Opinion
2013-01-23
Joshua KAMINASH, respondent, v. Limor LEVI, appellant.
Helene Bernstein, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Elaine McKnight, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
Helene Bernstein, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Elaine McKnight, Brooklyn, N.Y., for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Adams, J.), dated November 18, 2011, which denied her motion for an award of interim counsel fees, to direct the plaintiff to pay all fees for services rendered by the attorney for the child and the forensic evaluator, and to direct the plaintiff to pay for certain translation and linguistic services.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
“An award of interim counsel fees ensures that the nonmonied spouse will be able to litigate the action, and do so on equal footing with the monied spouse” ( Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667;see O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 193, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193;Gaffney–Romanello v. Romanello, 82 A.D.3d 930, 918 N.Y.S.2d 736;Meltzer v. Meltzer, 63 A.D.3d 702, 703, 882 N.Y.S.2d 422;Wald v. Wald, 44 A.D.3d 848, 850, 844 N.Y.S.2d 86). Such an award is generally warranted “where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties” ( Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d at 65, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667;see Gaffney–Romanello v. Romanello, 82 A.D.3d at 930, 918 N.Y.S.2d 736).
Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant's motion which was for an award of interim counsel fees, since the record demonstrated that there was no significant disparity in the parties' financial circumstances ( see Ahmed v. Ahmed, 88 A.D.3d 629, 930 N.Y.S.2d 472;see generally DeCabrera v. Cabrera–Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881, 524 N.Y.S.2d 176, 518 N.E.2d 1168;Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d at 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667). Similarly, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying those branches of the defendant's motion which were to direct the plaintiff to pay all fees for services rendered by the attorney for the child and the forensic evaluator ( see Wesche v. Wesche, 77 A.D.3d 921, 909 N.Y.S.2d 764;Cash–Scher v. Scher, 299 A.D.2d 193, 748 N.Y.S.2d 868).
The defendant's contention that the plaintiff should be directed to pay for translation and linguistic services in excess of those services already authorized by the Supreme Court is without merit.