Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:01-CV-045-C
February 22, 2002
ORDER
On this day the Court considered Defendant Central Texas Mental Health Mental Retardation Center's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 15, 2002. Plaintiff Robert Karnes, individually and as Representative of the Estate of Patsy Karnes, filed a Response to Defendant's Motion on February 1. 2002. Defendant filed a Reply on February 19, 2002. After considering all relevant arguments end evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Patsy Karnes ("Karnes") began her employment with Defendant, Central Texas Mental Health Mental Retardation Center as a Training Specialist II in December of 1995. Karnes's position required her to care for AND assist mentally retarded women living in a group home. On October 29, 1998, Karnes became ill and was admitted to the hospital. In a letter dated November 2, 1998, Defendant notified Karnes that her absence would be treated as leave under FMLA. Karnes did not return to work until January 6, 1999. On February 17, 1999, Karnes became ill again and left work. Karnes was subsequently diagnosed with cancer. specifically indometrial sarcoma carcinoma. In a letter dated February 22, 1999, Defendant notified Karnes that her leave would be treated as leave under FMLA and that her leave under FMLA would expire on March 4, 1999. Karnes was unable to return to work, and on March 4, 1999, Defendant terminated Karnes's employment and cancelled her health insurance.
On June 4, 2001, Plaintiff, Robert Karnes ("Plaintiff"), individually and as Representative of the Estate of Patsy Karnes filed suit against Defendant, Central Texas Mental Health Mental Retardation Center. Plaintiff alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ( 29 U.S.C. § 2601) ("FMLA"). the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983) ("ERISA"), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On July 27, 2001. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim. On August 17, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On September 28, 2001, this Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims with the sole exception of Plaintiff's FMLA claim.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving parties case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary jndgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)
In the context of the summary judgment motion before the Court, the Court finds that Plaintiff's request for continuance is improper under Rule 56(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Fifth Circuit has held that a proper request for continuance under Rule 56(f) requires the nonmoving party to (1) present specific facts why he was unable to respond substantively in opposition to the motion and (2) specifically demonstrate how not granting the summary judgment or granting additional time for discovery will rebut the moving party's evidence that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990); S.E.C. v. Spence Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980). In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must show how the additional discovery will defeat the summary-judgment motion." King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). "Vague assertions by the non-moving party that discovery will uncover unspecified facts are not enough to trigger Rule 56(f) protection." United States Fidelity Guar. Co. v. Lipsmeyer Constr. Co., 754 F. Supp. 81, 84 (M.D. La. 1990) (citing Washington, 901 F.2d at 1285; Gossett v. Du-Ra-Kel Corp., 569 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1978)).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make a proper showing under Rule 56(f). At best, Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance contained the following vague assertion of what additional discovery would yield:
Future controverted facts and summary judgment evidence will demonstrate that there are genuine issues of facts that are material and favorable to one or more elements of Plaintiffs' (sic) claim that Defendant's [sic] violated entitlement rights clearly established by the FMLA when the incident took place.
The Court finds that such an assertion is insufficient to trigger Rule 56 (f) protection. This Court finds that the Court's examination of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is not premature.
Family Medical Leave Act Claim
Plaintiff sued Defendant for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., alleging that Defendant had interfered, restrained, and denied Plaintiff the rights secured to Plaintiff by the [FMLA], specifically, miscalculation of Karnes's FMLA leave and insufficient notice to Karnes of her FMLA rights.
The FMLA applies to private-sector employers with fifty or more employees. § 2611(4). An employee is eligible for FMLA leave after working for a covered employer for at least 1,250 hours during the preceding twelve months. § 2611(2). The FMLA. entitles an eligible employee to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any twelve-month period when the employee has a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's position. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The parties do not dispute that Defendant is a qualifying employer that Karnes is an eligible employee, that Karnes had a serious health condition necessitating medical leave, or that Defendant granted Karnes medical leave as required under the FMLA. The parties dispute the calculation of Karnes's FMLA leave and the notice provided to Karnes regarding her FMLA rights.
Plaintiff first argues that Karnes did not receive notice of potential cancellation of her insurance benefits as is required. This argument is at odds with the evidence before the Court. Defendant sent Karnes a letter dated November 2, 1998, stating that as of October 29, 1998, Karnes's leave was designated as FMLA leave. The letter continues by stating that Karnes is entitled to 12 weeks or 480 hours of FMLA leave per year and that her year began on October 29, 1998. The letter contains notice that all accrued leave must be used first; after all accrued leave is exhausted, then Karnes would be put on Leave without pay; in the event Karnes is placed on leave without pay, she is responsible for the insurance premiums for her family-, Defendant would pay Karnes's insurance for 12 weeks, Karnes must present a full release/return to duty statement prior to her returning to work. The November 2 letter gave Karnes sufficient notice of her rights under FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301. In addition to the November 2 letter, Defendant sent Karnes a letter on December 21, 1998, advising her of her remaining FMLA leave available. The letter stated that on December 24, 1999, Karnes would go into leave without pay and that if Karnes had not returned to work by January 21, 1999, her FMLA leave would expire. The letter advised Karnes that she would be responsible for paying the insurance premium for her family beginning January 1, 1999. The letter also stated that Defendant would continue paying Karnes's personal insurance through January 21, 1999, the date upon which her FMLA would be exhausted.
Karnes received yet another letter from Defendant on February 22, 1999. This letter explained to Karnes that as of January 6, 1999, she had 2 weeks and 2 days of FMLA left to use before October 29, 1999. The letter advised Karnes that as of February 17, 1999, Karnes had been placed on FMLA leave. The letter stated that Karnes's FMLA would be exhausted on March 4 1999, and that her insurance would expire on that day. It is clear to the Court that Karnes received sufficient notice of her FMLA rights in each of the three letters. Plaintiff's claim that Karnes had no notice of potential cancellation of health insurance benefits is against the great weight of evidence presented to this Court The first letter sent to Karnes in November of 1998 stated that "the Center will continue to pay your insurance as an employee for the 12 weeks." Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant had an employee manual and included in that manual there must be a policy on leave and attendance. Defendant has refuted this claim by presenting to this Court evidence that no employee manual exists. Whether or not an employee manual exists is irrelevant because there is no requirement that an employer must have an employee manual. Furthermore, Karnes was provided written notice explaining her rights and obligations under the FMLA. No clearer notice could have been given Plaintiff's claim of insufficient notice is without merit.
Plaintiff's second claim is that Karnes's FMLA leave was miscalculated. Plaintiff relies on a regulation which states that designation of an employee's absence as FMLA should be made in writing and given to the employee within a reasonable time following the notice by the employee for such leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208. Defendants complied with this regulation. As stated in the November 2 letter, Defendant was notified by Karnes's sister on October 29, 1998, and again on November 2, 1998, of Karnes's illness. Within a reasonable time of such notification, Defendant notified Karnes in writing that her absence was designated as FMLA. The fact that Karnes did not sign the letter until November 10 has no bearing on when the FMLA calculation begins. Plaintiff's second claim fails.
Plaintiff also makes a scant assertion that Defendant's "leave year" calculation is incorrect. Plaintiff asserts that it is "his" belief that the calculation of FMLA leave ended on the last day of each year and a new twelve weeks began on the first day of the following year. The "leave year" regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.200. allows employers, at their option, to calculate the twelve-month period in which an employee is limited to twelve weeks of protected leave by one of four methods. Defendant has selected one of the four methods provided in the regulation — FMLA leave is measured from the date the employee first uses FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.200 (b)(3). Defendant submitted evidence that it had always determined FMLA leave in this manner and that all employees' FMLA leave was determined in this manner. Plaintiff has provided no competent summary judgment evidence to refute what has been presented by Defendant to this Court Defendant correctly calculated Karnes's FMLA leave.
Plaintiff's final claim is that Defendant "discriminated against and interfered with Karnes's request for leave on March 2, 1999 by wrongfully asserting that her twelve weeks of leave was exhausted . . . and cancelled Plantiff's health insurance immediately. . . ." The FMLA contains two distinct types of provisions. First, the FMLA creates a series of substantive "prescriptive" rights for eligible employees. Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998)). See also Bocalbos v. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1998). To insure the availability of these prescriptive guarantees, the FMLA declares it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right" provided under the FMLA. Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319. See also Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
When proving a violation of an employee's prescriptive rights, the subjective intent of the employer is not relevant. Hodges, 144 F.3d at 159. "The issue is simply whether the employer provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA." Id. Therefore, an employee who claims a violation of his substantive prescriptive rights under the FMLA must "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence only entitlement to the disputed (right]." Rice, 209 F.3d at 1017.
Second, the FMLA provides "proscriptive" protection in the event an employee is discriminated against for exercising his substantive rights. Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383. See also Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1998). When proving a violation of an employee's proscriptive rights, the employer's subjective motive is relevant, and the "issue is whether the employer took adverse action because of a prohibited reason or for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. See also Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383; Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726. Such issues are analogous to similar questions raised in cases involving other types of discrimination, i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726. Thus, when direct evidence of discrimination is lacking, the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is utilized if an employee claims he was discriminated against for availing himself of rights protected by the FMLA. Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 319-20 (referring to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See also Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726; Hodgens, 144 E.3d at 160.
Here, Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for a violation of a proscriptive duty under the FMLA. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant "discriminated against and interfered with Plaintiff Pasty [sic] Karnes' request for FMLA Leave on March 2, 1999 by wrongfully asserting that her twelve weeks of leave was exhausted. . . ."
Defendant argues that Karnes was terminated and her insurance cancelled because she could not return to work once she exhausted her FMLA leave entitlement. Plaintiff argues that Defendant wrongfully asserted Karnes's twelve weeks of leave was exhausted and cancelled Karnes's health insurance to avoid insurance coverage on a scheduled surgery. Nevertheless, Defendant argues that, because Karnes had exhausted her twelve weeks of leave under the FMLA, Defendant, had a legal right to terminate her and to discontinue paying for her health insurance. Plaintiff claims that Defendant has presented no evidence to substantiate its assertion that Karnes's FMLA leave was exhausted. Plaintiff is incorrect. Defendant has presented this Court with sufficient summary judgment evidence to establish that Karnes's FMLA leave was indeed exhausted and that she received notice of her FMLA rights. Furthermore, it is Plaintiff who has presented no evidence at all to this Court to support any of his various claims, including this claim of discrimination.
In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the summary judgement evidence before this Court demonstrates that Defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Karnes; Karnes was unable to return to work after the expiration of the twelve-week period. Gray v. Sears, Roebuck Co., Inc., 131 F. Supp.2d 895, 900 (S.D. Tex. 2001). If an employee is unable to return to work after the expiration of the twelve-week period, the employer is not obligated under the FMLA to restore the employee to his position. Id. Plaintiff has not produced substantial probative evidence that Defendant's proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that the real reason was Karnes's FMLA leave. Plaintiff has not introduced sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant's articulated reason for her discharge. This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff has not countered the evidence offered by Defendant.
After reviewing the pleadings and affidavits on file in the light most favorable to Plaintiff the non-moving party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, this Court is persuaded that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Plaintiff's claims regarding violations of the FMLA. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons previously discussed. Defendant, Central Texas Mental Health Mental Retardation Center's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Family and Medical Leave Act claim is GRANTED. All relief not expressly granted is DENIED.
SO ORDERED