Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-cv-3396-TLW-TER
03-30-2022
VICTORIA LUNN JONES, Plaintiff, v. SYKES ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. She alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12). Because she is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendant's motion could result in dismissal of her Complaint. Plaintiff filed two Responses (ECF Nos. 13, 17). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
Defendant objects to the second Response (ECF No. 17) as untimely. However, it was filed within the deadline provided in the Roseboro Order (ECF No. 14).
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, which is a call center that provides customer service for Bank of America. Compl. ¶ 2 (ECF No. 1). On April 20, 2021, Plaintiff's employment was terminated by Human Resource Manager Latoya Walker-Cole. Compl. ¶ 8. Walker-Cole told Plaintiff that her employment was terminated because Plaintiff did not complete and sign the 2021 Data Protection Acknowledgment Form required by Bank of America. Compl. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff believes her termination was in retaliation for a previous race and gender discrimination lawsuit she filed against a former employer, the Florence County Tax Assessor's Office, “years before.” Compl. ¶¶ 10, 25. Plaintiff avers that the case went to the United States Supreme Court, which refused to hear the case and, thus, Plaintiff began to seek help regarding the matter from different government agencies as well as President Trump and Senator Graham. Compl. ¶¶ 10-14. Plaintiff believes that on or around February 15, 2019, Defendant and Bank of America were notified by the United States Department of Justice, at the direction of Senator Graham, of Plaintiff's previous lawsuit and, thus, “the leadership” began to view Plaintiff as a troublemaker and did not want her associated with their companies. Compl. ¶ 17. “Managers and co-workers did everything they could” to get Plaintiff fired.” Compl. ¶ 17. Management began to try and force Plaintiff to sign different forms, which she believes would have taken away her legal rights to talk about retaliation against her. Compl. ¶ 18. “These people” also took a hit out on her life to keep her quiet. Compl. ¶ 19. As stated above, Plaintiff's employment was terminated on April 20, 2021. Compl. ¶ 8.
Plaintiff avers that she filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, though she did not attach a copy to her complaint. Compl. ¶ 29. She avers that Defendant did not respond to the charge, but the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue Letter on August 24, 2021, which she did attach to her complaint. Compl. ¶ 30. Plaintiff filed the present action on October 18, 2021. In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Charge of Discrimination, in which she asserts that she was terminated in retaliation for her previous lawsuit against a former employer. Charge of Discrimination (ECF No. 17-1, p. 7).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because she did not attach her Charge of Discrimination to her Complaint, without which, neither Defendant nor the Court can determine the scope of this action. However, as stated above, Plaintiff provided the Charge of Discrimination in response to Defendant's Motion. Therein, it is clear that Plaintiff raised only retaliation to the EEOC and, thus, her action in this court is limited to a claim of retaliation. See King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir.1976) (stating that a subsequent civil suit “may encompass only the ‘discrimination stated in the [EEOC] charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge'”) (quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Gen. Elec., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir.1976)); see also Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir.2000) (“A plaintiff's EEOC charge defines the scope of her subsequent right to institute a civil suit.”).
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim of retaliation. Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Defendant argues that even assuming all the allegations in the complaint are true, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege a causal connection between Plaintiff's discrimination lawsuit against a previous employer “years before” and Plaintiff's termination by Defendant. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.1985); Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir.1998); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir.1998). However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained, “[i]n the context of a Title VII case, ‘an employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination' to survive a motion to dismiss, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.E.2d 1 (2002). Instead, a Title VII plaintiff is ‘required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by the that statute.' McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015).” Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (2020) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant and Bank of America became aware of the previous discrimination lawsuit on February 15, 2019, began trying to figure out ways to get her fired, and her employment was ultimately terminated on April 20, 2021. Though the causal connection between the two events as alleged is attenuated, the allegations at this stage of the litigation are sufficient to state a claim of retaliation. See, e.g. Lowman v. Maryland Aviation Admin., No. JKB-18-1146, 2019 WL 133267, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2019) (“But, at the prima facie stage-and, even more so, at the motion to dismiss stage-establishing causation ‘is not an onerous burden.' ”) (quoting Strothers v. Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 335 (4th Cir. 2018)); White v. Ocean Duchess Inc., No. 2:07CV300, 2007 WL 4874709, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 7, 2007), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wallace v. Ocean Duchess, Inc., No. 2:07CV300, 2008 WL 318299 (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2008) (holding that allegations of an adverse employment action following protected activity are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, dismissal is not appropriate.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for discrimination. However, the complaint does not specifically state a claim of discrimination and, as stated above, the Charge of Discrimination, which Defendant did not have at the time it filed the motion, does not include a claim of discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) be denied.