Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-03889-RMG-JDA
03-01-2023
Keaston D'Ahja Kinard, Plaintiff, v. Michael McCall, Dennis Patterson, Willie Davis, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Keaston D'Ahja Kinard (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the above-named Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently incarcerated at the Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”).
Plaintiff's original Complaint named the following Defendants: Brian P. Stirling, C. Holbrook, Dennis Patterson, and Michael McCall (the “original Defendants”). [Doc. 1 at 1-3.] In his first Amended Complaint, Plaintiff stated he was dismissing the original Defendants from this action and, instead, named only “the Division of Operations.” [Doc. 17 at 2.] Now, in his second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names the following three Defendants: Michael McCall, Dennis Patterson, and Willie Davis. [Doc. 23 at 1-3.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Presently before the Court for review is a second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff, which was entered on February 9, 2023. [Doc. 23.] For the reasons below, the undersigned concludes that this action should be dismissed for failing to state a claim without affording Plaintiff further leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Upon review, the undersigned concluded that the Complaint was subject to summary dismissal and issued a Report and Recommendation dated November 10, 2022. [Doc. 7.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation and also filed a motion to amend his Complaint. [Docs. 13; 10.] By Order dated January 5, 2023, the Honorable Richard M. Gergel declined to adopt the Report and Recommendation, granted Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint as of right, instructed the Clerk of Court to file the first Amended Complaint, and referred the matter to the undersigned for consideration of the sufficiency of the allegations as stated in the first Amended Complaint. [Doc. 15.]
Plaintiff's original Complaint was comprised of a standard prisoner complaint form [Doc. 1] as well as a handwritten document with additional allegations [Doc. 1-1]. Also, Plaintiff attached certain documents to his Complaint, including inmate grievance forms [Doc. 1-4] and inmate disposition forms [Doc. 1-3] related to his claims.
In his first Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that, although he was dismissing the original Defendants named in the Complaint, he “wishe[d] to keep [his] initial arguments relating to his Constitutional violations.” [Doc. 17 at 4.] As such, the undersigned conducted a review to evaluate the allegations together from the original Complaint and the first Amendment Complaint and concluded that the case was subject to summary dismissal. [Doc. 21.] However, by Order dated January 19, 2023, the undersigned gave Plaintiff “one FINAL opportunity to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies” of Plaintiff's pleadings. [Id. at 1.] Plaintiff was warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [by the Court in its Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal without further leave to amend.[Id. at 16.] In response to the Court's Order regarding amendment, Plaintiff filed a second Amended Complaint, which was entered on February 9, 2023. [Doc. 23.]
Ordinarily, an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2017) (“A pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a) supersedes the pleading it modifies and remains in effect throughout the action unless it subsequently is modified. Once an amended pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case ....”). However, out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned will consider the original Complaint, the first Amended Complaint, and the second Amended Complaint in evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations. Indeed, the factual allegations contained in all three pleadings are very similar. And, Plaintiff has again named some of the original Defendants that he named in his original Complaint.
Allegations from the Original Complaint
In the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the original Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that, in August 2022, he was designated with a security detention (“SD”) custody classification and placed in the restrictive housing unit (“RHU”) at Perry. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff alleged he was being falsely imprisoned in the RHU, even though he was a victim of the prison riot at the Lee Correctional Institution. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff alleged that his S.D. custody classification was the result of an “illegal” investigation related to the Lee Prison Riot and that he previously served two years on S.D. custody classification for the same investigation. [Id. at 8.]
A riot occurred at the Lee Correctional Institution in Bishopville, South Carolina, on April 15, 2018 (the “Lee Prison Riot”). See Kinard v. Stirling, No. 8:21-cv-01077-SAL-JDA (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2021), Doc. 16 at 1. During the riot, seven inmates were killed by other inmates and more than thirty others were attacked and severely injured, including Plaintiff. Id., Doc. 1 at 19.
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleged he had suffered from “serious mental and emotional duress.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff acknowledged that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71 (1996) (“PLRA”), provides that no federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner for emotional or mental injury without a prior showing of physical injury. [Id.] However, Plaintiff alleged that he “was stabbed 9+ times” during the Lee Prison Riot. [Id.] Plaintiff alleged that, even though he was a victim of the Lee Prison Riot, he was being detained and was under investigation for conduct related to the Lee Prison Riot. [Id.] Plaintiff noted that he previously litigated claims concerning his injuries and medical treatment resulting from the Lee Prison Riot in the state court at case number 2019-CP-31-00236 and federal court at case number 8:21-cv-01077-SAL-JDA and was awarded money damages for his injuries. [Id.]
Specifically, the PLRA provides, “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
The undersigned takes judicial notice of these cases as well as the other cases Plaintiff previously filed in this Court. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
For his relief, Plaintiff sought money damages to compensate him for the time he had been falsely imprisoned in the RHU. [Id.] Specifically, Plaintiff sought $10,000 in nominal damages, $50,000 in actual damages, and $150,000 in punitive damages. [Id.]
Allegations from the First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff made the following allegations in his first Amended Complaint. [Doc. 17.] Plaintiff alleged the sole Defendant named in the first Amended Complaint, the Division of Operations, illegally detained him in violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 2.] Although Plaintiff acknowledged he was not entitled to a particular custody designation, he alleged the Division of Operations violated prison policy by placing him in S.D. custody without any disciplinary charge or hearing. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, he was a victim of the Lee Prison Riot and he was compensated for his injuries. [Id.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleged he was attacked, stabbed “9+ times,” and tied up and held hostage. [Id.] Plaintiff was placed in RHU lockup from July 2018 to 2020 related to the investigation into the Lee Prison Riot and, as a result, suffered “irreparable mental damages.” [Id.] Ultimately, he was cleared from the investigation and compensated for his damages resulting from the Lee Prison Riot. [Id.] However, Plaintiff was back in the RHU at Perry for an alleged investigation related to the Lee Prison Riot. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleged the Division of Operations was subjecting him to the “same conditions that caused his mental breakdown” when he was in RHU during the initial investigation following the Lee Prison Riot. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleged he was being illegally detained for the same investigation, although he was never charged and despite the fact that he was a victim and compensated for his injuries. [Id.] Plaintiff alleged that his security classification and placement in the RHU was a violation of his due process rights and was causing him mental distress. [Id.] Plaintiff alleged that he was a “LV3 mental health patient” and should not be housed in S.D. custody in accordance with prison policy. [Id.] Plaintiff alleged that the Division of Operations failed to follow numerous prison policies concerning mental health. [Id.]
For his relief, Plaintiff requested money damages in the amount of $50,000 in nominal damages, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages. [Id. at 4.] Additionally, Plaintiff requested injunctive relief to require Defendant to change its policies and procedures. [Id.]
Allegations from the Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his second Amended Complaint. [Doc. 23.] Plaintiff contends Defendants are administrators and supervisors who have certain duties with regard to Plaintiff, including the duty to protect his right to procedural due process. [Id. at 14.] Plaintiff contends that, “through emails and memorand[a],” Defendants had Plaintiff placed in S.D. custody and he was sent to Perry RHU on July 21, 2022, “for unrelated offenses.” [Id.] Plaintiff was informed in August 2022 that he was being placed on S.D. custody for a homicide disciplinary #9 and was being investigated by the S.D. Board. [Id.] However, Plaintiff was never charged or had any disciplinary actions with regard to the homicide disciplinary #9 investigation. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that “the department's process did not meet minimum due process standards with [the] S.D. Board.” [Id.]
Plaintiff contends his procedural due process are being denied as he cannot be released from solitary confinement “until the illegal investigation is lifted” because his S.D. Board review is “hindered because of the investigation.” [Id. at 15.] Plaintiff contends that his S.D. confinement constitutes atypical and significant hardship because he is being denied education, vocation, and proper mental health services; he is subjected to constant cavity and strip searches when he leaves his cell; he is denied canteen privileges; he is being detained without any institutional charges; he does not receive proper recreation; he receives smaller food portions; he is classified as “mental health LV3 and is not supposed to be placed on S.D. custody” pursuant to SCDC policy; and he is supposed to be in mental health programs. [Id.] Plaintiff contends Defendants have blatantly disregarded SCDC mental health policies, disciplinary policies, and RHU policies in detaining him. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends he served two years, from 2018 to 2020, for the same investigation for which he is now being detained. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he was a victim of the Lee Prison Riot, he was stabbed 9 times, he was held hostage, and he was eventually cleared from the investigation in the riot. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights by “fabricating certain documents and altering Plaintiff's disciplinary record to have him illegally detained in RHU, S.D. custody.” [Id. at 17.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks $25,000 in nominal damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $50,000 in compensatory damages. [Id. at 18.] Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief to require Defendants “to change SCDC policies,” to remove Defendants from their supervisory positions, and to clear Plaintiff from any involvement in the Lee Prison Riot. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and he “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This statute charges the Court with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff has paid the full filing fee of $402. Accordingly, this action is not subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's second Amended Complaint, like his original Complaint and first Amended Complaint, is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Defendants are Entitled to Dismissal
As an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that all three Defendants named in the second Amended Complaint are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff names three Defendants in the second Amended Complaint-Michael McCall, Dennis Patterson, and Willie Davis-who are each identified as administrators and/or supervisors over the Division of Operations at SCDC headquarters. [Doc. 23 at 1-3; 14.]
The Court notes that McCall and Patterson were also named in the original Complaint. [Doc. 1 at 1-3.]
A review of the allegations in the second Amended Complaint, like the prior pleadings, shows that these Defendants appear to have been named by virtue of their respective positions as supervisors within SCDC and not because of anything they have personally done to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege facts showing how Defendants were personally involved in any of the events giving rise to his claims. The sole allegation that ascribes any specific conduct to Defendants is Plaintiff's bald and unsupported assertion that these Defendants “fabricat[ed] certain documents and alter[ed] Plaintiff's disciplinary record to have him illegally detained in RHU, S.D. custody.” [Doc. 23 at 17.]
The law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government official in his individual capacity. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that, in a § 1983 action, “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations”). In order to proceed with a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must affirmatively show that a defendant acted personally in the deprivation of his constitutional rights, Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928, and when a complaint contains no personal allegations against a defendant, that defendant is properly dismissed. See Curtis v. Ozmint, No. 3:10-cv-3053-CMC-JRM, 2011 WL 635302, at *4 n.5 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 601259 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2011). The second Amended Complaint contains no plausible allegations of any individual action, or inaction, by Defendants. Although Plaintiff asserts that Defendants fabricated documents and altered his disciplinary record to support his placement in the RHU and in S.D. custody, such a cursory allegation, without more, is insufficient to state a claim for relief. See, e.g., Harvey v. Mahon, No. 7:02-cv-00829, 2004 WL 3334794, at *10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2004) (finding the plaintiff's allegation that a defendant “fabricated state documents to hold [the plaintiff] in segregation and justify his placement there” failed to state an actionable due process claim).
Further, although Plaintiff appears to sue Defendants in their supervisory capacities, a § 1983 claim generally cannot be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior or supervisory liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667 (citing Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”)). The second Amended Complaint fails to allege that Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and their broad supervisory responsibilities do not impose supervisory liability under § 1983. Therefore, the second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants for violation of a federal right under § 1983. See Primus v. Stirling, No. 1:13-cv-415-JFA-SVH, 2014 WL 12538158, at *2 (D.S.C. May 7, 2014), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2014 WL 12538157 (D.S.C. July 29, 2014), aff'd, 583 Fed.Appx. 250 (4th Cir. 2014); Williams v. Stirling, No. 9:17-cv-2538-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 6885229, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 339287 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2018).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to name any proper Defendant in this § 1983 action. The original Defendants in the initial Complaint were subject to dismissal and the sole Defendant in the first Amended Complaint was also subject to dismissal. The Defendants named in the second Amended Complaint are also subject to dismissal. Accordingly, as Plaintiff has had numerous opportunities to name a proper Defendant, and has failed to do so, this case should be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend.
Failure to State a Claim
Additionally, even if Plaintiff had named a proper Defendant, this action would be subject to dismissal because the second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Liberally construed, Plaintiff's second Amended Complaint, like his other two pleadings, appears to assert (1) a claim for violations of Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. However, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under § 1983. The Court will address each claim in turn.
Due Process Claim
Plaintiff appears to assert a due process claim related to his S.D. custody classification and placement in the RHU. “Supreme Court precedent establishes that convicted prisoners possess some procedural due process rights with respect to administrative segregation,” as well as other disciplinary measures. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 183 (4th Cir. 2018). However, while prisoners retain many constitutional rights, incarceration inherently limits certain constitutional rights of prisoners. Hall v. McCabe, No. 8:11-cv-1317-TLW-JDA, 2011 WL 5083219, at *2 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082201 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2011). When a person is lawfully convicted and confined to prison, he loses a significant interest in his liberty for the period of the sentence. See Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir. 1991).
Under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), “when an action might result in a prisoner's loss of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, minimal due process is required.” Dawson v. Cartledge, No. 4:14-cv-3259-DCN, 2015 WL 5092617, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2015), aff'd, 631 Fed.Appx. 145 (4th Cir. 2016). These limited due process rights are required in an inmate disciplinary action resulting in a punishment that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). “Whether confinement conditions are atypical and substantially harsh ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life' is a ‘necessarily . . . fact specific' comparative exercise.” Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 527 (4th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1997)). As the Fourth Circuit has explained,
“To state a procedural due process [claim], a plaintiff must [first] identify a protected liberty or property interest and [then] demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Put differently, a prisoner claiming a violation of his right to procedural due process must show: (1) that there is a “state statute, regulation, or policy [that] creates such a liberty interest,” and (2) that “the denial of such an interest ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.'” Id. at 248-49 (quoting Sandin[, 515 U.S. at 484]. An inmate who fails to satisfy these two requirements “cannot ‘invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.'” Id. at 248 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original).
Here, Plaintiff's second Amended Complaint “does not include any factual allegations establishing that he experienced conditions during his temporary placement in segregation that ‘were atypical and significantly harsh compared to [those of] the general population,'” and his allegations therefore fail to state a plausible due process claim. Id. at 253-54 (citation omitted); see also Backey v. S.C. Dep't. of Corrs., 73 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table opinion) (noting the plaintiff's allegations of wrongful placement in administrative segregation did not involve the kind of significant or atypical hardship necessary to invoke his due process rights); Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding inmates' allegations that prison officials' decision deprived them of a liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation did not constitute a deprivation of life or property by governmental action in violation of the Constitution); Benjamin v. Lewis, No. 9:19-cv-1467-SAL-MHC, 2020 WL 8083690, at *6 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2020) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's claim pertaining to his lock-down or placement in RHU because “Plaintiff has not shown that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference toward him or failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 62501 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2021).
Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff also asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, it is also subject to summary dismissal. “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment on one convicted of a crime.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Amendment provides protection with respect to “‘the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.'” Id. at 165-66 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), the United States Supreme Court explained that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the alleged deprivation must be objectively “sufficiently serious,” that it results “in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'” and (2) the prison official must have a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,'” i.e., “‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 834 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court further determined that its standard for “deliberate indifference” would be “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 839-40. “In short, the Court concluded that ‘a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.'” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). Although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, . . . lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to a claim for cruel and unusual punishment arising from the conditions of his confinement, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. Critically, Plaintiff has failed to set forth facts to establish that any conditions of his confinement resulted in any violation of his constitutional rights because he has not identified any specific person responsible for any specific deprivations. Although Plaintiff appears to allege the named Defendants are responsible for his continued disciplinary detention, he does not present any facts showing that any particular individual was deliberately indifferent to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. The deprivations alleged in a conditions-of-confinement claim must be serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wall v. Knowlin, No. 9:07-cv-3199-HMH-GCK, 2007 WL 3232129, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007). Here, the second Amended Complaint contains no such allegations.
Accordingly, this action is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has failed to name a proper Defendant and because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the second Amended Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to correct his pleading deficiencies. In light of the allegations in the original Complaint, the first Amended Complaint, and now in the second Amended Complaint, the undersigned finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claims for relief. Accordingly, the District Court should dismiss this action without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his second Amended Complaint. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to grant an opportunity to amend where amendment would be futile); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018) (same).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).