Opinion
CV156058493S
08-02-2018
Michael KLING v. The HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sybil V. Richards, Judge
The plaintiff, Michael Kling, commenced the present action against the defendant, The Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, on November 15, 2015 by filing a writ, summons and complaint. On February 23, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s lack of standing deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. In its motion, the defendant argues, more specifically, that the instant case is brought pursuant to Connecticut’s Direct Action Statute and said statute requires a valid, final judgment against one of the defendant’s insureds in order to have standing. The defendant next argues that because the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant’s insured was brought with an unsigned writ, and because that action should have been dismissed pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine, the default judgment rendered against the insured in the plaintiff’s prior action is void as that court lacked jurisdiction. The defendant further contends that said judgment is invalid because an unsigned writ does not commence an action.
General Statutes § 38a-231, our Direct Action Statute, provides, in relevant part: "Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person, firm or corporation by any person ... for loss or damage on account of bodily injury ... if the defendant in such action was insured against such loss or damage at the time when the right of action arose and if such judgment is not satisfied within thirty days after the date when it was rendered, such judgment creditor shall be subrogated to all the rights of the defendant and shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that the defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer had such defendant paid such judgment."
Facts
The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. On or about July 13, 2013, the plaintiff was a pedestrian walking on the sidewalk of Orchard Street in New Haven, Connecticut at the time, Newton E. Carroll ("Carroll"), the defendant’s insured, was operating a 2012 Dodge truck that had a trailer attached to it that was towing a large kettle corn equipment affixed and owned by the defendant Elm City Kettle Corn Company, LLC. While the truck was traveling in New Haven, the kettle corn machine detached from the trailer, flew over a curb and struck and pinned down the plaintiff.
A final judgment was rendered against the insured, Carroll, on May 27, 2015, and that judgment was not satisfied within 30 days of the date of judgment. Kling v. Elm City Kettle Corn Company, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 14-6047194-S (May 27, 2015, Flanagan, J.)
Discussion
The legal standard that governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is well settled. "[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ... The motion to dismiss ... admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 614, 109 A.3d 903 (2015).
"Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "Subject matter jurisdiction does not rest on the viability of the claims that a court is asked to adjudicate." Olympus Healthcare Group, Inc. v. Muller, 88 Conn.App. 296, 300, 870 A.2d 1091 (2005). Rather, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented to it. It exists if the court has the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular proceeding belongs." New England Retail Properties, Inc. v. Maturo, 102 Conn.App. 476, 481, 925 A.2d 1151, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912, 931 A.2d 932 (2007). "It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2015).
Although the defendant correctly states that a final judgment against an insured party is a criterion of standing under our direct action statute; Tucker v. American International Group, Inc., 745 F.Supp.2d 53, 59-60 (D.Conn. 2010); and that a judgment issued by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and vulnerable to challenge; Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 576, 953 A.2d 868 (2008); the defendant’s argument ultimately fails because the defendant lacks standing to challenge the underlying judgment on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over its insured, Carroll. Beyond a conclusory assertion that the direct action statute authorizes it to challenge the validity of the final judgment, the defendant cites no authority, and the court can find none, that would permit a defendant insurer to raise the issue of personal jurisdiction on an insured’s behalf. Indeed, case law suggests the opposite. See Id., 576 ("although [the plaintiff] is correct in asserting that a judgment of strict foreclosure ordinarily cannot be opened after the law day has passed, the judgment can be attacked on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the party challenging it" [emphasis added] ); see also Rode v. Rode, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA 12-4015581-S (October 1, 2013, Gould, J.) ("[a]lthough the plaintiff is correct that if a court does not have jurisdiction over a party, then any judgment entered is void and subject to be vacated or collaterally attacked, the plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction over her son"); Simsbury v. Silver, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 05-4013487-S, CV 05-4013486-S (October 3, 2006, Satter, J.T.R.) ("the defendants have no standing to challenge the court’s personal jurisdiction over [other defendants]"). Consequently, although the defendant may challenge whether the plaintiff has obtained a final judgment prior to bringing this action pursuant to the direct action statute, it lacks the ability to attack the validity of the judgment by asserting that the court in the underlying action lacked personal jurisdiction over its insured.
The defendant’s argument that the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff is invalid pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine also fails. Even if this court were to determine that the defendant’s argument concerning the applicability of the doctrine should be heard despite the fact that the defendant was not a party to the underlying action, and even if the court agreed with the defendant with regard to this issue, the applicability of the doctrine would not render the default judgment issued in the underlying action a nullity because "the prior pending action doctrine does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the court." Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Caridi, 144 Conn.App. 793, 804 n.9, 73 A.3d 863 (2013). Accordingly, the defendant’s argument that an action to which it was not a party may have been subject to dismissal on a ground that did not implicate the court’s jurisdiction does not effectively challenge whether the plaintiff in the present case has obtained a final judgment.
Finally, to the extent that the defendant argues that the underlying judgment is invalid because the action against its insured never commenced, and to the extent that the court can consider this argument, given that the defendant was not party to that action, an action brought with an unsigned writ is not necessarily void. First, the defendant’s reliance on Raynor v. Hickock Realty Corp., 61 Conn.App. 234, 763 A.2d 54 (2000) for the proposition that the underlying action never commenced is misplaced. Although the Appellate Court addressed the importance of a signed writ with regard to the commencement of an action, in Raynor, Id., 240-42, the circumstances of that case are distinguishable. The issue before the court in Raynor was not whether an unsigned writ prevents an action from commencing; rather, the decision turned on whether prejudgment remedy documents, which included an unsigned writ, summons and complaint, commenced an action. Second, although an unsigned writ deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it is a waivable defect. See Stewart-Brownstein v. Casey, 53 Conn.App. 84, 89-90, 728 A.2d 1130 (1999). Given a defendant’s ability to waive the jurisdictional issue presented by an unsigned writ, it does not logically follow that such an action automatically fails to commence as the defendant argues. For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the defendant fails to demonstrate that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present case, and accordingly, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.