Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11075.
January 5, 2005.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Harold M. Brown, Judge. Superior Court No. 3KN-02-510 CI.
James Dale Knight, pro se, Lander, Wyoming. Dale Dolifka, Soldotna, for Appellees.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
In 1976 Margaret J. Irons and Jack L. Irons conveyed real property located in Soldotna to James Dale Knight and Karen Faith Knight. In 1980 James gave Karen a general power of attorney over all of his affairs, and Karen conveyed the property by warranty deed to Nina R. Knight, Janiece I. Knight, William J. Knight and Margret Knight [collectively "the Knights"]. The power of attorney and deed of trust were apparently executed in Wyoming.
This property is described as: "Lots #1,-2,-3,-Block #8.-Irons Subdivision, according to the official map and plat thereof on file at the District Recording Office, Kenai, Alaska" ("the property").
Fifteen years later James filed a "Notice of Request for Correction of Deed Signatures" with the Kenai Recording Office, asserting that the property had been fraudulently transferred and warning that any purchaser would be subject to court action. This notice was subsequently recorded.
In 2002 the Knights filed a quiet title action in the Alaska Superior Court in Kenai, alleging that James's notice clouded title to the property and asking the court to quiet their title. James answered the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the 1980 conveyance to the Knights was fraudulent and had not been authorized by his power of attorney to Karen.
The case proceeded to a bench trial in Kenai before Superior Court Judge Harold M. Brown. At trial, Nina Knight testified in support of the quiet title action, and James testified in opposition, asserting his fraudulent transfer claim. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Brown issued a decision finding that James had given Karen a valid general power of attorney and that Karen had validly conveyed the property to the Knights on behalf of herself and James. The judge concluded that the Knights are entitled to quiet and peaceful possession of the property. Based on these findings, the court entered judgment in favor of the Knights.
James appeals, arguing (1) that there was insufficient evidence to justify the court's findings that the Knights had valid title; (2) that his power of attorney to Karen did not authorize her to transfer real property; (3) that the transfer violated Alaskan escrow law; and (4) that the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Alaska Civil Rule 52(a) provides that after trial "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." We have held that "[a] finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this court with a definite and firm conviction on the entire record that a mistake has been made." We have also emphasized that "[i]t is the function of the trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence." We review the superior court's conclusions of law using our independent judgment.
Wyller v. Madsen, 69 P.3d 482, 485 (Alaska 2003) (quoting City of Hydaburg v. Hydaburg Coop. Ass'n, 858 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Alaska 1993)).
Knutson v. Knutson, 973 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Alaska 1999).
State v. Beard, 960 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1998) (citing Pederson-Szafran v. Baily, 837 P.2d 124, 127 n. 1 (Alaska 1992)).
James first asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support the Knights' quiet title action. Yet the record contains ample evidence supporting the court's findings. The testimony at trial showed that James and Karen Knight bought the property from Jack and Margaret Irons in 1976; that James executed a power of attorney in March 1980, giving his wife, Karen, "full power to do and perform all and every act that I may legally do through an attorney in fact"; and that Karen transferred the property to the Knights on May 6, 1980. And indeed, James did not deny that these events took place. Rather he testified that the power of attorney did not give Karen authority to transfer the property. Having failed to convince the trial court to credit this testimony, he now asks us to rule in his favor. But without any basis in the trial record to show why the superior court's findings were clearly erroneous, we must affirm that court's findings.
Second, James argues that the superior court erred in concluding that his power of attorney to Karen was valid for the conveyance of property. But James fails to cite any persuasive authority to support this theory. The only authority he did cite is a Wyoming recording statute that has no obvious bearing on the issue at hand.
James cited WY. ST. § 34-1-104, which provides:
Every letter of attorney, or other instrument, containing a power to convey lands as agent or attorney for the owner of such lands, and every executory contract for the sale or purchase of lands, only when acknowledged by such owner, may be recorded by the register of deeds [county clerk] of any county in which the lands to which such letter, instrument or contract relates, or any part of such lands, may be situated, and when so acknowledged, and the record thereof when recorded, or a transcript of such record duly certified, may be read in evidence in the same manner and with like effect as a conveyance recorded in such county.
Next, James contends that an interest in property that is held in escrow cannot be transferred. But similarly, he fails to cite legal authority for this position. Although he quotes Alaska escrow law at length, the statutes he cites simply do not stand for his proposition.
James cites AS 34.80.050, which deals with recording, filing, and delivery of escrow transaction documents; and AS 34.80.090, which provides definitions.
Finally, James argues that the superior court lacked personal jurisdiction to adjudicate his rights to the property. He reasons that the court's ruling that he has no valid interest in the disputed property left no basis for finding that he had any personal ties to Alaska. This argument is unavailing. James filed a "Notice of Request for Correction of Deed Signatures" with the recording office in Kenai. After that notice prompted the Knights to file a quiet title action, he appeared in Alaska and claimed a right to the land, asserting his theory of fraudulent transfer. James's voluntary assertion of a claim to land located in Alaska provided ample connection to support personal jurisdiction under the state and federal constitutions and under the state jurisdictional statutes, even assuming that James is correct in his argument that this action was brought in personam rather than in rem or quasi in rem. Because jurisdiction turned on the claim's assertion, not on its underlying validity, the fact that the superior court ultimately resolved the controversy in the Knights' favor and found that James had no interest in the disputed property did not retroactively rob the court of its personal jurisdiction over James.
See AS 09.05.015, which provides in relevant part that a court "has jurisdiction over a person served in an action according to the rules of civil procedure . . . (6) in an action that arises out of (A) a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff . . . by the defendant to create in either party an interest in, or to protect, acquire, dispose of, use, rent, own, control, or possess by either party real property situated in this state."
We AFFIRM.