Opinion
2:22-cv-01661-TLN-DB
09-28-2022
FARYAL KABIR, THE GUARDIAN OF THE CANINE COMPANION ZEUS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ELK GROVE; BOBBIE SINGH-ALLEN, ACTING MAYOR OF ELK GROVE; AND DOES 1-10, Defendants.
ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Faryal Kabir's (“Plaintiff) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF No. 3.) Defendants City of Elk Grove (the “City”) and Mayor Bobbie-Singh Allen (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No. 14.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. The Court also STAYS the instant action in part.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The instant motion seeks to enjoin Defendants from euthanizing her dog, Zeus. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff also seeks one of the following pending litigation: (1) enjoin Defendants to properly care for and shelter Zeus until further orders are given; (2) allow Rocket Dog Rescue to hold Zeus; or (3) return Zeus to Plaintiff. (Id.)
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is verified in that she has declared under penalty of perjury the statements made in the FAC are true and correct, except as to the statements made upon information and belief. (ECF No. 11 at 23.) Factual allegations in a verified complaint may serve as the basis for a TRO. Right to Life of Cent. Cal. v. Bonta, 562 F.Supp.3d 947, 951 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2021).
This case arises out of the City designating Zeus as a dangerous animal and Plaintiff being accused of noncompliance with the City's dangerous animal restrictions. (ECF No. 11 at 2.) On May 16, 2022, there was an incident between Zeus and a man, which resulted in Zeus biting the man on both legs. (Id. at 4; ECF No. 13-2 at 2, 5-6.) Defendants assert the man was on the public sidewalk, and Plaintiff contends he was by the end of her driveway. (ECF No. 11 at 4; ECF No. 13 at 5.) The parties also dispute the extent of the man's injuries. (See ECF No. 11 at 4; ECF No. 13 at 5.) On May 25, 2022, the City designated Zeus as a dangerous animal, a designation Plaintiff sought to dispute. (ECF No. 11 at 5; ECF No. 13-2 at 8-10.)
On June 8, 2022, an administrative hearing regarding the dangerous animal designation was held via Zoom. (ECF No. 11 at 5; ECF No. 13-2 at 16.) Plaintiff contends she attempted to attend the hearing, but she could not attend due to technical issues. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) Plaintiff then phoned the hearing officer, but she was told she could not attend the hearing via phone. (Id.) The hearing continued in Plaintiff's absence and Plaintiff was unable to assert a provocation defense for Zeus. (Id.)
On June 15, 2022, the hearing officer issued an order finding the City had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Zeus is a dangerous animal within the meaning given in the Elk Grove Municipal Code (“EGMC”). (ECF No. 13-2 at 16-21.) The order provided that Plaintiff had 30 days from the issuance of a dangerous dog designation to comply with all restrictions regarding Zeus. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff alleges she provided evidence of compliance, but before the 30-day period to comply elapsed the City's animal control and police seized Zeus. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) Plaintiff alleges animal control demanded Plaintiff put Zeus in their truck. (Id. at 5-6.)
A video recording from the seizure shows Plaintiff attempting to place a leashed and unmuzzled Zeus in the back of the City's animal control truck. Elk Grove Police Dep't, Dangerous Dog Case, YouTube (Sept. 22, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErQDkFJzZMQ. At that time, the City's police and animal control officers were several feet behind the truck. Id. As Plaintiff and Zeus were nearing the rear of the truck, Zeus barked and began running at the officers while continuing to bark. Id. The officers backed up, but Zeus continued to advance toward them despite Plaintiff holding onto his leash. Id. Zeus then bit one of the officers on his left leg causing a tear in the officer's pant leg. Id. Plaintiff then placed Zeus in the back of truck. Id. One of the officers asked, “You have broken skin?” to the officer who was bitten. Id. After inspecting his leg, the officer who was bitten replied, “Yeah.” Id. Plaintiff alleges a criminal misdemeanor change was placed against her on July 15, 2022, for failure to comply pursuant to the EGMC. (ECF No. 11 at 8.)
The video recording was provided via a weblink in a declaration in support of Defendants' opposition. (ECF No. 13-2 at 3.)
On August 15, 2022, a second administrative hearing took place before a different hearing officer. (Id. at 6; ECF No. 13-2 at 30.) After the hearing, Plaintiff alleges the hearing officer asked for post-hearing objections, which the City submitted along with video evidence. (ECF No. 11 at 6.) Plaintiff alleges she submitted proof of compliance after the hearing, but it was not admitted. (Id.) Plaintiff further contends the City made an ex parte communication with the hearing officer after the hearing instead of using the correct procedure. (Id.)
On September 2, 2022, an order from the second hearing was issued. (ECF No. 13-1 at 52-61.) The order found Zeus had violated two provisions of the EGMC, and therefore, Zeus was to be humanely euthanized. (Id. at 60.) The order also provided a five-day period to appeal the order, and that any appeal would be trial de novo. (Id. at 61.) The hearing officer later issued an amended order changing the right to judicial review. (ECF No. 13-2 at 30 n.1.) The amended order stated a party could seek judicial review by filing a petition for review with the Sacramento County Superior Court. (Id. at 39.)
On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Sacramento County Superior Court, case no. 34-2022-80003929 (the “First State Court Action”).(Kabir v. City of Elk Grove, 34-2022-80003929-CU-WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022).) On September 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed her first amended verified petition for writ of mandate (the “Amended Writ Petition”). (ECF No. 13-1 at 5.) The Amended Writ Petition alleges: (1) federal and state procedural due process violations stemming from the administrative hearings on June 8th and August 15th; (2) portions of the EGMC relating to dangerous dogs are in conflict with California law and void under Article XI, § 7 of the California Constitution; and (3) violation of the “takings” provisions of the United States Constitution and California Constitution. (See id. at 5-23.)
Defendants filed a declaration attaching filings from the First State Court Action and the Second State Court Action. (ECF No. 13-1.) The Court also takes judicial notice of the filings and dockets in the two cases. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting courts may take judicial notice of documents on file in state courts).
Also on September 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed an emergency ex parte motion to stay Zeus' euthanasia in the First State Court Action. (Id. at 26.) On September 14, 2022, the City filed its opposition to Plaintiff's ex parte motion. (Id. at 38.) That same day, the superior court issued a minute order denying Plaintiff's ex parte motion. (Id. at 49.) The minute order states, “Based upon the information presented, the Court denies Petitioner's Application.” (Id.) However, the First State Court Action's docket shows the case remains pending and judgment has not been entered. (Kabir v. City of Elk Grove, 34-2022-80003929-CU-WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022).)
On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff appealed the order from the August 15th administrative hearing to the Sacramento County Superior Court, case no. 34-2022-00326595 (the “Second State Court Action”). (ECF No. 13-1 at 51; Kabir v. City of Elk Grove Animal Servs., 34-2022-00326595-CL-PT-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022).) On September 21, 2022, the superior court issued an order granting the City's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's request for appeal by trial de novo. (ECF No. 13-1 at 117-118.) The Second State Court Action's docket reflects this case has been dismissed. (See Kabir v. City of Elk Grove Animal Servs., 34-2022-00326595-CL-PT-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022).)
On September 21, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the instant action and filed her complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Also on September 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for TRO. (ECF No. 3.) On September 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed her FAC. (ECF No. 11.) The FAC alleges six causes of action: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations; (3) a constitutional challenge to portions of the EGMC regulating dangerous animals; (4) a due process claim concerning the burden of proof; (5) declaratory relief; and (6) violation of the Article XI, Section 7 of the California Constitution. (Id.) On September 22, 2022, the Court issued an order enjoining Defendants from euthanizing Zeus until September 28, 2022 in order to preserve the status quo until Defendants had a chance to respond to the motion for TRO. (ECF No. 12.) On September 26, 2022, Defendants filed their opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 13.) On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed her reply. (ECF No. 14.)
II. Standard of Law
A TRO is an extraordinary remedy. The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending a fuller hearing. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. In general, “[t]emporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary injunctions.” Aiello v. One West Bank, No. 2:10-cv-0227-GEB-EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010) (internal citations omitted); see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 231(a).
Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citingMazurekv. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also Costa Mesa City Emps. Ass'n v. City of Costa Mesa, 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305 (2012) (“The purpose of such an order is to preserve the status quo until a final determination following a trial.”); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney, Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The status quo ante litem refers not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”).
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A plaintiff must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, a district court may weigh the plaintiff's showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where the plaintiff shows that there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, plaintiffs must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in [plaintiffs' favor in order to succeed in a request for preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134-35.
III. Analysis
In the Court's September 22nd Order granting Plaintiff's motion for TRO until September 28, 2022, the Court stated it had questions regarding its jurisdiction to hear this case because of Plaintiff's unsuccessful actions in the superior court. (ECF No. 12 at 5.) In making this statement, the Court cited to cases applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Id. (citing Irlina v. City of Oakland, Oakland Animal Servs. Div., No. 14-cv-00381-TEH, 2014 WL 806390, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014); Jones v. Tulare Cty., No. 1:15-cv-01779-EPG, 2016 WL 7034744, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2016)).) Therefore, the Court will determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, and if not, whether another doctrine, such as Younger abstention, applies due to the First State Court Action and Second State Court Action.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As stated, the Court's September 22nd Order questioned the Court's jurisdiction to hear the instant case and cited to cases applying Rooker-Feldman. (ECF No. 12 at 5.) However, now that the instant motion has been fully briefed and the Court has been more fully apprised of Plaintiff's superior court actions, the Court finds the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to be inapplicable.
The First State Court Action remains pending and judgment has not been entered. (Kabir v. City of Elk Grove, 34-2022-80003929-CU-WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022). Instead, the superior court only issued a minute order denying Plaintiff's ex parte motion to stay Zeus' euthanasia. (ECF No. 13-1 at 49.) Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not apply because there has been no final judgment from the superior court. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”).
The Second State Court Action resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff's request for appeal by trial de novo. (ECF No. 13-1 at 117-18). Therefore, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because the superior court “did not analyze [Plaintiff's contentions on the merits.” See Snowden v. Cty. of Calaveras, No. 1:18-cv-01595-DAD-SAB, 2019 WL 4829480, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (finding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to a superior court order denying as untimely a challenge to a county order).
Therefore, based upon the current status of Plaintiff's superior court proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. Thus, the Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the instant action due to Rooker-Feldman.
B. The Younger Abstention Doctrine
“In ‘exceptional circumstances,' the Younger abstention doctrine instructs federal courts to decline to hear a case when a parallel state proceeding is ongoing.” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 37 F.4th 579, 587-88 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)). The doctrine applies to three categories of cases: “(1) parallel, pending state criminal proceedings[;] (2) state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions[;] and (3) state civil proceedings that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019). If a state proceeding falls into one of these categories, Younger abstention may apply so long as three additional factors are also met. Id. at 1044. The additional factors are that the state proceeding must be: (1) ongoing; (2) implicate important state interests; and (3) provide adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 588 (9th Cir. 2022). Additionally, the requested relief in the federal proceeding must seek to enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state proceeding. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014).
“Younger abstention is mandatory[.]” Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2005); Pachal v. Bugreeff, 495 F.Supp.3d 963, 966 (D. Mont. 2020) (noting that when all Younger requirements are met, a district court lacks discretion to hear the case). However, even if the Younger factors are satisfied, there are exceptions that would make abstention inappropriate. Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021).
Younger abstention may be raised sua sponte at any time. Columbia Basin Apartment Ass 'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001); Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cty. of Alameda, 338 F.Supp.3d 995, 1002 & n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2018), aff'd, 953 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2020).
The Court begins by determining whether Plaintiff's superior court actions, and the underlying administrative hearings, fall into one of the three categories that may be subject to Younger abstention. If so, the Court will examine whether the additional factors for Younger to apply have been met and if any exceptions apply.
i. The Categories of Cases Under Younger Abstention
One of the categories of cases that can be subject to Younger abstention is civil enforcement proceedings that are akin to criminal proceedings. See ReadyLinkHealthcare, 754 F.3d at 759. A civil enforcement action is akin to a criminal proceeding when the action is “characteristically initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff . . . for some wrongful action” and “[investigations are commonly involved.” Id. A municipal administrative proceeding, and the appeal of that proceeding to state court, can also qualify as civil enforcement actions under Younger abstention. See Joseph v. City of San Jose, No. 19-CV-01294-LHK, 2020 WL 1031899, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) (finding Younger abstention could apply to a city administrative proceeding involving municipal code violations); see Villa San Clemente, LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 17-1484 JVS(JCGx), 2017 WL 8793227, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017) (finding an appeal in state court following a city's administrative citation proceeding was a quasicriminal enforcement proceeding).
Here, “at the heart of Plaintiff's [F]AC [are] [City] administrative proceeding[s] that involve[] municipal code violations.” Joseph, 2020 WL 1031899, at *12; see also Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. CV 15-03172 MMM AGRX, 2015 WL 4163346, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (noting Younger applies to a city's civil action to enjoin a public nuisance). The August 15th administrative hearing was conducted “to decide whether or not to uphold the City of Elk Grove Police Department Animal Services Division . . . determination that [Plaintiff], owner of a German Shepherd dog named Zeus, violated [EGMC §§] 8.06.080 and 8.06.090.” (ECF No. 13-2 at 30.) Therefore, a division of the City had already determined that Plaintiff violated the EGMC. Thus, the August 15th administrative hearing had been “initiated to sanction [Plaintiff] . . . for some wrongful action.” ReadyLink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 759. Moreover, the June 8th administrative hearing followed the City's investigation into the first bite incident by Zeus. (See ECF No. 13-2 at 2, 24.) Because the August 15th administrative hearing concerned whether Plaintiff violated EGMC §§ 8.06.080 and 8.06.090, at stake was whether Zeus would be euthanized. (See id. at 38.)
Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of two chapters of the EGMC. (ECF No. 13-3.) “Municipal ordinances are proper subjects for judicial notice.” Tollis, Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants' request for judicial notice. The Court notes that EGMC § 8.06.110 provides that the failure to comply with the requirements to keep, harbor, own, possess, or control any dangerous animal constitutes a misdemeanor. (ECF No. 13-3 at 21.) Although the administrative hearings do not appear to be criminal in nature, Plaintiff's FAC alleges a misdemeanor charge was placed against her pursuant to EGMC § 8.06.110. (ECF No. 11 at 8.)
Judicial review of an administrative proceeding is treated as a unitary process. Mir v. Kirchmeyer, No. 12cv2340-GPC-DHB, 2014 WL 2436285, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2014); Howard Jones Invs., LLC v. City of Sacramento, No. 2:15-cv-954-JAM-KJN, 2016 WL 1599511, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (noting that after the administrative hearing and appeal, the plaintiff filed a writ for state-court judicial review). Therefore, the Court considers the administrative hearings and Plaintiff's superior court actions together when determining if they fall within a category of cases that may be subject to Younger abstention. As such, the reasons why the administrative hearings are civil enforcement proceedings also applies to Plaintiff's superior court actions. See Villa San Clemente, 2017 WL 8793227, at *3-4.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's superior court actions are civil enforcement proceedings and fall within a category of cases that may be subject to Younger abstention.
ii. Additional Younger Abstention Factors
As stated, the additional Younger factors are that the state proceeding must be: (1) ongoing; (2) implicate important state interests; and (3) provide adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 588. Additionally, the requested relief in the federal proceeding must seek to enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state proceeding. ReadyLink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 758. The Court examines each of these factors in turn.
a. Ongoing State Proceeding
The first factor is satisfied if the state proceeding was pending when the federal action was filed. Columbia Basin, 268 F.3d at 801. In determining whether a proceeding is going, courts consider judicial review of an administrative proceeding as a unitary process. See Mir, 2014 WL 2436285, at *11; Howard Jones, 2016 WL 1599511, at *2 (“[T]he proceeding is on-going, because after the administrative hearing and appeal, [the plaintiff] filed a writ for state-court judicial review.”).
Here, the First State Court Action was filed on August 16, 2022 and that case remains pending. (Kabir v. City of Elk Grove, 34-2022-80003929-CU-WM-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022). Indeed, Plaintiff's reply acknowledges that her writ request in the First State Court Action is pending. (ECF No. 14 at 9.) On the other hand, the Second State Court Action was filed on September 6, 2022 and that case was dismissed on September 21, 2022. (Kabir v. City of Elk Grove Animal Servs., 34-2022-00326595-CL-PT-GDS (Sacramento Sup. Ct. 2022). The instant action was filed on September 21, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) Therefore, although the Second State Court Action was no longer pending when the instant action was filed, the First State Court Action was. Thus, the first factor is met with regard to the First State Court Action.
The FAC argues Younger does not apply because “there is no ongoing state proceeding complaint and this action does not challenge any state interest or procedure.” (ECF No. 11 at 4. The Court notes that this argument may be related to another case because it states Younger does not bar the instant action from being heard in the “Northern District of California.” (ECF No. 11 at 4.) However, even if Plaintiff's argument concerns the instant action, it is without merit because the First State Court Action is still pending as Plaintiff has acknowledged.
b. Implication of Important State Interests
The second factor requires the ongoing state proceeding to implicate important state interests. Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 588. The importance of a state's interest “is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state's interest in the resolution of an individual case.” Baffert v. Cal. Horse RacingBd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003). The second factor may be met due to a municipality's interest in its municipal code and acting for the benefit of its residents. Columbia Basin, 268 F.3d at 801 (finding the second factor met because of the city's strong interest in its land-use ordinance and in maintaining habitable dwellings for its residents).
Here, the First State Court Action implicates important state interests. That action is the judicial review of the administrative hearings on June 8th and August 15th. The administrative hearings, and thereby the First State Court Action, concern the City's enforcement of the dangerous animal requirements in the EGMC against Plaintiff. The City has a strong interest in enforcing the EGMC. See Columbia Basin, 268 F.3d at 801. The City also has a strong interest in the safety of its residents, including by protecting them against dog bites. See id. Therefore, the second factor is met. /// ///
c. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenges
For the third factor, “[s]tate court proceedings are presumed adequate to raise the federal claim[s] ‘in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.'” Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc. v. Ingenito, 86 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)).
Here, there is no unambiguous authority showing the First State Court Action, or any further state court proceedings, are inadequate to raise the constitutional challenges that Plaintiff asserts in the instant action. Indeed, the Amended Writ Petition asserts many, if not all, of the federal constitutional challenges that Plaintiff asserts in the instant case. (Compare ECF No. 13-1 at 12-23 with ECF No. 11 at 9-23.) Thus, the third factor is met.
d. Effect of Enjoining State Proceedings
As stated, for Younger to apply, the requested relief in the federal proceeding must seek to enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state proceeding. ReadyLink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 758. Although “direct” interference is not required, there must be some interference with state court proceedings for Younger to apply. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, “Younger principles may apply to claims for damages under § 1983.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims “represent a collateral constitutional challenge to the pending [First State Court Action and its review of the administrative hearings].” Morning Hill Foods, LLC v. Hoshijo, 259 F.Supp.3d 1113, 1124 (D. Haw. 2017). All but Plaintiff's sixth claim allege federal constitutional violations or seek declaratory relief for those violations. (ECF No. 11 at 9-19.) Additionally, Plaintiff's sixth claim is a collateral constitutional challenge to the pending First State Court Action and its review of the administrative hearings based on an alleged violation of the California Constitution. (Id. at 19-20.) Therefore, Plaintiff's claims “go to the heart of h[er] opposition to the [City's] action in the [administrative hearings and First State Court Action], such that [the Court's] decision on the merits of [Plaintiff]'s claims would have the same practical effect on the state proceeding as an injunction.” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 982; see also Morning Hill, 259 F.Supp.3d at 1124.
In the instant action, Plaintiff's requested relief includes injunctive relief returning Zeus to Plaintiff and declaratory relief that Defendants violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights when they seized and kept Zeus. (ECF No. 11 at 20.) Whether the City rightfully “seized” Zeus is at issue in the First State Court Action.
Plaintiff argues she is not seeking to hold a state court judgment to be unconstitutional. (ECF No. 14 at 9.) However, the First State Court Action is Plaintiff seeking judicial review of the administrative hearings, and judicial review of administrative hearings and the administrative hearings themselves are considered a unitary process. See Mir, 2014 WL 2436285, at *11; Howard Jones, 2016 WL 1599511, at *2. Therefore, the fact that Plaintiff requests relief concerning the administrative hearings themselves, rather than the judicial review of those same hearings, does not mean Plaintiff's requested relief would have no effect on the First State Court Action. See Villa San Clemente, 2017 WL 8793227, at *5 (finding a federal action, in which the plaintiff sought a declaration that the city code was unconstitutional, would have the practical effect of enjoining a state court appeal following an administrative hearing for a city citation).
Plaintiff also contends the First State Court Action is limited to the administrative hearing and it does not challenge the provisions of the EGMC that Plaintiff challenges in the instant action. (ECF No. 14 at 9.) However, this contention is contradicted by the Amended Writ Petition. Among Plaintiff's request for relief in the Amended Writ Petition is the issuance of a writ of mandate that the City cannot enforce the EGMC in a manner that violates due process, including how EGMC § 8.06.090 contains arbitrary and capricious language. (ECF No. 13-1 at 22.) Thus, Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the EGMC in the First State Court Action.
Plaintiff argues the Court has parallel jurisdiction while the First State Court Action is pending. (ECF No. 14 at 10.) As part of this argument, Plaintiff cites to and provides a hearing transcript from the case of Hobbs v. Cty. of San Joaquin, No. 2:12-cv-02290-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2012). (ECF No. 15 at 8.) Plaintiff asserts Hobbs, which involved a federal due process challenge in federal court and a writ petition proceeding in the superior court, presents similar circumstances to the instant action. (ECF No. 14 at 10 & n.5.) Plaintiff points to a portion of the hearing transcript, in which the Hobbs court stated the superior court writ petition could “proceed along a parallel track in which [Hobbs was] going to challenge the actual conclusions and findings themselves.” (ECF No. 15 at 20.) However, the Court finds Hobbs to be distinguishable because the Hobbs court did not expressly consider nor reference Younger abstention during the hearing, and nor did the Hobbs court have an adequate opportunity to do so because it was only informed of the superior court writ petition during the hearing. (See ECF No. 15 at 19-20.)
Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of the hearing transcript in Hobbs as well as a decision of the Washington Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 15 at 1.) Plaintiff also requests judicial notice of an email from Plaintiff's counsel, but Plaintiff does not explain how this email, as opposed to court filings, is subject to judicial notice. (Id. at 1-2.) Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for judicial notice as to the court filings and DENIES it as to the email. See Harris, 682 F.3d at 1132 (noting courts may take judicial notice of the documents on file in federal or state courts).
Plaintiff's only other legal authority under her argument that parallel jurisdiction is appropriate is Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). However, Zinermon addressed whether state remedies were relevant as to the existence of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, and the opinion did not reference Younger abstention nor parallel state court proceedings. Id. at 124.
Accordingly, the Court finds the effect of enjoining state proceedings factor to be met. Thus, all of the Younger abstention requirements have been met. Thus, abstention is mandatory unless an exception applies.
iii. Younger Abstention Exceptions
The exceptions to Younger abstention include whether “there is a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.'” Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133. Bias in the state court proceeding is another exception. Morning Hill, 259 F.Supp.3d at 1125. Another exception concerns irreparable harm. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1133.
Here, there has been no showing of bad faith or harassment in the First State Court Action and the Court can find no evidence of such. (See ECF Nos. 3, 11.) While Plaintiff alleges the hearing officer in the August 15th administrative hearing displayed bias (ECF No. 11 at 7), “[t]he party raising bias must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Morning Hill, 259 F.Supp.3d at 1125 (citing Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)). Even if Plaintiff could overcome this presumption as to the hearing officer, Plaintiff makes no claim of bias against the superior court (see ECF No. 11), and the Court cannot find evidence of bias in the First State Court Action. Therefore, the Court does not find the exceptions for bad faith, harassment, or bias apply.
The irreparable harm exception applies only in “extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.” World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1987). This exception is narrowly applied because “if allegations that a plaintiff's constitutional rights were being violated were sufficient to constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances,' this exception to Younger would swallow the rule.” Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 530 F.Supp.3d 914, 939 (E.D. Cal. 2021). Additionally, the standard for irreparable harm as a Younger exception is distinct from the showing of irreparable harm for injunctive relief. See id. (noting the irreparable harm exception under Younger requires not only irreparable harm but also extraordinary circumstances).
Courts have found the irreparable harm exception can apply in situations involving a deprivation of a person's physical liberty that cannot be fully vindicated after trial. Bean, 986 F.3d at 1134-35 (finding the exception for irreparable harm due to the forcible injection of antipsychotic medication); Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 598 (noting a Younger exception applied to a case where the petitioner had been incarcerated for over six months without a bail hearing).
Here, the Court does not find the irreparable harm exception to Younger abstention applies. This case does not involve deprivation to a person's physical liberty, nor does it involve a constitutional violation that approaches the level of a deprivation of a person's physical liberty. To the extent Plaintiff may assert she suffers irreparable harm because of the inadequacy of monetary damages, the Court finds this does not demonstrate the necessary “extraordinary circumstances” to apply this exception. See Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 530 F.Supp.3d 914, 939 (E.D. Cal. 2021).
Additionally, the ability to have a state court decision reviewed by appellate state courts also weighs against the irreparable harm exception. Applied Underwriters, 37 F.4th at 598 (noting that even if the superior court adopted a proposed plan, the plaintiffs would have ample opportunity for state appellate court review). Here, the superior court in the First State Court Action denied Plaintiff's ex parte motion to stay Zeus' euthanasia on September 14, 2022. (ECF No. 13-1 at 49.) However, the superior court's denial of a preliminary injunction or TRO is appealable. See Bustos v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 39 Cal.App. 5th 369, 375 (2019) (“A TRO, as an interim provisional order granting injunctive relief, is immediately appealable[.]”); Busch v. Hurwitz, No. A097841, 2002 WL 31752266, at *3 (Cal.Ct.App. Dec. 10, 2002) (noting both an order denying a preliminary injunction and an order denying a TRO are appealable). Therefore, Plaintiff has had the opportunity to appeal the superior court's denial of her motion in the First State Court Action. The docket in the First State Court Action does not reflect any notice of appeal of the denial of Plaintiff's ex parte motion. This weighs against the irreparable harm exception.
“The Court may cite unpublished California appellate decisions as persuasive authority.” Washington v. Cal. City Correction Ctr., 871 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1028 n.3 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
Accordingly, the Court finds no exception to Younger abstention applies. Thus, the Court will address the impact of Younger abstention on the instant action.
iv. Application of Younger Abstention
“When a court abstains under Younger, claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are typically dismissed.” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1042; see also San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of S.F., 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal claim for injunctive relief[.]”). However, the Ninth Circuit “has also recognized that, when a district court abstains from considering a damages claim under Younger, it must stay - rather than dismiss - the damages action until state proceedings conclude.” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1042 (italics in original).
Plaintiff requests monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 11 at 20.) Accordingly, the Court must deny the instant motion for TRO. See Joseph, 2020 WL 1031899, at *17. On the other hand, the Court may not dismiss the instant action because of Plaintiff's request for monetary relief. The FAC's prayer for relief does not clearly differentiate between what causes of action serve as the basis for monetary relief as opposed to the ones for those serving as the basis for injunctive and declaratory relief, or whether any causes of action are the basis for multiple forms of relief. (ECF No. 11 at 20-23.) Thus, the Court at this time will refrain from dismissing any of Plaintiff's claims as opposed to staying them.
The Ninth Circuit has found Younger abstention does not apply to a § 1983 claim for damages that alleges a Fourth Amendment violation for an unlawful search. Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1049. This exception applies even though it raises the possibility of piecemeal litigation. Id.
Here, Plaintiff's first claim alleges a § 1983 claim based on alleged Fourth, Fifth, and Fifteenth Amendment violations. (ECF No. 11 at 9-11.) In the first claim, Plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment violation due to the alleged seizure of Zeus without a warrant. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff's first claim also asserts that she is entitled to damages. (Id. at 11.) Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's first claim seeks damages, as opposed to declaratory or injunctive relief, and is predicated upon an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, Younger abstention would not apply to that portion of the claim.
The Court recognizes this case presents difficult facts and is sympathetic to the situation at hand, especially considering there appear to be less drastic options available. However, Younger abstention is mandatory, and it requires dismissal of claims for injunctive relief. See Canatella, 404 F.3d at 1117; Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1042; San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1103. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for TRO and STAYS the instant action with the exception of Plaintiff's first claim but only to the extent the first claim seeks damages and is predicated on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 3.) The Court STAYS the instant action with the exception of Plaintiff's first claim but only to the extent the first claim seeks damages and is predicated on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation.
The claims that the Court stays in the instant Order shall remain stayed until the Court orders otherwise. The parties shall file a Joint Status Report notifying the Court not later than thirty (30) days from the conclusion of the underlying state proceedings and explaining why Younger abstention is no longer warranted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.