Opinion
No. LT73668/16.
04-07-2017
KINGSTON HEIGHTS APARTMENTS, Petitioner, v. Laquisha HURDLE, Respondent.
Gutman Mintz Baker & Sonnenfeldt, PC, New Hyde Park. Vance Gathing, Esq., Veterans Justice Project of Brooklyn Legal Services, Brooklyn.
Gutman Mintz Baker & Sonnenfeldt, PC, New Hyde Park.
Vance Gathing, Esq., Veterans Justice Project of Brooklyn Legal Services, Brooklyn.
SUSAN F. AVERY, J.
BRIEF HISTORY
Petitioner commenced this proceeding based upon the contention that the "[r]espondent Laquisha Hurdle entered into occupancy of the premises without the knowledge, consent or permission of the [l]andlord.... Moreover, it is believed that they (sic ) entered into occupancy pursuant to a license granted by the preceding tenant of record, Sharon Tribble, who is deceased" and that said license was terminated upon the death of the tenant of record. The premises which is the subject of this action is 28 MacDonough Street, Apartment 3K, Brooklyn, New York 11216.
Petition dated June 6, 2016 at ¶ 2.
Petition dated June 6, 2016 at ¶¶ 4 and 5.
It is petitioner's contention that the "tenant of record, Sharon Tribble, died on or about April 1, 2016" and that the "[r]espondent is not an immediate family member of the deceased tenant, or if [r]espondent is a family member, [r]espondent was not listed on the income recertification and/or did not reside with the prior tenant, for the two years prior to the death of the tenant of record, nor has [r]espondent's occupancy received approval from the Department of Housing and Urban Development [ ("HUD") ] and/or the landlord."
Petition dated June 6, 2016 at ¶ 3.
Petition dated June 6, 2016 at ¶ 5.
Respondent appeared through counsel and filed an answer, which included numerous defenses, including a succession defense.
The premises which is the subject of this action, is subject to the "project based" section 8 subsidy which is overseen by HUD.
A "project-based" subsidy is associated with a specific dwelling unit and remains with the unit when the tenant vacates. In contrast, a "tenant-based" subsidy is a portable voucher which a tenant can use to pay rent on any apartment, within certain limits, in the United States, Klein v. Rhea, 39 Misc.3d 1216(A) (Sup Ct N.Y. County [Stallman, J., 2013] ).
THE INSTANT APPLICATION
By notice of motion dated September 15, 2016, respondent seeks an order dismissing the instant proceeding based on the contention that she is the successor tenant to the tenant of record, who is her mother or alternatively dismissing the proceeding because the petitioner failed to follow HUD prerequisites prior to commencing the instant action.
Petitioner opposes the motion.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT: SUCCESSION CLAIMS
The respondent asserts that she is a disabled veteran and has been residing at the premises which is the subject of this action since 1985. She states that since she initially moved into the subject premises in 1985, she has never had any other address except the subject premises. The respondent also states that during her tours of active military duty she did receive correspondence at Army base(s) at which she was stationed. The respondent also states that the petitioner did not properly name her in this proceeding, as her name is Laclesha Tribble. Indeed, annexed to the respondent's moving papers as exhibit 8, is a copy of her birth certificate, which clearly shows that the respondent's birth name is Laclesha Tribble. As Ms. Laclesha Tribble is entitled to be addressed by her proper name, this court will refer to her as Ms. Laclesha Tribble, movant or respondent.
Affidavit of Ms. Laclesha Tribble, sworn to on September 8, 2016 at ¶ 9.
Affidavit of Ms. Laclesha Tribble, sworn to on September 8, 2016 at ¶¶ 3, 6 and 7.
Affidavit of Laclesha Tribble, sworn to on September 8, 2016 at ¶ 4.
Affidavit of Laclesha Tribble, sworn to on September 8, 2016 at ¶ 5.
In support of her assertions that she has continuously resided at the subject premises, since 1985, Ms. Laclesha Tribble annexes a health care proxy dated July 14, 2015, executed by her mother, the tenant of record, appointing the respondent as her mother's health care agent. The document states that Ms. Laclesha Tribble's address is "28 MacDonough Street, Apartment 3K, Brooklyn, New York." Respondent also annexes a letter from the Department of Veterans Affairs ("DVA") dated September 8, 2016, summarizing the benefits that she has earned as a result of her service to this country. The letter is addressed to her at 28 MacDonough Street, Apartment 3K, Brooklyn, New York and states that the letter is provided "to assist disabled veterans when applying for benefits." The letter also states that her disabilities are 80% related to her service of this country.
Respondent's exhibit 9 at ¶ 1.
Respondent's exhibit 9 at ¶ 10.
Respondent's exhibit 9 at ¶ 10, fifth line from the bottom.
Respondent also attaches a "dd 204" form which is generated upon her completion of service. The document is dated August 1, 2014. The document states that the respondent's "home of record at time of entry" into service was: "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216" and that the date her tour of duty commenced was July 26, 2007. The document also states that she separated from her final tour of duty on August 29, 2014. The document also lists the respondent's mailing address, after her separation from service as "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216." Additionally, the document lists Ms. Sharon Tribble as respondent's "nearest relative" and lists Ms. Sharon Tribble's address as "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216." Additionally, the document states that upon her separation from service, Ms. Laclesha Tribble was honorably discharged and that during her service she was awarded numerous commendations, medals and decorations.
Respondent's exhibit 12.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 7b.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 12a.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 12b.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 19a.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 19b.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 19a.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at boxes 23 and 24.
Respondent's exhibit 12 at box 13.
Additional documents annexed to the respondent's motion, all contained within exhibit 12, which all list her address as "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216" include a DVA "Certificate of Eligibility" dated January 14, 2015; a DVA claims decision dated April 16, 2015; a DVA payment stub dated March 21, 2016; a letter from the Defense Finance Accounting Service dated June 9, 2015; a letter from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs dated December 21, 2014, thanking her for her service; a bank statement dated January 4, 2014; a letter from DVA dated February 26, 2015; a letter from USAA Federal Savings Bank dated January 8, 2014 regarding a completed investigation; as well as additional bank account statements for periods from February 2015 through April 2016.
Also annexed to the respondent's exhibit 12 is a bill requesting payment for renters and automobile insurance dated July 18, 2010 addressed to "Laclesha W Tribble SGT USA" at "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216."
Respondent asserts that she is entitled to succeed to her mother's tenancy as she has resided at the premises since 1985, when her mother initially entered possession of the premises. It is respondent's contention that her temporary absence from the premises when she was on active military duty serving our country, does not negatively affect her residency at 28 MacDonough Street. Respondent also attaches an affidavit from a childhood friend who states: "I have been a close friend of Laclesha Tribble since we were 12 years old. I see her at least weekly and also saw her mother regularly until she passed. Sharon Tribble and her daughter, Laclesha Tribble, lived together at 28 MacDough Street No.3K in Brooklyn New York until Laclesha's mother pass[ed] and except during her enlistment in the Army.... Laclesha Tribble has lived at 28 MacDonough Street, # 3K, and nowhere else."
Affidavit of Ms. Crystal Goodwin, sworn to on January 18, 2017, at ¶ 2.
Affidavit of Ms. Crystal Goodwin, sworn to on January 18, 2017, at ¶ 3.
Respondent also argues that because she is disabled, she was only required to reside with the tenant of record, her mother, for a one (1) year period prior to her mother's passing.
PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION
It is petitioner's contention that the respondent's motion for summary judgment must be denied. Petitioner asserts that the respondent has failed to state a claim for succession. Alternatively, the petitioner argues that issues of fact as to the respondent's succession defense have been raised, which precludes granting summary judgment in the respondent's favor.
Petitioner contends that the respondent is not entitled to succeed to the premises following the death of her mother because she was never listed on the yearly income recertifications that her mother submitted to management, and that the documentation annexed to the respondent's motion is insufficient to demonstrate that the respondent is entitled to succeed to the premises.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated November 9, 2016 at ¶ 6.
The petitioner argues that the respondent "failed to prove that the subject premises was her primary residence prior to entering the military service ..." and failed to provide "any proof regarding her residency in 2002 prior to her enlisting in military service." It is the petitioner's assertion that because her last tour of duty terminated in August of 2014, and the tenant of record passed away in April of 2016, respondent's succession defense fails because the respondent is unable to demonstrate that she resided at the premises with her mother for the statutorily required two (2) year minimum period.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated November 9, 2016 at ¶ 7.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated November 9, 2016 at ¶ 7.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated November 9, 2016 at ¶ 7.
Annexed to the petitioner's opposition, are the following exhibits: exhibit 1, which is a copy of a lease agreement dated April 21, 2010, which is addressed to Ms. Sharon Tribble at the subject premises, and also signed by Ms. Sharon Tribble; exhibit 2, which is a copy of a document entitled "Owner's Certification of Compliance with HUD's Tenant Eligibility and Rent Procedures" and is dated January 17, 2014; exhibit 3, which is a copy of a document entitled "Lease Agreement" dated March 1, 2016; exhibit 4, which is a copy of a document entitled "Owner's Certification of Compliance with HUD's Tenant Eligibility and Rent Procedures" dated January 21, 2016. The court notes, and it is not disputed, that the documents relate to Ms. Sharon Tribble and make no mention of Ms. Laclesha Tribble.
Additionally, annexed to the petitioner's opposition as exhibit 5 is a copy of a document from the "U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development" ("HUD Handbook") "Issued: March 30, 2010" and "Expires: March 31, 2011" and the stated "SUBJECT" (sic ) of the document is "Effective Use of the Enterprise Income Verification (EIV) System's Deceased Tenants Report to Reduce Subsidy Payment & Administrative Errors." In its supplemental opposition, the petitioner annexes the updated and unexpired HUD Handbook.
Annexed to the petitioner's opposition as exhibit 6, are copies of the pleadings, predicate notices and service affidavits; and annexed to the petitioner's opposition as exhibit 7 are two (2) documents. The first document is one (1) page and the second document is three (3) pages. The one (1) page document bears the heading "Shinda Management Corporation" and bears a title of "NY Split Ledger Balance As Of: 11/7/2016" the document bears the name "Lakisha Hurdle" with an address of "305 Decatur Street, Apt 3H, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11216." The three (3) page document also bears the heading "Shinda Management Corporation." This document is titled "Resident Ledger" and is dated November 7, 2016. The document also bears the name "Lakisha Hurdle" with an address of "305 Decatur Street, Apt 3H, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11216."
To support that the respondent does not have a claim of succession rights, petitioner annexes the affidavit of Keturiah Smith, which states that the affiants "knowledge is premised on daily management of and oversight ... [of] 28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216."
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 3.
The affidavit states that the subject apartment is "subject to HUD regulation [s and located] in a project based section 8 building. The affidavit also states that "Sharon Tribble was the sole household member for the subject premises" which is demonstrated by "[e]xhibits ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4.’ "
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 4.
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 5.
Additionally, the affidavit states that the "HUD handbook" annexed to petitioner's opposition as "exhibit 5" "explicitly sets forth eligibility criteria for an individual [to succeed] ... [as] head of household [which] requires that ... [the] remaining family member must be a party named in the lease ... [t]o continue in occupancy after the vacatur and/or death of the head of household." According to the affidavit, "[t]his court is bound by the explicit HUD regulations ... [which] dictate that the respondent's absence from the lease at the time of the tenant of record's death precludes her from succeeding to the tenancy .... [and] there are no exceptions to this policy and procedure. "
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 7.
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶¶ 7 and 8 (emphasis in the original ).
Additionally, the affidavit in opposition submitted by the petitioner, states that "arrears for outstanding use and occupancy ... total $1,432.31 through November [of] 2016." The affidavit refers to exhibit 6 to support the claim for outstanding arrears.
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 12.
It is petitioner's contention that "Sharon Tribble was the sole household member for the subject premises. The [r]espondent was never listed on the lease or the annual recertifications for the subject premises. See Exhibits ‘2’ ‘3’ and ‘4’ ".
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 5.
THE LAW
Under federal regulations, "[a] ‘family member’ who has lived with a subsidized tenant for a significant period of time is entitled to succeed to the deceased tenant's Section 8 subsidy (if otherwise eligible) instead of starting as a new applicant at the bottom of the several-year waiting list for Section 8 payments." Pursuant to HPD rules and regulations, to qualify for succession rights in the subject apartment, an occupant must either be approved from a waiting list, or must qualify as a family member who had co-occupied the apartment with the tenant of record for at least two [ (2) ] years prior to the vacatur of that tenant, however, "[t]his time period is reduced to one [ (1) ] year if the occupant is a senior citizen or disabled."
Evans v. Franco, 246 A.D.2d 377 (1st Dept [1998] ).
28 RCNY § 3–02[p].
Manhattan Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of City of NY, 3 Misc.3d 717 (Sup Ct N.Y. County [Richter, J., 2004] ) affd 8 AD3d 111 (1st Dept [2004] ).
The regulations, provide that "[t]he failure of the family member who is seeking to succeed to possession of the apartment to appear on the appropriate income affidavits creates a presumption that he or she did not reside in the apartment as a primary residence. The presumption created by this regulation could be overcome if the applicant could prove by other evidence that he or she in fact resided in the apartment for the requisite period. "The burden of proof is on said family member to show use of the apartment as his or her primary residence during the required period to be eligible to succeed to possession."
Manhattan Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of City of NY, 3 Misc.3d 717 (Sup Ct N.Y. County [Richter, J., 2004] ) affd 8 AD3d 111 (1st Dept [2004] ).
See Chinatown Apartments, Inc. v. Lee, 168 Misc.2d 990 (Civ Ct N.Y. County [Madden, J., 1995] )"the present regulations create a presumption, based upon the failure to list family members on annual income affidavits, that the individuals did not reside in the premises as their primary residence. 28 RCNY 3–02(p)(3). Presumptions are rebuttable ..."
28 RCNY § 3–02[p][3].
The absence of a family member's name on the lease or income recertification documents is not fatal to that [ ] family member's succession claim, as "[t]he failure of a family member to be listed on annual certification forms is only one factor to be considered in determining whether that family member is entitled to succeed to the Section 8 subsidy ..." "the touchstone of succession to a project-based Section 8 tenancy is the legitimacy of respondent's occupancy as a member of the family unit at the time of the tenant of record's death, and not the accuracy of one [ (1) ] or more HUD forms."
Los Tres Unidos Associates, LP v. Colon, 45 Misc.3d 129[A] (App Term 1st Dept [2014] ).
28 Chinatown Apartments, Inc. v. Lee, 168 Misc.2d 990 (Civ Ct N.Y. County [Madden, J., 1995] ) ; see also RCNY § 3–02[p][3].
Bronx 361 Realty, LLC v. Quinones, 26 Misc.3d 1231[A] (Civ Ct Bx County [Madhaven, J., 2010] ).
The rational that the failure of a family member to be listed on annual certification forms is only one (1) factor to be considered in determining a succession claim, and not the sole determinative factor, is because the "[r]espondent derives her interest in the apartment ... from her mother's tenancy. Yet, if respondent's allegations are true, she ... ha[s] independent federal rights to continued occupancy. Respondent's mother had no authority to alienate th[ose] rights...."
Morrisania II Assocs. v. Harvey, 139 Misc.2d 651 (Civ Ct N.Y. County [Stalman, J., 1988] ).
Indeed, in Valley Dream Hous. Co., Inc. v. Schmidt, the court dismissed "a holdover proceeding, ‘heard on submitted facts' where the daughter of deceased tenant of record in project-based Section 8 building, demonstrated that she had succession rights to her mother's apartment, even though she had not been listed on annual income affidavits. In that case, the court noted that in "Amsterdam Avenue Housing Associates v. Estate of Almeda Wells the [c]ourt held that ‘the absence of [an occupant's] name on the family composition document was not fatal to her succession claim otherwise established by the trial evidence.’ The ... decision ... cautions lower courts to follow such decisions and precedents of higher courts."
16 Misc.3d 1138[A] (Dist Ct Nassau County [Fairgrieve, J., 2007] ).
Valley Dream Hous. Co., Inc v. Schmidt, 16 Misc.3d 1138[A] (Dist Ct Nassau County [Fairgrieve, J., 2007] ).
10 Misc.3d 142 (App Term 1st Dept [2006] ),
cf Greater Centennial Homes Hous. Dev. Fund Co. Inc. v. Thomas, 50 Misc.3d 1214(A) (City Ct Mt Vernon [Seiden, J., 2016] )"[a]lthough some courts have held that the absence of respondent's name from the re-certification and lease amendments does not bar a succession claim, it is clear from a review of those cases that the decisions were fact specific and were compelled by the courts' desire to render decisions that were based upon their inherent sense of justice rather than following the letter of the law."
"Indeed, neither section 8 nor its implementing regulations mandates that a tenant's failure to list an occupant on the recertification form be accorded preclusive effect against a tenant's survivors. To the extent that lease provisions can be read to the contrary, they are in conflict with the intent of the Federal law."
All. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Garcia, 53 Misc.3d 1215(A) (Civ Ct Bx County [Lutwak, J., 2016] ).
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW AND THE FACTS
The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence in admissible form to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action; mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient.
Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853 ( [1985] ) ; Zuckerman v. New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 ( [1980] ).
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 ( [1986] ) ; Zuckerman v. New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 ( [1980] ).
In the case at bar, the respondent has presented sufficient evidence to meet her initial burden on this motion. The birth certificate annexed to respondent's moving papers demonstrate that the tenant of record, is her mother. Additionally, the affidavits from respondent, and her childhood friend coupled with the documents annexed to the respondent's motion, including: the health care proxy executed by her mother; the DVA letter; the "dd 204" form; the DVA "Certificate of Eligibility" dated January 14, 2015; the DVA claims decision dated April 16, 2015; the DVA payment stub dated March 21, 2016; the letter from the Defense Finance Accounting Service dated June 9, 2015; the letter from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs dated December 21, 2014, the letter from DVA dated February 26, 2015; the letter from USAA Federal Savings Bank dated January 8, 2014; bank account statements for periods from January 2014 through April 2016 and a bill requesting payment for renters and automobile insurance dated July 18, 2010, corroborate the respondent's succession claim.
See All. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Garcia, 53 Misc.3d 1215(A) (Civ Ct Bx County [Lutwak, J., 2016] )"the familial relationship at issue in the earlier case was mother-daughter, which is easily proven with the [submission of the] daughter's birth certificate."
See, e.g., Classic Props, LP v. Martinez, 168 Misc.2d 514 (App Term 1st Dept [1996] ) ; Hazel Towers Co., LP v. Gonzalez, 41 Misc.3d 1230[A] (Civ Ct Bx County [Vargas, J., 2013] ).
Moreover, the DVA letter dated September 8, 2016 states that she is a disabled veteran and that her disabilities are 80% related to her service of this country. Accordingly, having separated from her final tour of duty in August of 2014, she was only required to reside with her mother, the tenant of record for one (1) year prior to her mother's passing on April 1, 2016, which was demonstrated by respondent's submission.
This court finds that the petitioner's assertion that the documents annexed to the respondent's moving papers, at most, demonstrate that she merely used the apartment as a mailing address and not a residence, to be purely speculative and unsupported by any facts and insufficient to raise a triable issue.
"Plaintiff presented no evidence [to support] ... its claim ... and mere conclusions, expressions of hope, or unsubstantiated assertions are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment" Tchaika Renewal Co., Ltd. v. City of New York, 232 A.D.2d 250 (1st Dept [1996] ).
Based upon the foregoing the respondent met her burden of proof and demonstrated that she resided with her mother, the tenant of record, for more than ten (10) years prior to her mother's passing on April 1, 2016. Alternatively, based upon the foregoing, the respondent met her burden of proof and demonstrated that she is disabled, and has resided with her mother, the tenant of record for at least one (1) year prior to her mother's death. Accordingly, the burden shifted to the petitioner to raise a triable issue of fact.
"Upon a review of the record, we find that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, as plaintiff established prima facie its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.... The burden then shifted to defendant to rebut the prima facie showing by demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact (internal citations omitted ). Defendant failed to submit an affidavit in opposition by one with personal knowledge of the facts so as to raise a triable issue of fact ..." Parts Auth., Inc. v. Kuruvilla, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op 50372(U) (App Term 2nd Dept [Decided on March 29, 2017] ).
PETITIONER'S SUBMISSION IN OPPOSITION
It is petitioner's contention that the respondent's motion for summary judgment must be denied. Petitioner asserts that the respondent has failed to state a claim for succession. Alternatively, the petitioner argues that issues of fact as to the respondent's succession defense have been raised, which precludes granting summary judgment in the respondent's favor.
It is not disputed that the certifications annexed to petitioner's opposition submitted by the respondent's mother do not list the respondent as part of her family composition. However, the petitioner's contention that the respondent failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to succeed to the premises because she was never listed on her mother's yearly certifications is without merit. Indeed, as cited above, the "... regulations create a presumption, based upon the failure to list family members on annual income affidavits, that the individuals did not reside in the premises as their primary residence [and the p]resumption [is] rebuttable ..."
Whether her mother misrepresented the family composition of the premises when submitting the certifications is merely a factor for the court to consider, supra.
See Chinatown Apartments, Inc. v. Lee, 168 Misc.2d 990 (Civ Ct N.Y. County [Madden, J., 1995] ) ; see also 28 RCNY 3–02(p)(3).
Additionally, the petitioner contends that the respondent failed to prove that the subject premises was her primary residence prior to entering the military service, and failed to provide any proof regarding her residency in 2002 prior to her enlisting in military service. The court notes that this contention is without factual support, as the respondent provided documents that listed her residence at the time she entered service, as the subject premises (including, the dd 204 form).
Petitioner also asserts that because her last tour of duty terminated in August of 2014, and the tenant of record passed away in April of 2016, respondent's succession defense fails because she is unable to demonstrate that she resided at the premises with her mother for the statutorily required two (2) year minimum period. Petitioner does not address the respondent's submission that she is a disabled veteran, and 80% of her disability is related to her service of our country, and as an individual with a disability the respondent only needs to meet a one (1) year "minimum period" of co-residency.
In addition to other exhibits, petitioner annexes copies of "tenant ledgers" as exhibit 7. The court notes that the documents bear the heading "Shinda Management Corporation" and there is nothing in the opposition connecting "Shinda Management Corporation" with the petitioner or the respondent. Also, the documents refer to "305 Decatur Street, Apt 3H, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11216" and there is nothing in the submissions before this court to connect "305 Decatur Street, Apt 3H, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11216" to the instant proceeding, as the premises which are the subject of this action are "28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216."
Further, the documents claim to be rent ledgers for "Lakisha Hurdle" and the appearing respondent claiming succession in the instant proceeding is "Laclesha Tribble." Petitioner fails to offer any facts as to the connection between "Lakisha Hurdle" and "Laclesha Tribble." Even if this court found the documents to be probative on the issue of the amount of arrears that are due, the documents have nothing to do with the respondent's succession defense, and therefore will not be considered by the court.
The court notes that the affidavit of Keturiah Smith, states that the affiant's personal knowledge is premised on the affiant's "daily management" and "oversight" of 28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216. The court also notes that the petitioner fails to allege, by one (1) with personal knowledge that the affiant "never saw Ms. Laclesha Tribble in or around the subject premises" or that the affiant "actually visited the apartment and saw no signs of Ms. Laclesha Tribble there."
Indeed, while the affidavit of Keturiah Smith states that currently the affiant's responsibilities include "daily management ... and oversight ... [of] 28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216" there is no statement that the affiant was actually employed by the petitioner to "daily manage[ ] ... and overs[ee] ... 28 MacDonough Street, Brooklyn, New York 11216" in April of 2015, (during the relevant time period which is) one (1) year prior to Ms. Sharon Tribble's passing, in April of 2016. Additionally, the affidavit fails to assert any facts to support the conclusions contained in the affidavit, and therefore of no probative value.
Affidavit of Keturiah Smith, sworn to on November 9, 2016 at ¶ 3.
"It appears from the affidavit ... that the chauffeur sought to be examined is not now, and for some time past has not been, employed by the defendant corporation. The affidavit ... is sufficient in our opinion to impose upon the moving party the burden of showing the existence of facts entitling him to the examination" Glasser v. Borglund, 248 AD 898 (App.Div. 2nd Dept [1936] ).
"In the case at bar, the affidavit submitted in support of defendant's motion was from one of its employees allegedly having personal knowledge of the claim. However, said employee failed to set forth supporting facts in evidentiary form indicating ... date[s or times] ... the purported [observations] w[ere] made. Accordingly, the employee's affidavit was insufficient ..." Amaze Med. Supply Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Misc.3d 138(A) (App Term 2nd & 11th Jud Dists [2004] ).
Indeed, the court is mindful that the petitioner failed to submit an affidavit from any individual, such as a property manager, superintendent or a neighbor to attest to Ms. Laclesha Tribble's absence from the premises which could create an issue of fact, to contradict the facts asserted in the respondent's submission.
See Goldman v. Wilson, 19 Misc.3d 136(A) (App Term 1st Dept [2008] )"[the motion was properly granted in a] nonprimary residence holdover proceeding (internal citations omitted ). The landlord's renewed submission included an affidavit of the building's resident superintendent indicating that the affiant seldomly saw tenant at the premises for a two-year period, as well as an affidavit by a representative of the landlord's management firm stating that he conducted a public records search which showed tenant's address to be at a specified location in Los Angeles."
THE HUD HANDBOOKS
As noted earlier, annexed to the petitioner's opposition as exhibit 5 is a copy of a document that is referred to as the HUD Handbook. The document contains language that it was "Issued: March 30, 2010" and it "Expires: March 31, 2011."
Noting that this document, upon which the petitioner relies and annexes to its opposition, "expired" on "March 31, 2011" in its supplemental opposition, the petitioner annexed the current version of the HUD Handbook. As the petitioner asserts arguments based upon the expired and the current versions of the Handbooks, this court will analyze the text of each Handbook as they apply to the instant decision.
THE HUD HANDBOOK
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS IN IT'S OPPOSITION
In its initial opposition, the petitioner cites to the expired HUD Handbook, at "section 7(c) page ‘5’ " as "expressly stat[ing] that" because Ms. Laclesha Tribble was not listed as an occupant of the premises on her mother's yearly certifications and "there are no exceptions to this policy and procedures " the respondent is not entitled to succession.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated November 9, 2016 at ¶ 21 (emphasis in original )
The provisions of the expired version of the Handbook at "7(c) page 5", as relied on by the petitioner in its opposition can be found in the sub-sub section titled " Note. "
Article 7 sub-sub section tieled " Note: " reads as follows:
" Note: PHAs are required to immediately terminate program assistance for deceased single member households which will result in termination of the HAP contract and HAP to the owner in accordance with the aforementioned provisions. The owner is not entitled to HAP from any month following the month in which the death occurred. There are no exceptions to this policy and procedure."
PHAs is an abbreviation for "Public Housing Agencies."
HAP is an abbreviation for "Housing Assistance Payment."
THE HUD HANDBOOK
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS IN IT'S SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION
In it's supplemental opposition, petitioner asserts that the "HUD regulations are federal regulations and pre-empt state housing court's decision[s] which establish the contrary." To support this contention petitioner refers to the currently effective HUD Handbook at § 3–16(B).
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated March 24, 2017 at ¶ 44.
Affirmation of Arianna Gonzalez–Abreu, Esq., dated March 24, 2017 at ¶ 44.
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPIRED AND UNEXPIRED HANDBOOK TO EACH OTHER
This court has reviewed and compared the provisions cited above of the expired Handbook, with the provisions of the current unexpired Handbook, and determines that the language in the current handbook which most closely applies to the petitioner's argument citing Article 7c of the expired Handbook, be found in Article 8 of the Handbook.
Article 8 of the current and unexpired Handbook, at the sub-sub section titled " Note: " reads as follows:
" Note: PHAs are required to immediately terminate program assistance for deceased single member households which will result in termination of the HAP contract and HAP to the owner in accordance with the aforementioned provisions. The owner is entitled receive the full HAP amount for the month in which the death occurred
"The owner is not entitled to HAP for any month following the month in which the death occurred, with the exception of the Project Based Voucher (PBV) in accordance with 24 CFR 983.352(b)....."
Pages 5 through 6 at h ttps:// portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=pih2012–4.pdf
Comparing Article 7c at sub-sub section " Note: " of the expired Handbook, with Article 8 sub-sub section " Note: " of the unexpired handbook, it is clear that, in the language contained in the sub-sub heading " Note. " in both Handbooks read almost identically. The only difference between the two (2) provisions is as follows:
The language in the second paragraph of the sub-sub heading "Note. " contained within the expired Handbook reads as follows:
"PHAs are required to immediately terminate program assistance for deceased single member households which will result in termination of the HAP contract and HAP to the owner in accordance with the aforementioned provisions. The owner is not entitled to HAP from any month following the month in which the death occurred.
There are no exceptions to this policy and procedure " (emphasis added ).
The language in the second paragraph of the subheading "Note. " contained within the current Handbook reads as follows:
"The owner is not entitled to HAP for any month following the month in which the death occurred, with the exception of the Project Based Voucher (PBV) program in accordance with 24 CFR 983.352(b)..." (emphasis added ).
Pages 5 through 6 at h ttps:// portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=pih2012–4.pdf
Indeed, 24 CFR § 983.352 is entitled "vacancy payment" and authorizes provides at paragraph 3, as follows: (3)The PHA may make vacancy payments to the owner only if: (i)The owner gives the PHA prompt, written notice certifying that the family has vacated the unit and containing the date when the family moved out (to the best of the owner's knowledge and belief); (ii)The owner certifies that the vacancy is not the fault of the owner and that the unit was vacant during the period for which payment is claimed; (iii)The owner certifies that it has taken every reasonable action to minimize the likelihood and length of vacancy; and (iv)The owner provides any additional information required and requested by the PHA to verify that the owner is entitled to the vacancy payment.
Accordingly, it appears that the promulgators of the HUD Handbook which is currently in effect, not only contains broader language intended to recognize exceptions to policy and procedure, but in fact, actually crafted an exception into the amendments which recognizes that the failure to be named in a family composition does not preclude a succession defense.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS: EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
In opposition to the respondent's motion, the petitioner was required to lay bear it's proof to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact, in order to rebut the respondent's demonstration, which petitioner failed to do.
"It is well established that once a moving party has made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" Indeed, "[t]he submission by the appellants of medical affidavits and documentary evidence sufficed to establish prima facie their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiffs to lay bare their proof and demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact."
Nel Taxi Corp. v. Eppinger, 203 A.D.2d 438 (2nd Dept [1994] ) citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 ( [1986] ).
Simms v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 192 A.D.2d 700, 701 (2nd Dept [1993] ) citing to Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851 ( [1985] ).
Having been required to lay bear their proof, this court must determine, if limiting the evidence that the petitioner could submit at trial to the petitioner's submissions in opposition to respondent's motion, has the petitioner met its prima facie burden to rebut Ms. Laclesha Tribble's, demonstration that she is entitled to succeed to her mother's tenancy. As petitioner failed to submit proof in admissible form to rebut the respondent's prima facie showing, the petition must be dismissed.
"As a matter of law, if the only facts proven at trial were those alleged by Petitioner in its motion, then Petitioner would not have met its burden to prove that Respondent had caused the leaks" Beacon 109 204–206 LLC v. Leon, 2015 WL 7070077 (Civ Ct N.Y. County [Weissberg, J., 2015] ).
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DETERMINATION
Based upon the foregoing, the motion is granted Ms. Laclesha Tribble is entitled to succeed to her mothers section 8 subsidy and the proceeding is dismissed.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the court.