Opinion
# 2015-018-647 Claim No. 119042
10-06-2015
LAPAUL KINARD Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's confinement was privileged. Claim is dismissed.
Case information
UID: | 2015-018-647 |
Claimant(s): | LAPAUL KINARD |
Claimant short name: | KINARD |
Footnote (claimant name) : | |
Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 119042 |
Motion number(s): | |
Cross-motion number(s): | |
Judge: | DIANE L. FITZPATRICK |
Claimant's attorney: | LAPAUL KINARD Pro Se |
Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
Signature date: | October 6, 2015 |
City: | Syracuse |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate, proceeding pro se, alleges he was wrongfully confined to the SHU for 35 days after his findings of misbehavior were reversed. A trial was held on August 6, 2015.
Claimant testified that on June 10, 2010, while an inmate at Cape Vincent Correctional Facility, he received a misbehavior report for fighting. After a Tier III Hearing, he was found guilty on June 17, 2010, and sentenced to 90 days in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at Gouverneur Correctional Facility (GCF) with a loss of privileges. Claimant appealed the decision.
On July 16, 2010, the hearing determination was reversed. Claimant testified that the reversal was because he was not involved in the altercation. Claimant was not released from the SHU until August 20, 2010, when he was moved directly to Marcy Correctional Facility.
Claimant testified at one point that he was released August 10, 2010, however, in referring to the claim, he indicated he was released August 20, 2010.
On cross examination, Claimant agreed the argument he made for the reversal of the misbehavior findings was his innocence, not any violation of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision rules and procedures. There is no reason indicated on the notice of reversal as to why the misbehavior findings were reversed.
The State called Howard Hooper, the supervisor of Guidance and Counseling, who has worked at GCF for 22 years. He works in the Guidance Unit at GCF and is familiar with the process of SHU confinement. He testified that a reversal notice is sent to the Tier Office which is then forwarded to Inmate Records where it is sent to other departments. If the reversal notice directs, the hearing records are collected and expunged, and then if the inmate has no other disciplinary charges or punishment, Mr. Hooper's office makes an unscheduled transfer request to have the inmate moved to another facility. In this case, Mr. Hooper noted the delay in releasing Claimant was because he had received another misbehavior report after the reversal. While the misbehavior report is pending, he would not be released from the SHU, and if he received a sanction he would serve the SHU time for the second incident before he could be transferred.
To successfully establish a cause of action for wrongful confinement, a Claimant must show that (1) Defendant confined him; (2) Claimant was conscious of the confinement; (3) Claimant did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not privileged (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]). Typically, the issue comes down to whether the confinement was privileged, and it is also the issue in this case. It is actually Defendant who bears the burden to establish privilege (Hollender v Trump Vil. Coop., 58 NY2d 420, 425 [1983]; Gonzalez v State of New York, 110 AD2d 810 [2d Dept 1985]).
In the prison setting, the State's actions in placing a claimant in disciplinary confinement will be found to be privileged where the defendant has acted in full compliance with its rules and regulations (Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d 305, 307 [3d Dept 1986]; Hernandez v State of New York, 48 Misc 3d 218, 220 [Ct Cl, 2015]; Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl, 1986]). The discretionary actions and determinations made by correction officials will be protected by absolute immunity as long as they act within the scope of their authority and do not violate the governing rules and regulations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]); Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013]; Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]).
When an inmate is held in restrictive confinement beyond the time given as punishment for a misbehavior finding or after the findings have been reversed, the release of the inmate is considered ministerial, unless the continued confinement is privileged (see Minieri v State of New York, 204 AD2d 982 [4th Dept 1994]; Hernandez, 48 Misc 3d at 220; Gittens,132 Misc 2d at 406; Ramos v State of New York, UID No. 2000-029-017 [Ct Cl, Mignano, J., Sept. 8, 2000]). Here, Defendant established that Claimant's continued SHU confinement after the reversal was due to another misbehavior infraction. Claimant did not dispute that he was charged with a new misbehavior report and confined to the SHU on the new charges. The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision regulations section 301.3, authorizes the detention of an inmate in the SHU pending an initial appearance or determination of a disciplinary or superintendent's hearing and, thereafter, based upon the hearing disposition (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1; 301.3). Mr. Hooper's undisputed testimony indicated that Claimant's continued confinement following the July 16, 2010 reversal was privileged (see Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 2001]; Callender v State of New York, 38 Misc 3d 651, 659 [Ct Cl 2012]). The claim is DISMISSED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
October 6, 2015
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims