Opinion
C/A No. 8:17-212-MBS-JDA
02-28-2017
Jeremy Kitchens, Plaintiff, v. State of South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeremy Kitchens ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action alleging violations of a federal law and the United States constitution. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee on house arrest, and he files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. He is currently on house arrest with Eagle Eye Monitoring, and he has been for one year. [Doc. 1-2.] Prior to house arrest, he was detained in the Pickens County "LEC" (presumably, law enforcement center) for ten months. [Id.] He was indicted and arrested in May of 2015 for violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655 (criminal sexual conduct). [Id.] The State of South Carolina has failed to bring his case to trial; Plaintiff may also be suing the Pickens County Solicitor's Office. [Id.] Plaintiff's ability to defend himself has been compromised because of the passage of time. [Id.] For example, vital witnesses for the defense cannot be located now. [Id.] Also, "GPS data" is now unavailable, and the information would have established that Plaintiff was at work during the time of the alleged crimes. [Id.] The unnecessary delay by the prosecution has caused the loss of vital evidence. [Id.]
In response to the Proper Form Order [Doc. 5], Plaintiff submitted proposed service documents that indicate he seeks to sue the Pickens County Solicitor's Office.
Based on these facts, Plaintiff contends that his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, and the federal speedy trial act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, has been violated. [Docs. 1, 1-2.]
Further, Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights have been violated because the prosecution knowingly suppressed evidence and testimony at the preliminary hearing with the intention of keeping Plaintiff in jail despite having no evidence. [Doc. 1.] For example, Plaintiff alleges that more than twenty associates will place Plaintiff at work during the times of the alleged abuse. [Id.] And, the medical exam performed at the "Julie Valentine Center" is definite that no sign of physical or sexual abuse was present. [Id.] However, that evidence was wrongfully suppressed by Defendant. [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks the dismissal with prejudice of the criminal charges against him. [Docs. 1, 1-2.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et al., is not applied to this action because, at the time he filed the action, Plaintiff was not detained in a facility. See Branham v. Bryant, C/A No. 1:11-1246-JFA, 2013 WL 1194843 (D.S.C. March 22, 2013) (discussing the status of being on bond); see also Cofield v. Bowser, 247 F. App'x 413 (4th Cir. 2007).
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint appears to be filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1501 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Because it is well settled that only "persons" may act under color of state law, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a "person." The term "staff" or the equivalent as a name for alleged defendants, without the naming of specific staff members, is not adequate to state a claim against a "person" as required in § 1983 actions. And, groups of people are not amenable to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Dalton v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 8:09-260-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 823931, at *2 (D.S.C. March 26, 2009) (dismissing the medical staff of SCDC and Prison Health Services as defendants because they were not persons). Therefore, because the State of South Carolina is not a person under § 1983, the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Even if Plaintiff had sued a person, for example a person in the Pickens County Solicitor's Office, this action still would be subject to dismissal based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Here, Plaintiff requests this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state criminal prosecution against him. However, because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it. In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. The second criterion has been addressed by the Supreme Court: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also decided the third criterion in noting "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
This Court finds that Plaintiff can raise his federal constitutional rights of due process and speedy trial in the state proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action that seeks a dismissal of the state charges against Plaintiff. See generally Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1975) (the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978); Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff cannot rely on the federal Speedy Trial Act because it applies to the prosecution of federal crimes. See United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012).
Even if Plaintiff had brought this action in this Court pursuant to a federal habeas corpus statute, Younger abstention would also apply.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page. February 28, 2017
Greenville, South Carolina
S/Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).