Opinion
2018-01055 Index No. 22606/12
07-14-2021
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, etc., respondent, v. Balbir Singh MULTANI, appellant.
David A. Bythewood, Mineola, NY, for appellant. Parker Ibrahim & Berg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Boris Peyzner and Scott W. Parker of counsel), for respondent.
David A. Bythewood, Mineola, NY, for appellant.
Parker Ibrahim & Berg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Boris Peyzner and Scott W. Parker of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Balbir Singh Multani appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Howard G. Lane, J.), entered November 2, 2017. The order denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court entered December 22, 2016.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In November 2012, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Balbir Singh Multani (hereinafter the defendant) to foreclose a mortgage on residential real property in Queens owned by the defendant. In March 2013, the defendant was served with the summons and complaint, and he failed to appear or answer the complaint. Thereafter, on December 22, 2016, the Supreme Court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
Approximately six months later, in July 2017, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale, alleging, inter alia, that the assignment of the mortgage was invalid on the ground of an impermissible conflict of interest. The defendant contended that the attorney for the plaintiff executed the assignment of mortgage on behalf of the assignor while representing the assignee, the plaintiff. In an order entered November 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant appeals, and we affirm.
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale. A defendant moving pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(3) to vacate a default based on intrinsic fraud, i.e., on the basis that the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint are false, must establish both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see ETrade Bank v. Ejenam, 188 A.D.3d 1004, 1005–1006, 132 N.Y.S.3d 689 ; New Century Mtge. Corp. v. Corriette, 117 A.D.3d 1011, 1012, 986 N.Y.S.2d 560 ). Here, the defendant failed to provide any excuse whatsoever, let alone a reasonable excuse for his default in appearing or answering the complaint (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Shatles, 157 A.D.3d 750, 751–752, 69 N.Y.S.3d 56 ; New Century Mtge. Corp. v. Corriette, 117 A.D.3d at 1012, 986 N.Y.S.2d 560 ). Since the defendant failed to show a reasonable excuse for his default, it is unnecessary to consider whether the defendant had a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Salzmann, 181 A.D.3d 896, 897, 119 N.Y.S.3d 898 ; New Century Mtge. Corp. v. Corriette, 117 A.D.3d at 1012, 986 N.Y.S.2d 560 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, we affirm the order.
MASTRO, J.P., RIVERA, HINDS–RADIX and DUFFY, JJ., concur.