Opinion
No. 1D21-762
05-04-2022
KIDDIE ISLAND ACADEMY, LLC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
Mark V. Murray of Law Office of Mark Murray, Tallahassee; Rawsi Williams of Rawsi Williams Law Group, Miami, for Appellant. Andrew McGinley, General Counsel, Tallahassee, and Lisa E. Ajo, Assistant General Counsel, Tampa, for Appellee.
Mark V. Murray of Law Office of Mark Murray, Tallahassee; Rawsi Williams of Rawsi Williams Law Group, Miami, for Appellant.
Andrew McGinley, General Counsel, Tallahassee, and Lisa E. Ajo, Assistant General Counsel, Tampa, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
Appellant, Kiddie Island Academy, LLC, a childcare facility licensed by Appellee, the Department of Children and Families ("Department"), appeals a final order in which the Department imposed a fine against it based upon the agency's determination that it failed to perform the duties of a mandatory reporter of suspected child abuse. Appellant argues that the Department erred in rejecting the administrative law judge's recommended order and making new factual findings in its final order. We agree.
In its complaint against the childcare facility, the Department alleged that child abuse occurred there and that Appellant failed to report the abuse as required by its Child Care Facility Handbook and section 39.201, Florida Statutes. In the recommended order, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") determined that because no child abuse occurred at the childcare facility, the Department did not prove that Appellant failed to perform the duties of a mandatory reporter. The ALJ did not expressly address the issue of whether there was reasonable cause to suspect child abuse under the circumstances. In its final order, the Department found that the ALJ misinterpreted the failure-to-report statute. The Department then determined for the first time that the circumstances created reasonable cause to suspect that child abuse had occurred.
The Department was correct in finding that the ALJ misinterpreted the law. The plain language of the failure-to-report statute does not require that the Department prove actual child abuse before it can show that a person failed to meet the statutory reporting mandate. Rather, a person need only have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse. See § 39.201(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing that any person who "knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect " that a child is abused shall report such knowledge or suspicion to the Department).
However, the Department was incorrect in finding that it could determine in the first instance whether Appellant had reasonable cause to suspect child abuse. The Department concluded that the reasonable cause determination is a purely legal one. Yet, the Department's conclusion is wrong because the reasonable cause determination involves both a proper application of the statute and a factual finding. See Beckett v. Dep't of Fin. Servs. , 982 So. 2d 94, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ("[A] statement that a statutory violation has occurred is a factual finding. ... However, the legitimacy of such a finding necessarily depends on a proper interpretation of the statute."); Green v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regul. , 49 So. 3d 315, 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The Department erred when it determined—with no finding by the ALJ—that the facts showed that there was reasonable cause for Appellant to suspect child abuse had occurred. See § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat.; Hamilton Downs Horsetrack v. State. Dep't of Bus. and Prof. Regul. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering , 226 So. 3d 1046, 1051 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("When competent substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's findings of fact, the agency may not reject them, modify them, substitute its findings, or make new findings .") (quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Because the ALJ made no findings on the reasonable cause determination, the Department reversibly erred in not remanding the case to him for further factual findings.
Accordingly, we reverse the Department's final order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
Rowe, C.J., and Lewis and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur.