Opinion
Civil No. 96-5980 (SMO).
March 29, 1999
Lenora Kennedy, pro se, Haddonfield, N.J., Owen C. Sweeney, pro se, Sewell, N.J.
Peter Verniero, Esquire, Attorney General, Kenneth C. Green, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety Division of Law, Trenton, N.J. Attorneys for Defendants John T. Monahan, Curtis Watts, Janet DiChristina and James Jarvie.
Robert G. Millenky, Esquire, County Counsel, M. Lou Garty, Esquire, Assistant County Counsel, County of Camden, Camden, N.J., Attorneys for Ralph Green and Camden County.
OPINION
Presently before the Court is the motion for a protective order brought by Defendants John T. Monahan, Curtis Watts, Janet DiChristina and James Jarvie (collectively "Defendants"). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Discussion
Discovery disputes in this matter have consumed an inordinate amount of the Court's time and the litigants' resources particularly in light of the limited factual and legal issues remaining in this case after the Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky's decision on the defendants' motions for summary judgment. This action was filed in December, 1996 and, according to the initial scheduling order, discovery was to be completed on or before December 31, 1997. See Scheduling Order dated July 29, 1997. Since then, the parties have filed no fewer than 24 discovery related motions and have sought the Court's intervention in numerous other discovery disputes. Despite the Court's extensive and atypical involvement in the discovery phase of this case, discovery is still not complete. Without assessing blame for the repeated delays in moving this case to trial, the Court will attempt in this opinion to define for the parties the legal and factual issues that remain in this case so that the parties can tailor the remaining discovery they seek to those issues without seeking the Court's intervention.
The facts, procedural history and legal issues in this matter are discussed at length in the opinions filed by the Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky on November 18, 1997 and July 18, 1998. The Court will discuss only the portions of those opinions that relate to the remaining issues in the case.
I. Relevant Facts
The initial event underlying Plaintiffs' original claims occurred on August 11, 1992. See Kennedy v. Jarvie, Civil Action No. 96-5980 (SMO), slip op. at 3 (November 17, 1997) ("Kennedy I"). On that date, The New Jersey Bureau of Housing Inspection ("BHI") inspected property located at 542-544 Haddon Avenue in Collingswood, New Jersey shortly before Plaintiff Lenora Kennedy took possession of the property pursuant to a property settlement between Ms. Kennedy and her ex-husband. See id. On September 17, 1992, BHI issued a seven-page report detailing ninety-eight separate violations of the New Jersey Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Act.See id. at 4.
On September 26, 1992, Kennedy was ordered to file an application for a certificate of inspection. See id. at 5-6. She did not comply and on January 8, 1993 a penalty of $149.00 was assessed against her. See id. at 6.
On April 7, 1993, the BHI reinspected the property and found that approximately one-third of the violations had been abated and on May 18, 1993 Kennedy was assessed a $1,000.00 penalty for the unabated violations. See id.
Kennedy alleges that a second reinspection occurred on June 15, 1994, but has been unable to produce any documentary evidence that this inspection in fact occurred. See id. at 7. At some point in time after June 15, 1994, Kennedy contacted Defendant Ralph Green, the original inspector's supervisor, and alleged that an inspector attempted to solicit a bribe from her. See id. The next documented inspection of the property occurred on July 5, 1994 where most of the unabated violations were found to be abated. See id. On September 16, 1994 Kennedy was assessed an additional penalty of $2,750.00 for the unabated violations.See id.
Following that assessment, Kennedy again contacted officials at the BHI, specifically, Curtis Watts, Chief of the BHI, alleging, among other things, that the newly discovered violations at the July 5 inspection were in retaliation for Kennedy's claim that the inspector had solicited a bribe. See id. at 7-8. Kennedy alleges that following that conversation with Watts, she had additional conversations with Janet DiChristina, Supervisor of State-Local Cooperative Housing Inspection Services, and James Jarvie, Senior Field Representative of the BHI, and arranged for an audit in October, 1994. See id. at 8.
That audit inspection took place on October 24, 1994. See id. Kennedy, Plaintiff Owen C. Sweeney, James Jarvie and Ralph Green were all present at the October 24, 1994 audit inspection. See id. Defendants allege that Sweeney identified himself as a federal agent at the audit in an effort to intimidate the inspectors. See id. at 8-9. The October 24 audit inspection resulted in an Inspection Report dated November 1, 1994, which noted that some of the newly discovered violations had been abated. See id. at 9.
On February 8, 1995, Defendant John T. Monahan wrote to Charles Brennan, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in Philadelphia, and alleged that Sweeney had identified himself as a federal agent at the October 24 inspection in an effort to intimidate the inspectors. See id.
After the November 1, 1994 inspection report, Kennedy contacted various officials, including Governor Christine Todd Whitman, complaining about the inspections of her property, the penalties imposed on her, and her allegations of bribery. See id. at 10-12. These contacts are not relevant to the issues before the Court because the Court dismissed those individuals from this case. See Kennedy v. Jarvie, Civil Action No. 96-5980 (SMO), slip op. at 42-44 (June 18, 1998) ("Kennedy II").
In May, 1996, the state instituted proceedings in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County, to collect the total amount of fines, penalties and fees that had been imposed on Kennedy. See Kennedy I at 12. On June 12, 1996, the Honorable E. Stevenson Fluharty ordered Kennedy to pay $3,060.00 to the State and further ordered Kennedy to abate all remaining housing violations. See id. On March 19, 1997, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed Judge Fluharty's decision and "noted the extensive history of violations and failures to abate, as well as appellant's failure to comply with the penalty orders or to request an administrative hearing as to any of them . . . ." See id. at 13 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). This action followed.
II. Remaining Claims
On November 18, 1997, Kennedy moved this Court for an order staying enforcement of the state court judgment. See Kennedy II at 4. The Court denied the motion. See id. All defendants then moved for an order dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See id. The Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions. The Court will not restate here Judge Orlofsky's extensive analysis of Plaintiffs' claims. For purposes of the motion before the Court and the remaining discovery in this action, the Court will identify only those claims that survived after Judge Orlofsky's decision.
As to Lenora Kennedy, the only claims that remain are i) her "claims under section 1983 for retaliation in response to the exercise of her First Amendment rights against Jarvie and Green in their individual and official capacities"; and ii) her claims against Watts, DiChristina, in their individual and official capacities, and Camden County for failure to supervise Jarvie and Green. See id. at 44.
As to Owen Sweeney, the only claims that remain are i) his "claims under section 1983 for retaliation in response to the exercise of his First Amendment rights against Green, Jarvie and Monahan in their official capacities"; and ii) his claims against Monahan, in his official capacity, and Camden County for failure to supervise Green, Jarvie and Monahan. See id.
III. Remaining Legal Issues
To prevail at trial on their remaining claims of retaliation, the plaintiffs must prove that "1) [they] engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; 2) a state actor responded with a retaliatory motive; and 3) the protected activity was the cause of the retaliatory response."See id. at 22 (citations omitted).
To prevail at trial on their remaining claims of failure to supervise, the plaintiffs must prove that the supervisors played an "affirmative role in the deprivation of the plaintiff[s'] rights and that" the supervisors' misconduct was not "merely a failure to act." Id. at 23 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
These narrow issues are the only legal issues that remain in this case.
IV. Controlling Law
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, . . . for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters; . . .
The party seeking a protective order must demonstrate that "good cause" exists to protect the material from disclosure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c);Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986);Cooper Hospital/University Medical Center v. Sullivan, 183 F.R.D. 135, 142-43 (D.N.J. 1998); Johnston Development Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 352 (D.N.J. 1990) (citation omitted). "Good cause" requires a showing that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury; broad allegations of harm will not suffice. See id. The party seeking the protective order bears the burden of persuasion. See id. Any party moving for a protective order must substantiate its allegations of harm with specific examples. See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1995); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994); Cooper, 183 F.R.D. at 143 (citations omitted).
The Court must engage in a factual analysis considering the nature of the information sought in light of the factual and legal issues remaining in the case. See Cooper, 183 F.R.D. at 143 (citations omitted); 8 C. Wright, A. Miller R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2035 at 486 (West 1994).
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the Court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or other person provide or permit discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); 8 C. Wright, A. Miller R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2035 at 486 (West 1994).
To determine which of Plaintiffs' discovery requests are relevant to the remaining claims in this matter, the Court must also consider the general standards governing discovery in federal court. Parties in a litigation "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). "The information sought need not be admissible at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. Additionally, Rule 26 requires that the discovery sought must be proportional to the claims and issues remaining in a case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) 1983 advisory committee's note. Discovery "must concern relevant information that is within the inquiring party's legitimate discovery needs when assessed against the lawsuit's `nature and complexity, the importance of the issues at stake in a case seeking damages . . . and the significance of the substantive issues . . . .'"Johnston Development Group, Inc. v. Carpenters Local Union No. 1578, 130 F.R.D. 348, 353 (D.N.J. 1990) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) 1983 advisory committee's note). See also Public Service Enterprise Group Inc. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 130 F.R.D. 543, 551 (D.N.J. 1990); Leksi, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 129 F.R.D. 99, 105 (D.N.J. 1989).
V. Analysis
The issues remaining in this case are rather limited. To succeed on their claims, Plaintiffs must prove that they engaged in protected speech; that Defendants Green and Jarvie retaliated against Kennedy based on her speech; that Defendants Green, Jarvie and Monahan retaliated against Sweeney based on his speech; and that Defendants Watts, DiChristina, Monahan and Camden County played affirmative roles in the retaliation in their supervisory roles.
The Court will analyze Defendants' request for a protective order balancing the standards of Rule 26 against the relevant facts of this case, the remaining claims, and the remaining legal issues.
Defendants have asserted grounds for a protective order for many of Plaintiffs' document requests served on several State Defendants. The Court will address each disputed request seriatim, considering the principles discussed above, and either permit or preclude Plaintiffs from seeking the production of certain materials pursuant to the Court's authority under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c).
A. Document Requests to Defendant Watts .
Plaintiff Kennedy's remaining claims against Watts are for his alleged participation in the retaliation against Plaintiffs as a supervisor of Green and Jarvie.
1. Document Request Number 2 .
Watts seeks relief from Plaintiffs' Document Request Number 2 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case. Document Request Number 2 seeks the Local Enforcement Agency's "Quarterly Registry covering Camden County for all years from 1980-1995."
Defendants' motion papers do not comply with Rules 7.1(c) and 7.2(a) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ("Local Rules"), generally provide the Court with very little useful information and are bereft of any legal analysis whatsoever. The Court may impose sanctions on an attorney who files an impermissible "certification" in support if his motion papers. See Local Rule 7.2(a); Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota, Inc . Civil Action No. 97-3722 (JBS), ___ F. Supp.2d ___, ___, 1999 WL 157684, *17-18, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2906, *49-52 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 1999). Defendants did not file a brief with their motion papers, do not cite any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in support of their motion, including Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), which governs protective orders, do not cite any relevant case law, and do not even mention the opinions filed by the Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, which clearly set-forth Plaintiffs' remaining claims in this action. Defendants apparently assume that it is the Court's duty to determine which rules and law entitle them to the relief they seek. That assumption is incorrect. The Court urges defense counsel to read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court before he files any other motion papers, particularly Local Rules 7.1, 7.2 and 37.1, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Counsel is warned that further disregard for the rules of procedure will result in the Court denying Defendants' motions without reaching the merits.
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how the requested documents relate to any remaining claim in the case. The thrust of Plaintiffs' relevance argument is that the original inspector of the premises, Inspector Cortes-Treherne, was not authorized to cite Plaintiff Kennedy for fire code violations.
First, the time period for which Plaintiffs seek documents, 1980-1995, is overly broad. The relevant time period here is 1994 when Defendants allegedly retaliated against Plaintiffs for their protected speech.
Second, whether or not the BHI and Inspector Cortes-Treherne were authorized by law to cite Kennedy for fire code violations is irrelevant to Kennedy's remaining claims that Defendants Green and Jarvie retaliated against her for her protected speech in 1994, and that Watts, DiChristina and Camden County played an affirmative role in that retaliation as supervisors.
Finally, Plaintiff Sweeney does not have any surviving claims against Watts.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 2 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 2.
2. Document Request Number 3 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 3, which seeks "[a]ll documents reflecting that the 10/24/94 audit investigation conducted by Jarvie at Kennedy's Collingswood, N.J. property resulted in dismissal of any of the `violations' that he audited." Watts claims that all responsive documents have been produced, and that Defendant further agrees to allow Plaintiffs to inspect documents located at the Department of Community Affairs offices at a mutually agreeable time.
Watts should state in his written responses and objections to Plaintiffs' Document Request that all responsive documents have been produced pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b). To the extent that there are additional responsive documents located at the Department of Community Affairs, Watts must identify those documents and permit Plaintiffs to inspect and copy those responsive non-privileged documents.
Defendants claim either to have produced the requested material or to make responsive documents available for inspection and copying and have not asserted grounds for relief from the request. Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 3 served on Defendant Watts is DENIED. Defendant Watts shall respond to Document Request Number 3 and produce all non-privileged responsive documents.
3. Document Request Number 4 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 4 on the grounds that it is irrelevant and does not relate to any material issue of fact remaining in the case.
Document Request Number 4 seeks "[a]ny and all documents reflecting any credits allowed to Camden County for inspections conducted on 6/15/94. (NJAC 5:10-1.3(B)(17)(10) [sic]."
According to Plaintiffs, New Jersey law provides a mechanism whereby local housing agencies are paid by the State for certain inspections, including the inspections of Plaintiff Kennedy's Collingswood property. Kennedy seeks through this Document Request documents relating to Camden County's efforts to receive credits for the inspection that allegedly took place at her property on June 15, 1994, and for which she has been unable to provide documentation.
Whether or not an inspection took place at Kennedy's property on June 15, 1994 is a relevant disputed material fact in this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to the documents they seek to prove that an inspection did in fact occur on June 15, 1994.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 4 served on Defendant Watts is DENIED. Defendant shall respond to Document Request Number 4 and Produce all non-privileged responsive documents.
4. Document Request Number 5 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 5 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any remaining issues in this case.
Document Request Number 5 seeks "[r]esumes submitted to the Bureau for Ralph Green, Cortes-Treherne and Mazarella." Plaintiff claims that the resumes sought were to be provided to Watts under New Jersey law. According to Plaintiffs, if Watts did not receive the resumes and did not ensure that the County inspectors were capable, that fact would "show a total disregard for the rights of property owners subjected to inspections by the `un-resumed' [sic] county inspectors."
Plaintiffs' argument is without merit. Whether or not the county inspectors were qualified to do their job has no relevance to the issue of whether or not Watts took an affirmative role in the retaliation against Kennedy for her protected speech. Request Number 5 seeks neither relevant information nor information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 5 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 5.
5. Document Request Number 6 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 6 on he grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any remaining issues in this case.
Document Request Number 5 seeks a "[l]isting of all training sessions scheduled by the Bureau where Ralph Green and/or other camden [sic] county [sic] inspectors were required to attend. (See NJAC 5:10-1.3(b)(13(4) [sic]." Plaintiffs claim that this information is relevant to the training and supervision of County inspectors employed by the State.
Whether or not the State or its agents trained the Camden County inspectors has no bearing on the remaining claims against the supervisors in this case. As discussed above, to hold the supervisors liable, Plaintiffs must show that the supervisor defendants took an affirmative role in the alleged retaliation against Plaintiffs. The training of inspectors might be relevant if Plaintiffs' legal claims required a showing of negligence. Negligence, however, is not the standard Plaintiffs must meet. Plaintiffs must prove that the supervisors played an affirmative role in the retaliation against them. Therefore, documents relating to training of County inspector are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 6 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 6.
6. Document Request Number 7 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 7 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant.
Document Request Number 7 seeks the "[l]etter of authorization for Camden County inspectors to perform inspections under SLHCIP [sic]." Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to the letters for the period 1992-1995.
The time period for which Plaintiffs seek the documents is overly broad. The only inspections of Kennedy's property relevant to her retaliation claims occurred in 1994 after Kennedy allegedly complained about the inspectors' conduct; specifically, the July 5, 1994 and the October 24, 1994 inspections. To the extent that the State retains copies of letters authorizing County inspectors to perform inspections, Plaintiffs are entitled to the letter for 1994 only.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 7 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 7 to the extent that the request seeks information for years other than 1994. Defendant Watts shall produce all non-privileged responsive documents regarding authorization for 1994.
7. Document Request Number 8 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 8 on the grounds that all relevant documents have been provided and that Plaintiffs will have an opportunity to inspect documents in the offices of the Department of Community Affairs.
Plaintiffs state that they "will not pursue obtaining this document at this time." The Court will assume that Plaintiffs mean that they are withdrawing the request.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 7 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 7.
8. Document Request Number 9 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 9 on the grounds that it does not seek any relevant information.
Document Request Number 9 seeks "[a]ll documents authorizing Collingswood Fire Department to act as LEA." Plaintiffs claim that the documents sought are relevant because they may show that the BHI was not authorized under state law to cite Kennedy for fire code violations.
The documents sought have no bearing whatsoever as to whether Watts, or any other supervisor, took an affirmative role in the deprivation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, or whether the other defendants otherwise retaliated against Plaintiffs.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 9 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 9.
9. Document Request Number 10 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 10 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any issue remaining in this case.
Document Request number 10 seeks "[a]ny and all documents whereby Collingswood Fire Department notified the Bureau that it would act as LEA."
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.8., supra, the documents sought in Document Request Number 10 are neither relevant to any issue remaining in this case, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 10 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 10.
10. Document Request Numbers 14-16(b) .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 14-16(b) on the grounds that the requests do not seek relevant information.
Document Request Numbers 14-16(b) seek from Watts all documents that existed between 1994 and 1996 detailing policies and procedures for the handling of allegations of inspector bribery, misconduct and incompetence. Plaintiffs claim that the documents are relevant to show "that Watts failed to supervise and train his subordinates to properly handle, process and inquire into the allegations in accordance with the State's own guidelines."
Plaintiffs seem to be under the impression that to prevail against the supervisors in this case, they must merely show that the supervisors were negligent in their supervision of the inspectors, or that the supervisors failed to follow state mandated procedural guidelines. Plaintiffs' burden is much higher. As discussed above, Plaintiffs must show that the supervisors, including Watts, played an affirmative role in the inspectors' alleged retaliation. Whether or not the supervisors followed state procedural guidelines is irrelevant to determine whether the supervisors affirmatively aided the alleged retaliation. Plaintiffs must prove that the supervisors' conduct was more than a mere failure to act, or failure to follow state procedural guidelines. Document Request Numbers 14-16(b) neither seek relevant information, nor information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 14-16(b) served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Numbers 14-16(b).
11. Document Request Numbers 18 and 19 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 18 and 19 on the grounds that no such documents exist.
If Watts claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 18 and 19 served on Defendant Watts is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material.
12. Document Request Numbers 20-25 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 20-25 on the grounds that the Document Requests seek information that is not relevant to the remaining issues in this case.
Document Request Numbers 20 and 21 seek all documents relating to the five most recent audits that resulted in no dismissal of violations, and the five most recent audits that resulted in dismissal of violations. Plaintiffs claim that this information is relevant to show that Kennedy was "treated disparately in retaliation for speech."
The results of the five most recent audits are irrelevant to the issue of whether Plaintiffs were retaliated against for their speech, or whether the supervisors participated in that retaliation. Additionally, Plaintiffs have never alleged that they are members of a protected class, or that they were some how treated disparately by the BHI. Therefore, Document Request Numbers 20 and 21 seek neither relevant information, nor information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Document Request Numbers 22 and 23 seek documents relating to the five most recent inspections that resulted in settlements and the five most recent inspections that resulted in no settlement that proceeded to an enforcement action.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to the documents sought in Document Request Numbers 22 and 23 for the same reasons that they are not entitled to the documents sought in Document Request Numbers 20 and 21.
Document Request Numbers 24(a) and 24(b) seek all reports of inspection and reinspection by Inspectors Cortes-Treherne and Mazarella from 1992-1995.
Neither Cortes-Treherne nor Mazarella are defendants in this action and their reports of inspections and re-inspections are not relevant to determine whether the defendants in this action retaliated against Plaintiffs. Document Request Numbers 24(a) and 24(b) seek neither relevant information, nor information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Document request Number 25 seeks "all reinspection reports on which changes regarding abatement of violations were made in any way, prior to the next inspection, including, but not limited to erasures, cross-outs, white-outs, etc." for the period 1993 and 1994.
Changes to reinspection reports other than reports of re-inspections of Kennedy's property are not relevant to the remaining claims in this action, nor are they reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 20-25 served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Numbers 20-25.
13. Document Request Number 26(a) .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request number 26(a) on the grounds that he does not supervise county inspectors, and, therefore, the documents sought do not relate to any claim against him.
Document request 26(a) seeks "[a]ll records . . . reflecting any reviews of Cortes-Treherne's and Mazarella's re-inspection" of Kennedy's property. In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs do not state how the information sought is relevant to issues remaining in this case. Plaintiffs merely argue that Watts likely has such information.
Neither Cortes-Treherne nor Mazarella are defendants in this action, and Plaintiffs have not asserted claims of retaliation against either inspector. Plaintiff has failed to show how the information sought in this document request relates to Watts alleged participation as a supervisor in the retaliation against Kennedy. The information sought in Document Request Number 26(a) seeks neither relevant information, nor information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 26(a) served on Defendant Watts is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents and information sought in Document Request Number 26(a).
14. Document Request Number 27 .
Watts seeks relief from Document Request Number 27 on the grounds that all responsive documents have been produced, and that the request does not seek relevant information.
If all non-privileged responsive documents have been produced, Defendant Watts must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests, otherwise Defendant must produce the requested material.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 27 served on Defendant Watts is DENIED.
B. Document Requests to Defendant DiChristina .
Plaintiffs have not submitted any opposition to Defendants' motion for a protective order as to the Document Requests served on DiChristina. The beginning of Plaintiffs' opposition brief states that "[s]ince many requests for the same documents were duplicated to all the defendants, the majority of Plaintiffs' rebuttals are incorporated in rebuttals to defendant Watts." The Court cannot determine, however, which arguments Plaintiffs make in opposition to Defendants' motion as to DiChristina that were made in their opposition to Defendants' motion as to Watts. The document requests served on Watts and DiChristina appear to be completely different requests with some overlapping subject matter. For example, Request Number 1 to Watts seeks a copy of his job description from 1992 to present, and Request Number 1 to DiChristina seeks documents relating to credits received by Camden County for inspections. Request Number 2 to Watts seeks the LEA quarterly registry for 1980-1995. Request Number 2 to DiChristina seeks Green's, Cortes-Treherne's and Mazarella's resumes. The Court cannot and will not compare Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion as to Watts and then attempt to find analogous requests made to DiChristina and apply Plaintiffs' argument to that request.
Plaintiff Kennedy's remaining claims against DiChristina are for her alleged participation in the retaliation against Plaintiffs as a supervisor of Green and Jarvie.
1. Document Request Number 1 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.3, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 1 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 1.
2. Document Request Number 2 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.3, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 2 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 2.
3. Document Request Number 3 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.5, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 3 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 3.
4. Document Request Number 5 .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Number 5 on the grounds that the request seeks information that is not relevant to the remaining issues in this case.
The request seeks "[a]ll documents relevant to the cyclical inspection of 542-544 Haddon Ave., Collingswood, prior to 1992."
This request seeks information regarding events that occurred before the alleged retaliation against Plaintiffs. Additionally, the request seeks information that is not relevant to a supervisors role in the alleged retaliation against Plaintiffs, nor is it reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 5 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 5.
5. Document Request Numbers 6-8 .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 6-8 on the grounds that the requests are not relevant to any issues remaining in the case.
Document Request Number 6 seeks "[a]ny and all documents authorizing Collingswood Fire Department to act as the LEA."
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.8, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 6 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 6.
Document Request Number 7 seeks"[a]ny and all documents whereby Collingswood Fire Department notified the DCA and/or Bureau of Housing Inspection that it would act as the LEA."
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.9, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 7 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 7.
Document Request Number 8 seeks "LEA Quarterly Registry covering Camden County for all years from 1980-1995."
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.1, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 8 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 8.
6. Document Request Numbers 9-11 .
DiChristina states that the documents sought in Document Request Numbers 9-11 already have been produced by Defendant Watts.
If the documents already have been produced to Plaintiffs, Defendant should so state in her written responses to Plaintiffs' Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order for Document Request Numbers 9-11 served on Defendant DiChristina is DENIED.
7. Document Request Numbers 12-15(b) .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 12-15(b) on the grounds that the requests seek documents that are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case.
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.10, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 12-15(b) served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 10-15(b).
8. Document Request Numbers 17 and 18 .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 17 and 18 on the grounds that she does not have any responsive documents.
If DiChristina claims that she does not have any of the requested documents, she must so state in her written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 17 and 18 served on Defendant DiChristina is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material.
9. Document Request Numbers 19-24 .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 19-24 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case.
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.12, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 19-24 served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 19-24.
10. Document Request Numbers 25(a) and 25(b) .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 25(a) and 25(b) on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case.
Defendants' certification only seeks relief from Document Request Number 25, however there is no request number 25 served on DiChristina, but, rather a request number 25(a) and a request number 25(b). Because both 25(a) and 25(b) address identical subject matter, the Court will assume that Defendants' motion applies to both requests.
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.12, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 25(a) and 25(b) served on Defendant DiChristina is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Numbers 25(a) and 25(b).
11. Document Request Numbers 26-34 .
DiChristina seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 26-34 on the grounds that the documents sought already have been provided to Plaintiffs with Defendants' responses to interrogatories, and are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case.
If DiChristina claims that she does not have any of the requested documents or that she already has produced the requested documents, she must so state in her written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 26-34 served on Defendant DiChristina is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant already has produced the requested material.
C. Document Requests to Defendant Jarvie .
For the reasons discussed in note 2, supra , the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not submitted opposition to Defendants' motion for a protective order as to the Document Requests served on Defendant Jarvie, with the exception of Document Request Number 1. Plaintiffs state in the beginning of their opposition brief that they were providing opposition arguments for Document Request Numbers 1 and 2 to Jarvie, however, Plaintiffs' brief contains only arguments as to Document Request Number 1.
Plaintiffs' remaining claim against Defendant Jarvie is for his alleged retaliation against Kennedy based on the exercise of her First Amendment right to engage in free speech.
1. Document Request Number 1 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Number 1 on the grounds that "audits" are not relevant to the issues remaining in this case, and that Plaintiffs should be seeking documents regarding "Field Reports."
Document Request Number 1 seeks "all reports, memoranda or any other documents relative to the last five audits [Jarvie] conducted or participated in." Plaintiffs claim that the requested material is relevant and further argue that they seek information regarding "audits" as opposed to "Field Reports."
Assuming for purposes of this motion that Jarvie conducted an audit on Kennedy's property on October 24, 1994, Plaintiffs have failed to show how the last five audits Jarvie conducted are relevant to her claim that he retaliated against her for the exercise of her First Amendment rights. Even assuming that Plaintiffs' claims that Jarvie failed to prepare certain documents in connection with the October, 1994 audit, that information will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether or not Jarvie retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining about county inspectors. Additionally, the document request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 1 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 1.
2. Document Request Number 2 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Number 2 on the grounds that the Court addressed the issue of Plaintiffs' claims that sequential documents were missing from Defendants' document production at the hearing held on February 11, 1999.
Document Request Number 2 seeks production of "the documents which are library/document no. 6169D, 6170D-1 and 6171D, or if available, the three documents prepared prior to and after [Jarvie's] 11/16/94 memorandum to Sheila Jerome marked 6170D-2." The Court finds that the issue of the "Wang Documents" was addressed at the February 11, 1999 hearing, but that the discussion at that hearing involved a different group of documents, namely, the following documents from the "U" library: 0275U, 0273U, 0272U, 0271U, 0278U 0279U and 0280U.
Defendants have not argued that the documents sought in Document Request Number 2 are not relevant to the issues remaining in this case and have not met their burden for a protective order as to those documents.
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 2 served on Defendant Jarvie is DENIED. Defendants shall produce all non-privileged responsive documents requested in Document Request Number 2.
3. Document Request Number 4 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.B.4, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 4 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 4.
4. Document Request Number 5 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.8, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 5 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 5.
5. Document Request Number 6 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Number 6 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any issue remaining in this case.
Document Request Number 6 seeks "[c]opies of all logs of your activities, call-in sheets and telephone credit [sic] card records for 10/24/94 and 11/1/94."
This issue was addressed by the parties at the February 11, 1999 hearing. At that hearing, the Court found that the documents sought in this request were not relevant to any disputed issue in this case, that Mr. Jarvie's whereabouts on October 24, 1994 and November 1, 1994 are not in dispute, and that Plaintiffs can readily obtain the information they need to establish Mr. Jarvie's whereabouts by asking Mr. Jarvie about his whereabouts at his deposition.
Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 6 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 6.
6. Document Request Numbers 7 and 8 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.8, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 7 and 8 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Numbers 7 and 8.
7. Document Request Numbers 9-11 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 9-11 on the grounds that he is not the appropriate person to whom this request should be directed, and on the grounds that the documents requested already have been produced.
If Jarvie claims that he does not have any of the requested documents or that the documents already have been produced, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 9-11 served on Defendant Jarvie is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant already has produced the requested material.
8. Document Request Numbers 12-14 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 12-14 on the grounds that the documents are not relevant to any issue remaining in this case.
Document Request Numbers 12-14 seek "[a]ny and all documents detailing DCA/BHI/SLCHIP procedures, guidelines, [or] directions regarding" allegations of bribery, misconduct and incompetence.
The documents sought in these requests are not relevant to any issues remaining in this case. Whether or not Jarvie followed or did not follow state procedural guidelines is not relevant to the remaining issues in this case, specifically, whether Mr. Jarvie retaliated against Kennedy for her exercise of her First Amendment rights.
Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 12-14 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Numbers 12-14.
9. Document Request Number 15 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.C.8, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 15 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 15.
10. Document Request Numbers 16 and 17 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.C.8, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 16 and 17 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Numbers 16 and 17.
11. Document Request Numbers 18-25 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.A.12, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 18-25 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 18-25.
12. Document Request Number 26 .
For the reasons discussed in Part V.C.5, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 26 served on Defendant Jarvie is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 26.
13. Document Request Number 27 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Number 27 on the grounds that the request seeks information that has been deemed irrelevant by the Court.
Document Request Number 27 seeks "[c]opies of Jarvie's diary entries and/or any other recordations [sic] regarding his on-the-job activities during the period 10/24/94 through 11/1/94, as they relate to any of his on-the-job activities concerning inspections, reinspections, audits, and any other matters concerning Kennedy and/or Sweeney."
The Court did in fact discuss with the parties Jarvie's diaries at the February 11, 1999 hearing. However, Defendants are not correct in their assertion that the Court ruled on the relevance of the diaries at the hearing. At the hearing, defense counsel stated that Jarvie did not have any diaries of his on-the-job activities. The Court made no ruling on the relevance of diaries if they did exist.
If Jarvie claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 27 served on Defendant Jarvie is DENIED. The Court has not ruled on the relevance of any diaries and a motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material.
13. Document Request Numbers 28-33 .
Jarvie seeks relief from Document Request Numbers 28-33 on the grounds that "these documents are not maintained by him, do not exist or have been provided."
If Jarvie claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, that the documents do not exist or that the documents already have been provided, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 28-33 served on Defendant Jarvie is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material, that the requested material does not exist or that the requested material has been produced.
D. Document Requests to Defendant Monahan .
For the reasons discussed in note 2, supra , the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not submitted opposition to Defendants' motion for a protective order as to the Document Requests served on Defendant Monahan, with the exception of Document Request Numbers 12, 13 and 30.
The only remaining claims against Monahan are for his alleged retaliation and participation as a supervisor in the retaliation against Sweeney for Sweeney's exercise of his First Amendment rights.
According to Judge Orlofsky's opinion in Kennedy II, Sweeney's claims against Monahan are limited. Judge Orlofsky held:
In one limited sense, however, Sweeney does state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sweeney adequately alleges a claim that the letter to Sweeney's employer was written in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights, and that statements were made as part of an Internal Revenue Service criminal investigation in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. . . . Accordingly, Sweeney does state a claim against Green, Jarvie and Monahan [for retaliation, and] . . . against Monahan and Camden County for failure to train and/or supervise . . . Monahan, Jarvie and Green from retaliating against Sweeney.Kennedy II at 34-35.
Accordingly, the rote document requests that Plaintiffs served on all Defendants seeking information about the inspection of Kennedy's property and inspections of properties in general are irrelevant to Sweeney's remaining claims. The only issues remaining on Sweeney's claims are whether his statements to the defendants were protected speech, whether Monahan's February 8, 1995 to the Internal Revenue Service was in retaliation for exercising his right to speak, whether statements made to Internal Revenue Service investigators were additional retaliation for exercising his right to speak, and whether Monahan and Camden County participated in the alleged retaliation as supervisors of Green, Jarvie and Monahan.
1. Document Request Number 2 .
Monahan seeks relief from Document Request Number 2 on the grounds that the documents sought are not relevant to any remaining claims against Monahan.
For the reasons discussed in the introduction to Part D, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 2 served on Defendant Monahan is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 2.
2. Document Request Number 3 .
Plaintiffs served two document requests denominated number three on Monahan. Monahan asserts the need for protection from Document Request Numbers 3 on two separate grounds. First, Monahan seeks relief from Document Request Number 3 on the grounds that the Court already has ruled on the relevance of these documents. The Court presumes that Defendants are trying to say that the Court has found that the documents are not relevant. Second, Monahan claims that he already produced the documents.
To the extent that Monahan, or any other party, has produced the documents sought in Document Request Number 3, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' document requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
To the extent that Defendants are referring to the discussion of the "U library" documents at the February 11, 1999 hearing, the court ruled at the hearing that Plaintiffs failed to show that those documents are relevant to this case and denied Plaintiff's motion to compel production of those documents.
For the reasons stated on the record at the February 11, 1999 hearing, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Number 3 served on Defendant Monahan is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Number 3.
3. Document Request Numbers 4-11 .
Monahan seeks protection from Document Request Numbers 4-11 on the grounds that there are no such documents and that documents maintained at the Department of Community Affairs will be made available for Plaintiffs' inspection.
If Monahan claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, that the documents do not exist or that the documents already have been or will be provided, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 4-11 served on Defendant Monahan is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material, that the requested material does not exist or that the requested material has been or will be produced.
4. Document Request Number 12 .
Monahan seeks protection from Document Request Number 12 on the grounds that the documents sought are not maintained by him, the documents do not exist, the documents have been produced and the documents maintained by the Department of Community Affairs will be made available to Plaintiffs for inspection.
If Monahan claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, that the documents do not exist or that the documents already have been or will be produced, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Number 12 served on Defendant Monahan is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material, that the requested material does not exist or that the requested material has been or will be produced.
5. Document Request Number 13 and 14 .
Monahan seeks protection from Document Request Number 13 and 14 on the grounds that the documents sought are not maintained by him, the documents do not exist, the documents have been produced and the documents maintained by the Department of Community Affairs will be made available to Plaintiffs for inspection.
If Monahan claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, that the documents do not exist or that the documents already have been or will be produced, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 13 and 14 served on Defendant Monahan is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material, that the requested material does not exist or that the requested material has been or will be produced.
6. Document Request Numbers 15-23 .
For the reasons discussed in the introduction to Part D, supra, Defendants' motion for a protective order from Document Request Numbers 15-23 served on Defendant Monahan is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking the documents or information sought in Document Request Numbers 15-23.
7. Document Request Numbers 25-30 .
Monahan seeks protection from Document Request Numbers 25-30 on the grounds that the documents sought are not maintained by him, the documents do not exist, the documents have been produced and the documents maintained by the Department of Community Affairs will be made available to Plaintiffs for inspection.
If Monahan claims that he does not have any of the requested documents, that the documents do not exist or that the documents already have been or will be produced, he must so state in his written responses to Plaintiffs' Document Requests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b).
Defendants' motion for a protective order as to Document Request Numbers 25-30 served on Defendant Monahan is DENIED. A motion for a protective order is not the proper place to respond to a document request by stating that the defendant does not have the requested material, that the requested material does not exist or that the requested material has been or will be produced.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' motion for a protective order is granted in part and denied in part. Where the Court has indicated in this Opinion that Defendants' motion is granted, Plaintiffs are precluded from seeking documents and information sought in that request. Where the Court has indicated that Defendants' motion is denied, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs with written responses and objections within fourteen (14) days from the date this Opinion and Order are filed, and shall produce all non-privileged responsive documents in their possession within thirty (30) days from the date this Opinion and Order are filed.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having been brought upon motion before the Court by Kenneth C. Green, Esquire, attorney for Defendants John T. Monahan, Curtis Watts, Janet DiChristina and James Jarvie; and the Court having considered the moving papers and the opposition thereto; and for the reasons stated in the opinion filed with this Order;
IT IS this 29th day of March, 1999 hereby
ORDERED that the defendants' motion for a protective order is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.