Summary
stating that "[t]here is no language in Buckhannon suggesting the opinion is limited to ADA and FHAA cases. The Court refers to fee-shifting statutes in general throughout the opinion. Id. at 1843.
Summary of this case from Brandon K. v. New Lenox School DistrictOpinion
No. 01 C 4798
August 27, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jose Luis R. ("Jose") and his mother Janette H. (collectively "plaintiffs") sue Joliet Township H.S. District 204 ("Joliet Township") for attorney's fees and costs from a mediation process, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Joliet Township moves for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
BACKGROUND
Jose suffers from learning disabilities and emotional disturbances. He is seventeen years old. Joliet Township is the public school responsible for providing educational services to Jose.
On November 1, 2000, plaintiffs requested a due process hearing seeking to have Joliet Township provide Jose with specialized instruction. The parties engaged in mediation. On February 5, 2001, a mediation agreement was reached. One week later, the agreement was read into the record before a hearing officer. As a result of the agreement, Jose receives educational services that he was previously denied. Plaintiffs filed a demand for payment of attorney's fees, expenses, and costs upon counsel for the defendant. Defendants refuse to pay expenses plaintiffs incurred as a result of the mediation process.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for judgment standard
Judgment on the pleadings is granted when the nonmoving party cannot prove any facts to support its claims for relief. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). In evaluating a motion for judgment, facts in the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Frey v. Bank One, 91 F.3d 45, 46 (7th Cir. 1996).
II. Attorney fees and costs
The IDEA provides, "The court, it its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is a prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The parties dispute whether plaintiffs meet the definition of a prevailing party. The complaint alleges plaintiffs are prevailing parties because: (1) they were a catalyst for change in Joliet Township's school policies and (2) an enforceable settlement agreement was reached.
The Supreme Court recently rejected the catalyst theory as a way to acquire the status of a prevailing party. Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840 (2001). The Court found that acquiring prevailing party status is only possible upon "a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties." Id. Plaintiffs contend Buckhannon is not binding upon them because the case involved the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA") rather than the IDEA. In addition, the Buckhannon plaintiffs prevailed as a result of legislative change. These distinctions are unpersuasive. There is no language in Buckhannon suggesting the opinion is limited to ADA and FHAA cases. The Court refers to fee-shifting statutes in general throughout the opinion. Id. at 1843. Similarly, the Court does not give import to the fact that legislative action motivated the defendant's concessions.
Plaintiffs' contention that the mediation agreement qualifies them as a prevailing party is more persuasive. Buckhannon grants prevailing party status to parties who receive favorable judgments on the merits or enter into settlement agreements enforced through consent decrees. Id. at 1840. "Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a court-ordered "chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant." Id. (internal citations omitted). Private settlement agreements do not confer prevailing party status. Id. at n. 7 ("Private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees").
Joliet Township contends the mediation agreement was a private settlement because an administrative hearing was never held, evidence was not presented, and there was no finding or order by the hearing officer. These factors do not conclusively establish that the settlement was private. A consent decree is defined as a "contract of the parties entered upon the record with the approval and sanction of a court of competent jurisdiction, which cannot be set aside without the consent of the parties . . ." Barron's Law Dictionary, p. 97 (1996). It is undisputed the parties' agreement was read into the record before a hearing officer. Interpreting all facts in favor of the plaintiffs, the legal relationship between plaintiffs and Joliet Township changed when the agreement was read into the record. Accordingly, plaintiffs may be entitled to prevailing party status.
CONCLUSION
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.