Opinion
No. 99 C 3560
December 18, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Riley Kees has filed a one count amended complaint against the Illinois Department of Human Services Office of Developmental Disabilities ("defendant") and W.A. Howe Development Center ("Howe"), alleging that he was terminated because of his race, African-American, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.
The parties agree that actions taken by Howe are attributable to the Illinois Department of Human Services, Office of Developmental Disabilities pursuant to 26 ILCS § 1705/4. Accordingly, the court dismisses defendant Howe from the instant action.
FACTS
All facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Certain facts will be discussed in greater detail in the body of the opinion.
On July 1, 1996, plaintiff was hired by defendant to work as a Mental Health Technician I Trainee and, on June 16, 1997, plaintiff was promoted to the title of Mental Health Technician I. At all relevant times, plaintiff worked as a part-time employee at the W.A. Howe Development Center ("Howe Center"), a residential center providing individualized programs, services and support for adults who are developmentally disabled. As a Mental Health Technician I at Howe Center, plaintiff's duties included acting as a group manager for developing mentally disabled adults and providing a program of care, training and recreation. To perform his job, plaintiff received extensive training at the Howe Center, including training on how to deal with physically aggressive patients.
On April 20, 1998, plaintiff was assigned to work in "Unit II — House 208" of the Howe Center. At approximately 9:15 a.m. that morning, plaintiff was involved in an incident with a patient who will be referred to herein as "J.H." The parties disagree about precisely what took place during this incident. Plaintiff claims that he heard J.H. speaking to Dr. Matthew Miller ("Dr. Miller") in the kitchen of the Howe Center. Plaintiff says J.H. was upset with plaintiff and was calling plaintiff names using strong profanity. Plaintiff says he entered the kitchen and asked if J.H. had a problem with plaintiff, at which time plaintiff says J.H. threatened plaintiff, saying that he (J.H.) would cut or hit plaintiff. Plaintiff responded by telling J.H. that he would do no such thing. Next, plaintiff says J.H. opened a drawer in the kitchen, took out a butter knife, and threw it at plaintiff, hitting him in the chest. Plaintiff says that Dr. Miller, who was present at the incident, did not say or do anything in response. Instead, plaintiff says another staff member entered the kitchen and positioned himself between J.H. and plaintiff with his back toward J.H. Plaintiff admits that at this point he told J.H. that he would "not disrespect" plaintiff in this way. In response, J.H. turned to grab another butter knife from the drawer, at which time plaintiff reached toward J.H. for the first time with his right hand open trying to protect himself. Plaintiff says that, in reaching for J.H., plaintiff lightly touched the left side of J.H.'s face and shoulder. After this, plaintiff says J.H. immediately calmed down, and the incident was over.
Defendant tells a different story. According to an investigation conducted by Lawrence Turner ("Turner"), an Investigator with the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), J.H. became upset with plaintiff after plaintiff told J.H. that plaintiff would dispose of J.H.'s breakfast tray if he did not come to breakfast when it was served. Then, at approximately 9:15 a.m., while J.H. was speaking to Dr. Miller and using profanity in reference to plaintiff, plaintiff confronted J.H. The confrontation moved into the kitchen area, and J.H. told plaintiff several times to leave him alone. Plaintiff did not comply and J.H. threw a butter knife at plaintiff, hitting him on the chest. Plaintiff then moved toward J.H. twice, swinging at him. J.H. blocked the first swing, but was unable to block the second and plaintiff's open hand made contact with J.H.'s cheek. At this point, another worker entered the room and stepped between plaintiff and J.H., telling plaintiff to "take a walk." Turner's OIG investigation report concluded as follows: "The results of the investigation indicate a finding of physical abuse is substantiated."
On August 10, 1998, Dorothy Carlson ("Carlson"), Director of Unit II at the Howe Center and plaintiff's immediate supervisor, presided over a pre-disciplinary meeting regarding the incident between plaintiff and J.H. Present at the meeting, in addition to Carlson, were plaintiff, Greg Manuel, plaintiff's Union Representative, and Paulette Taylor ("Taylor"), Living Unit Administrator for Unit II at Howe Center. During the pre-disciplinary meeting, plaintiff was allowed to demonstrate what happened between him and J.H. to those present. Following the meeting, Carlson recommended that plaintiff be discharged for striking J.H. on the face. Carlson's recommendation was based on the findings of the OIG investigation and was given to Scott Umbreit ("Umbreit"), the Chief Operating Officer at the Howe Center. Umbreit made the final decision to discharge plaintiff, and he based his decision on the OIG investigation report. On August 29, 1998, plaintiff was suspended pending discharge. On September 21, 1998, the Director of the Department of Central Management Services approved plaintiff's discharge, which took effect on September 29, 1998.
Taylor completed a "staff statement" on the day of the incident which stated, inter alia, that plaintiff admitted to her that he hit J.H.
Howe Center policy prohibits striking patients in the face or on any other part of their body. Physical abuse of a patient is cause for discharge at the Howe Center. Additionally, staff at the Howe Center are taught to defend themselves but never to take the offensive against a patient.
Prior to April 20, 1998, no employee of the Howe Center used a racial slur against plaintiff or discriminated against plaintiff based on his race. Plaintiff has testified that he does not believe that Carison or Umbreit discriminated against him; instead plaintiff maintains that it was Dr. Miller and J.H. who discriminated against him by making false complaints.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1993). Once a moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993). This standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where issues of intent and credibility often dominate. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
Because plaintiff has not offered direct evidence of discrimination in responding to this motion, the court focuses entirely on the burden-shifting requirements for Title VII cases set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the burden-shifting approach, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505 (1993). The plaintiff's success in establishing a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, causing the burden to shift to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. See Anderson v. Baxter Healtheare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994). If the defendant is successful, the presumption of discrimination dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id. At all times, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her. See Hughes v.Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1994).
According to the Seventh Circuit, where the plaintiff cannot show pretext, it is unnecessary to decide whether the employee has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case. Mora v.Chicago Tribune, 57 F. Supp.2d 626, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff'd, 215 F.3d 1330 (7th Cir. Ill. 2000) (citing Holmberg v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir, 1990). Thus, if plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendant's articulated reason for his discharge was pretextual, the court need not consider plaintiff's prima facie showing. Mora, 57 F. Supp.2d at 634 (citing Sample v. Aldi, Inc., 61 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1995); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) ("Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.")). This method is particularly useful where, as here, plaintiff's prima facie case is disputed but there is very little evidence of discriminatory pretext.
In examining whether an employer's proffered reason for terminating an employee is pretextual, courts focus on what the employer honestly believed when it terminated plaintiff. See Mora, 57 F. Supp.2d at 635 (finding that "an employer need only supply an honest reason, not necessarily a reasonable one."). "Indirect evidence of pretext showing that an employer's proffered reasons are not credible may be made by demonstrating that the reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge."Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983 (7th Cir. Ill. 1999) (citations omitted).
According to defendant, plaintiff was discharged following the flnding that he "physically abused" patient J.H. Plaintiff argues that "defendant's explanation of [plaintiff's] termination is not credible as it is insufficient to justify any adverse action and was more likely motivated by discriminatory intent." Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendant's finding of physical abuse was "false" and that the testimony of Vivian Smith raises an inference of racial discrimination which is sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The court will address each of plaintiff's arguments in turn.
Plaintiff argues that his contact with J.H. can hardly be termed "physical abuse." Defendant responds by pointing out why that term was assigned to plaintiff's conduct. It is Howe Center policy that, "any employee who abuses. . . a [patient] may be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge." Abuse of a patient is defined as follows in the policy:
Physical abuse shall include but is not limited to the hitting, kicking, choking, biting, punching, burning or cutting of a [patient] by an employee or any other direct physical act by an employee, e.g., pinching, slapping, striking with an object, etc., that is the proximate case of harm or injury to a [patient].
Thus, while plaintiff's contact with J.H. may not appear to be "physical abuse" as that term is commonly used, it does fit within the definition of physical abuse in defendant's policy.
Plaintiff also argues that his contact with J.H. was not the proximate cause of any apparent injury and therefore cannot be deemed physical abuse under Howe Center policy. While it may be true that J.H. sustained no apparent physical injury to his face or shoulder as a result of plaintiff's contact, defendant could still conclude that J.H. suffered "harm" from that incident. J.H. is a patient in a residential facility for adults who are developmentally disabled. Plaintiff was an employee at the Howe Center who was specifically trained to react to patient outbursts defensively, rather than offensively. The OIG investigation report notes that upon hearing J.H. complaining about plaintiff, plaintiff confronted J.H. in the kitchen of the residence and remained there despite J.H.'s requests that plaintiff leave him alone, and even after J.H. hurled a butter knife at plaintiff. Further, the action that plaintiff claims was a "touch" in an effort to protect himself from J.H. was found by defendant's internal investigation to be a "strike" that resulted from plaintiff taking more than one offensive swing at J.H. Thus, the court finds that there is ample evidence to support a finding that J.H. was harmed by plaintiff's conduct.
For all these reasons, the court cannot conclude that defendant's determination of physical abuse was "false," as plaintiff claims. Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that defendant's finding of abuse was anything other than defendant's honest belief about the incident, even if its complete accuracy is debatable. See Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983 (7th Cir. 1999). As the court in Mora explained, "[a]rguing about the accuracy of the [defendant's] assessment is a distraction, since the question is not whether the [defendant's] reasons for its decision are correct, but whether the [defendant's] description of its reasons is honest." 57 F. Supp.2d at 635. This court will not act as a "super personnel department" or second-guess defendant's good faith assessment of plaintiff's actions. Mills v. Health Care Serv.Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 459 (7th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff next argues that the testimony of Vivian Smith ("Smith") raises an inference of racial discrimination in the instant case. Smith, a nurse at the Howe Center, was in Unit II — House 208 at the time of the incident on April 20, 1998. Plaintiff points to Smith's deposition testimony and argues that her testimony illustrates that the Howe Center was a "discriminatory environment." The testimony to which plaintiff refers, however, is vague at best. When asked repeatedly whether she had "ever heard any rumors or discussions regarding the differences in the way [Howe Center] employees were treated . . . based on their race," Smith repeatedly hesitated to answer. Finally, Smith intimated her belief that all people in America are prejudiced ("white people have always been considered superior to black people") and Howe Center is in America. Plaintiff thus urges the conclusion that, based on Smith's reasoning, people at the Howe Center are prejudiced toward African Americans.
This testimony is insufficient to raise the inference that plaintiff was terminated based on his race rather than the OIG investigation report conclusion that plaintiff physically abused J.H. First, Smith did not specifically state that any particular person at the Howe Center discriminated against African-American employees. In fact, when asked, "Have you ever heard any stories or rumors about any . . . employees being treated differently based upon their race, be it African-American or other?" Smith answered, "No." Smith also did not testify that she had any reason to believe that plaintiff was fired because he is African-American. Smith was asked, "Do you have any information that [plaintiff's] termination had anything at all to do with his race?" and she answered, "No." Further, Smith's testimony is undermined by plaintiff's own admission that prior to April 20, 1998, no employee of the Howe Center ever uttered a racial slur about, or discriminated against plaintiff because of, his race. Thus, the court finds the testimony of Smith insufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory pretext with regard to plaintiff's termination.
The court further notes that plaintiff's admissions disprove his own assertion of discriminatory pretext. Plaintiff agrees that Carlson based her recommendation to terminate plaintiff on the OIG investigation report. Plaintiff also agrees that it was Umbreit who made the final decision to terminate plaintiff, and that Umbreit based his decision to do so on the OIG investigation report. Finally, plaintiff stated in his deposition that he does not believe that Carlson or Umbreit terminated him because of his race. Therefore, because plaintiff admits that the individuals who terminated him did so based on the OIG investigation conclusion that the charges of physical abuse were substantiated, and not based on any discriminatory pretext, plaintiff's case cannot survive summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff was a pretext for racial discrimination. Defendant's summary judgment motion is granted.