Opinion
Civil Action 23-187
08-21-2023
PAUL KENDRICK, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary Of The Department Of Corrections, et al., Defendants.
William S. Stickman, District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NO. 29
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Paul Kendrick (“Plaintiff”), an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI - Fayette”), has presented a civil rights complaint and has been granted leave to prosecute without prepayment of costs. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by retaining him in solitary confinement for a prolonged period without due process of law and were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health conditions. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff also sets forth a claim for negligence related to the alleged inadequacy of mental health treatment and the conditions of his confinement. Id.
Presently before the Court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendant Psychiatrist Peter Saavedra (“Saavedra”). ECF No. 29. Upon review, it is recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim and grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this Report and Recommendation. As of October 5, 2022, Plaintiff had been on the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Restricted Release List for 4.5 years, and spent “almost 5 years in solitary confinement at multiple Pennsylvania State Prisons.” ECF No. 7 ¶ 15. Plaintiff asserts he endured the “harsh conditions” of his confinement that “deprive[] him of a life worth living.” Id. ¶ 17. His cell is illuminated 24 hours per day, which interferes with sleep, and the construction of his cell leaves him completely isolated from human contact. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Five days per week, when weather permits, he may leave his cell for one hour to exercise outdoors, but otherwise Plaintiff remains in his cell and eats meals alone. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.
Plaintiff alleges that the conditions of his confinement have caused him to suffer anxiety, extreme depression, frustration, loneliness, auditory and visual hallucination, and paranoia. The conditions also have increased the severity of his anti-social personality disorder and night terrors. Id. ¶ 28. These feelings have led Plaintiff “to attempt suicide multiple times.” Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff filed several grievances complaining of his conditions of confinement and requesting psychiatric treatment as well as placement in a therapeutic program, to no avail. Id. ¶¶ 27, 34. Plaintiff alleges that DOC administrators Little and Bickle have “the exclusive power to end or to prolong Plaintiff's isolation,” but have failed to reassign him. Id. ¶ 57.
From June 2022 through September 2022, Plaintiff informed Dr. Saavedra that he was experiencing “hallucination symptoms” because of sleep deprivation. Id. ¶ 37. He also complained of suicidal ideation, but Dr. Saavedra “dismissed Plaintiff's numerous pleas and delusionary behavior ... as behavioral and refused to provide medical care or address Plaintiff's verbalized suicidal ideation.” Id. ¶¶ 38-40. In September 2022, because of his “mounting” depression, he “attempted suicide by ingesting a razor and hanging himself.” Id. ¶ 47. “Despite these events . psychiatry still refused to treat the Plaintiff or put him in a more conducive environment.” Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Saavedra violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and was otherwise negligent in failing to exercise reasonable care. Id. ¶ 69.
In response to the Complaint, Dr. Saavedra filed the pending Partial Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dr. Saavedra argues that Plaintiff cannot sustain his Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting an inference that Dr. Saavedra knew the length of Plaintiff's solitary confinement and in any event, lacked the authority to change Plaintiff's housing assignment. Dr. Saavedra also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim because Plaintiff failed to file a Certificate of Merit as required under Pennsylvania law. ECF No. 30.Plaintiff filed a response, a supplemental response, and a brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 32, 34, and 36.
Dr. Saavedra filed a Reply Brief at ECF No. 35 that appear identical to the brief filed at ECF No. 30.
The Partial Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “[D]etailed pleading is not generally required.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016). Rather, the rules require “‘only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint. All reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, the Court need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice. The complaint therefore “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim.”). Id. at 233, 234.
Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Department of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
Yet there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility - “Pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim ....they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff is a Pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim
Plaintiff's complaint asserts federal civil rights claims against all Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The personal involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element; thus, a plaintiff must allege how the defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges two Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Saavedra: first, for the denial of medical and mental health care and second, for the conditions of his confinement. Dr. Saavedra moves to dismiss only Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,318-19 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition to impose affirmative duties on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Allah v. Bartkowski, 574 Fed.Appx. 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctrs., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010)). When an Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context of a challenge to conditions of confinement, the relevant inquiry is whether the prisoner has been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2003). A deprivation is sufficiently serious when viewed within the context of “contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993); Bracey v. Beard, No. 11-217E, 2014 WL 4659639, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2014), aff'd sub nom., 686 Fed.Appx. 130 (3d Cir. 2017). Thus, a prisoner must establish that he has been denied “basic human needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety” from physical assault. Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997).
A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that the inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. A trier of fact may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious. Id. at 842.
Dr. Saavedra contends that absent an allegation that he was aware of the length of Plaintiff's confinement, Plaintiff fails to adequately support his claim that he knew Plaintiff faced a risk of serious harm. ECF No. 30 at 5-6. Further, because Plaintiff alleges that DOC administrators Little and Bickle control Plaintiff's housing placement, Dr. Saavedra cannot be found personally involved in the alleged violation of his rights arising from the length of his exposure to the allegedly unconstitutional conditions of his confinement.
Upon review, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts related to the conditions of his confinement that if proven would permit an inference that Dr, Saavedra deprived Plaintiff the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. See Snider v. Pennsylvania DOC, 505 F.Supp.3d 360, 439 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2017) (“acknowledge[ing] the robust body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement”). To that end, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Saavedra knew Plaintiff suffered a risk of serious harm during the four months he knew Plaintiff was housed in isolation. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Saavedra knew Plaintiff threatened and then attempted suicide, and heard Plaintiff's complaints of deteriorating mental health that included hallucinations and suicidal ideation. Plaintiff also alleges that despite this knowledge, Dr. Saavedra deliberately disregarded Plaintiff's condition and failed to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. ¶¶ 71, 72, 73.
Discovery may reveal - or it may not - that Plaintiff's conditions of confinement are as represented related to isolation and lighting, and the impact, if any, of those conditions on Plaintiff's mental health. Discovery may also reveal that Dr. Saavedra was authorized to recommend a change to Plaintiff's housing, even temporarily, to address Plaintiff's alleged deteriorating mental status, and that such a recommendation would have resulted in a change in Plaintiff's housing assignment. Finally, discovery may reveal that Plaintiff's housing assignment is periodically reviewed and determined necessary based on legitimate penological concerns that preclude placement in a unit with less supervision and control over his movement. See Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018); Porter v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 446 (3d Cir. 2020) (“In evaluating the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test, we may also consider whether officials ‘had a legitimate penological purpose' behind their conduct.”).
However, at this early stage of the litigation, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court deny Dr. Saavedra's Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.
2. Negligence Claim
Dr. Saavedra contends that Plaintiff's state law negligence claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff challenges Dr. Saavedra's clinical judgment and yet failed to file a Certificate of Merit to support his claim, as required under Pennsylvania law. ECF No. 30 at 7 (citing Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3). Dr. Saavedra filed a Notice of Intention to Enter Judgment of Non-Pros on Professional Liability Claim on May 9, 2023, ECF No. 25. The Notice served to alert Plaintiff of his obligation to produce a Certificate of Merit stating that a qualified expert has supplied a written statement that there is a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised by the defendant fell outside acceptable professional standards, and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. In response, Plaintiff asserts Dr. Saavedra's motion is premature and should be reviewed at the summary judgment phase. ECF No. 32 at 5.
Rule 1042.3 expressly requires a person who brings a claim of medical negligence to file a Certificate of Merit either with the complaint or 60 days thereafter. Pa. R. C. P. 1042.3. The purpose of the required Certificate of Merit is “to assure that malpractice claims for which there is no expert support will be terminated at an early stage in the proceedings.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). Rule 1042.3 does not excuse Pro se plaintiffs, and it constitutes a rule of substantive law applicable in federal court. Perez v. Griffin, 304 Fed.Appx. 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Rule 1042.3 is a substantive state law that federal district courts must apply ... [b]y its explicit terms, the rule applies to both represented plaintiffs and pro se plaintiffs, like [the incarcerated prisoner] Perez.”). Failure to comply with Rule 1042.3 results in dismissal of the medical negligence claim.
Under the well-established requirements of Rule 1042.3, Plaintiff has failed to file a Certificate of Merit within the required 60 days following the filing of his Complaint, and he did not timely request an extension of time to do so. Thus, in the absence of a Certificate of Merit, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim against Dr. Saavedra without prejudice. See Donelly v. O'Malley & Langan, 370 F. App'x. 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Booker v. United States, 366 F. App'x. 425, 427 (3d Cir. 2010).
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Dr. Saavedra's Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 29, be denied as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim but granted as to Plaintiff's negligence claim.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.