Opinion
Civil No. 02-620 (RHK/AJB)
June 26, 2002
Albert T. Goins, Sr., and Kathryn R. Burke, Goins Wood, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Manly A. Zimmerman, Zimmerman Bix, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.
Richard B. Lapp and Michelle K. Mellinger, Seyfarth Shaw, Chicago, Illinois, and Thomas Hutchinson, Eastlund, Solstad, Cade Hutchinson, Savage, Minnesota, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
Defendant APCOA/Standard Parking operates a parking facility at the Minneapolis/Saint Paul International Airport. Plaintiff Lisa Klaahsen was an employee of APCOA at the airport. Her supervisors were Defendants Ross Spriggs and Steve Peterson. Klaahsen alleges that, between November 2000 and March 2001, Spriggs and Peterson (1) attempted on more than one occasion to remove her clothing and/or to write on her skin with markers, (2) made sexually offensive and inappropriate statements to her, and (3) engaged in other sexually-oriented offensive conduct. Klaahsen also alleges that, on one occasion, Spriggs pinned her to the ground, lifted up her blouse and bra, and touched her breasts.
Klaahsen filed a fourteen-count Complaint in state court. The first twelve counts assert state common law claims. Counts I and II allege assault and battery, respectively. Counts III, IV, and V allege intentional, negligent, and reckless infliction of emotional distress, respectively. Count VI alleges an invasion of privacy. Counts VII through X allege various theories of negligence, including negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention. Count XI asserts a false imprisonment claim. Count XII alleges a common law claim of "sexual coercion." The final two counts allege statutory causes of action. Count XIII asserts violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), and Count XIV asserts a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.
The Defendants removed the Complaint to this Court and have brought a motion pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss portions of it. The grounds on which the Defendants premise their motion may be summarized as follows:
The Defendants do not move to dismiss the Title VII claim against APCOA or the MHRA claim.
# The state common law claims against APCOA are preempted by the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA");
# The state common law claims against all of the Defendants are preempted by the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA");
# The negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims against Spriggs and Peterson must be dismissed because there is no individual liability under those causes of action;
# The "sexual coercion" claim must be dismissed because Minnesota does not recognize such a common law cause of action; and
# The Title VII claim against Spriggs and Peterson must be dismissed because there is no individual liability under Title VII for supervisors.
In response to the Defendants' motion, Klaahsen concedes that the negligent retention, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision claims against Spriggs and Peterson may properly be dismissed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the balance of the Defendants' motion.
Background
The following facts are taken from the Plaintiff's Complaint, the allegations of which are, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, taken as true. Klaahsen was an employee of APCOA/Standard Parking between November 2000 and March 2001. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4, 8.) For some or all of that time period, Klaahsen worked the "A shift" at the airport parking facility with Spriggs and Peterson, her supervisors. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 5.) Klaahsen complains of four specific instances of conduct by Spriggs and/or Peterson during that time period.
• On November 14, 2000, Klaahsen was working inventory in the control room with Spriggs and Peterson. Spriggs forcibly held Klaahsen down, and both men tried to lift up her top and mark on her skin with markers. When Klaahsen tried to hold her top down, Spriggs and Peterson tried to remove her pants. Peterson managed to remove Klaahsen's shoes and socks. Klaahsen got free and ran from the control room without her shoes and socks. She walked barefoot several blocks to her car. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
• On February 26, 2001, Klaahsen was again working and went to the office copy room to make photocopies. Spriggs was also in the copy room. While Klaahsen was standing at the copier, Spriggs grabbed her from behind and brought her to the ground. Spriggs straddled her and pinned her arms so that she could not move. He then pulled up Klaahsen's shirt and bra, exposed her breasts, and began to slap them from side to side. When Spriggs tried to put his mouth on her breasts, Klaahsen got free and ran from the room. (Id. ¶ 5.)
• On March 2, 2001, Klaahsen received a telephone call from Spriggs at about 1:30 in the morning, which was not during regular working hours. In that call, Spriggs asked Klaahsen if she would come to his house and have sex with him and another woman. (Id. ¶ 7.)
• On March 4, 2001, Klaahsen was working in inventory. During work, Peterson had a conversation with Klaahsen in which he told Klaahsen that Spriggs had said she was "really good with her tongue." (Id. ¶ 8.)
In addition to these specific incidents, Klaahsen also generally alleges that Spriggs has placed his hands down the inside back of her pants in an effort to figure out whether she was wearing underwear, grabbed her buttocks, and tried to remove her pants. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Klaahsen alleges that Spriggs and Peterson also repeatedly engaged in the following conduct "within the limits of the workplace, both as to time and place": (1) they asked her whether she was wearing underwear; (2) they tried to write or mark on her person with marker pens; and (3) they tried to remove her clothing. (Id. ¶ 9a-c.) Spriggs and Peterson allegedly also made "inappropriate, unwanted, and threatening statements" to Klaahsen to the effect that their actions were part of a "workplace initiation"; Spriggs and Peterson allegedly cajoled Klaahsen by telling her that other female employees did not mind such conduct or "liked" it. (Id. ¶ 9d.) Spriggs and Peterson also allegedly made "inappropriate statements toward Plaintiff alluding to sexual or inappropriate behavior." (Id. ¶ 9e.)
Analysis
I. Standard of Decision
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . . A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), may challenge the plaintiff's complaint either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States., 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the court restricts its review to the pleadings and affords the non-moving party the same protections that it would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n. 6. The court presumes that all of the factual allegations in the complaint concerning jurisdiction are true and will not dismiss the claims unless the plaintiff fails to allege an essential element for subject matter jurisdiction. See Titus, 4 F.3d at 593 (citing Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731-32 (11th Cir. 1982)); Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n. 6. In this case, the Defendants have asserted that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over certain state-law tort claims because they are preempted by the WCA or the MHRA. The Defendants base their preemption arguments on the allegations appearing on the face of the Complaint. Therefore, the above standard applies.
Other portions of the Defendants' motion are made under Rule 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court again must take as true the allegations contained in the complaint. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam).
A complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts that a plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. "Thus, as a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief."
Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir. 1978)). Therefore, the court may dismiss a case under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is clear that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 67 467 U.S. 69], 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
II. Existence of a Cause of Action for Sexual Coercion
Count XII of the Complaint alleges a claim for "sexual coercion." Klaahsen contends that a cause of action for "sexual coercion" exists in Minnesota based upon the fact that section 541.073 of the Minnesota Statutes sets a six-year statute of limitations for "sexual abuse." The Plaintiff notes that section 541.073 refers the reader to sections 609.342 through 609.345 of the Minnesota Statutes for a definition of "sexual abuse."Page See Minn. Stat. § 541.073, subd. 1. The Plaintiff concludes that, because the concept of sexual contact obtained through coercion is included in the definition of "sexual abuse," a cause of action exists for "sexual coercion."
These sections from chapter 609 define what constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, third, and fourth degree, respectively.
Section 541.073 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n action for damages based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse." Minn. Stat. § 541.073, subd. 2(a). This statute of limitations applies to "an action for damages commenced against a person who caused the plaintiff's personal injury either by (1) committing sexual abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligently permitting sexual abuse against the plaintiff to occur." Id., subd. 3. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it views the language of section 541.073 as "simply a legislative pronouncement that `personal injury caused by sexual abuse,' as opposed to personal injury caused by any other activity, is entitled to a different limitation period because of its uniqueness and because of the difficulties attendant on the victim's often repressed recollections." Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996). Thus, the limitations period defined in section 541.073 stands in contrast to the general two-year limitations period set by the legislature for torts resulting in personal injury that arise out of other activities. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1).
Nothing in section 541.073 suggests that a separate cause of action — apart from the intentional torts already defined at common law — exists for "sexual coercion." The Plaintiff has not cited to the Court, nor has the Court on its own been able to find, any Minnesota cases addressing the essential elements of a cause of action for "sexual coercion." Count XII, at best, duplicates the other intentional torts alleged in the Complaint and is redundant. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Defendants' motion with respect to Count XII and dismiss it.
III. Preemption of the Common Law Claims Against APCOA under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act
APCOA argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the common law claims Klaahsen has brought against it (claims I through XII) because those claims are preempted by the WCA. The WCA provides that "[e]very employer . . . is liable to pay compensation in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to the question of negligence." Minn. Stat. § 176.021 (emphasis added). The WCA defines "personal injury" as
injury arising out of and in the course of employment and includes personal injury caused by occupational disease; but does not cover an employee except while engaged in, on, or about the premises where the employee's services require the employee's presence as a part of that service at the time of the injury and during the hours of that service. . . . Personal injury does not include an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of personal reasons, and not directed against the employee as an employee, or because of the employment.
Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16 (emphasis added). The WCA is the exclusive remedy for an employee who suffers a "personal injury." Minn. Stat. § 176.031. If an injury is not compensable as a "personal injury" under the WCA, however, the exclusivity provision of the act does not apply and the employee can assert common-law claims to recover for her damages. Minnesota courts have held that where the WCA provides the employee's exclusive remedy, the district courts have no jurisdiction. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995) (citing Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. 279, 22 N.W.2d 3 (1946)).
The "assault exception" to compensable "personal injury" under the WCA excludes from the scope of the WCA any injury "caused by the act of a . . . fellow employee intended to injure the employee because of personal reasons, and not directed against the employee as an employee, or because of the employment." Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subd. 16. As the Minnesota Supreme Court long ago explained:
Compensation cases arising from assault fall mostly into three groups. Non-compensable are cases where the assailant was motivated by personal animosity toward his victim, arising from circumstances wholly unconnected with the employment. . . . In contrast and compensable are injuries resulting from assault where provocation or motivation arises solely out of the activity of the victim as an employee. . . . In a middle ground are cases . . . where the assault was directed against the victim, neither "as an employee" nor for "reasons personal to him." Injuries so arising are ordinarily compensable.
Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 600, 297 N.W. 19, 21-22 (1941) (citations omitted), cited in McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834. In McGowan, the most recent Minnesota Supreme Court case to address the "assault exception," the court held that the director of a homeless shelter could not maintain a negligence action against her employer for injuries she sustained as the result of being raped by a shelter client. McGowan argued that her assailant's subjective intent was to assault her for personal reasons, as evidenced by the fact that he developed a personal interest in her, made personal advances towards her, and was rebuffed in those advances. McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 833.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this argument, focusing on the fact that (a) the assault occurred during working hours, in McGowan's office, and during a time when she was engaged in performing her duties as shelter director; and (b) she had never had any contact with her assailant outside the workplace. Id. at 834. From those facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it could not say that the assault "arose from circumstances unrelated to McGowan's employment." Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court quoted with approval this passage from Arthur and Lex Larson's 1994 treatise on "workmen's compensation":
While it may be admitted that there is no clearer example of non-industrial motive than rape, it is equally clear . . . that employment that requires women to be in isolated places is a causal factor contributing to such an attack.
McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson and Lex K Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 11.11(b) at 3-197 to 3-198). This Court is troubled by the Larsons' assertion that the nature of a woman's employment is a "causal factor" that "contributes" to a sexual assault. As a threshold matter, the Larsons' statement implies that sexual assault is just another occupational event (like accidents arising from the use of heavy equipment or machinery) that is an inherent part of the workplace. Sexual assault in the workplace does not, however, neatly fit the mold of an injury that occurs "as a natural incident of the work . . . as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment." Hanson, 209 Minn. at 599, 297 N.W. at 21.
Second, both the Larsons' statement and the McGowan decision blur the concepts of the assailant's motivation for the attack with causation. The "assault exclusion" of the WCA is concerned with motives; it examines why the person who harmed the plaintiff intended to do so. As the Larsons acknowledge, a sexual assailant acts based on a non-industrial motive. That is, the sexual assailant is driven by psychological factors that have nothing to do with where the victim is employed. It is the "arising out of" element of the WCA's definition of "personal injury" that addresses causation; i.e., whether the victim's employment was a contributing factor to the injury. See Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn. 1992). As indicated above, the Court disagrees with the notion that a "causal link" should be drawn between a sexual assault and the victim's employment. "[T]o claim that rape is just another reasonably predictable event arising from the industrial setting is to remove responsibility from the male actors involved in the rape." Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et al., Raped at Work: Just Another Slip, Twist, and Fall Case?, 11 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. 67, 98 (Winter 2000). Finally, the Court questions whether the WCA can provide an adequate remedy for injuries resulting from a sexual assault in the workplace. The Minnesota Legislature did not intend the state's workers compensation laws to be remedial in any sense; they are not to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of the employee or claimant. Minn. Stat. § 176.001. Furthermore, if the sexual assault does not result in a loss of earning power for the victim, the employer may not have to pay compensation. See Minn. Stat. § 176.101.
APCOA contends that the conduct underlying Klaahsen's common-law tort claims all results in compensable injury under the WCA because Spriggs and Peterson's conduct arose "solely out of [Klaahsen's] activities as an employee, as some kind of initiation ritual." (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) APCOA relies principally on two allegations from Klaahsen's Complaint: (1) that Spriggs and Peterson made statements to Klaahsen to the effect that their actions were part of a "workplace initiation," and other female employees did not mind such conduct or "liked it" (see Compl. ¶ 9d.), and (2) that Spriggs and Peterson were, "at all times material to this action . . . employed by and/or acting in the scope and course of [their] employment with Defendant APCOA." (Id. ¶ 3.)
The Court has reviewed each of Klaahsen's common law tort claims in light of the "assault exception" and the binding precedent of McGowan. The assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy claims are based upon incidents in which Spriggs and/or Peterson allegedly grabbed Klaahsen, pinned her down and tried to remove her clothes, or touched her breasts or other parts of her body in a blatantly sexual manner. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14, 17, 24, 28-29.) Klaahsen's claim of false imprisonment also is based on incidents in which Spriggs and Peterson allegedly pinned her down and tried to remove her clothing; Klaahsen alleges that she tried to escape her supervisors' grasp and leave the room in which she was being held down but was, for a period of time, unable. (Id. ¶¶ 51-53.)
Klaahsen contends that the Court must reject APCOA's preemption argument on the grounds that it is premature. Klaahsen argues that, under Fernandez v. Ramsey County, 495 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993), the question of whether an assault and battery are "personally motivated" or the product of the employment is a question of fact that can be resolved only after the full development of a factual record. The Court cannot rely on Fernandez to deny APCOA's motion to dismiss for two reasons. First, it is not a complete statement of Minnesota law on WCA preemption in that it fails to address the standard set out in Hanson v. Robitshek-Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W.19 (1941), and relied upon in McGowan, for determining whether an assault is compensable under the WCA. Second, nothing in Fernandez alters the question of whether there can exist any set of facts consistent with the facts pleaded in the Complaint that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Spriggs and/or Peterson were motivated by personal reasons arising from circumstances wholly unconnected with Klaahsen's employment.
To these intentional tort claims, the Court applies the standard articulated in McGowan — an injury is non-compensable under the "assault exception" to the WCA only if the assailant was motivated by reasons that arise from circumstances wholly unconnected with the employment. See Hanson, 209 Minn. at 600, 297 N.W. at 21-22. The Court is compelled, reluctantly, to conclude that there is no set of facts that can be proven, consistent with the allegations made in the Complaint, from which a jury could find that Spriggs and Peterson's conduct arose from circumstances unrelated to Klaahsen's employment at APCOA. See McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834. Her intentional tort claims do not fit within the "assault exception" of the WCA.
It appears that Klaahsen, unlike McGowan, did have some contact with alleged assailant Spriggs outside the workplace. Spriggs' telephone call propositioning Klaahsen to come to his home for sex, however, occurred after the incident involving Spriggs' and Peterson's efforts to undress Klaahsen and write on her body with magic markers and after Spriggs assaulted her in the copy room.
As for the claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision, the Court notes that the "assault exception" only applies to acts that are intended to injure the employee. Claims of negligence are not premised upon, and do not require proof of, an intent to cause injury. Rather, negligence-based torts depend upon the existence of a duty of care (owed by the defendant to the plaintiff) and a breach of that duty. Klaahsen has cited no cases, nor has the Court found any, supporting her contention that the "assault exception" applies to all of her common-law claims, including the negligence-based torts. Looking at the facts underlying those negligence-based claims, the Court determines that they are alleged to be based on events that arose out of and in connection with Klaahsen's employment at APCOA. (See Compl. ¶¶ 21, 33, 38-39, 43-44, 47-48.) There is no set of facts that Klaahsen could prove, consistent with the allegations in the Complaint, that would establish that APCOA's alleged negligent acts fall within the "assault exception."
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant APCOA's motion to dismiss the common law claims against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the claims are preempted by the WCA.
IV. Preemption of the Common Law Claims Against Spriggs and Peterson by the Minnesota Human Rights Act
Klaahsen alleges common law claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, reckless infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, negligence, and false imprisonment against the individual defendants, Spriggs and Peterson. Spriggs and Peterson move to dismiss these counts on the grounds that they are preempted by the MHRA.
The Plaintiff agrees that the claims against Spriggs and Peterson for negligent retention, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring (Counts VIII through X) may be dismissed. (See Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 19, n. 16.) Accordingly, the Defendants' motion will be granted with respect to Counts VIII, IX and X against Spriggs and Peterson.
The MHRA states that "as to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive." Minn. Stat. § 363.11. Spriggs and Peterson rely upon a 1996 Minnesota Supreme Court decision construing section 363.11, Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., Inc., 551 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Minn. 1996). In Williams, the issue presented was whether the specific preemption provision of the MHRA controlled over a later-enacted general remedial statute, the Minnesota Whistleblowers' Act. Finding no clear indication that the legislature intended the general remedial provision to "take precedent" over the exclusivity of remedies provision of the MHRA, the Williams court held that the MHRA operates to bar the separate maintenance of a claim under the Whistleblowers' Act. Williams, 551 N.W.2d at 486 (Minn. 1996). In reaching that decision, the Williams court reasoned that the legislature certainly would not have "contemplated that employees seeking redress for allegedly discriminatory employment action could simultaneously maintain an action relating to the same discriminatory practice and predicated on identical factual statements and alleging the same injury or damages." Id. at 485.
Williams is not, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court's final word on preemption under section 363.11. In Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997), the court permitted a plaintiff to maintain parallel MHRA and tort claims against the airline. The Vaughn court determined that the airline's common law duty (as a common carrier) to aid disabled passengers in avoiding foreseeable physical injury was distinct from its statutory duty (as a provider of a public service or accommodation) not to discriminate on the basis of disability against those who would enjoy its services. Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 743-44. The airline argued that Vaughn's common-law negligence action was preempted by section 363.11 of the MHRA because "Vaughn did not `allege separate facts to support a negligence claim.'" Id. at 745. Reiterating its earlier reasoning in Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990), however, the court in Vaughn expressly rejected the idea "that factually parallel causes of action are mutually exclusive." Id. (emphasis in original). The decisions of this Court on the issue of MHRA preemption are not consistent. The most recent formulation of a standard for MHRA preemption is as follows:
the MHRA preempts a common law cause of action if (1) the factual basis and injuries supporting the common law claim also would establish a violation of the MHRA, and (2) the obligations the defendant owes to the plaintiff, as a practical matter, are the same under both the common law and the MHRA.
Pierce v. Rainbow Foods Group, Inc., 158 F. Supp.2d 969, 975-76 (D.Minn. 2001) (Alsop, J.).
The first part of this standard is derived from Williams, a case involving the application of Minnesota's rules of statutory construction and resulting in the preemption of a statutory claim. Pierce does not, however, reconcile Williams with Vaughn and Wirig, cases that have plainly held that a plaintiff may maintain a common-law cause of action that is factually parallel to an MHRA claim. See Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 745 (citing Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 379). The undersigned believes that the analysis in Williams should be confined to cases raising the issue of whether another Minnesota statute controls over the exclusivity provision of the MHRA. The argument advanced by Spriggs and Peterson — that Klaahsen's common-law claims are preempted because she has based them on the same set of facts as those underlying the MHRA claim — is unavailing under controlling Minnesota Supreme Court precedent.
Wirig and Vaughn also hold that the plaintiff may not obtain a double recovery except under limited circumstances. Vaughn, 558 N.W.2d at 745; Wirig, 461 N.W.2d at 379.
Comparing each common-law cause of action to Klaahsen's MHRA sexual harassment claim, the Court concludes that the common law claims require different elements of proof and address different injuries. The Minnesota legislature has imposed obligations on Spriggs and Peterson under the MHRA for reasons that are distinct from the purposes underlying the common law of assault, battery, infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and negligence. Klaahsen will be permitted to proceed with her common law claims against Spriggs and Peterson (as pleaded in Counts I through VII and XI of the Complaint). The Court reserves for a later date the question of whether Klaahsen will be entitled to recover under more than one of these theories.
V. Individual Liability for Spriggs and Peterson under Title VII
Plaintiff contends that, while the Eighth Circuit has held that "co-workers" are not liable under Title VII, it has explicitly declined to rule on whether supervisors are exempt from liability. In support of that assertion, she relies upon a 1995 Eighth Circuit case, Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995). Two years later, however, the Eighth Circuit held — in a pair of per curiam decisions — that a supervisor may not be held liable under Title VII. See Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir. 1997); Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997). Whatever question remained open by the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Lenhardt was firmly closed in Spencer and Bonomolo-Hagen. Dismissal of Count XIV against Defendants Spriggs and Peterson is warranted.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART as follows:
1. Per the Plaintiff's representations to counsel and the Court, Counts VIII, IX, and X against Defendants Spriggs and Peterson are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
2. Count XII, alleging "sexual coercion" against all Defendants, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3. Counts I through XI against Defendant APCOA/ Standard Parking are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE on the grounds that they are preempted by the Minnesota Workers Compensation Act; and
4. Count XIV against Defendants Spriggs and Peterson is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.
The following claims remain: Counts I through VII and XI against Defendants Spriggs and Peterson; Count XIII against all of the defendants; and Count XIV against Defendant APCOA.