Opinion
No. HHD CV 10-6007952-S
March 1, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, a slate of candidates (the "Kirkley-Bey slate"), in the Fifth Assembly District ("Fifth District") primary election for the City of Hartford Democratic Town Committee to be held on March 2, 2010, bring this expedited lawsuit pursuant General Statutes §§ 9-329a and 9-329b claiming they have been aggrieved by a decision of the defendants, Olga Iris Vazquez the Democratic Registrar of Voters for the City of Hartford ("Registrar"), John V. Bazzano, Town and City Clerk ("Clerk") and Garey Coleman, Deputy Registrar of Voters for the City of Hartford ("Deputy Registrar") (together hereinafter "the City defendants"), for acts in violation of General Statutes § 9-410. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Vazquez, Coleman and Bazzano were responsible for "accepting and verifying the petitions for the Fifth District Democratic Town Committee of the City of Hartford," that Vazquez and Coleman, in their capacities as Democratic Registrar and Deputy Registrar, respectively, wrongfully failed to reject the petitions of the plaintiffs' Fifth District rivals, the so-called Giles slate, for placement on the March 2, 2010 Democratic Town Committee primary ballot; that the deadline for filing the necessary petitions with the Democratic Registrar of Voters for candidates to appear on the ballot for the March 2, 2010 Democratic Town Committee primary was January 27, 2010 at 4:00 p.m.; that the Kirkley-Bey slate submitted their petitions to Vazquez prior to January 27, 2010; that the Giles slate also submitted petitions in support of their candidacies prior to January 27, 2010; that on January 22, 2010, Vazquez submitted the primary petition pages for both slates to Bazzano, in his capacity as Town and City Clerk; that 323 valid signatures are required for placement on the ballot; that due to the failure of the circulators of the Giles Slate petitions to complete Part C of nineteen (19) of the petitions filed with the Registrar, as required by § 9-410(c), less than the required amount of signatures were validly submitted; that after the deadline on January 27, 2010, Vazquez, by her deputy, Coleman, removed the deficient Giles Slate petitions from the office of the Clerk and returned them to the office of the Registrar where they were improperly completed without the presence of the circulator; and that the improperly corrected petitions were re-submitted to the Clerk on January 29, 2010." Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the conduct of the City defendants violated § 9-410(c) insofar as that statute mandates that if the statement of the circulator is incomplete in any respect or does not contain the requisite certification of the registrar of the town in which the circulator is an enrolled party member, it shall be rejected by the registrar. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to § 9-329b, the plaintiffs seek an order from the court removing the members of Giles Slate from primary ballot for the Fifth District Democratic Town Committee primary scheduled for March 2, 2010.
Although the original complaint, dated February 12, 2010 and filed on February 16, 2010, consisted of one count pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a following motion to strike filed by the defendants on February 22, 2010, a revised complaint, now the operative complaint, was filed the same day.
The Reverend Paul Ritter, a candidate in the March 2, 2010 primary election for a position on the Democratic Town Committee from the Fifth District and a member of the Giles slate (fully identified infra at note 3), whose status in the primary election ballot is at issue herein, has intervened as a defendant. On February 25, 2010, he filed an answer to the complaint. Although he raises a special defense of equitable estoppel, it is addressed to Vazquez, in her capacity as Registrar of Voters, against whom he has no claim.
In the course of these expedited proceedings, the so-called Kirkley-Bey slate has at times also been referred to as the Bell slate. The so-called Giles slate has at times also been referred to as the Downes slate. Since the complaint uses the Kirkley-Bey and Giles designations, the court adopts them as the designations herein. The Giles slate includes the following candidates: W. Michael Downes, Juanita M. Giles, Glendowlyn L. Hall, Ashley, J. Johnson, Joseph L. Martinez, Brandon Lee L. McGee Jr., Charles F. Oxley, Paul M. Ritter, Olga Iris Vazquez, Radames V. Vazquez, Charlene Williams and Ludella Perry Williams, all of whom were served in accordance with General Statutes § 9-329a(b) by order of the court, dated February 16, 2010 (Graham, J.), as was the Secretary of the State, and the State Elections Enforcement Commission.
Following the court's ruling on the defendants' motion to strike the revised complaint, the operative complaint now consists of two counts, pursuant to §§ 9-329a and 9-329b, respectively. Pursuant to the original order of the court issued on February 16, 2010 (Graham, J.), and in accordance with the requirements of § 9-329a(b), a hearing was commenced on February 19, 2010. The evidentiary portion of the hearing continued on February 23 and 24, 2010. On February 26, 2010, the defendants filed an answer and four special defenses as follows: 1) "Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-329a and 9-329b, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to provide the relief requested by the plaintiffs"; 2) "The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case given that the Secretary of State and Elections Enforcement Commission are the appropriate state agencies with the responsibility and authority to discipline municipal officials who fail to follow election law, as the allegation in this case"; 3) "Given that the Registrar of Voters instructed the Fifth District; as well as all other voting districts, that section c of the primary petition applied to situations where a circulator was registered to vote in a town other than Hartford, she is equitably stopped from subsequently disqualifying any petitions in which section c is incomplete"; and 4) "[a]ll of the Fifth District petitions should have been rejected for failure to complete sections c and d of the petitions." At the close of the evidence, the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, some of which were resolved by the court's ruling on the motion to strike. Since it was beyond the time for adjournment for the day and only counsel for the City defendants had an adequate opportunity to address the court, briefs were ordered and oral argument scheduled for February 26, 2010. Following argument on that date, the court denied the motion to dismiss in all respects for reasons that were fully stated in open court.
Since the court has rejected the defendants' claim made in their motion to strike that the plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged aggrievement in open court during the hearing and there is no claim by the defendants that the technical requirements of § 9-329a have not otherwise been met, the court does not recite that lengthy statute herein.
Section 9-329b of the General Statutes provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Removal of candidate's name from ballot label: At any time prior to a primary held pursuant to sections . . . 9-425 . . . the Superior Court may issue an order removing a candidate from a ballot label where it is shown that said candidate is improperly on the ballot."
The motion to dismiss was made orally on February 24, 2010. Oral argument on the motion commenced on February 24 and concluded on February 26, 2010 when it was denied by the court.
As this case has been presented by the parties, the validity of the nineteen (19) identified and tabbed Giles Slate petitions (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 2) depends on an interpretation of the requirements of § CT Page 5951 9-410(c) as it relates primarily to Part C and to a lesser extent Part D of the petition form, identified as, "ED-610a Rev. 12/01 (g\forms\ed-600s\ed-610a.doc)."
A description of the form is instructive. The first page of the petition form consists of Parts A and B. In essential part, Part A contains spaces for the name of the party, the date of the primary, city or town, town committee position sought, in this case the Democratic Town Committee from the Fifth District, the names and addresses of the candidates, the length of term, an instruction to file completed petitions with Vazquez as Registrar of Voters, at 550 Main Street, not later than 4:00 p.m., on January 27, 2010. Part B contains columns with spaces for the signed and printed names of electors, their dates of birth and their street addresses within the Fifth District. The reverse side of the petition contains Parts C and D. Part C, the focus of attention in this case, begins as follows:
STATEMENT BY REGISTRAR OF VOTERS AS TO CIRCULATOR'S STATUS AS AN ENROLLED PARTY MEMBER
C. Circulator must have Part C filled in before submitting it to party's registrar in municipality in which the signers are enrolled. (Emphasis added.)
Immediately below the foregoing statement are defined boxes designated for the "Circulator's Name," and the "Circulator's Residence Address (No., Street, Town)." Following the circulator name and address boxes is an attestation of the Registrar of Voters:
I, Registrar of Voters of the party named in Part A of the petition, in the Town of _____________, do hereby attest that the above circulator is an enrolled member of said party in said municipality and that he is entitled to vote.
Date (Signature of Registrar of Voters)
Part D contains the "Circulator's Statement of Authenticity of Signatures" with a blank to fill in the street address and town of the circulator as well as a signature line for the circulator. This part also contains a "Certification of Acknowledging Officer." The instructions for Part D are as follows:
D. Part D must be completed, by Circulator and by Acknowledging Officer, after obtaining all signatures on this page and before filing it with the party's Registrar in municipality in which the signers of the page are enrolled. (Emphasis original.)
The "Certification of the Acknowledging Officer," conforms to General Statutes § 1-34 in all respects except that the space for the name of the circulator, personally appearing, is missing. This portion of the form appears, in pertinent part, as follows:
On this the ___ day of _____, 2010, before me, the undersigned officer, personally appeared, known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose (name of circulator) name is Subscribed to the foregoing Statement of Circulator and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purpose contained therein.
Theodore Bromley, a staff attorney from the Office of the Secretary of the State, who was subpoenaed by plaintiffs to appear as a witness, testified that the petition form was emailed from the Office of the Secretary of the State to Vazquez' office and that the loss of the space for the name of the circulator was a printing error.
Following a full evidentiary hearing and oral arguments of appearing counsel, the issues presented for resolution are: 1) whether the failure of the circulators of the Giles slate petitions to complete the portion of Part C requiring their names and addresses before submitting the petition to the Registrar invalidates the petitions in question requiring the Registrar to reject them; 2) whether the failure of the Registrar to sign the attestation contained in Part C before the deadline of 4:00 p.m. on January 27, 2010, invalidates the petitions; and 3) whether the printing defect in the acknowledgment portion of Part D is fatal to the petitions of both the Giles and Kirkley-Bey slates.
As noted previously, the petitions in question are tabbed and are contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 2.
This issue is addressed later on in this decision. Although there is no affirmative claim brought by any member of the Giles Slate on this issue, it is raised by the City Defendants by way of its fourth special defense.
The facts as they unfolded in the course of the hearing are as follows: On December 30, 2009 and January 13, 2010, meetings were held by Vasquez, in her capacity as Democratic Registrar of Voters, to instruct candidates and circulators on the primary petition process for the district primaries for the Democratic Town Committee of the City of Hartford to be held on March 2, 2010. The Fifth Assembly District includes downtown and a portion of north Hartford. The purpose of the meetings held by the Registrar was to address the legal requirements for completing primary petitions for town committee on the forms prescribed by the Secretary of the State, as set forth in General Statutes § 9-410, and to hand out the petitions. Vazquez is herself a candidate for the Fifth District Democratic Town Committee on the Giles Slate and was a circulator of petitions for that slate. Due to her candidacy, Vazquez delegated the processing of the Fifth District petitions to her deputy, Coleman. Although Vazquez has at least thirteen years of experience as either the Democratic Registrar or Deputy Registrar of Voters for the City of Hartford, Coleman first came to work in the Registrar's office as Deputy in April 2009. The March 2, 2010 election is his first involvement in a Democratic Town Committee primary. Bazzano has been Town and City Clerk for approximately four and a half months. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4 and Defendants' Exhibit B reflect that a total of 323 valid signatures is required for each slate to be put on the ballot. The deadline for filing the petitions with the Office of the Registrar of Voters was 4:00 p.m. on January 27, 2010.
Prior to the deadline, both the Kirkley-Bey and Giles slates submitted petitions on behalf of their candidacies for the Fifth District Democratic Town Committee to Vazquez in her capacity as Democratic Registrar of Voters. On January 22, 2010, Vazquez, in her capacity as Democratic Registrar of Voters, first submitted the primary petitions for both the Kirkley-Bey and Giles slates to Bazzano, the Town and City Clerk. On January 27, 2010, shortly before the 4:00 p.m. deadline, Mark DiBella, a candidate on the Kirkley-Bey slate, obtained copies of the Giles slate petitions from Bazzano's office marked into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Earlier that afternoon, at approximately 2:30 p.m., DiBella informed Bazzano that he had reviewed the Giles slate petitions and that Part C was incomplete in many of them in that the circulator had not filled in his or her name and address and that the Registrar had not signed and dated the portion below attesting that the circulator was an enrolled member of the democratic party in the city of Hartford and entitled to vote. Upon DiBella's suggestion, Bazzano telephoned the Office of the Secretary of the State in DiBella's presence, and spoke to a staff attorney in that office identified as Ted Bromley. Bazzano asked Bromley about the significance of failing to complete Part C of the petition. Bazzano informed Bromley that in some instances the Registrar of Voters had failed to sign "the endorsement" in Part C and that in other instances the entire section was left blank. Bazzano requested a written response to his inquiries. Bromley responded to Bazzano's inquiry by email sent at 2:51 p.m. the same afternoon. Bromley responded that the Office of the Secretary of State has consistently advised the following:
(1) if the registrar of voters fail to sign the endorsement in section "c" but everything else on the petition is correct, we have instructed the registrars of voters to correct their error and to process the petition pages;
(2) if section "c" is not completed at all, state statute (9-410) requires that the registrars of voters reject the entire petition page. However, our office does advise the registrars of voters to contact the individuals in question in these situations and if the errors can be rectified by the petition deadline (1/27 @ 4 p.m.) then the individual can come into the registrar's office, correct any outstanding errors and the pages can be processed. If this does not happen, however, the petition pages would have to be rejected pursuant to the state statute.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; Defendant's Exhibit A.
Bazzano did not see the email until around 3:30 p.m. and brought Vazquez a copy of it around 3:45 p.m. Vazquez also called Bromley herself after which she conferred with Coleman. Bromley forwarded the email to Coleman at 4:03 p.m. and asked him to "forward to Olga as well." Around 4:00 p.m., Coleman went to the Clerk's office, picked up all the previously filed petitions and returned with them to the Registrar's office. Although the names and addresses of the circulators in Part C of the Kirkley-Bey petitions were filled in, in nineteen (19) of the Giles Slate petitions, the names and addresses of the circulators were missing. In addition, neither Vazquez nor Coleman had filled the portion of Part C designated for the Registrar's signature in any of the Fifth District petitions. With the assistance of other staff members, Coleman filled in the names and addresses of the circulators where missing and then signed and dated Part C in the place designated for the signature of the Registrar of Voters. In parentheses next to his signature in most cases he wrote in "registrar error" or "reg. error." Coleman returned all the petitions to the Clerk's office on Friday, January 29, 2010. At that time, as the exhibits reflect, the total number of signatures validated by the Registrar of Voters from the Giles Slate petitions was 472. The nineteen (19) petitions in dispute, all of which are tabbed in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, account for 206 signatures. Since the balance of the petitions reflect only 266 valid signatures, if the nineteen (19) petitions are invalidated, the Giles slate will be 57 signatures short of the 323 valid signatures required.
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5.
Vazquez filled in her name and address in Part C in one of the two petitions that she submitted as circulator. Paul Ritter also filled in his name and address in Part C on one of the several petitions that he submitted as circulator. Although Vazquez initially delegated the processing of the Fifth District petitions to Coleman because of her own candidacy as a member of the Giles Slate from that district, on January 27, 2010, she became actively involved in the decision to retrieve them Clerk's office all the petitions previously filed with that office on January 22, 2010, including those for the Fifth District, and to fill in the missing portions of Part C.
I Whether the failure of the circulators of numerous petitions to complete the portion of Part C requiring their names and addresses before submitting the petition invalidates the petitions in question requiring the Registrar of Voters to reject them?The court first considers the issue of whether the failure of a circulator to fill in his or her name and address in accordance with the Part C directions prior to filing the petition requires the Registrar of Voters to reject the petition.
There has been conflicting evidence as to whether Vazquez instructed attendees at the various instructional meetings concerning the Democratic Town Committee primary held at City Hall and other locations that there was no need for a circulator of a petition to fill in his or her name in Part C (despite the clear instruction on the form to do so) unless the circulator was from a city or town outside of Hartford. Vazquez, Coleman, and Ritter all testified that Vazquez gave this instruction. DiBella, Georgina Holloway, another plaintiff and member of the Kirkley-Bey Slate, and Attorney Bruce Rubenstein each testified that no such instruction was given at the meetings they attended. In fact, they reported that Part C was either not mentioned at all during the meetings or barely mentioned by Vazquez. In support of DiBella, Holloway and Rubenstein's testimony, the plaintiffs emphasize that all the circulators of the Kirkley-Bey slate petitions filled in their names and addresses before submitting their completed petitions to the Registrar's Office, a fact that makes their testimony more persuasive.
As noted supra, the instruction for Part C states: "Circulator must have Part C filled in before submitting it to party's registrar in municipality in which the signers are enrolled." (Emphasis added.)
Vazquez haltingly testified that although she received the email Bazzano brought to her on the afternoon of January 27th, before reading it, she telephoned Bromley herself and, in the course of the conversation, told him that she considered the omission of the circulator's names and addresses in Part C of the petitions to be a clerical error made by her. She also testified that when she hung up with Bromley she read his email but held fast to her belief that the error was hers and, because the omission was clerical in nature, the missing information could be filled in by Coleman or clerks in the Registrar's office at his direction. She further testified that, based on her conversation with Bromley, she told Coleman to go and get all the petitions back from the Clerk's office and correct them. There is little doubt that by the time Bromley's email passed from Bazzano to Vazquez, and certainly by the time Vazquez telephoned Bromley, it was too late to correct the petitions in the manner Bromley indicated as it would have required contacting the circulators and arranging for them to come in and fill out their required portion before the 4:00 p.m. deadline.
Both the first three sentences and the next to the last sentence of General Statutes § 9-410 (c) address the necessity of Part C of the petition. The subparagraph begins as follows: " Each circulator of a primary petition page shall be an enrolled party member of a municipality in this state who is entitled to vote. Each petition page shall contain a statement signed by the registrar of the municipality in which such circulator is an enrolled party member attesting that the circulator is an enrolled party member in such municipality. Unless such a statement by the registrar appears on each page so submitted, the registrar shall reject such page." (Emphasis added.) Further on in the subparagraph, it addresses the requirements that have been translated into Part D of the petition form which states: "Each separate sheet of such petition shall contain a statement as to the authenticity of the signatures thereon and the number of such signatures, and shall be signed under the penalties of false statement by the person who circulated the same, setting forth such circulator's address and the town in which such circulator is an enrolled party member and attesting that each person whose name appears on such sheet signed the same in person in the presence of such circulator, that the circulator either knows each such signer or that the signer satisfactorily identified the signer to the circulator and that the spaces for candidates supported, offices or positions sought and the political party involved were filled in prior to the obtaining of the signatures. Each separate sheet of such petition shall also be acknowledged before an appropriate person as provided in section 1-29. Any sheet of a petition filed with the registrar which does not contain such a statement by the circulator as to the authenticity of the signatures thereon, or upon which the statement of the circulator is incomplete in any respect, or which does not contain the certification hereinbefore required by the registrar of the town in which the circulator is an enrolled party member, shall be rejected by the registrar." (Emphasis added.) The italicized language sets forth the statutory mandate for Part C of the petition form.
For the reasons articulated herein, the court finds that the failure of the circulator to complete the form in manner mandated by the statute by completing the form as directed by Part C before the deadline for filing petitions requires the Registrar to reject the form. The court further finds that the failure of a circulator to fill in his or her name and address in Part C of the petition is not a clerical error. Section 9-410(c) reads as a watchdog provision over the conduct of circulators as they go about the business of collecting signatures for primary petitions. Parts C and D of the petition form were unquestionably created as a vehicle to impose the strict and detailed requirements on the petition process to ensure the integrity of primary elections. The "Statement by the Registrar of Voters as to Circulator's Status an Enrolled Party Member" is the heading of Part C and is specifically mandated by the language in § 9-410(c) that "[e]ach petition page shall contain a statement signed by the registrar of the municipality in which such circulator is an enrolled party member attesting that the circulator is an enrolled party member in such municipality." While the statutory language does not specify that the circulator must fill in his or her own address above the registrar's sworn statement, the language of the form states that the "[c]irculator must have Part C filled in before submitting it to party's Registrar in municipality in which the signers are enrolled." Further, the statement of the Registrar attests that " the above named circulator" is an enrolled member of the democratic party in the city of Hartford and is entitled to vote. (Emphasis original.) In this way, both the statute and the form require that the circulator state his or her eligibility by filling in the name and address so the Registrar has knowledge of the circulator's name and address before the Registrar signs the statement attesting to the fact that the circulator is an enrolled party member in the Registrar's municipality.
The precise appearance of the Registrar's statement is as follows:
I, Registrar of Voters of the party named in Part A of the petition, in the Town of _____________, do hereby attest that the above circulator is an enrolled member of said party in said municipality and that he is entitled to vote.
Date (Signature of Registrar of Voters)
Next, § 9-410(a) specifically provides that "[t]he petition form for candidacies for nomination to municipal office or for election as members of town committees shall be prescribed by the Secretary of the State . . ." General Statutes § 9-410 not only governs the content of the primary petition form, the rules by which it must be circulated and completed and the standards by which it may be accepted or must be rejected, it specifically entrusts and delegates the task of creating the petition form to the Secretary of State. Ordinarily, "[courts afford] deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes." King's Highway Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, 114 Conn.App. 509, 514, 969 A.2d 841 (2009). Further, by separate provision, "the Secretary of the State, by virtue of the office," is "the Commissioner of Elections of the state, with such powers and duties relating to the conduct of elections as are prescribed by law and, unless otherwise provided by state statute, the Secretary's regulations, declaratory rulings, instructions and opinions, if in written form, shall be presumed as correctly interpreting and effectuating the administration of elections and primaries under this title . . ." General Statutes § 9-3; see also Villaneuva v. Aviles, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV HHD 04 4001055 (Beach, J, August 5, 2004) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 477). Giving proper deference to the Secretary of State's interpretation of § 9-410 in creating the petition form, the requirements of Part C must be met to ensure compliance with the statute.
Vazquez testified that she has previously been known by the last name Aviles.
In addition, the conclusion of the court is supported by Plaintiff's Exhibit 5/ Defendant's Exhibit A, the email from Bromley to Bazzano forwarded to Coleman and Vazquez, as well as Bromley's hearing testimony on February 23, 2010. As quoted earlier in this decision, in that email, Bromley stated that "[o]ur office consistently advised" that "if section `c' is not completed at all, state statute (9-410) requires that the registrars of voters reject the entire petition page." Bromley testified that, in addition to his email response to Bazzano's telephone inquiry, the instructions prepared by the Office of Secretary of State and given to the registrar along with the blank petition forms indicate that although Part C may be completed at any time, "it must be completed prior to the filing with the Registrar of Voters." Bromley also reaffirmed that the Secretary of the State's office takes the position that the form, the statute and the instructions all require that if Part C is incomplete at the time a petition is filed, it must be rejected by the Registrar. Bromley testified that his office will "always allow the registrar to fix a clerical error, if it's unilaterally the registrar's mistake or if it's a signature that is needed by a circulator or an endorsed candidate even if the defect can be cured before the filing deadline . . . if the circulator's name were there, but for whatever reason the registrar missed a signature . . . we would allow the registrar to go back and put their signature there [after the deadline] because . . . we would view that as a ministerial or clerical error by the registrar and the circulator had done all they needed to do in order to complete the petition." (Transcript, 2/23/2010, pp. 11-12.) Finally, Bromley testified that his office requires the circulator him or herself must fill in the name and address portion. ( Id., p. 13.) Because Bromley's view that completion of Part C prior to filing a petition with the Registrar reflects established advice of the Secretary of State office which is incorporated in the instructions provided to registrars of voters, circulators and candidates along with primary petitions, in accordance with § 9-3, the court presumes that the advice is a correct interpretation of § 9-410(c).
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7.
As noted earlier in this decision, the court finds that the failure of a circulator fill in his or her name and address in Part C is a circulator error, not a clerical error.
Although the defendants have argued that the failure of a circulator to fill in the name and address portion of Part C is de minimis and exalts form over substance, the directives of our legislature and our Supreme Court suggest otherwise. Rather, careful and detailed regulation and oversight of primary petitions is reflective of a strong public policy in favor of protecting the sanctity of elections, a fundamental element of our democracy. For this reason and all the foregoing reasons, the court finds that completing Part C of the petition in accordance with the directions set forth on the form is an essential component of establishing the eligibility of the circulator as required by § 9-410(c).
The defendants have argued that Part D of the form, which contains the statement by the circulator as to the identity of the signers of the petition and other information contained in Parts A and B the petition also contains the name and address of the circulator as well as an acknowledgment of the circulator's signature by another official, is essentially redundant of Part C, and therefore, omission of Part C, even in its entirety at the time of its filing, should not be fatal to the validity of the petition. This second guesses the concerns that the legislature obviously sought to address in setting the requirements of § 9-410(c) in its present form which is beyond the power of this court to do.
Further, the defendants have argued that since the Registrar can determine the enrollment status of the circulator from the information contained in Part D, the statute is ambiguous and unclear in its requirements. "When construing a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . Statutory provisions governing election contests are strictly construed." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caruso v. Bridgeport, 285 Conn. 618, 638-39, 941 A.2d 266 (2008).
The defendants also point to ambiguity in the portion of § 9-410(c) which provides that "[a]ny sheet of a petition filed with the registrar which does not contain such a statement by the circulator as to the authenticity of the signatures thereon, or upon which the statement of the circulator is incomplete in any respect, or which does not contain the certification hereinbefore required by the registrar of the town in which the circulator is an enrolled party member, shall be rejected by the registrar."
A review of the legislative history of the statute reveals that an important purpose underlying the promulgation and subsequent revisions to § 9-410(c) was to impose what the legislators considered to be important restrictions on the process employed for circulating petitions and on the circulators themselves in an effort to eliminate the possibility of fraud. Section 9-410(c) is rooted in Public Act 78-125, H.B. No. 5595, entitled "An Act Concerning Election Complaints And The Revision Of Primary Petition Circulation To Preclude Possible Fraud." Testimony offered in connection with the bill, in the state Senate, House of Representatives, and state Elections Committee repeatedly mention that the purpose of the bill as it related to circulators was intended to more strictly define their responsibilities and more tightly control the process of circulating and filing petitions from the first steps of the circulators to their last in order to impose greater protections on the integrity of the election process. Specifically, Representative Lowden, in introducing PA 78-125 to the House of Representatives noted that "the provisions concerning the submission and authentication of petition pages are simply intended to tighten the procedures for insuring authentic signatures." 21 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 1978 Sess., p. 1456. As to an amendment to the bill on the issue of whether the circulators would be required to go the Registrar's Office in person, Senator O'Leary noted: "This amendment will allow the circulator of a petition to acknowledge before a proper authority such as a notary or justice of the peace that they have circulated this petition, that they have witnessed the signature to the petition and upon that acknowledgment, they may turn the petition in. They do not have to go to the Registrar's Office in person, but I believe that we keep the intent of the law that we know exactly who is circulating our petitions and that the persons circulating them realize that they have to do a proper job . . ." 21 S.Proc., Pt. 4. 1978 Sess., p. 1653-54. As to the intended relationship between the statute and the Secretary of the State's office, Senator Johnson remarked "Speaking on the amendment, we have worked closely with the Secretary of the State's office and I am convinced that we have maintained the tightness in the bill . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 1654.
As the legislative history reflects, the statute is intended to reduce the possibility of fraud with several safeguards to insure that at all times the registrars of voters know who is circulating and signing the petitions. To the extent that Part C accomplishes this goal, it is an essential part of the petition. Further, as reflected in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 and 2 and the testimony of Coleman, there may be times when the circulator's signature as contained in Part D may be illegible thus making it more difficult for the Registrar or Deputy, in that circumstance, to verify the actual circulator of the petition in disregard of at least one of the legislative purposes of the statute to insure that the registrars know who is circulating the petitions.
The defendants have argued both in their written submissions to the court, as well as in oral argument that the purpose underlying § 9-410(c) and § 9-329b has little to do with the issues before the court. Counsel for the City defendants argued at trial that the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 284 Conn. 554, 937 A.2d 13 (2007), held that § 9-329b was enacted for the very specialized purpose of preventing circulators from corrupting the election process by circulating for more than one slate of candidates. The defendants specifically point to Gonzalez v. Surgeon, supra at 563. However, in that decision the Supreme Court addressed § 9-410(c), not § 9-329b.
It appears that the defendants have mistakenly confused these two statutes. To the extent that the defendants claim that § 9-329b has nothing to do with this case, they are mistaken. Viewing § 9-329b as it relates to § 9-329a, the former provision plainly and unambiguously further empowers the Superior Court to act on behalf of aggrieved parties when it is shown that candidates are improperly on the ballot. Since its purpose is clear, the court is not authorized to look to the legislative history. See General Statutes § 1-2z.
Finally, the court bases its finding that the failure of the circulator to complete the form in the manner mandated by the statute by completing the form as directed by Part C before the deadline for filing petitions requires the Registrar to reject the nineteen (19) petitions filed by the Giles slate on the fact that "[s]tatutory provisions governing election contests are strictly construed." Caruso v. City of Bridgeport, supra, 284 Conn. 639. There is no question that the decision of Vazquez and Coleman to retrieve the primary petitions from the Clerk's office after the filing deadline on January 27, 2010 and direct staff to complete the omitted names and addresses of the circulators was in disregard of § 9-410(c), the specific language of the form prescribed by the Secretary of State's office for circulating petitions, and the specific direction of a staff attorney from that office in relating orally, and again in writing, the consistent advice that the Secretary of State has given on this precise issue and the separate instruction form for primary petitions for municipal offices, and was an improper act by municipal election officials within the application of General Statutes § 9-329a from which the plaintiffs have been aggrieved. See Caruso v. City of Bridgeport, supra, 284 Conn. 646.
II Whether the failure of the Registrar of Voters to sign the attestation contained in Part C before the deadline of 4:00 p.m. on January 27, 2010, invalidates the petitions? As to the second issue, the court holds that the failure of the Registrar to sign the attestation contained in Part C before the deadline of 4:00 p.m. on a January 27, 2010 does not invalidate the petitions. Section 9-410(c) provides that "[e]ach circulator of a primary petition page shall be an enrolled party member of a municipality in this state who is entitled to vote. Each petition page shall contain a statement signed by the registrar of the municipality in which such circulator is an enrolled party member attesting that the circulator is an enrolled party member in such municipality. Unless such a statement by the registrar appears on each page so submitted, the registrar shall reject such page." As distinguished from the requirement of the circulator to fill in his or her name and address before submitting the petition to the Party's Registrar, Part C does not prescribe when the Registrar's statement attesting to the enrollment of the circulator in municipality where he or she is entitled to vote must be completed. As Bromley explained, the statute requires that while the circulator's obligations are required before filing, an omission of the Registrar's signature in Part C is a clerical error which can be filled in even after the deadline, the rationale being that the focus of § 9-410(c) is on the conduct of the circulator and not on the ministerial acts of Registrar. As Bromley further explained in his testimony, "[T]he statute does not restrict the circulator from having that [Part C name and address] signed even prior to them circulating the petition. It says, in fact, our instructions say that they can have that portion, subsection C, executed at any time prior to filing. So, technically, the circulator could have gone to the registrar in Hartford at any time during their circulating process to have it done . . . if they're [the registrars are] doing it simultaneously with the filing, I think that the execution would be done before the petition pages are officially filed . . . I don't know the inner process of the workings of a registrar's office. I can only tell you what the statute says . . . if the circulator is not there then that — the circulator section would have had to have been filled out prior to and given to the individual who was delivering them all . . . (Transcript, 2/23/2010, pp. 27-9.)General Statutes § 9-412 holds that "[u]pon the receipt of any page of a petition proposing a candidacy for a municipal office or for member of a town committee . . . the registrar . . . shall forthwith file such certified page in person or by mail . . . with the clerk of the municipality . . . within seven days after the receipt of the page." The registrar's duty is to check the name of the circulator against the rolls of registered voters in the municipality, in order to ensure that the circulator is a registered voter and member of that party for which they are circulating a petition and ultimately certifying that the form has been filled in validly and completely before accepting the petition for filing. Because the filing deadline for the March 2, 2010 Democratic Town Committee primary was not until 4:00 p.m. on January 27, 2010, as a practical matter, the registrar may not be able to certify and sign all the forms before the deadline thus allowance for clerical entries does not conflict with the statutory purpose or the petition form. The language of § 9-412 supports the distinction drawn by Bromley and the Secretary of State's office as reflected in his email and the petition instructions that the deadline for completion of the form is intended to strictly apply to the obligations of the circulator, not the registrar. The court holds that the failure of the registrar to sign the petitions in Part C by 4:00 p.m. on January 27, 2010 does not invalidate those petitions.
As previously noted, as to this issue the email states "if the registrars of voters fail to sign the endorsement in section "c" but everything else on the petition is correct, we have instructed the registrars of voters to correct their error and to process the petition pages. Plaintiff's Exhibit 5/Defendant's Exhibit A.
III Whether the printing defect in the acknowledgment portion of Part D is fatal to the petitions of both the Giles and Kirkley-Bey slates?
With respect to the third and final issue before the court, the defendants have alleged as their fourth special defense that the "Certification of the Acknowledging Officer," in Part D of the petition form emailed by the Secretary of State's office to the Registrar, contained a printing error which constitutes a fatal defect in the petitions of both the Giles and Kirkley-Bey slates. Specifically, the form when printed out omitted the space for the acknowledging officer to print the name of the circulator whose acknowledgment was being taken. Section 9-410(c), in pertinent part, requires that each separate sheet of the petition shall "be acknowledged before an appropriate person as provided in section 1-29." Section 1-29 and related provisions fall within Chapter 6 of the General Statutes, the Uniform Acknowledgment Act. Section 1-28 of Chapter 6 provides that, "[a]ny instrument may be acknowledged in the manner and form now provided by other laws of this state, or as provided in this chapter." The rest of the chapter including § 1-34 concerning "certificates of officers," sets forth the various forms of acknowledgment including the acknowledgment of an individual as contained in Part D of the petition form. Section 1-34 provides: "An officer taking the acknowledgment shall endorse thereon or attach thereto a certificate substantially in one of the following forms." (Emphasis added.)
In all of the forms that are supplied in General Statutes § 1-34(1-6), there is included a space for the acknowledging officer to write in the name of the person whose acknowledgment is being taken. The absence of this space, however, does not necessarily invalidate the acknowledgment. The form of the acknowledgment is not mandated by the statute to be in the precise form set forth therein. Rather, as § 1-34 states, the certificate of the acknowledging officer must "substantially" correspond to the sample form. General Statutes § 1-1(a) provides that "[in] the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly." In this case, the word "substantially" is commonly defined as "being largely but not wholly that which is specified." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 1993). Since Part D consists of only two subparts, the "Circulator's Statement of Authenticity of Signatures" and the "Certification of the Acknowledging Officer" and the acknowledgment immediately follows the signature of the circulator at the end of the circulator's statement, neither the purpose of the § 9-410(c), or the acknowledgment is undermined by this omission. In addition, although the space to fill in the name is missing from the form, the acknowledgment does include the descriptive phrase, "name of circulator." Assuming the name of the circulator is also included in Part C, there can be no doubt as to the name of the circulator who is the subject of the acknowledgment. Therefore, the omission of a space where the acknowledging officer can fill in the circulator's name and the absence of the circulator's name from the acknowledgment does not invalidate Part D of the form.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the plaintiffs have sustained counts one and two of their complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329a in that they have established by preponderance of the evidence that nineteen (19) of the Giles Slate petitions, containing 206 signatures, as tabbed in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, were improperly validated and certified by the Democratic Registrar of Voters, or the Deputy Registrar of Voters, acting on her behalf, in violation of General Statutes § 9-410(c) and should have been rejected. Because the total of amount of valid signatures remaining is less than the number of valid signatures required for placement on the ballot as candidates in the Fifth Assembly District Primary for the City of Hartford Democratic Town Committee to be held on Tuesday, March 2, 2010, since this judgment is entered prior to the primary, in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 9-329b, the court hereby further orders that these candidates be removed from the ballot label.
This slate is identified as W. Michael Downes Slate in the certification of petition signatures filed by the Registrar with the Town City Clerk.