging all other entities from any possible claims arising from the accident.
On June 28, 2000, this Court denied RPM's motion for summary judgment. RPM now moves for a rehearing, submitting that the Court's June 28 Order contained an error of law.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows motions to alter or amend judgment to be filed within ten days of entry of judgment. A district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). However, reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly. See Rottmund v. Continental Assur. Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D.Pa. 1992).
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, RPM argued that Knight's release of Jones extinguished any claim Knight had against RPM. The Court held thatSampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So.2d 326 (La. 1981) foreclosed this argument. In Sampay, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the release of an employee does not preclude recovery against the employer. Id. at 328. RPM asserts that Sampay only applies in situations where the plaintiff has reserved her rights against the employer in her settlement with the employee. Mem. at 2.
RPM correctly states that the plaintiff in Sampay reserved his rights against the employer. However, Sampay was decided under La. Civ. Code art. 2203, which has been repealed. The case at bar is governed by La. Civ. Code art. 1803. Article 1803 provides that the discharge of one solidary debtor "gives rise to a presumption that the remission of debt was intended for the benefit of all the solidary obligors." LA. CIV. CODE ART. 1803. That presumption is "fully rebutted where [as here] the names of specific parties are typed or handwritten on a printed form." Tinsley v. Packard Truck Lines, Inc., 846 F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1988). Knight's release stated: "in consideration for the sum of [Ten Thousand Dollars (handwritten)] . . . I do hereby release and forever discharge [Leonard Jones and Allstate (handwritten)] and any other person, firm or corporation charged or chargeable with responsibility or liability, their heirs, representatives and assigns, from any and all claims." Release at 1. Accordingly, Knight did not have to reserve her rights against RPM to bring her present claim.
Article 2203 provided that the discharge of one solidary debtor discharges all others "unless the creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter."
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant RPM Pizza's Motion for Rehearing is DENIED.