Opinion
December 12, 1933.
February 1, 1934.
Workmen's compensation — Employee — Slight injury — Failure to request medical attendance until fourth day — Notice of accident — Award — Act of April 13, 1927, P.L. 186, Section 306 (e).
In a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the claimant's evidence disclosed that while he was in the course of his employment he was struck in the left eye by some foreign object. Thereafter he worked with some inconvenience for three days without reporting the injury to the defendant. On the fourth day he started the day's work but was unable to finish. Immediately thereafter he reported to the defendant's doctor and received treatment. As a result of the injury he lost the use of his eye.
In such case an award of compensation will be sustained.
The fact that an employee, who has suffered a trivial injury, fails to have immediate medical attendance, will not defeat recovery if the injury afterwards develops into something serious.
An employee has fourteen days in which to report an accident and there is no illegal delay until the expiration of the fourteen days.
Appeal No. 282, October T., 1933, by defendant from judgment of C.P., Schuylkill County, March T., 1933, No. 128, in the case of Joe Klimovige v. Hazle Brook Coal Company.
Before TREXLER, P.J., KELLER, CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE, STADTFELD, PARKER and JAMES, JJ. Affirmed.
Appeal from award of compensation by Workmen's Compensation Board. Before HOUCK, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court below.
HOUCK, J.:
According to the referee's findings of fact, affirmed by the board, the claimant was struck in the left eye by some foreign object while in the course of his employment on November 30, 1931. He worked, with some inconvenience, on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd. On December 4th he started the day's work but was unable to finish and he then proceeded to the colliery office where he reported the accident to the clerk in charge. The clerk sent him to Dr. E.R. Samuel, one of defendant's regularly employed physicians, and Dr. Samuel, in turn, sent him to Dr. Zimmerman, an eye specialist. By December 4th, claimant had developed an ulcer on the injured eye and it has resulted in the loss of the use of the eye. The compensation authorities found that this loss resulted from the accidental injury and awarded compensation accordingly. Defendant has appealed to this court assigning numerous exceptions, some of which attack findings of fact. These, however, have been abandoned, as indeed well they might be, because all of the findings are supported by competent proof, and the appeal has been rested upon a single contention.
The question involved is thus stated in defendant's brief: "Is an employer liable for compensation where the employee, after the accident, refrains from seeking medical treatment and giving notice of the accident to his employer when the probability is, had he done so, the employee would have recovered from the condition from which he is now alleged to be suffering and for which the referee, affirmed by the board, has awarded compensation?" Under the facts presented, the compensation authorities did not err in answering this question affirmatively.
There are but two sections of the compensation act which could have any application in this case. The first is section 306 (e) which provides that if the employee shall refuse reasonable medical services tendered to him by his employer, he shall forfeit all right to compensation for any injury or any increase in his incapacity shown to have resulted from such refusal. This section has no application to the facts at bar because the employee did not refuse any medical services tendered to him by his employer. In fact, he accepted the tendered services.
The other section is section 311, the pertinent portion of which provides that unless the employer shall have actual knowledge of the occurrence of the injury or unless the employee shall give notice thereof to the employer within fourteen days after the accident, no compensation shall be due until such notice be given or knowledge obtained, but if the delay in giving notice was due, inter alia, to mistake or ignorance of fact or of law, or to any other reasonable cause or excuse, then compensation shall be allowed, unless the employer shows that he did not know of the accident and that he was prejudiced by the delay. This section does not aid the defendant because notice of the accident was given within fourteen days of its occurrence. The accident happened on November 30th and notice of it was given four days later, or on December 4th. Under the section referred to, the employee has fourteen days in which to report the accident and there is no illegal delay until the expiration of the fourteen days: Boylan v. P. amp; R.C. amp; I. Co., 92 Pa. Super. 562. In that case, President Judge TREXLER said (p. 565), "We can hardly hold that where there is a trivial injury such as a slight scratch or burn or any abrasion of the skin, that the failure to have immediate medical attendance, will defeat recovery if the injury afterwards develops into something serious." That observation exactly meets the situation here presented. There is no merit in the appeal and the award of compensation must be affirmed.
And now, April 24, 1933, defendant's exceptions are dismissed, the referee's award, affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Board, is affirmed, and judgment is entered in favor of the claimant for $1,875.
The court dismissed the appeal. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was the entry of the judgment.
P.B. Roads, for appellant.
Roger J. Dever, for appellee.
Argued December 12, 1933.
The judgment is affirmed upon the opinion of the lower court.