Opinion
05-22-00570-CR 05-22-00571-CR05-22-00572-CR
06-13-2023
ZIYON YAHHMENYISRAYL JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F18-15327, F19-00227, & F18-15326
Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARICELA BREEDLOVE JUSTICE
Ziyon Yahhmenyisrayl Jones appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery. In one issue, appellant asserts he is entitled to have his back-time credit corrected. The State concedes that appellant may be entitled to additional back-time credit, and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the portions of the judgments showing 691 days "Total Jail Time Credit" and remand to the trial court for further determination of this issue. We also modify the judgments to reflect that there were no plea agreements on punishment in this case.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 22, 2018, when appellant was sixteen, he was arrested for five counts of aggravated robbery. He was detained in a juvenile detention facility until the juvenile judge filed a waiver of jurisdiction and order of transfer under Texas Family Code 54.02 on January 31, 2019, when he was transferred to the Dallas County jail where he remained until judgment was entered in his three pending cases on March 16, 2020.
Appellant appealed the three cases, and his convictions were reversed and remanded to the criminal district court for a new punishment hearing because appellant had been denied the opportunity to testify on his own behalf at punishment. The trial court held a new punishment hearing on May 31, 2022, at which appellant testified on his own behalf. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.
Appellant now appeals the trial court's sentence. In one issue, appellant complains that his back-time credit was incorrectly calculated in the judgment. Specifically, he argues that in each case, he was entitled to 1409 days of back-time credit and was only granted 691 days in violation of his Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and asks this Court to reverse and render judgment including the correct back-time credit amount. In response, the State agrees that it appears appellant may not have been credited for the time spent in juvenile detention but argues that the record does not contain the necessary information for this Court to render judgment and instead asks this Court to remand to the trial court for further proceedings. In a single cross-point, the State also requests that our order instruct the trial court to correct an error in the judgment which states that there was a plea bargain in the cases when there was not.
II. DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, appellant asserts he is entitled to correction of his back-time credit because the trial court erroneously failed to include the time appellant spent in juvenile detention prior to being transferred to Dallas County jail. The State agrees that appellant is possibly entitled to additional credit but argues that the record is insufficient for this Court to make that determination.
A defendant is given credit on his sentence for the time that he has spent in jail for the case from the time of his arrest and confinement until his sentence by the trial court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03 § 2(a)(1). This includes time the defendant has spent in juvenile detention prior to his sentencing as an adult. See Ex. Parte Gomez, 15 S.W.3d 103, 103-04 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The May 31, 2022 judgment includes back-time credit for the time appellant spent in Dallas County jail but appears to omit back-time credit for the time appellant spent in juvenile detention. We agree with appellant that he is likely entitled to additional back-time credit for his time spent in juvenile detention. See id. Although an appellate court may reform a judgment to "speak the truth" when it has the necessary information, see Tex. R. App. P. 43.2; Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd), the record contains insufficient information regarding the start date and full duration of appellant's juvenile detention. Thus, it is unclear from this record how many additional days appellant was incarcerated.
Accordingly, we conclude the record is insufficient for this Court to reform the judgment. See Lewis v. State, No. 05-19-01026-CR, 2020 WL 7351127, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 15, 2020, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (requiring remand when record is insufficient for appellate court to calculate appropriate amount of additional back-time credit). We therefore reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount of back-time credit required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.03, section 2(a)(1) and for reformation of the judgment in accordance with that determination. See id. (citing Largher v. State, No. 05-14-00440-CR, 2015 WL 6781933, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 6, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The State additionally notes that on remand, the trial court should be instructed to correct an error in the judgment. The judgment indicates there was a plea bargain of 25 years' confinement, but the record shows there were no plea agreements on punishment in these cases. Therefore, we reform the portion of the judgment to reflect that there were no plea agreements on punishment in these cases. See Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 529.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the portions of the judgments showing 691 days "Total Jail Time Credit" and remand to the trial court for further determination of this issue. We modify the portions of the judgments to reflect that there were no plea agreements on punishments.
JUDGMENT
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED as to the portion of the judgment showing 691 days "Total Jail Time Credit" and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is MODIFIED to reflect that there was no plea agreement on punishment. In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.