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Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co.

Court of Appeals of Ohio
Sep 14, 1970
265 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)

Summary

In Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co. (1970), 24 Ohio App.2d 101, 53 O.O. 2d 285, 265 N.E.2d 297, the court held that the denial of a continuance, requested because a material witness was absent due to the death of his father, and the sua sponte dismissal of the action constituted an abuse of discretion.

Summary of this case from Coats v. Limbach

Opinion

No. 11197

Decided September 14, 1970.

Continuance — Within discretion of court — Refusal to grant, gross abuse of discretion, when — Absence of material witness — Request for continuance not opposed.

The denial of a request for a continuance based upon the ground that a material witness was absent because of the death of his father and the dismissal, sua sponte, of the action when the opposing party neither appeared nor opposed the request, constitutes a gross abuse of discretion by the court.

APPEAL: Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.

Messrs. Wilson, Stridsberg Rimedio, for appellant.

Mr. Edward J. Utz, for appellee Cincinnati Transit Company.

Messrs. Lindhorst Dreidame, for appellee BJ Jacobs Company.


This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County dismissing an action filed in that court.

On October 3, 1963, plaintiff Ruth Kidd, appellant herein, filed a petition in which she prayed for damages for alleged personal injuries suffered October 5, 1961. Thereafter, an amended petition was filed and on July 15, 1964, the defendants, appellees herein, filed their answer thereto.

The case was set for trial repeatedly and all but one of the continuances granted (the exception being the one given March 25, 1968) were upon grounds other than those advanced by plaintiff.

On February 4, 1970, the case was called for trial and plaintiff requested a continuance, stating to the court that her physician could not appear to testify because of the death of his father who was out of the city of Cincinnati. No counsel for or representative of defendants appeared to answer the call of the case. Whereupon, the court, sua sponte, dismissed the case without prejudice to the plaintiff. It is from such order that this appeal is taken.

The power of courts to grant continuances is independent of statute and incident to their authority to hear and determine causes. However, continuances are a matter of judicial discretion. It is the general rule that the granting or refusing of a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, generally, 11 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 168, Continuances, Section 2, and citations thereunder.

Ordinarily, an appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it clearly appears that an abuse thereof has prejudiced a party. 3 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 730, Appellate Review, Section 756.

The granting of a continuance rests upon the right of a litigant to a reasonable opportunity to try the cause upon its merits with a view to obtaining justice without unnecessary delay. 11 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 168, Continuances, Section 5.

It is the policy of the law that the parties to an action should have the benefit of the personal attendance of material witnesses to a trial whenever reasonably practicable. 11 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 168, Continuances, Section 12. See, also, 12 American Jurisprudence 464, Continuances, Section 23.

In the case at bar, the request for a continuance rested upon the inability of the plaintiff to have a material witness, her physician, attend the trial personally. Certainly, the suggested reason for his absence would justify a conclusion that plaintiff was not seeking an unreasonable delay.

We conclude that to deny a request for a continuance based upon the ground that a material witness was absent because of the death of his father and, sua sponte, to dismiss the action when the opposing party neither appeared nor opposed the request, constitutes a gross abuse of discretion by the court.

The order dismissing the action is reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, for further proceeding according to law.

Judgment reversed

HESS, J., concurs.

HILDEBRANT, J., not participating.


Summaries of

Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co.

Court of Appeals of Ohio
Sep 14, 1970
265 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)

In Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co. (1970), 24 Ohio App.2d 101, 53 O.O. 2d 285, 265 N.E.2d 297, the court held that the denial of a continuance, requested because a material witness was absent due to the death of his father, and the sua sponte dismissal of the action constituted an abuse of discretion.

Summary of this case from Coats v. Limbach

In Kidd v. Transit Co. (1970), 24 Ohio App.2d 101, 102, 53 O.O.2d 285, 286, 265 N.E.2d 297, 298, the court stated that the court's power to grant continuances is incident to its authority to hear and decide matters and rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court.

Summary of this case from Village of Glenwillow v. Tomsick

In Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co. (1970), 24 Ohio App.2d 101, a continuance was sought because the expert witness could not appear to testify in that case, by reason of his father's death out of town.

Summary of this case from Garrett v. Garrett
Case details for

Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co.

Case Details

Full title:KIDD, APPELLANT, v. CINCINNATI TRANSIT CO. ET AL., APPELLEES

Court:Court of Appeals of Ohio

Date published: Sep 14, 1970

Citations

265 N.E.2d 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970)
265 N.E.2d 297

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