Opinion
No: C 00-04705 SC
September 6, 2001
ORDER RE CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Claimant Damon Keel ("Claimant") brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), seeking judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security's ("Defendant") decision that there had been an improvement in Claimant's medical condition warranting discontinuation of his benefits. He also claims to have been improperly denied a hearing continuance by Administrative Law Judge Don Rector ("ALJ")
Now before the Court are Claimant's motion for summary judgment and Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. Claimant asks the Court to reverse the Defendant's decision or, in the alternative, to remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Claimant initially filed for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits with the Social Security Administration ("Administration") on June 13, 1991. (R. 62-65, 66-78.) On September 19, 1991, he was found to be disabled by a personality disorder and by drug abuse in remission. (R. 79.) He subsequently began receiving SSI.
Claimant's case was reviewed on August 27, 1996. (R. 80-89.) At the review interview, Claimant described continuing back pain, "ADHD" and brain damage resulting from an assault by his stepfather when Claimant was two-years-old. (R. 80.) He also described a recent attack by a "friend," which resulted in broken ribs and a punctured lung. Id.
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
The record suggests that at least two evaluative medical examinations were then scheduled to determine whether Claimant's disabilities were ongoing. First, Claimant's back was examined by Nam H. Tran, M.D. on September 28, 1996. Dr. Tran determined that Claimant had "no limitations." (R. 228.) Next, a consultive examination, presumably psychological in nature, was scheduled for October 10, 1996. Despite having been sent a reminder notice on October 3, Claimant failed to attend, and the exam was rescheduled for later in the month. Again, Claimant failed to attend. (R. 91.) As a result, on October 24, 1996 the Administration notified Claimant that he was no longer eligible for benefits because the evidence in the record regarding his condition was insufficient to support a finding of disability. (R. 91-96.) He was informed that his benefits would be terminated effective January 1, 1997.
On December 2, 1996, Claimant requested reconsideration and a hearing, alleging that he missed his appointments because he was given the wrong date. (R. 97.) He again requested review on December 23, 1996, claiming that his back injury had not improved. (R. 100.)
Another psychological exam was scheduled, as was a hearing. Claimant attended his scheduled exam on January 25, 1997 with psychologist Laura Petraceck, Ph.D. (R. 229.) He failed, however, to attend the May 7, 1997 hearing. (R. 105-12.) On May 8, 1997, the Disability Hearing Officer ("DHO"), taking into account the reports of Dr. Petraceck and Dr. Tran, ruled that Claimant was not disabled, and Claimant was mailed notice of the decision. The notice informed Claimant that his SSI payments would be terminated. (R. 102-04.) Claimant requested a rehearing before an ALJ, which was scheduled for June 9, 1998. Claimant again failed to appear, and ALJ Edward D. Steinman dismissed his claim on June 22, 1998. (R. 247-51; 253-56.) Claimant successfully obtained a waiver of the late filing of an appeal, and the case was again scheduled for a hearing.
The hearing officer's report says that it was Paul Kullrnan, Ph.D., who examined Claimant. In fact, even though Dr. Kullman cosigned the report, Dr. Petraceck appears to have performed the consultation. (R. 229.)
Claimant alleges that he did not receive notice of the hearing or the dismissal. It seems that at some point his case was transferred from Oakland to San Diego. In 1998, Claimant filed a brief with the Oakland office, but it was apparently never forwarded to San Diego. (R. 260.) The Administration closed Claimant's case for abandonment because the brief was never received by the San Diego ALJ. Id. To complicate matters further, Claimant's attorney's contact information was not entered in the file. (R. 263.) Everything was straightened out eventually when Claimant requested that the case be transferred back to Oakland and reopened on the merits.
On February 1, 2000, Claimant failed to appear for a hearing before ALJ Donald J. Rector. (R. 46.) Claimant's attorney requested a continuance in order to locate his client. (R. 54.) ALJ Rector granted the request and the hearing was rescheduled for June 15, 2000. Again, Claimant failed to appear. (R. 58.) Claimant's attorney requested yet another continuance in order to locate his client. This request was denied. (R. 59.)
Attorney Richard Rowland appeared on behalf of Claimant's regular counsel at this hearing.
On July 17, 2000 the ALJ, relying on the record, ruled on the case. (R. 12-18.) He determined that Claimant had ceased to be disabled on October 24, 1996, and that his entitlement to SSI ended on December 31, 1996. (R. 17-18.) On July 18, 2000, Claimant requested that the Appeals Council of the OHA review his case, (R. 8.), but this request was denied on October 24, 2000. (R. 4-5.) This action ensued.
B. Factual History
Claimant is a 33-year-old male with an 11th-grade education. (R. 119.) He alleges in his motion not to have engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 1991. (Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5:15-16.) In 1991, Claimant applied for SSI claiming mental incapacity and an injured back. (R. 62.)
The Court notes for the record that Claimant's lawyer reported to ALJ Robert P. Wenten that Claimant last worked in 1996 as a part-time painter. (R. 257.)
1. Mental Incapacity
In 1991, Claimant was found to be disabled based on a primary diagnosis of personality disorder and a secondary diagnosis of drug abuse in remission. (R. 79, 181.) He told the examining psychiatrist, David Bot, M.D., that he did not drink alcohol, but that he had used cocaine at age 17. (R. 171.) Claimant also told Dr. Bot that he had tried to commit suicide four times, and that at the time of the exam he was attending weekly counseling sessions. (R. 171-72.)
Dr. Bot noted in his report that his exam revealed a history of problems with anger management. (R. 172.)
Dr. Bot made the following diagnoses:
Axis I — (1) Cocaine and marijuana abuse, apparently in remission. (2) Mixed somatoform disorder, not otherwise specified. There are traits of somatoform pain and hyochondriacal disorders.
Axis II — Mixed antisocial and narcissistic traits. He shows a lot of cluster B traits which include antisocial and narcissistic, but here [sic] is also histrionic.
(R. 175.)
Dr. Bot "strongly recommended" continued psychiatric treatment and noted that Claimant's prognosis was "guarded." Id. He described Claimant as likely to have problems with concentration, persistence and pace due to his "personality disorder and inadequate social functioning." Id. Dr. Bot continued: "His principle diagnosis, by far, is his personality disorder. He is quite primitive, impulsive and unpredictable .. He would have to be in a relatively benign, supportive and low-stress environment for him to successfully work." Id.
On September 17, 1991, state agency reviewing psychologist John McRae, Ph.D. conducted a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (R. 190-91.) McRae wrote that Claimant "would see his present limited state as seen in Dr. Bot's and other MBR worsened if he were in a work situation and its usual pressures, stresses and expectations mdash would expect blow-ups, walking off, blaming and a very disrupted work pace and inability to maintain work focus." He continued: "Even [illegible] special supervision he would need to work away from the public and most co-workers due to his anger, poor judgment, social inappropriateness and lack of stress tolerance and lack of frustration tolerance." (R. 192.)
In August 1996, Claimant was hospitalized after a fight with a "friend" for a fractured rib and pneumothorax secondary. (R. 200-19.)
A collapsed lung.
On January 25, 1997, Claimant was given a psychological exam by Laura petraceck, LCSW, Ph.D., at the request of the Department of Social Services. (R. 229.) Under "Substance Abuse History," Petraceck wrote "Claimant stated he drinks every once and a while, and denies that alcohol use is a problem. Claimant denied ever attending an AA meeting, nor had he ever received treatment for chemical dependency." (R. 229.) Petraceck administered a battery of psychological tests, which led her to conclude that Claimant has a low to average IQ, low to average memory functioning and low to average attention/concentration functioning. (R. 231.) She noted that Claimant had "appropriate judgment," apparently based on his comment that if he found an envelope with a stamp on it he would put it in the nearest mailbox. (R. 230.) Finally, Petraceck observed that Claimant showed good insight, because when he was working "he was able to afford a place nicer place [sic] to live as opposed to living with four other people." (R. 230.)
Based on the above, Petraceck made an Axis I diagnosis of alcohol abuse in partial remission. She deferred an opinion on Axis II, where she would have addressed whether Claimant had a personality disorder. (R. 230.)
"Claimant alleges there is no evidence to suggest he ever had an alcohol problem. Because his appeal relates primarily to the medical improvement in his personality disorder, that is, his claim that he still suffers from it, the Court will not address whether the Claimant in fact has a drinking problem he claims not to have.
2. Back Injury
Claimant was examined in 1991 by Paul E. Piper, M.D. who described Claimant's lower back and neck pain as "muscular in origin." (R. 177.) On May 9, 1996 Claimant went to the hospital complaining of lower back pain and was diagnosed with "iliolumbar ligament sprain/strain." (R. 197.) On September 28, 1996, Claimant's back was examined by Nam H. Tran, M.D., at the request of a state agency. The exam was normal. (R. 228.) Dr. Tran suggested a "progressive work program" with a gradual increase in lifting activities. Id. In his examination note, Dr. Tran wrote that Claimant "does not drink." (R. 227.)
3. The ALJ's Findings
In his opinion, ALJ Rector determined that Claimant has "a history of alcohol abuse, in remission; history of pneumothorax, resolved; and a history of low back pain." (R. 15.) The ALJ concluded that these conditions do not constitute a severe impairment as defined by the Regulations. He found that the medical evidence showed an improvement in Claimant's medical condition, and that this improvement was related to his ability to work.
Because Claimant was found to be not impaired, the ALJ proceeded to determine whether Claimant could return to past relevant work. He concluded that Claimant does not have any transferrable skills, but does have "the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work with the following restrictions: he has moderate restriction in understanding and carrying out detailed instructions." (R. 17.)
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Substantial Evidence
According to the Act, "[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action" in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (2001). A district court should affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and is based upon the application of correct legal standards. See Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) )
A district court should review the record as a whole, not merely the evidence tending to support a finding. See Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 990 (9th Cir. 1978). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the [Commissioner's] conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [Commissioner]." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1998).
B. Standard for Determining Disability
An individual with a disability is entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act ("The Act"). 42 U.S.C § 423(a)(1)(D). The Act defines a disability as "any medically determinable physical or mental impairment" that prevents a claimant from engaging "in any substantial gainful activity" and is expected to result in death or last "for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1)(A)
C. Medical Improvement
If a claimant demonstrates medical improvement, his benefits may be terminated. Medical improvement is defined by the Regulations as:
any decrease in the medical severity of [claimant's] impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [claimant was] disabled or continued to be disabled. A determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with [claimant's] impairment(s)20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (b)(1)(i). If a decrease in medical severity is found, the ALJ must compare the claimant's current residual functional capacity to the residual capacity at the time the claimant was most recently found to be disabled. This will determine whether the improvement is related to claimant's ability to do work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (b)(2) (ii-iii), (b)(5) (iv).
D. Notice and Hearing
If a claimant fails to attend a scheduled hearing, the ALJ C.F.R. § 404.957. For example, if neither the claimant nor his representative appear, "and good cause is not found by the administrative law judge," the case will be dismissed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (b)(1)(i). In determining whether good cause exists, an ALJ may consider "physical, mental, education, "and linguistic limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (b)(2).
IV. DISCUSSION
Claimant makes two principal arguments. He argues first that the ALJ applied improper legal standards in finding him medically improved. Claimant also argues that the ALJ improperly denied Claimant's counsel's request for a continuance of the June 15, 2000 hearing. Claimant's first argument is closely related to his contention that the ALJ's finding of medical improvement is not supported by substantial evidence.
A. Medical Improvement
Claimant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the ALJ's finding of medical improvement.
1. Back injury
Claimant alleged back pain in his 1991 application for SSI, but it was not deemed disabling. (R. 79.) He complained again of back pain in the Report of Continuing Disability Interview submitted August 27, 1996. (R. 80.) On September 28, 1996, at the request of a state agency, Dr. Tran examined Claimant's back. Although Dr. Tran acknowledged "a history of chronic low back pain," he concluded that the musculoskeletal exam was "normal." (R. 228.) Dr. Tran suggested a "progressive work program" with a gradual increase in lifting activities. Id. Claimant does not longer disabling, thus the Court will not address it.
2. Personality Disorder
Plaintiff' s primary diagnosis in 1991 was a personality disorder. (R. 79.) In his July 17, 2000 opinion, ALJ Rector found that "medical evidence establishes that there has been an improvement in the claimant's medical impairments since June 1, 1991." (R. 17.) Claimant argues that there was insubstantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that he showed medical improvement, because the personality disorder was not evaluated in Dr. Petraceck's exam. Defendant disagrees, citing the psychologist's finding that Claimant was deemed to have relatively good judgment by 1996, and that he was getting along better with others, including his family.
A personality disorder is a condition in which "personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or subjective distress." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, 12.08. They are diagnosed in the psychiatry and mental health professions on Axis II of the multiaxial' system. According to the Diagnostic and Satistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"), personality disorders are listed on their own axis to ensure "that consideration will be given to the possible presence of personality Disorders . . . that might otherwise be overlooked when attention is directed to the usually more florid Axis I disorders." American Psychiatric Assoc., DSM-IV 25 (4th ed. 1994). If a mental health professional has not gathered enough information about an Axis II condition, the diagnosiS will be deferred. See id. at 26-27.
"A multiaxial system involves an assessment on several axes, each of which refers to a different domain of information that may help the clinician plan treatment and predict outcome. . . . A multiaxial system provides a convenient format for organizing and communicating clinical information, for capturing the complexity of clinical situations, and for describing the heterogeneity of individuals presenting with the same diagnosis." American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV") 25 (4th ed. 1994).
In her report, Dr. Petraceck made an Axis I diagnosis of alcohol abuse in partial remission. She deferred diagnosis on the personality disorder, Claimant's original primary disability. It was based upon this evidence that ALJ Rector made his medical improvement decision.
To be upheld, ALJ Rector'S decision that there has been medical improvement must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Sandgathe, 108 F.3d at 980. According to the Regulations, medical improvement occurs when the severity of the impairment has decreased since the claimant was most recently found disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 (b)(1)(i). Here, Dr. Petraceck's diagnosis of Claimant's personality disorder was deferred. Thus, the ALJ had nothing to compare against the diagnosis made in 1991. The Court can only conclude that ALJ Rector's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, since there was no evidence from which he could draw a conclusion about an improvement in Claimant's
If this were the only issue presented in the case, the Court would have no trouble overruling the ALJ's findings. But Claimant's compliance with Administration Regulations governing appeal was seriously flawed. The ALJ was left no choice but to rule the way he did because Claimant's failure to appear hindered all further development of the record. These concerns are more fully addressed below.
B. Due Process: Notice and Hearing
Due Process requires that a benefits recipient be afforded notice and a hearing before her benefits are terminated. See Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ). But Claimant has demonstrated a chronic indifference to the procedural steps that would enable him to obtain relief. He failed to appear for not one, but two hearings before an ALJ who was willing and able to explore the merits of his appeal. Claimant was represented by counsel at both hearings. At the June 15, 2000 hearing, the ALJ denied Claimant's attorney's request that the hearing be put over yet again so that Claimant's whereabouts could be determined. The ALJ issued his opinion based on the record that had been compiled to date.
At the February 1, 2000 hearing, the ALJ acknowledged that there was a "strong argument" that Claimant's personality disorder had not been assessed, thereby undermining the medical improvement determination: "The Administration has the burden of showing that with medical evidence there's a medical improvement. There's nothing in this file to indicate that the personality disorder has gone away. I mean there's no diagnosis on whether it's there or not." (R. 52.)
Claimant argues that the denial of the continuance was improper under the Regulations and under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He bases this argument on two grounds. First, argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the date, time and place of the hearing, all hearing notices having been returned undelivered and unacknowledged. Second, Claimant argues that he was denied his right to appear at a hearing and present evidence. His claims will be addressed in turn.
1. Adequate Notice
Claimant alleges that there is "no evidence" that he "received notice of either the hearing on February 1, 2000 or that on June 15, 2000." In his motion, Claimant supports this allegation with reference to pages 27-29, 30-39 and 53-55 of the Record. The Court finds Claimant's evidence baffling; the referenced pages are simply copies of the notices that were mailed. Nowhere is there evidence — a letter informing the Administration of a change of address, say, or even an envelope showing a new address — that the notices were undelivered. The last set of pages, 53-55, is equally unhelpful. It is an excerpt from the February 1, 2000 hearing at which Claimant's attorney complains to the ALJ about not having received notice of an administrative hearing two years earlier. The point was made moot when the Administration acknowledged this mistake by reopening the hearing and allowing Claimant and his attorney the chance to appear on February 1, 2000. (Pl.'s Hot. for Summ. J. at 15:19- 21).
Claimant's argument misplaces the burden of proof. If a claimant could avoid dismissal for failure to appear simply by saying he did not receive notice of the hearing, the obligation to attend hearings would be rendered a nullity. According to the Regulations:
notice of the hearing will be mailed to the parties at their last known addresses, or given by personal service, unless you have indicated in writinq that you do not wish to receive this notice. The notice will be mailed or served at least 20 days before the hearing. . . The notice will also contain . . . a reminder that if you fail to appear at your scheduled hearing without good cause the ALJ may dismiss your hearing request .. If you or your representative do not acknowledge receipt of the notice of hearing, we will attempt to contact you for an explanation. If you tell us that you did not receive the notice of hearing, an amended notice will be sent to you by certified mail.20 C.F.R. § 416.1438.
The notice for the February 1, 2000 hearing was mailed on January 5, 2000 to Claimant's last known address. (R. 30.) At the February hearing, Claimant's counsel made no effort to update Claimant's address or explain his absence. Indeed, it seems as if Claimant's own lawyer did not know how to reach him. The notice for the June 15, 2000 hearing was mailed on April 24, 2000. (R. 27.) At the June hearing, Claimant's lawyer again requested more time to locate his client. There was still no update to Claimant's address.
The following exchange took place at the June 2000 hearing:
"ALJ: [D]o I understand correctly that you, that you still have not located the claimant?"
Atty: That's correct. . . . [W]e do not know where he is." (R. 58.)
Even assuming that Claimant never received the notices of his forthcoming hearing dates, the Court is at a loss as to how to remedy the problem. The Court cannot guess as to where Claimant now lives, particularly his own lawyer does not know. Given this dilemma, the Court finds Claimant's argument unpersuasive, particularly when Claimant apparently did not contact his lawyer from September 9, 1999 (the date of last contact according to Claimant's attorney as related to the ALJ at the February 2000 hearing) until at least June 15, 2000, the date of his rescheduled hearing. This is an insufficient basis on which to overturn the ALJ's ruling.
2. Right to a hearing
Claimant also argues that the ALJ did not comply with the necessary procedural requirements for dismissal for failure to appear. According to the Regulations, if neither the claimant nor his representative appear, "and good cause is not found by the administrative law judge," the case will be dismissed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (b)(1)(i)
In McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit emphasized that when read literally, the regulation means dismissal is inappropriate if either the party or his representative appears. See id. at 1088; see also Bousquet v. Apfel, 118 F. Supp.2d 1049, 1055 (C.D.Cal. 2000) ("No sanction is authorized where, as here, the claimant's representative appears at the hearing, but the claimant does not.") . The McNatt court went on to conclude that an attorney (and thus his client) will be deemed to have appeared even if the lawyer only comes to the hearing solely for the purpose of requesting a continuance. See id.
While it seems well-accepted in this circuit that a continuance must be granted to claimant who himself fails to appear for a hearing, but whose counsel does attend, there is no case law addressing a situation in which a claimant is repeatedly absent and his whereabouts are unknown. one continuance is allowed in order for an attorney to locate his client, when the client is an "essential witness" in the case. See Mcnatt, 201 F.3d at 1088. Such a continuance was allowed in this case, February 2000 hearing. But after the second failure to appear, the Court begins to question Claimant's dedication to pursuing his claim. This is true despite the ALJ's obligation to fully develop the record. See Bousquet, 118 F. Supp.2d at 1056, ("[P]laintiff's failure to attend the hearing and his scheduled consultative examinations did not necessarily exonerate the ALJ from taking additional steps to develop the record.")
Nor is the Court persuaded that Claimant's alleged mental impairment should factor into its decision about whether or not to permit repeated continuances. There is case law to support the notion that the ALJ's duty to develop the record is heightened when a claimant is adversely affected by mental illness. See, e.q., Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099; Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). But these cases are clearly distinguishable.
In both Udd and Higbee, the claimant suffered from schizophrenia, a thought disorder characterized by hallucinations, delusional thinking, disorganization, and poor judgment. Udd, 245 F.3d at 1100; Higbee, 975 F.2d at 561. While Dr. Bot does mention that Claimant had been assessed as having paranoid schizophrenia in the past, 110 additional evidence of that condition was presented here. (R. 170.) Perhaps most importantly, though, neither plaintiff in the above-cited cases was represented by an attorney. See Udd, 245 F.3d at 1100 (citing SSA Ruling 91-5p, which provides that good cause exists for failure to timely request review of an administrative action if claimant presents evidence of mental incapacity in I "had no one legally responsible for prosecuting the claim on his behalf at the time of the prior adverse action"); Higbee, 975 F.2d at 561.
Here, even if it is conceded that Claimant suffers from a personality disorder, there is little evidence to support a finding that he was so incapacitated so as not to be aware of the process for requesting review. Indeed, the record shows that Claimant himself has corresponded with the SSA in the past, once explicitly to request review of an adverse decision. (R. 113.) He appears competent enough to understand the appeal process and the necessity of providing evidence. There is no suggestion that Claimant is paranoid or delusional. Dr. Petraceck found Claimant to exhibit no signs of organic impairment, and concluded that he had low to average attention/concentration function, and no "disturbance of consciousness." (R. 231.) Moreover, Claimant was represented by an attorney during the period in which he sought review. Therefore, under the circumstances, the Court does not consider this line of cases to be controlling. The denial of a continuance at the June 15, 2000 hearing did not constitute a denial of Claimant's due process rights.
It is true that little or no harm would be incurred by continuing Claimant's hearing again. He does not currently receive SSI, and a continuance is merely an administrative matter. But the Court hesitates to accommodate Claimant in this way. No declaration, affidavit or other testimony supports a finding that Claimant is ready and willing to appear for a hearing. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Claimant's lawyers have managed to find him at all. The Court cannot reasonably condone a situation in which a hearing to determine benefits is put on hold indefinitely until the claimant contacts his attorneys to disclose his whereabouts. One who seeks help should make his whereabouts known, at least to those who are advocating on his behalf.