Opinion
376 CA 15-01528.
05-06-2016
In the Matter of Daniel F. KENEFICK, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Thomas STICHT, Superintendent, Gowanda Correctional Facility, and Anthony Annucci, Acting Commissioner, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondents–Appellants.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of Counsel), For Respondents–Appellants. Daniel F. Kenefick, Petitioner–Respondent Pro Se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of Counsel), For Respondents–Appellants.
Daniel F. Kenefick, Petitioner–Respondent Pro Se.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, DeJOSEPH, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM: In this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, respondents appeal from a judgment that set aside their determination denying petitioner's release to parole, and granted petitioner a de novo parole hearing before a different panel. We reverse the judgment and dismiss the petition.
“It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed so long as the Board [of Parole] complied with the statutory requirements enumerated in Executive Law § 259–i ” (Matter of Gssime v. New York State Div. of Parole, 84 A.D.3d 1630, 1631, 923 N.Y.S.2d 307, lv. dismissed 17 N.Y.3d 847, 930 N.Y.S.2d 542, 954 N.E.2d 1168 ; see Matter of Johnson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839, 884 N.Y.S.2d 545 ; see generally Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 790–791, 610 N.Y.S.2d 954, 632 N.E.2d 1277 ). The Board is “not required to give equal weight to each of the statutory factors” but, rather, may “place[ ] greater emphasis on the severity of the crimes than on the other statutory factors” (Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 815, 2012 WL 5258825 ; see Matter of Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947, 910 N.Y.S.2d 112 ). Where parole is denied, the inmate must be informed in writing of “the factors and reasons for such denial of parole” (§ 259–i[2][a] [i] ). “Judicial intervention is warranted only when there is a ‘showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 ; see Matter of Johnson v. Dennison, 48 A.D.3d 1082, 1083, 849 N.Y.S.2d 741 ; Matter of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781 ).
Here, we conclude upon our review of the record that the Board considered the required statutory factors and adequately set forth its reasons for denying petitioner's application for release (see Matter of Siao–Pao v. Dennison, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 778, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602, 896 N.E.2d 87, rearg. denied 11 N.Y.3d 885, 873 N.Y.S.2d 258, 901 N.E.2d 751 ; Matter of Patterson v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1456, 1457, 966 N.Y.S.2d 303, lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 912, 975 N.Y.S.2d 732, 998 N.E.2d 395 ). We further conclude that the Board's determination does not exhibit “ ‘irrationality bordering on impropriety’ ” (Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is dismissed.