Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2499-KHV
October 31, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff brought suit against Gateway, Inc. on claims arising from his purchase of a Gateway computer. Well over a year ago, on June 15, 2000, the Court entered an order which overruled Gateway's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims on the ground that they were subject to mandatory arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #26) ("underlying order"), 104 F. Supp.2d 1332. In that order, the Court ruled that Gateway had not provided sufficient evidence that plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his claims under Kansas or Missouri law. See id. at 15, 104 F. Supp.2d at 1341. After the Court entered this order, Gateway filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court sustained this motion on September 7, 2000, see Memorandum And Order (Doc. #30), 2000 WL 1372886, and the Clerk entered judgment the same day. See Judgment (Doc. #31) filed September 7, 2000.
This matter comes before the Court on Gateway's Motion To Vacate Order (Doc. #34) filed September 27, 2001. Gateway urges the Court to vacate the underlying order because the Court later found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. In support of its argument, Gateway cites Rule 60(b)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P, which provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void. . . ." Gateway does not assert, however, that the judgment in this case is void. Rather, Gateway contends that the underlying order is void.
The cases which Gateway cites do not support its position. In University of South Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court should have ruled on defendant's motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction before allowing plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss under Rule 41(a)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. See id. at 411; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (court must address issues of jurisdiction before reaching merits). Because it found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand to state court. See id. at 412-13. Unlike University of South Alabama, at the time the Court entered the underlying order in this case, neither the Court nor the parties had questioned the Court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against Gateway. Rather, Gateway chose to seek dismissal on the ground that plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate his claims. Gateway does not assert that the Court erred in ruling on that motion before Gateway filed a second motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective immediately and requires no action by the district court. See id. at 409. In Univ. of South Alabama, however, the notice of dismissal was filed by the state attorney general, who claimed that he had power to control the litigation which the university had commenced. See id. The university vigorously contested his claim of authority. See id. Thus, in order to rule on the notice of dismissal, the district court was required to decide whether the attorney general had power under state law to manage and control complex litigation which the university commenced. See id. at 408.
The lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this case was not apparent from the face of the complaint. Rather, Gateway argued that plaintiff could not in good faith claim that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #30) at 1, 2000 WL 1372886 at *1.
Gateway also cites United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront N.Y. Realty Corp., 907 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In that case, the court vacated a judgment as void where it later determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 668. The case does not address whether the court should vacate a non-dispositive order which is entered before the parties challenge subject matter jurisdiction.
The purpose of Gateway's motion is unclear. See, e.g., Martinez v. Winner, 800 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1986) (not sure of practical effect of counsel's request to vacate previous orders). Clearly, the underlying order is not binding on the parties. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct 692, 695-96 (Cl.Ct. 1987) (court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot establish law of case); Wilkie v. Hoke, 609 F. Supp. 241, 242 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (previous ruling of another court without personal jurisdiction not binding). Nevertheless, it may be helpful to a court which may later acquire jurisdiction over the controversy, see, e.g., Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 656 F.2d 606, 610 (Ct.Cl. 1981), or "to someone in the future simply as a description of the course of this case." Id. For one thing, the underlying order dismissed plaintiff's claims against another defendant, Hewlett-Packard, Inc., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #26) at 15-18, 104 F. Supp. d at 1342-43. Gateway has therefore failed to show good reason why the underlying order should be vacated.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Gateway's Motion To Vacate Order (Doc. #34) filed September 27, 2001 be and hereby is OVERRULED.