Opinion
Case No. 2:01-CV-00933 PGC
April 15, 2003
OPINION
This matter is currently before the court on eight different motions related to the disbursement of a settlement fund from litigation between Mr. David Cade, and Zions Bank. "Zions Litigation"). The court has reviewed all the pleadings and rules as follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter has a long and complicated history. Because the precise timing of events is important the court will set them out in some detail. In December 1988, defendant David Cade entered into a contract with Zions Bank to help Zions enter the secondary market for government guaranteed SBA loans. Mr. Cade's contract specified the rate of commission he would receive for this service. Zions had great success in this endeavor, and at some point Mr. Cade, determined he was not being paid according to the terms of his contract.
In April 1991, Mr. Cade retained Mr. Jeffrey Silvestrini, at the law firm of Cohne, Rappaport Segal ("CRS") to help him negotiate a renewal of his employment contract with Zions. The negotiations deteriorated due to Zions failure to pay the commissions that Mr. Cade believed he was owed.
In July 1991, CRS began action on Mr. Cade's behalf against Zions in Third District Court in Utah. The state court ordered the parties to participate in arbitration over the objections of CRS.
Mr. Cade's relationship with CRS deteriorated. In May 1994, CR5 recorded a Notice of Claim with the Salt Lake County Recorder for an attorney's lien. Ultimately, in May 1998, CRS obtained a valid judgment and declaration of a valid attorney's lien against the proceeds of the Zions' Litigation for $32,500 plus interest, accruing from March 19, 1998, against Mr. Cade.
In August 1993, Mr. Cade sought legal counsel from Mr. Daniel L. Bartley and Ms. Sharon Green. That same month, Bartley and Green participated in arbitration with Mr. Cade before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), as ordered by the court. Mr. Cade agreed to pay Bartley and Green 40% of any awards received.
In April 1996, Mr. Cade was awarded $460,823.00 in arbitration. Unhappy with the award and with Bartley and Green, Mr. Cade ended his relationship with them, without paying them. Bartley and Green then filed an attorney's lien against the proceeds of the Zions Litigation which was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on May 15, 1996. On August 6, 1998, a valid judgment for attorney's fees and costs totaling $184,329.20 was entered in favor of Bartley and Green, in Nevada. This judgment was domesticated in Utah.
In May 1996, Anthony Rampton, then with the law firm of Fabian Clendenin ("F C"), agreed to represent Mr. Cade and appeal the order requiring NASD arbitration of Mr. Cade's claims. Mr. Cade signed a contract with F C agreeing to pay them at an hourly rate and awarding F C 15% of any awards received over $1 million dollars.
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Rampton began work on Mr. Cade's case and discovered the complaint filed against Mr. Cade by Bartley and Green in Nevada. Bartley and Green also sued Mr. Rampton for interference with their contract with Mr. Cade.
Mr. Rampton did a wide variety of legal work for Mr. Cade. In one of Mr. Rampton's first acts on behalf of Mr. Cade, he filed a motion in Third District Court to disqualify James Holbrook of Callister, Nebeker and McCullough ("Callister") because of post-arbitration conversations between Zions, the IRS, and Bartley/Green. The court denied the motion but allowed for renewal of the motion if Mr. Cade won his appeal of the arbitration award.
In June 1996, Mr. Rampton discussed with Mr. Cade that he owed close to $10,000 to F C and no fees had been paid. Mr. Cade reassured Mr. Rampton he could make large sums of money available quickly.
In January 1997, Mr. Rampton appealed the 1993 arbitration award and the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr. Holbrook. In May 1997, Mr. Rampton left F C to join the law Firm of Kruse Landa Maycock (KLM). The $61,062.87 ofaccounts receivable, for approximately twelve months of work, followed Mr. Rampton to KLM. Mr. Cade signed another contract for attorney's Fees with KLM.
In April 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals granted the motion to vacate the arbitration award and remanded the matter for trial.
In June 1998, Mr. Cade sought additional help from Mr. Rampton on a dispute he had with GE Capital. Also, over the summer, Mr. Rampton finally received the case files from Bartley and Green and began preparing Mr. Cade's case. Mr. Rampton informed Mr. Cade the case required more work than he originally believed necessary due to its complexity. Mr. Rampton represented to Mr. Cade that the costs of handling the Zions Litigation would be between $150,000 and $200,000.
In December 1998, Mr. Rampton left KLM for the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook McDonough. ("Jones Waldo"). Due to the large outstanding balance owed by Mr. Cade, Mr. Rampton tried unsuccessfully to find Mr. Cade a new attorney.
In September 1999, Mr. Cade signed a contract with Jones Waldo. The Retainer Agreement provided that the "legal services will be on an hourly basis to be billed monthly. In addition, a contingency equal to twenty percent of all sums of money or other items of value actually recovered from Zions or its insurers, including compensatory and punitive damages, costs, interest, attorney fees, etc., in excess of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) by way of settlement or trial." On September 27, 1999, Mr. Rampton wrote to Mr. Cade and gave him an accounting of the $249,158.57 in legal fees and costs that Mr. Cade owed Mr. Rampton and the prior firms that had represented him.
In December 1999, Mr. Rampton settled the GE Capital case for $185,000. Jones Waldo kept $50,000 of the settlement as a retainer on the Zions Litigation. Mr. Cade agreed to Jones Waldo attorney's fees on an hourly basis, billed monthly, plus a 20% contingency fee for all sums of money received from the Zions Litigation in excess of $500,000. Mr. Cade signed a retainer agreement on November 4, 1999.
During 1999 and early 2000, discovery continued in the Zions Litigation. Ultimately it involved over twenty depositions, numerous experts, and thousands of pages of documents.
In July 2000, Mr. Cade acknowledged to Mr. Rampton that he had no funds. Mr. Rampton referred Mr. Cade to Tony Wand of the Kinnamon Group. Mr. Cade took out a loan of $75,000 from the Group and signed a security agreement. The loan was secured by the judgment in the Zions litigation. Mr. Cade made no payments on the note between July 2000 and December 2002. Mr. Cade's current balance would be $175,000, according to the loan terms.
Also in July 2000, Jones Waldo sent a letter to Mr. Cade informing him of a potential conflict of interest because another attorney at Jones Waldo had represented Zions Bank on employment law matters unrelated to Mr. Cade's case. Mr. Cade signed a consent to this conflict. This was followed up by letter in September 2000 requesting Mr. Cade's consent to Mr. Rampton's continued representation despite Jones Waldo's representation of Zions Bank on other matters. Ultimately. Mr. Cade signed four different consent letters.
In September 2000, Mr. Cade's case against Zions finally went to trial. During the trial, Mr. L. Deane Smith provided testimony on the amount of damage Mr. Cade had suffered. He testified to a range of damages between $441,441 and $6,400,00 dollars. At the close of trial, Zions moved for a directed verdict on attorneys fees and fraud claims. The court denied the motion on attorney's fees but reserved ruling on the fraud claim until after the jury verdict.
On October 2, 2000, the jury awarded Mr. Cade $441,000 in compensatory damages and $536,000 in additional damages. This verdict meant that the proceedings would then continue to a punitive damages hearing. Zions immediately moved for a clarification of the verdict and renewed its motion on the fraud claims.
On the afternoon of the verdict, the parties met to discuss a settlement. Mr. Rampton contended that Mr. Cade originally agreed to settlement terms between $2,200,000 and $4,000,000. The parties negotiated into the night and up until the morning of the punitive damages hearing. At that time, Mr. Rampton told Mr. Cade that Zions had offered $1,750,000 to settle this case. According to Mr. Rampton, Mr. Cade consented to settling for this amount. The attorneys met with Judge Frederick and told him that they had settled the case.
The same morning, Mr. Cade asked for $6000 to help him pay his hotel bill, and Jones Waldo advanced him $12,000 from the settlement proceeds. Settlement papers were drawn up, but Mr. Cade had not finalized the total amount due on an outstanding Internal Revenue Service lien. After negotiations, the IRS ultimately stated it sought $662,000 from Mr. Cade. The parties continued to negotiate the final payout until February 2001. Judge Frederick finally ordered the parties to file the settlement agreement or he would dismiss the case with prejudice.
In March 2001, Judge Frederick entered a settlement order for $1,750,000. Mr. Cade acknowledged that he consented to this order. Later, Mr. Cade indicated that he felt he had no choice in the matter. Shortly after the settlement, Mr. Cade stopped working with Mr. Rampton and hired Jeffrey Hubbard as his new attorney.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The various interested parties continued to battle over who was entitled to what portion of the proceeds. In July 2001, to avoid placing itself in the middle of litigation regarding disbursement of settlement funds, Zions Bank deposited $1,750,000 with the Third District Court in Utah. In July 2002, the IRS then removed the issue of proper disposition of the award to this court, under the statute granting this court jurisdiction to hear matters involving the property of the United States Government. In July 2002 the case was transferred to this court.
On October 17, 2002, the court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment filed by Jones Waldo and KLM. At the conclusion of hearing, the court granted both motions. Counsel for Mr. Cade indicated he had no legal basis for objecting to the claims listed in the two motions. The court, however, granted both motions subject to determining the reasonableness of the attorney's fees at a later hearing. The court also set future briefing deadlines for all remaining summary judgment motions, the issue of reasonableness of attorney's fees sought, and priority among the various claimants to the money deposited with the court. Mr. Cade's counsel, Mr. Moody and Mr. Fisher, then requested permission to withdraw from the case in view of the fact that Mr. Cade was challenging their effectiveness. The court requested that they remain on the case, despite their motion to withdraw, through the final round of briefing on this matter.
On November 13, 2002, the court entered an order memorializing its rulings, including the ruling provisionally allowing Mr. Fisher and Mr. Moody to withdraw after the conclusion of the briefing. Upon receiving the order, the Clerk's Office erroneously took Mr. Fisher and Mr. Moody off of the case immediately, rather than waiting for the briefing deadline. As a result, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Moody received no documentation regarding this case for almost two months. During this time, all of the parties to this case — with the notable exception of Mr. Cade — came to a stipulated settlement agreement regarding the disbursement of funds. Documents to this effect were sent to the court.
Despite the lack of notice, Mr. Moody and Mr. Fischer learned of the settlement shortly before a January 8, 2003, hearing on the matter and filed a response to the proposed settlement. At the January 8, 2003 hearing, the court allowed them to withdraw.
At that point, Mr. Cade was a pro se participant in this case who had possiblyjust received notice of the settlement. In deference to this status, the court allowed him one more opportunity to respond to the proposed settlement. The court directed Mr. Cade, in any Future briefing, to show good cause for any newly filed objections.
On January 31, 2003, Mr. Cade filed an affidavit, which this court construed as both his response to the pending motions for summary judgment and the proposed settlement, despite its lack of proper form. The parties responded and the remaining matters are before this court. On March 24, 2003, this court issued its order on all pending motions. This explanatory opinion now follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Steven Davis Affidavit
Mr. Steven Davis has again filed an affidavit with this court on this matter. Mr. Davis is not a named party in this case. The court construes this affidavit as a motion for leave to file an amicus brief. So construed, the court denies the motion because the brief is not helpful to determining the issues before the court.
Motion to Strike David Cade's Affidavit
Several of the parties have moved to strike the January 31, 2003, affidavit of David Cade. In its order regarding Mr. Cade's response, the court directed Mr. Cade to demonstrate good cause for providing new information in his 1ast pleading, rather than earlier. Mr. Cade provided no explanation in his affidavit for his last minute filing. The court agrees that the affidavit is often irrelevant and lacking in foundation. However, the court will tolerate lapses in proper form due to Mr. Cade's status as a pro se participant and will consider the affidavit accordingly. Therefore, the court grants the motion by KLM to join the motion to strike portions of the affidavit (#91-1). However, it denies the motions to strike the affidavit (#87-1 and #91-2).
Standard of Review
The court may grant summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists. The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of issues of material fact. The nonmoving party must do more than show there exists "some metaphysical doubt" as to issues of material fact.
See Young v. United Auto Workers Labor Employment Training Corp., 95 F.3d 992, 995 (10th Cir. 1996).
See Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 706 (10th Cir. 1995).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Bartley and Green, and Cohne Rappaport and Segal's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment
The above-named defendants sought summary judgment on their claims to the Zions Litigation proceeds. The undisputed facts establish that Mr. Silvestrini, an attorney with CRS, began representing Mr. Cade in April 1991 in Mr. Cade's negotiations for renewal of his employment agreement with Zions Bank. On July 11, 1991, CRS commenced an action on Mr. Cade's behalf against Zions Bank in Third District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The relationship between Mr. Silvestrini and Mr. Cade deteriorated shortly thereafter.On May 27, 1998, CRS obtained a valid judgment and declaration on a valid attorney's lien for $32,500. plus interest accruing from March 19, 1998, against Mr. Cade. Mr. Rampton represented Mr. Cade in defense of the suit brought against Cade by CRS prior to the time that he joined KLM.
Cohne Rappaport Segal P.C. v. David G. Cade, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil Action No. 970901544.
Mr. Cade raises three objections to payment of the CRS fees: (1) that CRS took a client that breached their fiduciary duty; (2) that CRS improperly proceeded to arbitration in this case; and (3) that Mr. Cade was unsatisfied with the results of Mr. Silvestrini's representation. The court finds that the undisputed facts all plainly demonstrated that these objections lack merit.
First, CRS and Mr. Silvestrini (by way of uncontested affidavit) have indicated they have no evidence they ever represented Mr. David Hemingway, the individual Mr. Cade claims created a conflict. Second, as counsel for Mr. Cade, CRS did file opposition to Zions' motion to compel arbitration. In fact, CRS advanced essentially the same — successful — arguments that ultimately overturned the arbitration award at the appellate court. Mr. Cade appears to misunderstand the fact that the Third District Court sent his case to arbitration, not Mr. Silvestrini. Third, Mr. Cade had seven years to raise any objections to the adequacy of Mr. Silvestrini's representation in his case. The final judgment regarding Mr. Silvestrini's fees was not entered into until 1998. The Third District Court resolved any issues regarding Mr. Silvestrini's representation many years ago with its entry of a Final judgment.
Green and Bartley represented Mr. Cade in the Zions litigation in the arbitration proceeding before the NASD, as ordered by the Third District Court. Green and Bartley obtained an arbitration award in favor of Mr. Cade in the amount of $460,823. Notably, this award was quite close to the compensatory award the jury in his trial ultimately granted, $441,000. On May 15, 1996, Green and Bartley filed an attorney's lien against the proceeds of the Zions' Litigation. On August 6, 1998, Green and Bartley obtained a valid judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $184,329.20 against Cade. This amount represented 40% of the arbitration award, exactly as Mr. Cade had agreed in the contract he signed with Bartley and Green.
Sharon Green, Lawyer v. Fabian Clendenin, a Professional Law Corp. and David Cade, et al., District Court for Clark County, Nevada, Civil Action No. A359884. This case was domesticated in Utah in Civil Action No. 016911371, in Third District Court, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Mr. Cade raises four objections: that Bartley and Green violated their fiduciary duty to him (1) by not continuing to represent him; (2) by refusing to appeal the arbitration award; (3) by immediately seeking their fees, and (4) by obtaining unsatisfactory results with their representation. The uncontested facts prove all these objections are meritless. First, Bartley and Green did not abandon Mr. Cade — Mr. Cade fired them. True, they did decline to represent him in an appeal of the arbitration award. However, no fiduciary duty obligated them to pursue claims on behalf of a client who was not cooperating with them and who challenged the value of their services. Moreover, Bartley and Green properly filed claims against Mr. Cade for the fees incurred in representing him in the court-ordered arbitration. They did SO only after Mr. Cade failed to make arrangements to pay them violation of the terms of their written fee agreement. Finally, regarding the unsatisfactory results, the final judgment in this matter was entered into in Nevada in 1998. Any objections to the performance of counsel could have been raised during that litigation. This court will not reopen that final judgment either.
For the above reasons the court grants both Bartley and Green, and CRS' motion for summary judgment (#49-1).
Kinnamon Group Motion for Summary Judgment
The Kinnamon Group loaned Mr. Cade $75,000, plus interest, secured by the proceeds of the Zions' Litigation. Mr. Cade denies neither that he signed this note nor that he failed to pay the note. Mr. Cade does argue that when Jones Waldo prepared the loan documents, they failed to file any "UCCs" indicating amounts owed and interest liabilities. However, there was a Security Agreement signed by Mr. Cade, which granted Kinnamon group a security interest in the proceeds from the Zions Litigation. Whether or not Jones Waldo should have prepared a "UCC" does not negate Kinnamon's right to recover its loan or share in the settlement proceeds pursuant to stipulation of the parties.
Mr. Cade also argues that either Mr. Wand or the Kinnamon Group filed for bankruptcy, thus staying these proceedings. This court has received no notice of bankruptcy or any stay. Furthermore, in their reply brief the Kinnamon Group indicates that only Tony Wand Filed for bankruptcy. If true, this has no effect on the Kinnamon Group's right to recover in this action.
Accordingly, the court grants the motion by the Kinnamon Group for summary judgment. (#62-1).
IRS Motion for Summary Judgment
The IRS assessed a tax liability against Mr. Cade for unpaid federal individual income taxes plus statutory penalties and interest accruing against Mr. Cade for years 1990 through 1993 and 1995 through 1999. As of February 2003, Mr. Cade's total tax assessment (including penalties and interest) was $791,867.97. For purposes of summary judgment, a certified form 4340 is sufficient evidence that an assessment was made in accordance with statutory and regulatory mandates.
See 29 U.S.C. § 6203; Long v. U.S., 972 F.2d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 1992).
Mr. Cade makes two arguments in his affidavit: (1) that the IRS improperly disclosed information; and (2) that the IRS had lost the right to collect their liens due to a lapse often years. Unauthorized disclosure of tax return information by IRS personnel is governed by statute. The method for redress of such a violation is not a relief from tax liabilities. Instead, Congress provided in an exclusive civil remedy for unauthorized disclosure of tax return information by agents of the government. The statute may not be used to challenged the assessments underlying a tax liability, or the merits of a tax assessment. Therefore, even assuming Mr. Cade's allegations regarding improper disclosure are true (which seems doubtful), they do not provide a basis for denying the IRS motion for summary judgment.
26 U.S.C. § 6103.
See 26 U.S.C. § 7431; and Schwarz v. U.S., 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000).
See Coplin and Associates, Inc. v. U.S., 814 F. Supp. 643 (W.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd 27 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 1994); and Bleavins v. U.S., 807 F. Supp. 487 (C.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd 998 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1993).
Mr. Cade next argues that the IRS' claims are time-barred. The IRS is required to either levy or initiate a proceeding in court to collect the tax owed within ten years of assessment. Levies upon intangible property occur by proper service of notice. Proper notice concerning the 1990, 1991, and 1992 tax liabilities were first delivered to the attorney for Zions in April 1996 and sent directly to Zions in July 1996. These dates are well within the ten-year collection period. The levy on Zions constituted a collection action and did not expire. The levy remains effective even if the property it was levied upon was not surrendered within the ten year period.
See U.S. v. Donahue Industries, Inc., 905 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1990).
See 26 U.S.C. § 6502.
See U.S. v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, (6th Cir. 1979), cent denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); U.S. v. Donahue Industries, Inc., 905 F.2d at 1330; 26 C.F.R. § 301.6343-1(b)(1).
Furthermore, the ten-year collection statute is suspended for the period in which the assets of the taxpayer are in the custody or control of a court, and for six months thereafter. Since September 17, 2001, the funds in this matter have been in the custody of a court. Even if the collection statute was still running, it was stayed by operation of law upon the deposit of the funds into the registry of the Third District Court. For the above reasons, the court grants the motion by the United States of America for summary judgment (#65-1).
KLM and Jones Waldo
Mr. Cade raises issues regarding the summary judgment for KLM and Jones Waldo. All of Mr. Cade's arguments were addressed in this COUrt'S prior order issued November 13, 2002, and Mr. Cade give no good reason for revisiting them at this late date.
Disbursement
After the January hearing, the court requested the parties brief the reasonableness of attorney's fees sought and the priority of claims to the fund. In light of the extensive briefing on this subject of attorney's fees, and the lack of any real substantive response from Mr. Cade, the court finds that a hearing on the issue of attorney's fees would not materially aid this court in its decision. The relevant facts are all essentially undisputed.
The court notes that the $1.75 million fund would not exist without the damages suffered by Mr. Cade initially. However, Mr. Cade does not deny he repeatedly signed contracts and documents encumbering this fund during his ten year journey towards the resolution of this case. Furthermore, he accrued a substantial tax liability during this same time frame. At some point, Mr. Cade must accept responsibility for his choices to sign contracts and consent letters while failing to pay his taxes. This court sees no choice but to enforce his voluntary agreements.
Concerning the disbursements to CRS, Bartley and Green, and the Kinnamon Group, no argument has been presented that would prevent the agreed upon disbursement. The issue of the reasonableness of the CRS and Bartley and Green's fees had been resolved years before this matter reached this court. The Kinnamon Group merely seeks enforcement of a valid contract.
Regarding the IRS, its claims too were properly assessed, and they agreed to a large reduction Mr. Cade's outstanding debt.
The only remaining argument is the reasonableness of the fees awarded to Mr. Anthony Rampton and his various law firms. it is undisputed that Mr. Cade repeatedly signed agreements that included monthly billing and hourly charges. Mr. Cade presents no arguments in his affidavit suggesting improper billing or inappropriate rates. His counsel, Mr. Fisher, did file a brief arguing, among other things, that the $86,000 in trial preparation costs were excessive. However, in light of the undisputed facts concerning the ten witnesses presented, the four attorneys working on the case, the sophisticated expert witnesses involved the complexity of the underlying commercial litigation, and extensive documentation supporting the costs involved this figure is plainly reasonable. The rates charged by Mr. Rampton and his associates and paralegals are well within the local rates for attorneys and paralegals of their experience and reputation.
Mr. Cade also seems to contend that Mr. Rampton (or his associates or paralegals) was excessively billing him for as much as 15-20 hours a week. But, Mr. Rampton, in the course of his representation of Mr. Cade, handled a successful arbitration appeal, a successful resolution of issues with GE Capital, a resolution of the lawsuits from former attorneys, a successful complex commercial litigation jury trial, and settlement negotiations. These numerous legal actions over the years easily justify the time spent by Mr. Rampton and his assistants.
Mr. Fisher also raises other costs, such as business dinners and secretarial costs, that he argues are appear excessive or improperly billed. However, in light of the reductions taken by these parties in the final disbursement, these costs are minimal and easily disappear in the reduced final sum that KLM, Jones Waldo, and Tony Rampton accepted in this matter.
In sum, after trial, Mr. Cade agreed to a $1.75 million settlement of his case. But for Mr. Cade's tax liability, Mr. Cade would have pocketed at least $400,000, even after all of his debts had been paid in full. While at first blush it seems odd that he is not receiving a portion of the funds, his deliberate choice not to pay his taxes dictates the final outcome for him in this case.
Finality
The court issued its ruling regarding disbursement on March 24, 2003. The court understands that this disbursement completely resolves the parties claims against Mr. Cade for the relevant claims discussed here. If not, any interested parties must file briefs within 10 days of this order demonstrating good cause as to why the disbursement does not settle their claims against Mr. Cade discussed here.
DISBURSEMENT
If not completed prior to this date, the interpled funds on deposit as proceeds from the settlement of Cade v. Zions First National Bank are to be disbursed to the parties as provided in this order.
The parties shall be paid as follows:
1. To the United States of America: $575,000.00;
2. To Cohne, Rappaport Segal: $37,902.10;
3. To Sharon Green and Daniel L. Bartley, jointly: $236,599.22;
4. To Anthony L. Rampton: $71,329.54;
5. To Kruse, Landa, Maycock: $106,380.28;
6. To Jones, Waldo, Holbrook McDonough: $666,498.35;
7. To Kinnamon Group: $77,670;
8. For any excess or surplus funds the remaining balance to be paid pro rata to all of the above parties except the United States of America.
CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS Sharon Green, Daniel Bartley, and Cohne Rappaport and Segal's motion for summary judgment (#49-1). The court GRANTS the motion by the Kinnamon Group for summary judgment (#62-1). The court also GRANTS the motion by the United States of America for summary judgment (#65-1). The court terms the motion by David Cade to extend time as MOOT (#68-1). The court GRANTS the motion by Kruse Landa Maycock for joinder to the motion to strike portions of the David Cade affidavit (#91-1). The court DENIES the motion by Jones Waldo to strike portions of the affidavit of David Cade (#87-1). The court DENIES the motion by Kruse Landa Maycock to strike portions of the affidavit of David Cade (#91-2). The court GRANTS their motion for approval of the stipulated disbursement of funds (#91-3).
SO ORDERED.