Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3568-14T3
05-02-2016
JEFF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAJODA STABLES and VERA HALLOWELL, Defendants-Respondents.
Harris C. Legome argued the cause for appellant (Legome & Associates, attorneys; Chloe E. Gartside, on the brief). Dana R. Bowling argued the cause for respondents (Law Office of Dana R. Bowling, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Bowling, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Nugent and Higbee. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-569-14. Harris C. Legome argued the cause for appellant (Legome & Associates, attorneys; Chloe E. Gartside, on the brief). Dana R. Bowling argued the cause for respondents (Law Office of Dana R. Bowling, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. Bowling, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Jeff Kane appeals from a March 4, 2015 order dismissing his personal injury action against defendants Majoda Stables and Vera Hallowell for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court dismissed the action on defendants' motion after determining plaintiff's claim was barred by the Equine Activities Liability Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 5:15-1 to -12. Having considered the pleadings under the liberal standard of review applicable to Rule 4:6-2(e), motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, we conclude the complaint stated a cause of action falling within an exception to the Act. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In his complaint, filed on March 11, 2014, plaintiff alleged Majoda Stables and Hallowell "failed to properly supervise [and] care for" his safety in allowing him "to be injured while attempting to mount a horse." He further alleged defendant Hallowell, through her negligent supervision or instruction of him, created a dangerous condition, and she "knew or should have known of the aforesaid dangerous condition as a result of her instructions and failure to properly supervise plaintiff on or before plaintiff's accident."
Defendants supported their Rule 4:6-2(e) motion with a memorandum of law that included facts about plaintiff's accident, many of which were unsupported by a certification or other competent evidence as required by Rule 1:6-6. Defendants contended plaintiff's cause of action was barred by two provisions of the Act: the first concerning a patron's assumption of risk; and the second requiring a patron to provide a written report to the operator of an equine facility within one hundred and eighty days of an injury as a precondition to filing suit. Defendants submitted with the memorandum a "Facility Use Agreement" the plaintiff had signed, which included a waiver of liability.
In the memorandum supporting their motion, defendants explained that "Majoda Stables, Inc." operates a horse farm utilized for "a therapeutic riding program and, in addition, riding lessons are given to able-bodied students at this facility, as well." Plaintiff took lessons for several months before the alleged incident, typically on Saturday mornings. He also volunteered to assist with the therapeutic riding program students after finishing his own lessons. The memorandum stated "[h]e had been riding for over six . . . months when the incident occurred; thus, he was fully familiar with the rules and procedures in place at Majoda Stables."
According to defendants, on the day of the accident plaintiff was to ride a mule named Lazer. Defendant Hallowell, who was finishing another lesson, stepped away from the riding ring to get a bottle of water. Plaintiff
voluntarily chose . . . to mount Lazer by himself outside of the presence of . . . Hallowell. He also chose . . . to mount Lazer from the ground, instead of using the mounting block . . . as he had been instructed to do. Lazer moved away during the mounting process and [plaintiff] fell.Plaintiff thought he was okay, got back on Lazer, then walked around the ring for a few minutes and dismounted. He left, but visited the farm a few more times that week.
The facility use agreement defendants appended to their memorandum contained a release of all claims and cited, in capital letters, the Act. Plaintiff had signed the facility use agreement on February 8, 2013, eight months before his accident.
Plaintiff opposed the motion. In addition to a letter brief, he submitted a certification relating his account of the accident. Plaintiff gave a different account of events in his certification. He said he "was inside the arena for a private therapeutic horse riding lesson with . . . instructor . . . Hallowell." During his previous lessons, Hallowell or another instructor always led him to a stepping block to mount his horse, and the instructor always held onto the horse while he was mounting it. On the day of the accident, Hallowell told him to mount the horse from the ground, which he had not done previously and which he had never been instructed to do. He claims that while struggling to mount the horse, Hallowell was busy talking to her boyfriend.
After two failed attempts to mount the horse, plaintiff began to swing his right leg over the back of the horse, but the horse "took off running." Plaintiff's right foot was not in the stirrup and Hallowell was not holding the horse as she had always done in the past. The horse ran to the right side of the arena approximately thirty yards, dragging plaintiff. The horse stopped suddenly and plaintiff flew into the air and hit the ground next to a water trough. Plaintiff claimed he sustained serious injuries that did not manifest themselves for several days.
In granting defendants' motion, the trial court stated explicitly it was accepting plaintiff's version of the accident. Although the court identified the motion as one to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court cited neither Rule 4:6-2(e) nor the standard of review applicable to motions filed pursuant to the rule. The court determined plaintiff's suit was barred by the assumption of risk provisions of the Act.
Our standard of review is de novo. When a plaintiff appeals a trial court's order granting a Rule 4:6-2(e) dismissal motion, "we apply a plenary standard of review . . .[,] ow[ing] no deference to the trial court's conclusions." Rezem Family Assocs. L.P. v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.) (citing Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297 (2005)), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 366, 368 (2011).
Rule 4:6-2 provides in pertinent part:
Every defense, legal or equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any complaint . . . shall be asserted in the answer thereto, except that the following defenses unless otherwise provided by R. 4:6-3, may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, with briefs: . . . (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.] . . . if, on a motion to dismiss based on the defense numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by R. 4:46, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to such a motion.
A judge considering a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion is required to "search the allegations of the pleading in depth and with liberality to determine whether a cause of action is 'suggested by the facts.'" Rezem, supra, 423 N.J. Super. at 113 (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). The court must "ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). Although "[a] pleading should be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one," Rezem, supra, 423 N.J. Super. at 113,
trial courts [should] approach with great caution applications for dismissal under Rule 4:62(e) for failure of a complaint to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We have sought to make clear that such motions, almost always brought at the very earliest stages of the litigation, should be granted in only the rarest of instances. If a complaint must be dismissed after it has been accorded the kind of meticulous and indulgent examination counselled in this opinion, then, barring by other impediment such as a statute of limitations, the dismissal should be without prejudice to a plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint.
[Printing Mart, supra, 116 N.J. at 771-72.]
Here, the trial court considered matters outside of the complaint but did not give the parties an opportunity to take discovery. Applying the standard of review required by Rule 4:6-2(e), we conclude "the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned" from the complaint and plaintiff's certification, that is, the pleadings state a cause of action falling within the Act's exceptions to its liability bar.
The Act begins with a legislative declaration "that the allocation of the risks and costs of equine animal activities is an important matter of public policy and it is appropriate to state in law those risks that the participant voluntarily assumes for which there can be no recovery." N.J.S.A. 5:15-1. To implement this Legislative policy, the Act sets forth in N.J.S.A. 5:15-2 a non-exclusive list of risks inherent in equine animal activity, including:
a. The propensity of an equine animal to behave in ways that result in injury, harm, or death to nearby persons;
b. The unpredictability of an equine animal's reaction to such phenomena as sounds, sudden movement and unfamiliar objects, persons or other animals;
. . . .
e. The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, including but not limited to failing to maintain control over the equine animal or not acting within the participant's ability.
The Act deems participants and spectators to assume the enumerated inherent risks as well as other inherent risks:
A participant and spectator are deemed to assume the inherent risks of equine animal activities created by equine animals, weather conditions, conditions of trails, riding rings, training tracks, equestrians, and all other inherent conditions. Each participant is assumed to know the range of his ability and it shall be the duty of each participant to conduct himself within the limits of such ability to maintain control of his equine animal and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the injury of himself or others, loss or damage to person or
property, or death which results from participation in an equine animal activity.
[N. J.S.A. 5:15-3.]
The assumption of risk set forth in N.J.S.A. 5:15-3 "shall be a complete bar of suit and shall serve as a complete defense to a suit against an operator by a participant for injuries resulting from the assumed risks." N.J.S.A. 5:15-5. Further, "failure of a participant to conduct himself within the limits of his abilities . . . shall bar suit against an operator to compensate for injuries resulting from equine animal activities, where such failure is found to be a contributory factor in the resulting injury." Ibid.
The Act also provides exceptions to its assumption-of-risk bar and complete defense to lawsuits. The Act states, "the following actions or lack thereof on the part of operator shall be exceptions to limitation on liability for operators":
b. Failure to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the participant's ability to safely manage the particular equine animal, based on the participant's representation of his ability, or the representation of the guardian, or trainer of that person standing in loco parentis, if a minor.
. . . .
d. An act or omission on the part of the operator that constitutes negligent disregard for the participant's safety, which act or omission causes the injury.
[N .J.S.A. 5:15-9.]
Analyzing plaintiff's complaint under the liberal standard of review required of Rule 4:6-2(e) motions leads to the conclusion the complaint stated a cause of action under one or more of the Act's exceptions. The complaint alleged defendant Hallowell not only improperly supervised and cared for plaintiff's safety, but allowed him to be injured while attempting to mount the horse. The fundament of a cause of action can be gleaned from this allegation. For example, one can glean from the allegation that Hallowell permitted defendant to attempt to mount the horse, either knowing he was unable to do so, thereby negligently disregarding his safety, or having first failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine his ability to safely manage Lazer.
Moreover, even considering documents the parties submitted outside of the complaint, the fundament of a cause of action can be gleaned from the complaint and plaintiff's certification. It can be inferred from these documents that Hallowell knew defendant was incapable of mounting Lazer without assistance, but told him to do so because she wanted to talk to her boyfriend rather than assist plaintiff as she had done in the past.
Defendants argue the Act's provisions concerning the scope of the risks assumed should be broadly construed, and the exceptions narrowly construed. We agree. As the Supreme Court has explained,
It is not enough . . . for plaintiff to point to a claimed act or omission, because it is only an act or omission that rests on one of the duties that the operator owes to the participant that will support relief. Nor will it be sufficient for a participant to characterize an injury caused by one of the expressly defined assumed risks in language designated to make it appear that in some fashion the injury arose through an act or omission of the operator. Instead, the participant must demonstrate that the injury arose not because of one of the inherent dangers of the sport, but because the facility's operator breached one of the duties it owes to the participant, as defined in the statute's exceptions. A contrary approach, in which the exceptions are read expansively, would threaten to upset the choice that the Legislature has made, because it would potentially permit the exceptions to extinguish the statute's broad protective scope.
[Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 203 N.J. 184, 206 (2010).]
Significantly, however, Hubner involved a summary judgment motion. The standard of review for a summary judgment motion is entirely different from the standard of review of a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion. When reviewing a summary judgment motion, a court must determine whether the party opposing the motion has demonstrated the existence of disputed material facts. R. 4:46- 2(c). This task is far removed from determining whether a cause of action can be gleaned from an obscure pleading.
As to defendants' second argument, the trial court did not decide defendants' motion on the basis that plaintiff did not submit a written report to defendants within one hundred and eighty days of his accident. We need not address this argument, because nothing in the record suggests Majoda Stables "conspicuously post[ed] notice to participants of the requirements of the section." N.J.S.A. 5:15-6(b). The statute makes the reporting requirement inapplicable absent the required posting.
Lastly, though the trial court noted the liability waiver in its opinion, the court did not dismiss plaintiff's complaint on that basis. Plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to take discovery before the validity of the liability waiver can be decided.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION