Opinion
23A-CR-2592
09-19-2024
T'arel Jordan Justice, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin, Sarah Medlin Marion County Public Defender Agency. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Caroline G. Templeton, Amanda Layne Martin-Nelson.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Cynthia L. Oetjen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D30-2009-F3-29631.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin, Sarah Medlin Marion County Public Defender Agency.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Caroline G. Templeton, Amanda Layne Martin-Nelson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING
Tavitas, Judge.
[¶1] In our original opinion, we reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court incorrectly placed on the defendant, T'arel Justice, the burden of proving his self-defense and defense of others claims, whereas the burden properly belonged on the State to disprove these claims. The State petitions for rehearing to challenge our order remanding for a new trial. According to the State, pursuant to Miller v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2017), the proper remedy was to remand for the trial court to "apply the correct standard," without holding a new trial. Pet. for Rehearing at 5. We grant rehearing to explain that the State's proposed remedy is inadequate under the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, affirm our original order remanding for a new trial.
[¶2] In Miller, 77 N.E.3d at 1196, the defendant "casually strolled up to" the victim, "as if to ask a question," then cut the victim "around the throat with a pocketknife." The cut was not deep, and the victim lived, but the cut could have posed a risk of death had it been slightly deeper. Id. The State charged the defendant, as relevant here, with attempted murder, an offense which requires specific intent to kill. The charging information, however, incorrectly alleged that the defendant "did knowingly or intentionally attempt to commit the crime of Murder, to-wit: to knowingly kill" the victim. Id. at 1197.
[¶3] A bench trial ensued, at which the defendant apparently did not testify; the trial court found the defendant guilty but mentally ill. Id. The trial court made specific findings that the defendant "had the requisite intent to kill" but also that the State "proved beyond a reasonable doubt" the defendant "did knowingly or intentionally attempt to commit the crime of Murder, to-wit: to knowingly kill" the victim. Id.
[¶4] The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's "references in the proceedings below to a 'knowing' mens rea could indicate the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof." Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, noting that "[t]he danger is that once we reverse and remand, the trial court judge who originally heard the case may have a difficult, if not impossible, task of distancing himself from the evidence already considered and in considering the case entirely anew, as we believe must be done in a criminal case." Miller v. State, 72 N.E.3d 502, 518 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. granted, overruled by 77 N.E.3d 1196.
[¶5] The State requested transfer, arguing, in part, that "the proper remedy is not a new trial, but a remand for the trial court to reconsider the case under the correct legal standard." Miller, 77 N.E.3d at 1197. In a short per curium opinion, our Supreme Court summarily "agree[d] the correct remedy in these circumstances is a remand for reconsideration by the trial court." Id. (emphasis added). Justice Slaughter, however, dissented, in part, from the per curium opinion and questioned whether remand for reconsideration by the trial court would be "adequate." Id. at 1198 (Slaughter, J., dissenting). Justice Slaughter explained:
[S]pecifically, I fear a mere remand to the same trial judge instructing him to apply the correct standard will be insufficient to redress the underlying harm from using the wrong standard. In my view, Miller should receive a new trial. The erroneous mens rea standard should not be dismissed as a slip of the tongue (or pen) in the court's written findings because it first appeared in the State's charging information and thus tainted the entire proceeding. Had this been a jury trial, the clear remedy would be to order a new trial. Although this case was tried to the bench, I believe a new trial also is warranted here. I share the Court of Appeals' concern that the trial judge, on remand, "may have a difficult, if not impossible, task of distancing himself from the evidence already considered and in considering the case entirely anew". Miller v. State, 72 N.E.3d 502, 518 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). In light of our grant of transfer, I would summarily affirm the Court of Appeals' thoughtful opinion in its entirety, including its remand for a new trial.Id.
[¶6] The instant case involves different circumstances than Miller, and a remand short of retrial would not be adequate under the facts of this case. To begin, unlike Miller, this is a self-defense case, and there is no question that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard here. This error had the effect of not merely conflating the proper mens rea standard, as in Miller, but of inverting the burden of proof against the defendant in a criminal trial.
[¶7] More importantly, unlike Miller, the defendant provided critical testimony in this case. He testified that he fired his gun because, upon perceiving that his pregnant girlfriend had been shot in the breast, he sensed an "imminent threat" to his, his girlfriend's, and his unborn child's life. Justice v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). Justice's testimony was critical to determining whether his actions were justified, but the trial court's inversion of the burden of proof tainted the assessment of Justice's credibility and the surrounding evidence from the start.
[¶8] A new trial is, of course, an extreme remedy. But the errors in this case leave no room for any other remedy in order to assure that Justice, as the criminally accused, is afforded a fair trial. We, therefore, affirm our original opinion in all respects.
Crone, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
Bradford, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
[¶9] While I agree that the State's petition for rehearing should be granted, I disagree with the majority's remedy of remand for a new trial. I agree with the State that remand for reconsideration of the evidence applying the proper standard of proof is the appropriate remedy pursuant to the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Miller v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2017), I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
[¶10] In Miller, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the proper remedy in cases where a trial court has applied the wrong standard of proof is "a remand for reconsideration by the trial court." 77 N.E.3d at 1197. While Miller did not involve a self-defense claim, I see no meaningful distinction between the misapplication of the proper standard of proof by the trial court in Miller and the misapplication of the proper standard of proof by the trial court in this case. As such, in my view, the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Miller controls here, such that the appropriate remedy is to remand the matter to the trial court for reconsideration of the proper standard of proof. Id. Furthermore, to the extent that the majority relies on Justice Slaughter's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, I note that Justice Slaughter's opinion is not controlling law as it did not reflect the majority opinion of the court. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 129 Ind.App. 271, 275, 153 N.E.2d 616, 618 (1958) (providing that inasmuch as a dissenting opinion "was not the view of the majority of that court, it is not a precedent binding on this court").