Opinion
No. 56320-3-I.
December 18, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 03-2-31896-5, Ronald Kessler, J., entered April 28, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Richard Azpitarte (Appearing Pro Se) Seattle, WA, 98168.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Timothy P Barnes Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, WA, 98104-2385.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
The superior court ordered Richard Azpitarte to remove all but 12 of the 80 vehicles he stored on his two residential lots in violation of King County ordinances within 60 days or face removal of those vehicles by the County. He did not remove the vehicles, so the County removed all of them from his property. Azpitarte argues the superior court should have held the County in contempt for failing to leave on his property the 12 operative vehicles he was entitled to keep under the order. We disagree. The superior court could not hold the County in contempt because it did not order the County to do or refrain from doing anything; it merely authorized the County to remove the vehicles if Azpitarte failed to do so. We affirm.
FACTS
For over 10 years, Azpitarte has stored a number of old vehicles on his two parcels of residential property in unincorporated King County. Sometimes he stored as many as 80 vehicles on his property, many of them not in working order. This violated King County ordinances which allow only six operative vehicles per residential lot, and require they be parked outside on impermeable surfaces. For many years, the County tried to compel Azpitarte to comply with the ordinances. It finally sought relief in superior court. On June 25, 2004, the superior court issued an injunction requiring Azpitarte to abate the public nuisance on his property by removing the vehicles. The court made clear in its order that if Azpitarte failed to remove the vehicles, the County was authorized to enter his property and remove them itself. The court further ordered Azpitarte to identify all of his vehicles, including the 12 operative vehicles he wished to keep, in order to facilitate the removal.
KCC 21A.18.110.I-J; KCC 21.32.230.
Azpitarte did not remove the vehicles within 60 days. On August 26, 2004, County Code Compliance Officer William Turner entered the property and began removing them. There is some dispute about whether Azpitarte cooperated with the County's abatement. He claims he identified the 12 operative vehicles he wanted to keep. The County claims he did not. The County did not remove all 80 vehicles in one day. It left 12 on the property overnight and came back the next day. During the night, Azpitarte towed the remaining vehicles to other locations. He left six in a nearby friend's yard and six in the parking lot next to Bernie and Boy's Market. The County contacted the owner of the market's parking lot and got permission to tow the six vehicles left there. It could not get permission to remove the other six from the neighbor's yard. Azpitarte claims the County also towed two more vehicles from his property on August 31, 2004, one belonging to him and the other to his brother.
On April 11, 2005, Azpitarte filed a motion for contempt, alleging the County violated the court's June 25, 2004 order by removing all 80 of his vehicles, including the 12 he was allowed to keep, and removing the two additional vehicles on August 31, 2004. The trial court denied his contempt motion. Azpitarte appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for contempt for abuse of discretion. The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. To the extent that a court bases its contempt decision on a question of law, we review that legal question de novo. RCW 7.21.010(1)(b) defines contempt as "[d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court." A court cannot hold an entity in contempt for disobeying an order unless it has clearly violated the order. In contempt proceedings, a court must strictly construe its order and may not expand it by implication beyond the meaning of its terms when read in light of the issues and the purposes for which the suit was brought.
In re King, 110 Wn.2d 793, 798, 756 P.2d 1303 (1988).
State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
In re Estate of Kordon, 157 Wn.2d 206, 209, 137 P.3d 16 (2006) (citing State v. Squally, 132 Wn.2d 333, 340, 937 P.2d 1069 (1997)).
Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 96 Wn.2d 708, 712-13, 638 P.2d 1201 (1982) (citing State v. Int'l Typographical Union, 57 Wn.2d 151, 158, 356 P.2d 6 (1960)).
Id.
Azpitarte contends that the trial court erred by refusing to hold the County in contempt for removing all of his vehicles because its June 25, 2004 order specified that he could keep 12 operative vehicles on impermeable surfaces on his property. The order states:
Defendant must . . . remove any vehicles currently stored on the property . . . within 60 days of the date of this Order;
efendant may maintain a total of six (6) operative vehicles on the property (6 per legal lot) in accordance with King County Code sections 21A.18.110(I) (J), provided they are parked on an approved impermeable surface. . . .
. . . .
. . . [S]hould defendant fail to abate the code violations as required by this Order, King County is authorized to enter the subject property and abate the code violations. . . .
But the court clearly directed its order at Azpitarte, not the County. The court did not order the County to leave Azpitarte six operative vehicles per legal lot. On the contrary, it ordered Azpitarte to remove all but 12 operative vehicles or face the consequences of removal by the County. The court did not even order the County to remove the vehicles; it merely authorized the County to do so. Without impermissibly expanding the terms of the order, the court could not hold the County in contempt.
Azpitarte asserts that it makes no difference whether the County was subject to the order because a court can hold even non-parties in contempt. He relies on State v. Mecca Twin Theater Film Exchange, Inc. for its holding that a court can hold a non-party with knowledge of the order's terms in contempt. Mecca does not apply to these facts. There, the non-party was an officer of the corporation that was subject to the court's order. The officer, as an employee of the corporation with knowledge of the order, was required to comply with the order despite not being personally named in it. But here, the court did not order the County to do anything, so it was not subject to the order. Contrary to Azpitarte's assertion, this is the critical difference. An entity cannot violate an order that did not require it to do or refrain from doing anything. The superior court did not err by refusing to hold the County in contempt because it did not and could not violate the order.
82 Wn.2d 87, 93, 507 P.2d 1165 (1973) (citing State ex rel. Lindsley v. Wallace, 114 Wash. 692, 693, 195 P. 1049 (1921)).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 92-93.
Int'l Typographical Union, 57 Wn.2d at 158.
We affirm the superior court's denial of Azpitarte's contempt motion and deny his request for attorney fees and costs.