Opinion
C/A 1:21-1232-JMC-SVH
08-06-2021
Andy A. Juman, #02949-000, Petitioner, v. Barry Wingfield, Acting Warden, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Andy A. Juman (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed this action seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 12]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Petitioner of the motion for summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Respondent's motion. [ECF No. 13]. Petitioner filed a response on July 22, 2021. [ECF No. 15]. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the motion for summary judgment.
The proper respondent in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 case is the petitioner's immediate custodian, who is now Barry Wingfield, Acting Warden, and no longer Bryan K. Dobbs, as named by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004). Barry Wingfield therefore should be substituted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). The Clerk of Court is directed to change the caption accordingly.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Williamsburg, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1 at 1]. He challenges three sentences issued by the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) Superior Court. First, on January 27, 1986, Petitioner was sentenced in case number F-2977-85 to a term of 4 to 12 months [ECF No. 12-2 ¶ 9, id. at 19]. Petitioner was then sentenced on March 12, 1986 in case number F816-85CDEFGI to a total term of 56 years-to-life on several charges. [ECF No. 12-2 ¶ 10, id. at 21]. Finally, on January 15, 1987, Petitioner was sentenced in case number F469-86(D) to a term of 5 to 15 years, to be served “consecutive to any other sentence now serving.” [ECF No. 12-2 ¶ 11, id. at 23].
In the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (“Revitalization Act”), Congress transferred responsibility for incarcerating D.C. felons to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). See D.C. Code Ann. § 24-101 et seq. The Revitalization Act provides, “[s]uch persons shall be subject to any law or regulation applicable to persons committed for violations of laws of the United States consistent with the sentence imposed.” See id. As a result, BOP performs sentence computations for D.C. Code felons transferred into the federal prison system, consistent with the sentence imposed by the D.C. Superior Court and applicable D.C. law. See Stevenson v. Mitchell, C/A No. 1:10-cv-2673-RMG-SVH, 2011 WL 3626545, at *1 (D.S.C. July 26, 2011) (describing this arrangement, stating “although the BOP is responsible for computing the sentences, including the award of good time credits, of D.C. offenders housed in its facilities, the D.C. Code (D.C. Code) continues to control the computation of such sentences”), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 1:10-2673-RMG, 2011 WL 3626605 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2011).
Based upon the sentences imposed, BOP has calculated Petitioner to be serving a term of imprisonment of 61 years, 4 months to life that commenced on January 27, 1986. [ECF No. 21-2 ¶¶ 4-5 & Att. 1]. He has credit for 7, 350 days: 123 days of jail credit, 7, 215 days of D.C. Institutional Good Time and 12 days of D.C. Educational Good Time. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. This results in a parole eligibility date of April 11, 2027. Id. ¶ 7.
Petitioner brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing the BOP should award additional good time credits of 54 days per year, as he alleges is required under a new D.C. law, the COVID-19 Response Supplemental Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, part of which addresses good time credits for certain sentences. [ECF No. 1]. He further asserts that, as a D.C. inmate serving a federal term of imprisonment, he qualifies for all the amended benefits that new law provides. Id. The parties agree Petitioner has exhausted all available administrative remedies.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, this petition has been carefully reviewed pursuant to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings for the United States District Court, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and other habeas corpus statutes. Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Rules Governing Section 2254 are applicable to habeas actions brought under § 2241. See Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
The new law at issue, D.C. Code Ann. § 24-403.01a (West), effective April 27, 2021, provides for good time credit for felony offenses committed before August 5, 2000. This new law allows for an award of retroactive good-time credit of up to 54 days for each year of the imposed term, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). However, subsection (b)(2) of the statute states that, for offenses committed before June 22, 1994, retroactive credits can be applied only to mandatory minimum sentences. See D.C. Code Ann. § 24-403.01a(b)(1), (2) (West). Respondent has submitted evidence that Petitioner's sentence does not include a mandatory minimum term of confinement. [ECF No. 12-2 ¶ 12]. Respondent argues that, as such, Petitioner is not eligible to receive credit pursuant to the revised D.C. Code.
Petitioner disagrees, arguing he qualifies for the retroactive credits in that “where the original sentence has been imposed under the mandatory Guidelines Scheme, the sentence is imposed is a mandatory sentence and the new law is readily applicable to the Petitioner at this time.” [ECF No. 15 at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b))].
Contrary to his argument, there is no indication Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the then-mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, where he was sentenced in the D.C. Superior Court. See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 871 A.2d 514, 518 n.6 (D.C. 2005) (“The main argument presented in the motion was that the [D.C. Superior Court] should have followed the federal sentencing guidelines. In its order denying the motion, the court stated, ‘As defendant knows, the federal sentencing guidelines do not apply in this case.' (The court was of course correct; the federal sentencing guidelines do not apply at all in the D.C. courts.)”). Additionally, there is no indication that the new D.C. law at issue, providing for the retroactive application of good time credits to mandatory minimum sentences imposed for crimes committed before June 22, 1994, is referencing sentences imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, pre-Booker.
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were to be treated as advisory rather than as mandatory.
In sum, because the uncontradicted evidence shows Petitioner's sentence imposed under the D.C. Code does not include a mandatory minimum term of confinement, the new D.C. law is inapplicable, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 12].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).