Opinion
03-22-2024
Carol L. JONES, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Donald J. Jones, Deceased, Jones-Carroll, Inc., and Sealand Waste LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOWN OF CARROLL and Town Board of Town of Carroll, Defendants-Respondents.
BRAUTIGAM & BRAUTIGAM, LLP, FREDONIA (DARYL P. BRAUTIGAM OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS CAROL L. JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD J. JONES, DECEASED, AND JONES-CARROLL, INC. KNAUF SHAW LLP, ROCHESTER (ALAN J. KNAUF OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SEALAND WASTE LLC. HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (JEFFREY C. STRAVINO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Grace Marie Hanlon, J.), entered December 9, 2022. The order dismissed three causes of action upon a nonjury verdict.
BRAUTIGAM & BRAUTIGAM, LLP, FREDONIA (DARYL P. BRAUTIGAM OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS CAROL L. JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DONALD J. JONES, DECEASED, AND JONES-CARROLL, INC.
KNAUF SHAW LLP, ROCHESTER (ALAN J. KNAUF OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT SEALAND WASTE LLC.
HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (JEFFREY C. STRAVINO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., BANNISTER, MONTOUR, OGDEN, AND DELCONTE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the ordering paragraphs dismissing the causes of action and granting judgment in favor of defendants as follows:
"It is ADJUDGED and DECLARED that Local Law No. 1 of 2007 of the Town of Carroll is valid"
and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in our decisions on the prior appeals (Jones v. Town of Carroll, 32 A.D.3d 1216, 821 N.Y.S.2d 708 [4th Dept. 2006], lv dismissed 12 N.Y.3d 880, 883 N.Y.S.2d 174, 910 N.E.2d 1004 [2009]; Jones v. Town of Carroll [appeal No. 1], 57 A.D.3d 1376, 873 N.Y.S.2d 391 [4th Dept. 2008], revd 15 N.Y.3d 139, 905 N.Y.S.2d 551, 931 N.E.2d 535 [2010], rearg denied 15 N.Y.3d 820, 908 N.Y.S.2d 153, 934 N.E.2d 886 [2010] [Jones I]; Jones v. Town of Carroll [appeal No. 2], 57 A.D.3d 1379, 873 N.Y.S.2d 395 [4th Dept. 2008] [Jones II]; Jones v. Town, of Carroll, 122 A.D.3d 1234, 996 N.Y.S.2d 804 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 910, 2015 WL 3618846 [2015] [Jones III]; Jones v. Town of Carroll, 158 A.D.3d 1325, 72 N.Y.S.3d 657 [4th Dept. 2018], lv dismissed 31 N.Y.3d 1064, 77 N.Y.S.3d 332, 101 N.E.3d 974 [2018] [Jones IV]; Jones v. Town of Carroll, 177 A.D.3d 1297, 110 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2019] [Jones V]; Jones v. Town of Carroll, 197 A.D.3d 1003, 150 N.Y.S.3d 673 [4th Dept. 2021] [Jones VI]).
As relevant to the present appeal, plaintiff Carol L. Jones and her husband, Donald J. Jones (decedent), owned property on a portion of which plaintiff Jones-Carroll, Inc. operated a construction and demoli- tion landfill under permits obtained from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) (see Jones III, 122 A.D.3d at 1235, 996 N.Y.S.2d 804). Plaintiff Sealand Waste LLC (Sealand) is a potential buyer of the property and had previously entered into an agreement with Jones, decedent, and Jones-Carroll, Inc. providing, among other things, that Sealand would test the suitability of the property for expansion of the landfill onto the entire parcel and then enter into contract negotiations to purchase the property. Sealand thereafter applied for a DEC permit for the proposed expansion and was denied a requested federal permit as a result of Local Law No. 1 of 2007 (2007 Law). The 2007 Law had been enacted by defendants and banned the operation of any solid waste management facility in defendant Town of Carroll (Town), but exempted, inter alia, such a facility then in operation pursuant to a permit issued by the DEC under the current terms and conditions of the existing operating permit (see Jones III, 122 A.D.3d at 1235-1236, 996 N.Y.S.2d 804). Jones, decedent, and Jones-Carroll, Inc. commenced this action seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the 2007 Law is invalid on the bases that it violates substantive due process and is arbitrary and capricious. Sealand was granted status as an intervenor (see Jones IV, 158 A.D.3d at 1328, 72 N.Y.S.3d 657). In 2022, the case proceeded to a bench trial on the causes of action asserting that the 2007 Law violates substantive due process and is arbitrary and capricious. At the close of trial, Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs had failed to prove their causes of action and dismissed them with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.
[1–4] Where, as here, the appeal follows a nonjury trial, "the Appellate Division has ‘authority … as broad as that of the trial court … and … may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts’ " (Sweetman v. Suhr, 159 A.D.3d 1614, 1615, 72 N.Y.S.3d 756 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 913, 2018 WL 3152819 [2018], quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809 [1983]; see Buchmann v. State of New York, 214 A.D.3d 1412, 1413, 183 N.Y.S.3d 899 [4th Dept. 2023]). "Nonetheless, the decision of the fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon appeal unless it is obvious that the court’s conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence" (Unger v. Ganci [appeal No. 2], 200 A.D.3d 1604, 1605, 161 N.Y.S.3d 546 [4th Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thoreson v. Penthouse Intl., 80 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 591 N.Y.S.2d 978, 606 N.E.2d 1369 [1992], rearg denied, 81 N.Y.2d 835, 595 N.Y.S.2d 397, 611 N.E.2d 298 [1993]; Davis v. Hinds, 215 A.D.3d 1242, 1243, 187 N.Y.S.3d 865 [4th Dept. 2023]). Moreover, when conducting such a review, we must view the record "in the light most favorable to sustain the judgment" (Farace v. State of New York, 266 A.D.2d 870, 871, 698 N.Y.S.2d 376 [4th Dept. 1999]; see A&M Global Mgt. Corp. v. Northtown Urology Assoc., P.C., 115 A.D.3d 1283, 1286, 983 N.Y.S.2d 368 [4th Dept. 2014]). Upon conducting that review, we conclude that there is a fair interpretation of the evidence supporting the court’s well-reasoned determinations. We have considered plaintiffs’ specific contentions, and we conclude that they do not require a different result.
[5] Although we do not disturb the court’s determination of the merits, we note that the court erred in dismissing the causes of action seeking declaratory judgment and should instead have made a declaration of the parties’ rights (see Pless v. Town of Royalton, 185 A.D.2d 659, 660, 585 N.Y.S.2d 650 [4th Dept. 1992], affd 81 N.Y.2d 1047, 601 N.Y.S.2d 455, 619 N.E.2d 392 [1993]; Hirsch v. Lindor Realty Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 878, 881, 483 N.Y.S.2d 196, 472 N.E.2d 1024 [1984]; Schlossin v. Town of Manilla, 48 A.D.3d 1118, 1119, 852 N.Y.S.2d 515 [4th Dept. 2008]). We therefore modify the order accordingly.