Opinion
No. CV 01 0456273 S
May 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS
Pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, the defendant State of Connecticut has moved to dismiss the present action on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff initiated the present matter essentially alleging that her spouse died as a result of being overworked by the defendant. The decedent, Frank J. Kinney, was a judge of the Superior Court who died of a heart attack on September 27, 1987. For several years following the decedent's death, the plaintiff filed various claims in administrative and judicial forums, including the Workers' Compensation Commission, to no avail. On August 1, 1994, the plaintiff filed a negligence claim with the Office of the Claims Commissioner seeking permission to file suit against the state. Although the plaintiff had failed to file the claim within the time constraints contained within General Statutes § 4-148 (a), the filing of said claim was authorized by the State Legislature pursuant to Special Act No. 94-13.
The Claims Commissioner rendered a decision on December 6, 2000, denying permission to sue. This decision was subsequently rejected by the State Legislature which passed House Joint Resolution No. 41, File No. 540, and permission to sue was authorized.
The defendant now maintains that Special Act No. 94-13, allowing the plaintiff to file her claim with the Claims Commissioner, is unconstitutional pursuant to Article First, Section One of the Connecticut Constitution. The defendant claims that the Act violates this section of the state constitution because it is a public emolument and serves no public purpose. Therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the Claims Commissioner was without jurisdiction to hear the claim, as the legislature was without jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff permission to sue.
A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person and (3) improper venue. "A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." Richardello v. Butka, 45 Conn. Sup. 336, 18 Conn.L.Rptr. 409 (1997); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544 (1991). "A motion to dismiss is used to assert jurisdictional flaws that appear on the record . . ." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien, 54 Conn. App. 178, 182 (1999), Bradley's Appeal from Probate, 19 Conn. App. 456, 461-62 (1989). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Darien, supra, at 183, Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 567 (1990). "It is the law in our courts, as it is in the federal courts, that [a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 309 (1998). It is well established principle that "the doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996); Amore v. Frankel, 228 Conn. 358, 364, 636 A.2d 786 (1994).
Frank J. Kinney, the decedent, died of a heart attack on September 27, 1987. Since his death, his widow, the administratrix of his estate, has received benefits as a surviving spouse of a superior court judge, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-51. Shortly after his death, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging that the decedent's heart attack was caused by work-induced stress. Although the workers' compensation commissioner initially awarded the plaintiff spousal survivorship benefits, in addition to those benefits provided to her pursuant to § 51-51, the Supreme Court ruled on November 28, 1989, that a judge of the superior court is not an employee for purposes of the workers' compensation act, but rather, is limited to the "comprehensive" benefit scheme established by the legislature for judges in General Statutes § 51-47 et seq., including pensions for surviving spouses and children, as set forth in § 51-51. Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 65, 566 A.2d 670 (1989).
Sec. 51-51. Pensions for surviving spouses and children of judges, family support magistrates and compensation commissioners.
(a) The surviving spouse of a deceased judge or of a compensation commissioner who commenced service as a judge or compensation commissioner prior to January 1, 1981, who died while holding judicial office or while holding the office of compensation commissioner or who died after retirement, shall receive, annually, for the rest of his or her natural life the following allowances:
(1) The surviving spouse of a person who was a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(2) The surviving spouse of a Chief Court Administrator who was a judge shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of Chief Court Administrator.
(3) The surviving spouse of a person who was an associate judge of the Supreme Court, shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of an associate judge of the Supreme Court.
(4) The surviving spouse of a person who was Chief Judge of the Appellate Court shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of Chief Judge of the Appellate Court.
(5) The surviving spouse of a judge of the Appellate Court shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of a judge of the Appellate Court.
(6) The surviving spouse of a Deputy Chief Court Administrator who was a judge shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of Deputy Chief Court Administrator.
(7) The surviving spouse of a person who was a judge of the Superior Court shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary for the office of a judge of the Superior Court.
(8) The surviving spouse of a deceased judge of the Court of Common Pleas, of the Circuit Court or of the Juvenile Court, shall receive annually, one-third of the salary for the office of Superior Court judge.
(9) The surviving spouse of a deceased compensation commissioner shall receive, annually, one-third of the salary of a compensation commissioner.
(b) The surviving spouse of a deceased judge of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Court or the Superior Court or of a family support magistrate or of a compensation commissioner who first commenced service as a judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner on or after January 1, 1981, and (1) who died while holding judicial office or the office of family support magistrate or compensation commissioner shall receive, annually, for the rest of his or her natural life, an allowance equal to one-third of the salary such judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner was receiving on the date of his or her death; or (2) who died after the judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner had retired shall receive, annually, for the rest of his or her natural life, an allowance equal to one-half of the retirement salary including any cost of living allowances the judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner was receiving on the date of his or her death.
(c) The surviving spouse of a deceased judge or of a family support magistrate or of a compensation commissioner who died after the judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner had resigned with a vested right to a retirement salary under the provisions of Section 51-49a, shall receive, annually, for the rest of his or her natural life, an allowance equal to one-half of the retirement salary the judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner would have received had he or she lived until he or she was so eligible.
(d) If a judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner leaves no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse dies before the youngest child of such judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner reaches the age of eighteen, the pension, if any, otherwise payable to his or her surviving spouse under this section shall be payable, until the youngest child reaches the age of eighteen, to the guardian of the child, for the support of such child and any other children of the judge, family support magistrate or compensation commissioner under the age of eighteen.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a surviving spouse or child who is receiving a pension under the provisions of any special act.
Following this decision, the plaintiff for several years pursued numerous legal avenues against the state in an attempt to obtain additional benefits, including a return to the workers' compensation review board, which ruled adversely to her; an appeal of that decision to the Appellate Court; a petition for certification to the Connecticut Supreme Court; and a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, all of which were denied. The plaintiff then initiated an action against the state in federal District Court, which was dismissed. This was followed by an appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an action in the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut, which was dismissed on December 18, 1992. On August 1, 1994, the plaintiff filed a negligence claim with the Office of the Claims Commissioner, seeking permission to sue the state. The plaintiff's claim alleged that the filing of the claim was authorized by Special Act No. 94-13.
During the proceedings before the claims commission, the state moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that Special Act 94-13 violated the public emolument provision of Article First, Section 1 of the state constitution. The claims commission denied the motion on the basis that the commission was not the proper forum to adjudicate constitutional issues.
After a hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's claim, the claims commissioner rendered a decision on December 6, 2000, over six years after the filing of the claim. The commissioner denied permission to sue, based on the facts that the decedent had received his salary for his hard work and his widow was receiving the legislatively mandated survivorship benefits upon the decedent's death. The legislature rejected the decision of the claims commissioner in House Joint Resolution No. 41, File No. 540 on May 1, 2001, and the permission for the plaintiff to sue the state was authorized. The plaintiff then filed a writ, summons and complaint in the superior court, bearing a return date of October 30, 2001, in which the plaintiff claims that the defendant acting through the Judicial Branch, was negligent in assigning excessive duties to Judge Kinney, causing the judge to develop stress and pressure resulting in medical complications to his coronary system, "including myocardial arteriosclerosis, which resulted in cardiovascular disease which caused his death." On November 29, 2001, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action.
The state's fundamental position is that the action of the legislature in enacting S.A. 94-13 violated Art. I, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution as a public emolument, serving no public purpose. The defendant argues that because the Claims Commissioner was without jurisdiction to hear the claim and because the legislature was without jurisdiction to grant permission to sue, the court now lacks jurisdiction over the matter based on sovereign immunity.
Conn. Const. Art. I., Sec. 1, reads as follows: "Sec. I. All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community."
The plaintiff's fundamental position is that the claims commissioner had jurisdiction to hear the claim because the Claims Commissioner, as a matter of law, cannot rule upon constitutional questions. The plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 4-148 (b), expressly permits the General Assembly to authorize a person to present a claim to the Claims Commissioner after the time limitations set forth in General Statutes § 4-148 (a) have expired, for the reasons set forth in Special Act No. 94-13. In Special Act No. 94-13 the General Assembly found that the plaintiff should be authorized to present her claim to the Claims Commissioner because of "compelling equitable circumstances and that Special Act No. 94-13 would serve a public purpose." Within the language of Special Act No. 94-13, the legislature specifically set forth a factual recitation of the history of the plaintiff's claim, which includes the substance of the plaintiff's allegations against the defendant. The plaintiff reasons further, that the General Assembly emphasized this point when it subsequently rejected the recommendation of the Claims Commissioner and authorized suit as set forth in House Joint Resolution No. 41, File No. 540. The plaintiff's position is that General Statutes § 4-148 (b), which expressly states, "such finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court," has nothing to do with special emoluments, but rather, applies to every citizen in Connecticut who seeks to utilize statutory procedures, and therefore, Special Act 94-13 serves a public purpose.
Sec. 4-148 (b) reads as follows:
(b) The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to present a claim to the Claims Commissioner after the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section have expired if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose. Such finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court.
Sec. 4-148 (a) reads as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no claim shall be presented under this chapter but within one year after it accrues. Claims for injury to person or damage to property shall be deemed to accrue on the date when the damage or injury is sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, provided no claim shall be presented more than three years from the date of the act or event complained of.
"The state and its employees acting in their employment capacity enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, unless such immunity is waived. Chapter 53 of the General Statutes, covering proceedings via the Claims Commissioner, is one example of a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. However, time limitations for filing claims, have been established in General Statutes § 4-148 (a). When one has not complied with the timeliness provisions, one can apply to the General Assembly for relief by special act, as provided in General Statutes § 4-148 (b). Relief may be granted if the legislature finds equitable circumstances and a public purpose. If there is no public purpose, then the special act violates the public emoluments clause." Lagassey v. State, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, No. CV01 0807201 S (Jan. 15, 2003) (Beach, J.), 33 Conn.L.Rptr. 715.
To prevail under article first, § 1, of our constitution, the defendant state must demonstrate that "the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual." State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862 (1952). If, however, an enactment serves a legitimate public purpose, then it will withstand a challenge under article first, § 1. Serrano v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 Conn. 437, 458-59, 664 A.2d 279 (1995); Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292, 294 A.2d 67 (1972). "Moreover, we conduct our review of [the special act] mindful that legislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and that a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984); see also Faraci v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168, 558 A.2d 234 (1989). Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 257-58, 690 A.2d 368 (1997).
In deciding whether Special Act 94-13 is constitutional, the court looks primarily to the decisions in Chotkowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 246; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 205, 558 A.2d 977 (1989); and Chotkowski v. State, 213 Conn. 13, 566 A.2d 419 (1989), for guidance.
Chapter 53 of the General Statutes establishes a procedure for presenting claims against the state to the Claims Commissioner and for obtaining a waiver of statutory immunity. General Statutes § 4-148 (a) provides that "no claim shall be presented under this chapter but within one year after it accrues" and "no claim shall be presented more than three years from the date of the act or event complained of." Since the right to bring a claim against the state is a statutory right in derogation of common law, observing the time limitation contained in § 4-148 (a) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to having the claim considered, and cannot be waived. Chotkowski v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 17-18, 19 n. 8; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 213, 558 A.2d 977 (1989); Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 231-33, 530 A.2d 1056 (1987); Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, 176 Conn. 497,504-06, 408 A.2d 254 (1979); Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 105, 355 A.2d 1 (1974).
The plaintiff's action alleges negligence of the state in assigning a heavy workload to the decedent, resulting in his death on September 28, 1987. Consequently, all actions of the state deemed negligent by the plaintiff, must have occurred, if at all, prior to this date. It is undisputed that the plaintiff's claim was filed with the Office of the Claims Commissioner nearly seven years later. Under ordinary circumstances, there would be little question that the plaintiff's claim was untimely and should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the legislature passed Special Act No. 94-13, § 1, waiving the time limitations of § 4-148 (a) for the plaintiff to file her claim before the Claims Commissioner, notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to comply with the statutory time and notice requirement.
The public emolument clause contained in Article First, Section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution provides as follows: "All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." This provision acts to prohibit the legislature from passing an act solely for the benefit of an individual without a public purpose. In Merly v. State, supra, 211 Conn. 212-13, the court discussed whether a public purpose is served by a Special Act of the legislature.
We have construed the provision of article first, 1 prohibiting "exclusive public emoluments or privileges" to apply to legislation preferring certain individuals over others when wholly unrelated to the public interest. "No enactment creating a preference can withstand constitutional attack if the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual. Its validity is contingent, at least in part, upon its furthering a public purpose; if enacted with that end in view, legislation can be sustained even though it may incidentally confer a direct benefit upon an individual or a class." State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862 (1952). "Only if an act serves some public purpose can it be constitutionally sufficient." Tough v. Ives., supra, 292.
The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of the constitutionality of a Special Act in Chotkowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 246. The court stated:
To prevail under article first, § 1, of our constitution, the state must demonstrate that "the sole objective of the General Assembly is to grant personal gain or advantage to an individual." State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862 (1952). If, however, an enactment serves a legitimate public purpose, then it will withstand a challenge under article first, § 1. Serrano v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 Conn. 437, 458-59, 664 A.2d 279 (1995); Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292, 294 A.2d 67 (1972). Moreover, we conduct our review of S.A. 91-8 mindful that "legislative enactments carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality, and that a party challenging the constitutionality of a validly enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 133, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984); see also Faraci v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 211 Conn. 166, 168, 558 A.2d 234 (1989). Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 257-58 (1997).
The scope of the court's review as to whether Special Act No. 94-13 serves a public purpose is limited. "[W]hat constitutes a public purpose is primarily a question for the legislature, and its determination should not be reversed by the court unless it is manifestly and palpably incorrect." Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 15, 98 A.2d 523 (1953); see also Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 345, 189 A.2d 399 (1963). "[W]e are not to assess [the constitutionality of an act] in the light of what we think of the wisdom and discernment of the law-making body in the particular instance. Rather we are bound to approach the question from the standpoint of upholding the legislation as a valid enactment unless there is no reasonable ground upon which it can be sustained." Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, see also Chotkowski v. State, 249 Conn. 259; Warner v. Gabb, 139 Conn. 310, 313, 93 A.2d 487 (1952). Thus, "if there be the least possibility that making the gift will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare, it becomes a question of policy and not of natural justice; and the determination of the legislature is conclusive." Lyman v. Adorno, supra, 133 Conn. 524. In other words, if we can discern "any conceivable justification for [the] challenged legislation from the public viewpoint"; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 205, 558 A.2d 977 (1989); we are bound to uphold it against a constitutional challenge predicated on article first, § 1. Chotkowski v. State, 249 Conn. 259.
After stressing that the legislature is to be accorded great deference in the consideration of what constitutes a public purpose, the court in Chotowski v. State, supra, 249 Conn. 246, stated:
Although [w]e have taken a broad view of the legislative goals that may constitute a "public purpose"; Beccia v. Waterbury, supra, 192 Conn. 134; "[b]ecause the elements of a public purpose vary as much as the circumstance in which the term is appropriate, each case must be determined on its own peculiar facts." Tough v. Ives, supra, 162 Conn. 292. In general, however, we have found "that an act serves a public purpose under article first, § 1, when it promote[s] the welfare of the state . . ., or when the principal reason for the appropriation is to benefit the public . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beccia v. Waterbury, supra, 134; Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corp., supra, 167 Conn. 117. Furthermore, an enactment will be deemed to serve a valid public purpose, even though it confers a direct benefit upon a particular individual, if it remedies an injustice done to that individual for which the state itself bears responsibility. Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 189, 198 A. 746 (1938); see also Chotkowski v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 18; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 213-14; Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, 176 Conn. 497, 506-07, 408 A.2d 254 (1979); Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 108-09, 355 A.2d 1 (1974). In such circumstances, the benefit conferred upon a private party by the legislature can be viewed as incidental to the overarching public interest that is served in remedying an injustice caused by the state. Fn. 18, Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 259-60 (1997).
By contrast, we have consistently held that legislation seeking to remedy a procedural default for which the state is not responsible does not serve a public purpose and, accordingly, runs afoul of article first, § 1, of the state constitution. See, e.g., Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 214; Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, supra, 176 Conn. 506-07; Hillier v. East Hartford, supra, 167 Conn. 108-09. Thus, legislation cannot survive a constitutional challenge under article first, § 1, if it excuses a party's failure to comply with a statutory notice requirement simply because the noncompliance precludes consideration of the merits of the party's claim. Merly v. State, supra, 214; Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, supra, 506-07; Hillier v. East Hartford, supra, 108-09. As we stated in Chotkowski II, supra, 213 Conn. 18, if a statutory notice requirement "could be set aside for the benefit of a particular person simply because the legislature viewed his claim as meritorious, it would be difficult to justify enforcing [the requirement] to bar any claim . . . from being resolved solely on its merits." Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 260 n. 18 (1997).
The plaintiff claims that the trial court lacks authority to consider the propriety of the legislative finding that S.A. 94-13 serves a public purpose because such review is barred by § 4-148 (b), which provides in pertinent part that "[s]uch finding shall not be subject to review by the superior court." The plaintiff maintains that this legislative prohibition against judicial review is valid because § 4-148 (b) deals with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and "[i]t is a matter for the legislature, not this court, to determine when our state's sovereign immunity should be waived." Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558, 534 A.2d 888 (1987). The court disagrees.
"Because an enactment must serve a valid public purpose in order to avoid the prohibition against the granting of `exclusive public emoluments and privileges' contained in article first, § 1, of the state constitution, the determination of whether an enactment serves such a purpose is necessarily one of constitutional magnitude. It is the court's duty to ensure that legislative action falls within constitutional boundaries; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 27, 355 A.2d 49 (1974); even if that action involves a waiver of the immunity from suit enjoyed by the state under the common law. Consequently, the legislature cannot `by mere fiat or finding, make public a truly private purpose' . . . Its findings and statements about what is or is not `public' cannot be binding upon the court." Chotkowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 259, 260; Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corp., supra, 167 Conn. 116 n. 2. "Accordingly, § 4-148 (b) would be constitutionally infirm to the extent that it were construed to shield from judicial review a legislative determination that its enactment meets the requirements of article first, § 1, of our state constitution." Chotkowski v. State, supra, 249 Conn. 258-59.
The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). The court seeks to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. "In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . ." Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 741, 785 A.2d 197 (2001). "Thus, this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity. Thus, we do not follow the plain meaning rule." Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 61 (2003).
"In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute." Id. at 61-62.
"This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extratextual sources of meaning will have to be in order to yield a different meaning." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, 263 Conn. 39, 61 (2003); quoting State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577-78 (2003).
Special Act 94-13, § 1 (substitute bill 5657) reads in its entirety:
(a) Notwithstanding the failure to file a proper notice of a claim against the state with the clerk of the office of the claims commissioner, as required by Section 4-147 of the general statutes, within the time limitations specified by subsection (a) of Section 4-148 of the general statutes, and notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (c) of said Section 4-148 barring the presentment of a claim once considered by the claims commissioner, by the general assembly or in a judicial proceeding, Joan A. Kinney is authorized pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of said Section 4-148 to present her claim against the state to the claims commissioner, provided she files a notice of such claim with the clerk of the office of the claims commissioner in accordance with said Section 4-147 not later than October 1, 1994.
(b) The general assembly finds: That Joan A. Kinney is the widow of Frank J. Kinney, Jr.; that Frank J. Kinney, Jr. was a judge of the superior court who died from a heart attack on September 28, 1987; that Frank J. Kinney, Jr., at the time of his death, in addition to his judicial responsibilities, was the presiding criminal and administrative judge for the judicial district of New Haven, the chief administrative judge of the criminal division of the superior court and the chairman of the Commission to Study Alternate Sentences; that Joan A. Kinney filed a workers' compensation claim against the state alleging that the decedent's fatal heart condition was causally related to work-induced stress; that the workers' compensation commissioner for the third district decided that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of his employment and awarded Joan A. Kinney the maximum allowable spousal survivorship benefits; that the state appealed the decision to the compensation review division; that the state appealed not on the issue of causation but on whether a judge is an employee for workers' compensation purposes; that the compensation review division reserved the questions of law for the advice of the appellate court; that the supreme court transferred the reservation to itself; that the supreme court on November 28, 1989, in Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, decided that a judge is not an employee for purposes of entitlement to workers' compensation benefits; that a subsequent hearing in the compensation review division was decided adversely to Joan A. Kinney, as was the appeal of that decision to the appellate court, and the petition for certification for appeal from the appellate court was denied by the supreme court on May 10, 1990, in Kinney v. State, 215 Conn. 807; that a petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court; that an action against the state in federal District Court was decided adversely to Joan A. Kinney and, upon appeal of that decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court; that an action in superior court was dismissed on the grounds of sovereign immunity; and that Joan A. Kinney failed to timely file a notice of claim against the state with the claims commissioner because she initially prevailed in her claim for workers' compensation benefits and then was forced to litigate her claim to benefits when the state appealed that award. The general assembly further finds it would be just and equitable to authorize Joan A. Kinney to present her claim against the state to the claims commissioner, that there are compelling equitable circumstances to support such authorization and that such authorization would serve a public purpose by not penalizing a person who exhausts his or her administrative and judicial remedies before filing a claim against the state with the claims commissioner.
(c) The state shall be barred from setting up the failure to comply with the provisions of Sections 4-147 and 4-148 of the general statutes, from denying that notice of the claim was properly and timely given pursuant to said Sections 4-147 and 4-148 and from setting up the fact that the claim had once been considered by the claims commissioner, by the general assembly or in a judicial proceeding as defenses to such claim.
In reviewing the language of Special Act No. 94-13 the General Assembly did make the conclusions required by § 4-148 (b) that it would be "just and equitable" to authorize the plaintiff to present her claims to the Claims Commissioner due to "compelling equitable circumstances." Special Act No. 94-13 additionally recites that "such authorization would serve a public purpose by not penalizing a person who exhausts his or her administrative remedy before filing a claim against the state with the claims commissioner." The court turns to the extratextual sources of the legislative history and legislative debate to discern what the stated "compelling equitable circumstances" and "public purpose" were that the legislature relied upon in passing Special Act No. 94-13.
The primary reason for the plaintiff's failure to file a timely claim with the Claims Commissioner pursuant to § 4-148 (a) is because the plaintiff chose to pursue her claim through Workers' Compensation. The initial choice of an improper forum to bring an action normally would not create an equitable exception to a statute of limitations period. Wetzel v. Thorne, 202 Conn. 561, 522 A.2d 288 (1987); Duquay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 464 A.2d 45 (1983). Good faith actions of petitioners and personal hardship do not constitute an equitable basis for granting an exception, Wetzel v. Thorne, supra, 202 Conn. 566; despite the fact that a claim may be meritorious or that the state may have some alleged "honorary obligation" to a claimant. See Chotkowski v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 18-19; Tough v. Ives, supra, 162 Conn. 294. "It is inevitable that such a limitation does defeat some worthy claims that have not been timely presented, as the legislature must have realized when it enacted § 4-148 (a). Our state constitution ban on awarding `exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community' is indifferent to the wisdom of such a limitation as contained in § 4-148 (a), but insists that, so long as it remains, it must be applied uniformly to all claimants." Chotkowski v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 18-19.
The legislature in enacting the Special Act No. 94-13, § 1, stated that a public purpose would be served "by not penalizing a person who exhausts his or her administrative and judicial remedies before filing a claim against the state with the Claims Commissioner." Given the decisions regarding the choice of an improper forum as noted in Wetzel v. Thorne, supra, 202 Conn. 561, and Duquay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, the court must review the entire record of the legislative proceedings to find justification for a public purpose.
In this case, the legislature, acting on the basis of undisputed testimony detailing the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's failure to file a claim within the period prescribed by § 4-148 (a); see Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, 1994 Sess., pp. 1092-7; found that the plaintiff had failed to comply with § 4-148 (a). The Judiciary Committee also heard testimony that there had been at least two occasions prior to the decision in Kinney v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 54, where members of the judiciary had been paid medical benefits as a result of filing Workers' Compensation claims. In neither case did the state contest the payment of these benefits.
Representative Lawlor on March 17, 1994, commented that, "if there ever was a public servant who met his death because of the amount of time he spent on the job, it was Judge Kinney." "There couldn't be a more compelling case of work-related death in my opinion and I would certainly support this initiative to test out the theory of negligence on the part of the state."
Speaking before the House of Representatives on April 19, 1994 (at page 2366) Representative Ward stated, "[m]any of us at least wouldn't have anticipated that you could not, as a judge, make a Workers' Compensation claim. Since that is not the case, it's appropriate for this unique set of circumstances to be considered by the Claims Commissioner."
Finally on May 4, 1994 the State Senate debated Special Act No. 94-13 § 1 (File No. 419, Substitute for House Bill 5657). Senator Jepsen commented that "one of the proper functions of our state is to show reasonableness and humanity . . ." Senator Looney stated that "there are some unique and unusual circumstances in which an action was initially pursued as an alternative to filing a claim." "It was not in anyway a case of sleeping on one's rights."
The testimony before the Judiciary Committee and remarks by Representative Ward, Representative Lawlor, and Senator Looney can be interpreted as taking into account the fact that on at least two occasions prior to the death of Judge Kinney, the state did not contest the payment of Workers' Compensation medical benefits to judges who filed claims. Said testimony and remarks can also be interpreted that the state misled the plaintiff into choosing this particular forum by the state's non-opposition and inaction to regarding prior claims by judges. The state apparently did not seek an injunction to prevent the Workers' Compensation Commissioner from proceeding to hear the merits of the plaintiff's claim. While this court is not in a position to verify the accuracy or truth of witness testimony regarding the honoring of previous workers' compensation claims by judges, it appears that the members of the legislature did take this testimony into account when passing Special Act No. 94-13, § 1.
The record is clear that the plaintiff initially prevailed in her quest for spousal survivorship benefits through the Workers' Compensation Commission after a hearing on the merits. The state, thereafter, appealed that award to the compensation review division, which reserved the questions of law to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the reservation was transferred to the Supreme Court, which issued its decision in Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 566 A.2d 670 (1989), a case of first impression, which denied the plaintiff's claim by ruling that a judge of the Superior Court is not an "employee" for the purposes of entitlement to workers' compensation as defined by General Statutes § 31-275 (9). Here the challenged special act seeks to remedy an inequity that the legislature rationally concluded has resulted from the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the prior conduct of state officials in not contesting previous claims for workers' compensation benefits by judges. See Chotkowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 262.
Sec. 31-275 (9) reads as follows:
(9) (A) "Employee" means any person who:
(i) Has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether the contract contemplated the performance of duties within or without the state;
(ii) Is a sole proprietor or business partner who accepts the provisions of this chapter in accordance with subdivision (10) of this section;
(iii) Is elected to serve as a member of the General Assembly of this state;
(iv) Is a salaried officer or paid member of any police department or fire department;
(v) Is a volunteer police officer, whether the officer is designated as special or auxiliary, upon vote of the legislative body of the town, city or borough in which the officer serves; or
(vi) Is an elected or appointed official or agent of any town, city or borough in the state, upon vote of the proper authority of the town, city or borough, including the elected or appointed official or agent, irrespective of the manner in which he is appointed or employed. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as affecting any existing rights as to pensions which such persons or their dependents had on July 1, 1927, or as preventing any existing custom of paying the full salary of any such person during disability due to injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.
(B) "Employee" shall not be construed to include:
(i) Any person to whom articles or material are given to be treated in any way on premises not under the control or management of the person who gave them out;
(ii) One whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business;
(iii) A member of the employer's family dwelling in his house; but, if, in any contract of insurance, the wages or salary of a member of the employer's family dwelling in his house is included in the payroll on which the premium is based, then that person shall, if he sustains an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, be deemed an employee and compensated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter;
(iv) Any person engaged in any type of service in or about a private dwelling provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week;
(v) An employee of a corporation who is a corporate officer and who elects to be excluded from coverage under this chapter by notice in writing to his employer and to the commissioner; or
(vi) Any person who is not a resident of this state but is injured in this state during the course of his employment, unless such person (I) works for an employer who has a place of employment or a business facility located in this state at which such person spends at least fifty per cent of his employment time, or (II) works for an employer pursuant to an employment contract to be performed primarily in this state.
In applying our rules of statutory construction set forth in State v. Courchesne, supra, 262 Conn. 537, the court discerns that the legislature recognized the unique circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's claim; that the state after choosing not to challenge prior determinations that judges were covered by workers' compensation, chose to appeal the plaintiff's claim in a case of first impression. The legislature intended that the plaintiff not be punished for selecting the forum of the Workers' Compensation Commission under the unsettled circumstances surrounding the choice of forum question which confronted the plaintiff at the time of her husband's death.
"An enactment will be deemed to serve a valid public purpose, even though it confers a direct benefit upon a particular individual, if it remedies an injustice done to that individual for which the state itself bears responsibility. Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 189, 198 A. 746 (1938); see also Chotkowski v. State, supra, 213 Conn. 18; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 213-14; Vecchio v. Sewer Authority, 176 Conn. 497, 506-07, 408 A.2d 254 (1979); Hillier v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 108-09, 355 A.2d 1 (1974). "In such circumstances, the benefit conferred upon a private party by the legislature be viewed as incidental to the overarching public interest that is served in remedying an injustice caused by the state." Chotkowski v. State, supra, 240 Conn. 259-60.
The court is also cognizant of the remarks of the legislature during debate that the plaintiff's allegations that the decedent was worked to death deserved to be tested under a theory of negligence. The legislature is sending a message to the public, employees and employers that those who go above and beyond the line of duty and indeed work so hard as to endanger their health, are persons that the state must recognize in order to foster worker productivity and worker morale, and that workers everywhere, who give more than their jobs require, will not receive short shrift from the state. The question of whether an employer can be held negligent for allegedly "overworking" an employee is in itself a public policy question that the legislature is looking to the courts to resolve.
The legislature's assertion that Special Act 94-13, § 1 serves a valid public purpose for the above-stated reasons is proper in deciding whether Special Act No. 94-13, § 1 passes the test for constitutionality. If the court can discern "any conceivable justification for [the] challenged legislation from the public viewpoint"; Merly v. State, 211 Conn. 199, 205, 558 A.2d 977 (1989); we are bound to uphold it against a constitutional challenge predicated on article first, § 1. Chotkowski v. State, 249 Conn. 259.
The court finds that the conclusions of the legislature are supported by the testimony presented to the legislature and further supported by remarks of various legislators during the debate on the merits of Special Act No. 94-13. The court cannot conclude, therefore, that the legislature's findings and conclusions are manifestly and palpably incorrect. Id. at 261.
The court also notes that the legislature further emphasized its findings and its intent when the decision of the Claims Commissioner denying the plaintiff permission to sue, was rejected subsequent to the passage of Special Act No. 94-13 § 1. After the denial of permission to sue by the Commissioner, House Joint Resolution No. 41, File No. 540, was passed rejecting the Claims Commissioner's denial and granting the plaintiff authority to sue the state.
House Joint Resolution No. 41 reads in its entirety as follows:
Resolved by this Assembly:
That the recommendation of the Claims Commissioner, file number 15029 of said commissioner, that no award be granted to Joan A. Kinney on her claim against the state in excess of seven thousand five hundred dollars and that permission to sue be denied, is rejected and Joan A. Kinney is authorized to institute and prosecute to final judgment an action against the state to recover damages for the death of Frank J. Kinney, Jr.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity and the defendant's further claim that Special Act No. 94-13, § 1 is a public emolument serving no public purpose, is hereby denied.
The Court
By: Judge Richard E. Arnold