Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:06CV683 (CFD).
July 27, 2006
RULING AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Ronnie Knight ("Knight"), an inmate confined at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, brings this civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Knight seeks damages for false arrest and unlawful restraint as a result of a December 2005 arrest at the University of Connecticut Health Center in Farmington, Connecticut. For the reasons that follow, the complaint is dismissed.
I. Standard of Review
Whenever a prisoner files an action seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the court must review the complaint to ensure that the case goes forward only if it contains cognizable claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss the complaint, or any part thereof, if it is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In order to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. First, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the defendant acted under color of state law. Second, he must allege facts demonstrating that he has been deprived of a constitutionally or federally protected right. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982); Washington v. James, 94 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986).
II. Factual Allegations
The following allegations are taken from the plaintiff's complaint and are deemed to be true for the purpose of this decision.
Knight was convicted of a state burglary offense involving the University of Connecticut Health Center. In September 2005 he was released on three years' probation. As a condition of his probation, Knight was to inform the Farmington Police Department before visiting the University of Connecticut Health Center.
Knight alleges that on October 5, 2005, he informed the Farmington Police Department that he had a doctor's appointment in the Dowling South building of the University of Connecticut Health Center. On December 14, 2005, Knight was arrested for violation of probation because Farmington police officers determined he had been at the Health Center, but had not informed police before his visit. Knight alleges that the officers had not checked to see whether Knight had permission to be on Health Center property. He was imprisoned for three weeks as a result of his arrest.
III. Discussion
A municipality is subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A municipal police department, however, is not a "municipality" for purposes of § 1983 analysis. Rather, it is a sub-unit or agency of the municipal government through which the municipality fulfills its policing function. See Cowras v. Hard Copy, Case No. 3:95cv99 (AHN), slip op. at 25 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 1997). Because a municipal police department is not an independent legal entity, it is not subject to suit under Section 1983. See id. Other courts addressing this issue concur that a municipal police department is not a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983 and, thus, not subject to suit. See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's dismissal of claims against county sheriff's department because, under state law, sheriff's department lacked capacity to be sued); Peterson v. Easton Police Dep't Criminal Investigations Divs., No. Civ. A. 99-4153, 1999 WL 718551, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of Section 1983); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626-27 (D. Md. 1999) (citing cases for the proposition that municipal departments including the police department, are not a person within the meaning of Section 1983); Gaines v. University of Pennsylvania Police Dep't, No. 97-3381, 1997 WL 624281, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1997) (holding "as a matter of law, that police departments are purely instrumentalities of the municipality with no separate identity; thus, they are not `persons' for purposes of § 1983 and not capable of being sued under § 1983.") PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F. Supp. 808, 825-26 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing cases to support statement that courts considering this issue have unanimously concluded that municipal police departments are not proper defendants in Section 1983 actions). Accordingly, all claims against the Farmington Police Department are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. Conclusion
The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Knight may move to reopen this case if he can identify the police officers who arrested him and allege they are defendants. Any motion to reopen should be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order and must be accompanied by an amended complaint naming appropriate defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.