Opinion
KNLCV176031485S
03-09-2018
KENT FROST, LLC v. James SCHURMAN
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
File Date: March 12, 2018
OPINION
Frechette, J.
The defendant, James Schurman, moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because he is a Rhode Island resident, and the case arises exclusively from home improvement services, meetings, and contract negotiations that occurred in Rhode Island. The defendant further asserts that there is no jurisdiction over him pursuant to General Statutes § 52-59b(a) as he does not own property in Connecticut, he does not derive substantial revenue from the state nor has it been alleged that he committed any tortious conduct within the state. The defendant’s motion is denied.
General Statutes § 52-59b grants jurisdiction to the Superior Court over nonresident individuals. Our Supreme Court " has explained that § 52-59b(a)(1) authorizes jurisdiction Lover nonresidents who transact any business within the state provided that the cause of action arises out of such transaction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012). " [A]lthough the term ‘[t]ransacts any business’ is not defined by statute, [our Supreme Court has] construed the term to ‘embrace a single purposeful business transaction.’ Ryan v. Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 119, 918 A.2d 867 (2007). In Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 146 Conn.App. 341, 350, 77 A.3d 880 (2013), the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who had never been physically present in Connecticut. In that case, the defendant, an Alaskan resident and political candidate running for the United States Senate in Alaska, contacted and hired a Connecticut-based consulting firm based on a recommendation. Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, supra, 146 Conn.App. 343, 345. The Appellate Court concluded that, although the defendant had never been to Connecticut for purposes of meeting with the plaintiff, the trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant had purposefully entered into a contract with a Connecticut business to perform consulting services out of the state of Connecticut, signed the contract, mailed the contract to the Connecticut-based firm, sent a personal check for $10,000 to the plaintiff’s place of business in Connecticut, and communicated with the plaintiff via telephone and email regarding the contract. Id., 348-49.
General Statutes § 52-59b provides in relevant part: " (a) As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual ... who in person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state ..."
In the present case, it is evident from the contract and the affidavits of the plaintiff’s principals that the work and accompanying services delineated in the contract would be completed in Connecticut, much like the work that was completed in Connecticut in Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, supra . Similar to Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, the defendant purposefully solicited the business of the plaintiff, knowing that the plaintiff was located in Connecticut. This is evidenced by the defendant’s affidavit in paragraphs eight and nine, in which he avers that he was referred to the plaintiff by his architect, Herb Arnold. As in Doyle, here, the defendant initiated the contact with the plaintiff’s Connecticut-based business. In support of its opposition to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff submits the affidavits of Chad Frost and Brian Kent. In paragraph seven of Chad Frost’s affidavit, he avers that the vast majority of the work performed by the plaintiff in accordance with the contract occurred in Mystic, Connecticut. The evidence presented makes clear that the plaintiffs are landscape architects, and the drawings, design plans, permitting documentation, construction documents, details, and cost estimates were all completed at the plaintiff’s place of business in Connecticut. The plaintiff is not in the business of building nor did the plaintiff’s principals physically construct anything in Rhode Island. See Affidavit of Brian Kent, paragraph 7. The plaintiff offers a service and it is apparent based on the allegations of the complaint, which the court must take as true for purposes of this motion, as well as from the affidavits submitted, that the plaintiff’s services involve creating, drafting, and drawing plans at its place of business in Connecticut.
In paragraph eleven of Chad Frost’s affidavit, he further avers that his main means of communication with the defendant were by email or telephone from his office in Connecticut. Specifically, Chad Frost avers that he and the defendant exchanged approximately seventy-five emails as well as dozens of telephone calls and text messages. Although those communications alone are insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the defendant; Green v. Simmons, 100 Conn.App. 600, 607-08, 919 A.2d 482 (2007); those communications, coupled with the evidence that the defendant purposefully availed himself to the plaintiff’s business, consciously sought out the plaintiff’s services, entered a contract with the plaintiff, and was fully aware that the work would be performed in Connecticut, are sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant under § 52-59b(a)(1).
It is not clear from the allegations of the complaint or from the record before the court whether the contract, which was signed by the defendant, was subsequently mailed to the plaintiff in Connecticut. Nevertheless, whether the contract was mailed to the plaintiff in Connecticut is inconsequential as there is sufficient information to establish that the defendant engaged in a business transaction within the state of Connecticut. In paragraph three of the plaintiff’s complaint, at the request of the defendant, the plaintiff provided services to the defendant. It is not refuted that the defendant requested the services of the plaintiff, and, in fact, this allegation is supported by paragraph eight and nine of defendant’s affidavit in which he avers that, " I first heard of the Kent Frost, LLC from Herb Arnold ... [and] [b]ased upon Mr. Arnold’s referral, I first met with representatives from Kent Frost at Mr. Arnold’s Westerly, Rhode Island, office." That the first meeting occurred in Rhode Island does not lessen the effect of the defendant’s purposeful solicitation of the plaintiff’s business. Accordingly, because the defendant engaged in a purposeful business transaction with the plaintiff in Connecticut pursuant to § 52-59b, this court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Although not discussed in Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, there is enough evidence in the present case to support the conclusion that the defendant had sufficient contact with the state of Connecticut under the constitutional minimum contacts analysis. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945). The constitutional due process standard requires that, " in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Turning to the minimum contacts requirement, the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in Connecticut by virtue of initiating a business relationship and seeking the services of the plaintiff. Secondly, as discussed above, it is clear that the duties delineated in the contract were to be completed by the plaintiff in Connecticut. Although this contractual relationship was a singular, isolated transaction, it was nevertheless a deliberate transaction with the state of Connecticut, and, therefore, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defendant will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See id., 316. Because the defendant’s actions were directed at the state of Connecticut, the contact is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant. (See also, Ziegler v. Hodges, 80 Ill.App.2d 210, 224 N.E.2d 12 (2d Dist. 1967), non-resident defendant had sufficient contacts with Illinois where defendant initiated transaction at issue with Illinois resident knowing that work was primarily being done in Illinois; Resin Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Gemini Roller Corp., 105 N.J.Super. 401, 252 A.2d 415 (App.Div. 1969) (same).
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.