Opinion
Case No. 2:05CV0053PGC.
April 7, 2005
ORDER GRANTING 12(b)(6) MOTION ON STATE CLAIMS
In this sexual harassment case, defendants, the Department of Health of the State of Utah, Family Dental Plan, Andrea Hight, and Erica Vekter (collectively "Family Dental"), move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff Margarita Juarez's state law claims. Family Dental alleges that Juarez failed to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Moreover, Family Dental asks the court to order Juarez to issue a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in respect to Juarez's Second and Ninth causes of action. The court grants in part and denies in part Family Dental's motion.
U.C.A. § 63-30d-401(2) (2004).
Background
According to Ms. Juarez's complaint, on or about January 19, 2004, Juarez traveled to Bicknell, Utah, on a business trip while working for Family Dental, a dental facility organized by the state of Utah and located in Salt Lake City. Dr. David Schlotman traveled with Juarez as her supervisor and while in Bicknell, he allegedly offered Juarez money in exchange for sex. Juarez declined the offer.Upon returning to Salt Lake City, Schlotman complained to management that Juarez had made sexual advances towards him during the trip. Juarez responded with her own claim against Schlotman, alleging that Schlotman harassed and teased her for her church affiliation, her race, and her decision not to have sex with him.
On or about February 4, 2004, Andrea Hight, a manager at Family Dental, confronted Juarez about the issue and told Juarez that Schlotman was an honorable man with a spotless record. Juarez told Hight that the Division of Occupational and Professional Licencing ("DOPL") had previously found Schlotman guilty of Medicaid fraud, that DOPL and several women had obtained restraining orders against Schlotman, that Schlotman's medical license to issue controlled substances had been suspended, that Schlotman's medical license to perform dentistry was suspended unless he practiced under the direct supervision of another licensed dentist, and that a court had ordered him to attend anger management classes. Furthermore, Juarez told Hight that Schlotman had been declared mentally ill.
Hight told Juarez that management was aware of Schlotman's past. Hight and other management personnel also told Juarez that she should not talk about the incident with Schlotman and that if she contacted an attorney her employment with Family Dental would be in jeopardy.
On or about February 13, 2004, Juarez was transferred to a different office, where she discovered that rumors of her case had spread around. Hight and other members of Family Dental's management threatened to fire Juarez for talking to co-workers about the case. They also told her that she was lying and that she "better keep to herself for her own good." As a result of these comments, Juarez sought and received medical leave for severe stress, anxiety and a nervous breakdown.
While on medical leave, Juarez filed a complaint with DOPL against Schlotman. When she returned to work, Juarez expressed concerns about working with Schlotman; Hight told Juarez that she had to work with Schlotman and that she was to show Schlotman respect, shake his hand, and be nice to him or be fired.
On or about March 3, 2004, DOPL contacted Family Dental about Juarez's complaint. Subsequently, Juarez alleges that she was isolated at work and "treated with extreme coldness." On March 11, 2004, she was placed on administrative leave. While she was gone, her friends were warned that Juarez was "going down," and that any of her friends would "go down with her." On March 29, 2004, Juarez returned to work, where she was demoted from Dental Assistant to office runner and room cleaner because none of the doctors wanted to work with her. Moreover, many of the employees disrespected Juarez, telling her that she was not wanted and that she needed to quit. She was also told not to file a lawsuit because she is Hispanic and no one would believe her over a white doctor and a white staff. In addition, several office members started complaining that they could not understand Juarez's English even though no such problem existed before the Schlotman incident. Members of management also warned employees that Juarez could be a thief and that they should not leave their belongings unattended in her presence.
Meanwhile, Schlotman was promoted and transferred to the St. George office, where he received a pay raise and new medical benefits. He subsequently quit the St. George office for a job in New Mexico, which he obtained with high recommendations from Family Dental.
Juarez filed this claim, raising ten causes of action including five based on state law. Family Dental argues that the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth causes of action are barred by Utah's Governmental Immunity Act or by Juarez's failure to file a notice of claim under state law and thus must be dismissed under rule 12(b)(6). Moreover, they move for a more definite statement regarding the Second and Ninth causes of action. The court addresses each motion in turn.
Issues and Standards of Review
Family Dental alleges that Juarez's failure to file a notice of claim as required by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah deprives this court of subject matter jurisdiction over her state law claims against the State of Utah or its employees. "Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Moreover, the court grants a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal "when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle [her] to relief, accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Finally, Family Dental seeks an order requiring that Juarez issue a more definite statement with respect to her Second and Ninth causes of action. The court grants a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) if the complaint "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading . . ." In evaluating these motions, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and views them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997).
See Sutton v. Utah State School for the Deaf Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).
Notice of Claim Requirement
The court grants Family Dental's motion to dismiss with regards to Juarez's state law claims because Juarez's failure to file a notice of claim under Utah law denies the court subject matter jurisdiction over these causes of action.It is axiomatic in our judicial system that "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,] empowered to hear only those cases authorized and defined by the Constitution[,] which have been entrusted to them under a jurisdictional grant by Congress." Consequently, federal district courts' original jurisdiction is limited to "civil actions under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
Henry v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 43 F.3d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 1994).
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2004).
Additionally, a district court may hear and determine state law claims under two separate but similarly rationalized statutes. First, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a civil defendant who successfully sought "removal" of her case from a state court to a federal court may ask the court to exercise jurisdiction over her state claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) allows the removal to federal court of "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." Furthermore, whenever a cause of action that arises under federal law "is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or in its discretion, may remand all maters in which State law predominates." Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal trial court with original jurisdiction over a claim in a case has discretion to exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" "over all other claims that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2004).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2004).
The reason behind allowing federal courts to hear state law claims under the "removal" or "supplemental jurisdiction" statutes is rooted in notions of justice for the parties and of judicial economy. In explaining the justification for allowing federal courts to exercise "pendent jurisdiction," one of the doctrines codified in § 1367 as "supplemental jurisdiction," the Supreme Court has noted that "justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants . . ." The opportunity to have their state claims heard in federal court, therefore, simply provides litigants an effective and fair forum where all their claims arising out of the same operative facts may be disputed at once. Certainly, when exercising jurisdiction over state claims based on removal, the federal court is bound to apply state law to the state claims, since "[i]t is frequently said that jurisdiction on removal is derivative, and that if the state court had no jurisdiction, the federal court acquires none, and cannot even remand, but must dismiss for want of jurisdiction." Thus, "[a] want of jurisdiction in a state court over the subject matter of a case is not cured by removal to federal court."
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
See id. (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
Bailey v. Marsh, 655 F.Supp. 1250, 1253 (D. Colo. 1987) (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts, 212 (4th ed., 1983)).
Id. at 1254 (citing Accord General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore M.S.R. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922)).
Similarly, a litigant seeking review of her state claims in federal court under "supplemental jurisdiction" cannot raise a state claim in federal court for which the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Such policy would not only provide the litigant a more efficient forum in which to litigate all her claims, but rather create a forum where she could dispute state law cases even though no state court had jurisdiction to hear such claims. Supplementary jurisdiction, therefore, only grants a federal court subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims to the extent that the state court would have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims. With these principle in mind, the court turns to the claims in this case.
The Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("the Act") requires that persons suing Utah governmental entities or their employees for actions or omissions that occurred "during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental." Where the governmental entity being sued is the State of Utah, the Act requires that a notice of claim written in accordance with Utah Code § 63-30d-401(3) be directed and delivered to the Utah attorney general. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "suit may not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act are strictly followed." Strict compliance with the Act "is a prerequisite to vesting a [trial] court with subject matter jurisdiction over claims against [Utah] governmental entities."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 (2004).
See id. at § 63-30d-401(3)(b)(ii)(E).
Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶ 11, 40 P.3d 632, 635 (emphasis added) (quoting Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, P11, 24 P.3d 958).
Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
In Wheeler v. McPherson, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a district court's dismissal of a tort claim against Kane County, Utah, and its employee, where the claimant served a notice of claim upon the county commissioner and the county's insurance company as opposed to the county clerk as the Act required. Although the commissioner's secretary had acknowledged receipt of the claimant's notice, and although the county's attorney directed the claimant to the insurance company, the Court found that failure to strictly comply with the Act barred the action. Even if the county clerk knew of the claimant's suit, the Court held that "actual notice of a claim by a governmental entity does not absolve a party of its duty to strictly comply with the Act." Thus, in order for a state court to have jurisdiction over a cause of action that falls under the Act the claimant must have strictly complied with the notice of claim requirement.
See id. at ¶¶ 14-16.
See McPherson, 2002 UT 16.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Here, Juarez does not dispute that she failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirement. Rather, she presents explanations, none of which are persuasive. First, Juarez argues that because the injuries she alleges did not arise out of a governmental function, Utah's Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to her claims. But the Act specifically notes that the notice of claim requirement applies "regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental." Second, Juarez argues that Defendants Hight and Vekter are not protected by the Act because they acted with malice or fraud. But the notice of claim requirement makes no such exemption. Third, Juarez argues that she fulfilled the requirements of the Act in frequently meeting with the Attorney General's office about her claim. In her view, the Attorney General received written and verbal correspondence about her claim. But even if the Attorney General indeed had actual notice of Juarez's claim, she was still required to comply with the specific mandates as outlined in U.C.A. § 63-30d-401(3). That section required that Juarez file a written notice of claim with the Attorney General, containing a brief statement of the facts, nature of the claim asserted, and damages she incurred so far as they were known. Moreover, she needed to name the state employees she individually wanted to sue and she needed to sign or have her attorney sign that document. Juarez does not dispute that she did not comply with these requirements and consequently the state court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear her state law claims against the State of Utah.
U.C.A. § 63-30d-401 (2).
See U.C.A. § 63-30d-401 (3).
See id.
As reasoned above, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction to review state claims, this court's subject matter jurisdiction over those claims is limited to that of the state court. Because the state court had no jurisdiction to hear Juarez's state claims, this court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address Juarez's state law causes of action. Consequently, the court dismisses the state law claims.
Effect of Dismissal
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that the defendants cite Rule 12(b)(6) as the basis for their motion for dismissal rather than Rule 12(b)(1). Generally, a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either raised by the parties under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures or by the court sua sponte under Rule 12(h)(3). A 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3) motion is not on the merits, and thus a dismissal under these rules "allows for the possibility of repleading the action to bring it within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court." By contrast, "a dismissal . . . other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits." Such dismissals are prejudicial and include dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). While the general rule is that a 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3) dismissal may not be "converted" into a 12(b)(6) prejudicial dismissal, "[t]here is . . . a widely recognized exception to this rule. If the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case, the issue should be resolved under 12(b)(6) . . ." Moreover, "[w]hen subject matter jurisdiction is dependent upon the same statute which provides the substantive claim in the case, the jurisdictional claim and the merits are considered to be intertwined."
Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (10th Cir. 1987).
See Hurdman, 825 F.2d at 259-60.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Juarez's state law causes of action derive from the same statute that provides subject matter jurisdiction to the state court to hear those claims. The Act specifically notes that "[t]his single, comprehensive chapter governs all claims against governmental entities or against their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Presumptively, Juarez's causes of action against the state are rooted in the waiver of immunities that the Act provides. As explained above, the Act also provides the notice of claim requirement, which under Utah law is determinative of a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the government. Consequently, while the defendants did not specifically raise the motion to dismiss as a jurisdictional issue, the court may treat it as a jurisdiction question under Rule 12(h)(3), which, circularly, brings the court back to Rule 12(b)(6), which was raised by the defendants. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth causes of action are therefore dismissed with prejudice.
U.C.A. § 63-30d-101(2)(b).
More Definite Statement Motion
The court denies Family Dental's 12(e) motion for a more definite statement in regards to Juarez's Second and Ninth causes of action. The court will grant a motion for a more definite statement only where the complaint "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading . . ." While perhaps it could have been more artfully pled, the second and ninth causes of action are detailed enough that a responsive pleading is possible.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (#3-2). The motion to dismiss plaintiff's state causes of action is GRANTED. The motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.