Opinion
02-23-00060-CR
02-01-2024
Daryl LaPaul Jones, Appellant v. The State of Texas
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1644625D.
Before Bassel, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Walker, Justice.
A jury convicted Appellant Daryl LaPaul Jones of the offense of "assault causing bodily injury to a family or household member or with whom the defendant had a dating relationship, after having been previously convicted of assault against a member of the defendant's family or household," see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(A), and assessed his punishment at fifty-five years' incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Jones now appeals, arguing in two points that the trial court erred by failing to make a competency determination (1) before commencing his trial and (2) not later than 20 days after the date he was returned from the state hospital. We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jones was also charged with "assault-causing bodily injury against a family or household member or with whom the defendant had a dating relationship by impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood, after having been previously convicted of assault of a family or household member." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b-3). The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on that count.
Some of the statutes cited in this opinion have been amended since the date of the charged offenses. The amendments to the statutes do not affect our analysis. We cite the current versions of the statutes for reference purposes only.
I. INTRODUCTION
The facts of the offense have no bearing on the issues Jones raises on appeal. The following timeline, however, is important to our analysis and resolution of his appellate issues.
• On June 2, 2020, a magistrate judge ordered that My Health My Resources of Tarrant County interview Jones and provide the magistrate with a written report of the interview "and the other information collected" regarding Jones. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 16.22; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 614.0032(c).
• On June 4, 2020, Andrea Little, a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, submitted a report stating that Jones was a person who had a mental illness and recommending that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation.
• On Jones's counsel's motion, the trial court ordered Dr. Barry Norman to examine Jones and report to the court on Jones's competency or incompetency. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005(a).
• Dr. Norman issued a competency evaluation of Jones dated November 13, 2020, stating that Jones was, at that time, incompetent to stand trial, and on December 7, 2020, the criminal court magistrate for Tarrant County found Jones incompetent to stand trial. See id. art. 46B.051 (b).
• After failing to be restored to competency in a jail-based competency restoration program, see id. art. 46B.091, Jones was committed to a state mental health facility, see id. art. 46B.073(b)(2).
• On November 16, 2021, the criminal court magistrate ordered Dr. Norman to again examine Jones to determine his "present competency to stand trial."
• On December 20, 2021, Dr. Norman filed a report (dated December 13, 2021) stating his opinion that Jones was competent to stand trial. Jones was found competent to stand trial, and the trial court set his bail at $15,000 and placed him on bond conditions.
• After Jones violated his bond, the trial court held his bond insufficient and signed a warrant for his arrest on February 2, 2022.
• On February 12, 2022, another magistrate judge signed an order finding that there was "reasonable cause to believe [Jones] has a mental illness or is a person with an intellectual disability" and making the same orders made in the June 2, 2020 magistrate order.
• On February 14, 2022, Little submitted a new report, including the same diagnosis, observations, findings, and recommendation that she had made in her June 2020 report.
• Jones's trial began on March 20, 2023. The trial court referred to Dr. Norman's report and made a finding, both orally and in writing, that Jones was "presently competent to stand trial." Jones's counsel also represented to the trial court that Jones was competent.
This was a different magistrate than the one who had ordered the collection of information from Jones back in June 2020.
It is unclear from the record which judge or magistrate made the finding that Jones was competent to stand trial, but the trial court judge signed the order setting his bond and placing him on bond conditions.
II. DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process. Ryan v. Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57, 65, 133 S.Ct. 696, 703 (2013); Owens v. State, 473 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). It is well-settled that this due process right to a fair trial prevents the government from subjecting to trial a person whose "mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense." See Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ((quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903 (1975))). A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a).
The general rule is that once a person is found to be incompetent, "he is presumed to be incompetent to stand trial until such time as it has been determined in accordance with the law that he is competent to stand trial." Schaffer v. State, 583 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Johnson v. State, Nos. 2-05-205-CR, 2-05-206-CR, 2006 WL 2578033, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 22, 2006, order) (not designated for publication), disp. on merits, 2006 WL 2310085, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 10, 2006, pet. refd) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, once a defendant who has been adjudged incompetent is returned to the court where his criminal case is pending, the trial court must make a determination with regard to the defendant's competency to stand trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.084(a-1)(1). "The court shall make the determination not later than the 20th day after the date on which the court received the applicable notice . . . or not later than the fifth day after the date of the defendant's return to court, whichever occurs first." Id.
A. Jones's First Point
In his first point, Jones contends that the trial court reversibly erred by commencing his trial while he was legally incompetent to stand trial. He relies on the finding of incompetency on December 7, 2020, and the attending presumption. He contends that "[n]o judgment of mental competency was signed by the trial court until March 20, 2023."
Here, the Record of Criminal Actions in the clerk's record contains a note that Jones was found competent to stand trial on December 20, 2021. Nothing in the record indicates that Jones was found incompetent after that date. "A judicial determination of competency prior to resuming criminal proceedings may be evidenced in a judgment, order, docket-sheet entry, or any other evidence that the court made a determination of competency after the defendant's return from a state hospital." Timmons v. State, 510 S.W.3d 713, 721 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, no pet.); see also Cooper v. State, 333 S.W.3d 859, 862 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref'd) ("The record must contain a judgment, order, docket entry, or other evidence that the trial court actually made a determination of competency."). Although the trial court did not contemporaneously memorialize its December 2021 competency determination in an order, Jones cites no authority stating that a defendant who is presumed to be incompetent to stand trial is found incompetent until the trial court signs a judgment of mental competency, and the authority we have found states otherwise.
Jones does not address this note in his brief.
Jones points us to the February 12, 2022 magistrate order and Little's February 14, 2022 report as indications that he was found incompetent in February 2022. But "a judicial determination that a person is mentally ill does not constitute a determination of a person's mental competency." Leyva v. State, 552 S.W.2d 158, 160- 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Even if the trial court had acted on Little's recommendation that Jones undergo a psychiatric evaluation, "[t]he fact that psychiatric examinations are ordered by a court does not constitute a determination that an issue as to the defendant's competency exists." Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195, 199-200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Even if we were to disregard this well-established case law and hold that the Record entry of December 20, 2021, did not evince a determination of competency, we cannot entertain Jones's contention that he "remained legally incompetent" until the point that the trial court signed the order finding him competent on March 20, 2023. When the trial court does not make a judicial determination of competency prior to trial, a retrospective determination is required. Timmons, 510 S.W.3d at 721. A retrospective determination of competency is allowed if there is sufficient evidence available to assure that a reliable determination of competency can be made. See Ex Parte Wilkinson, No. 2-06-298-CR, 2008 WL 2078508, at *5 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 15, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
The trial court stated on the record that its determination of Jones's competency to stand trial was "based solely on [Dr. Norman's] report and the evaluation." Both the trial court's judgment and the order it signed discharging the jury reflect that-before the jury was selected, impaneled, and sworn-it appeared to the trial court that Jones was mentally competent to stand trial. The trial court thus determined that Jones was mentally competent to stand trial at the time of his trial. See Cooper, 333 S.W.3d at 866 (concluding that trial court made determination of defendant's competency before accepting defendant's guilty pleas where punishment charge and judgments reflected finding by trial court that defendant was mentally competent to stand trial and record reflected that trial court had the opportunity to consider defendant's competence before trial, that it thoroughly admonished defendant before trial, and that it had the opportunity to evaluate defendant's mental competence both before and during trial). No error has been shown. We overrule Jones's first point.
B. Jones's Second Point
In his second point, Jones argues that the trial court erred by failing to make a competency determination not later than 20 days after the date he was returned from the state hospital. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.084(a-1)(1). Jones contends that "this case should be abated to the trial court for a hearing on the issue of whether [Jones] was competent to stand trial at the time the trial court should have determined [Jones]'s competency under art. 46B.084(a-1)(1)."
The State responds that Jones's complaint is not preserved for our review. To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Jones contends that "a complaint that the trial court neglected to make this determination cannot be forfeited by the defendant's failure to raise it in the trial court" because "the trial court has a statutory duty to determine a criminal defendant's competency before resuming criminal proceedings against him." Assuming without deciding that Jones is correct, we still cannot sustain this point.
We have ruled that the trial court made a judicial determination of Jones's competency on December 20, 2021-which was within the 20-day window prescribed by statute-and again on March 20, 2023, the first day of his trial. Jones has thus already received the relief that he is requesting. A new retrospective finding by the court at this point provides him no more relief than he has already received. See Labar v. State, No. 02-20-00050-CR, 2022 WL 3913553, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
As Jones points out in his brief, the record in this case does not reflect the exact date of his "return to the court," see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.084(a-1)(1), but Dr. Norman's report indicates that Jones had been "returned" to the Tarrant County Corrections Center by December 8, 2021, when Dr. Norman examined him. Jones contends that "the trial court had twenty days from that date to enter a finding that [Jones] was competent based on [Dr. Norman's report] or any information received from the state hospital."
We reject Jones's argument that the failure to make a finding of competency within twenty days of receiving notification of his competency "makes the trial court's competency finding of March 20, 2023, void." Jones cites Schaffer and Johnson as authority supporting this contention, but neither case says any such thing. See Schaffer, 583 S.W.2d at 630; Johnson, 2006 WL 2578033, at *18.
Accordingly, we overrule Jones's second point.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of Jones's points, we affirm the trial court's judgment.