Opinion
No. 3-477 / 02-0854
Filed October 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink, Judge.
Randy Dean Jones appeals from the denial of his postconviction relief application. AFFIRMED.
J. Michael Mayer, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and George Karnas, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Hecht, JJ.
Randy Dean Jones appeals from the denial of his postconviction relief application. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
A jury convicted Jones of first-degree murder in 1996, and the court sentenced him to life in prison. In an unpublished decision, our court affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Jones, No. 96-0758 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We laid out the following facts in that opinion:
Jones, on his way home from a night of drinking at local bars, encountered Christopher Little. After Jones and Little violently argued in Jones' yard, Jones fired a shot from a handgun in order to scare him off his property. Little left Jones' yard, but Jones pursued him for at least a block before he discharged the handgun into Little's right temple from close range. The next morning, neighbors spotted Little's body in a vacant lot and called police.
Jones claimed he killed Little in self defense after Little threatened to return to his home and kill him. Testimony revealed Little was unarmed. Initially, Jones told police he knew nothing about Little's death. At trial, however, Jones admitted shooting Little after Little lunged at him. Additionally, two witnesses actually observed the murder. One witness testified to seeing Jones put the gun to Little's head and pull the trigger. Another witness observed Jones raise the pistol and fire at Little. Jones later told a witness he had killed Little. Moreover, two of Jones' cellmates testified he boasted to them about killing Little by putting the gun to the back of Little's head before firing.
Jones subsequently filed a postconviction relief application in which, among other things, he contended trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce additional evidence regarding his physical limitations in order to defend against the State's theory he had run Mr. Little down and killed him. Second, he argued that newly discovered evidence of juror misconduct justified a new trial. In particular, he presented evidence that a juror, Deanna Woodson, failed to inform the court of her familiarity with the Jones family and with her predisposition against him.
Following a hearing, the district court dismissed the postconviction relief application. Regarding the claim counsel should have offered additional evidence about Jones' physical limitations, the court noted Jones testified extensively about his injuries at the criminal trial and that, in their postconviction relief testimony, both Jones' sister and a good friend of his testified as to his lack of mobility. The postconviction court thus found evidence of Jones' physical infirmity was adequately demonstrated, and concluded "no prejudice resulted just because cumulative evidence of those injuries was not introduced." The court also rejected the juror misconduct claim, specifically finding Jones' witnesses were not credible. Because it found they were "patently unbelievable," the court determined Jones' claim that Ms. Woodson was prejudiced against him was without merit. Jones appeals from this ruling.
Scope and Standards of Review.
Postconviction proceedings are law actions ordinarily reviewed for errors of law. Carter v. State, 537 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Iowa 1995). However, when there is an alleged denial of constitutional rights, our review is de novo. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998).
To prevail in his claim that he has been denied effective assistance of counsel, a postconviction applicant must show that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the failure prejudiced the applicant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). The applicant must prove both elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. However, both elements do not always need to be addressed. If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently. Id.
Expert Testimony on Jones' Physical Limitations.
As noted, the postconviction court held Jones suffered no prejudice by trial counsel's failure to introduce additional evidence illustrating his prior injuries and physical limitations. Now on appeal, he contends postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to produce expert testimony to prove his injuries prevented him from "running" after the victim and shooting him. He believes a more objective analysis by a medically trained expert would have had a more compelling effect on the court and "could reasonably be expected to have changed his mind."
We first note that in this appeal, Jones makes no express assertion that such an expert opinion was available and could have been produced. Jones' only request in this appeal is that the case be remanded for "limited presentation of such additional information from a medical expert." Absent a more specific description of the available proof, we question whether Jones can establish prejudice. See Cox v. State, 554 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Moreover, on our review of the postconviction record, we believe postconviction counsel adequately presented Jones' case that his physical limitations prevented him from chasing or running down the victim and shooting him, as was advanced by the State in the criminal trial. Jones himself testified about his 1981 motorcycle accident that caused significant debilitating injuries and required several surgeries and years of recuperation. He claimed he could neither run nor jog, and could only walk for short periods of time. Jones' postconviction trial counsel also introduced into evidence Jones' medical records from University of Iowa Health Care describing the nature of the injury and treatment provided for it. Further, Jones' sister testified as to his severe leg injuries and surmised his physical condition would have prevented him from killing the victim in the manner alleged by the State.
Substantial evidence regarding Jones' physical abilities was certainly presented, and we conclude further evidence, whether lay or expert, would have been cumulative and would not have produced a different outcome. Our confidence in the outcome of the trial is not undermined by the lack of expert testimony as to the extent of Jones' physical impairment. Accordingly, we conclude Jones is unable to establish that, but for counsel's omission, a reasonable likelihood exists that the outcome of the postconviction trial would have been different. See Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1999).
Newly Discovered Evidence of Juror Misconduct.
At his postconviction relief trial, Jones presented testimony from Bonnie Harrold and Donald Johnson regarding alleged discussions they had with juror Deanna Woodson following Jones' trial. Harrold had been a juror on another trial being held at the same time as Jones' trial who testified she knew Woodson from her employment at a Des Moines Quik Trip. She testified that during breaks in the trial, Woodson discussed the progress of the Jones trial and stated her belief Jones did not come from a good family. Harrold opined Woodson's comments evidenced that she had prejudged Jones. In addition, David Johnson testified he also knew Woodson from her Quik Trip employment and that she told him about serving on the Jones jury and expressed her belief Jones was guilty.
Jones claimed this evidence of juror misconduct entitles him to a new trial. Our supreme court has articulated a three-part test to determine whether a jury verdict must be impeached because of juror misconduct:
First, the evidence from the jurors must consist only of objective facts as to what actually occurred in or out of the jury room bearing on misconduct. Second, the acts or statements complained of must exceed tolerable bounds of jury deliberation. Third, and finally, it must appear the misconduct was calculated to, and with reasonable probability did, influence the verdict.
State v. Wells, 437 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 1989); see also State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Iowa 1997).
The postconviction court rejected Jones' claim, specifically finding Harrold's and Johnson's testimony to be "convenient" and "incredible." It concluded:
In the present case the Court finds the witnesses making the allegations of juror misconduct to be patently unbelievable. Simply stated, the Court does not find that the convenience store incidents took place. Nor does the Court believe that the accused juror made the statements attributed to her at the courthouse.
We give weight to the findings made by a postconviction court regarding the credibility of witnesses. Wycoff v. State, 382 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1986). We believe substantial evidence in the record supports the court's findings regarding the credibility of Harrold and Johnson. For example, both Harrold and Johnson were acquaintances of Jones' family. Harrold grew up near the Jones family, went to high school with Jones' brothers, and worked in a bar frequented by Mr. Jones. Woodson refuted all of the charges made by Harrold and Johnson, denying any discussions concerning the Jones case with them. In addition, Harrold's testimony was at times vague, when for example he failed to remember the exact words spoken by Woodson. Finally, neither Harrold nor Johnson immediately informed any of the attorneys or other authorities about their conversations with Woodson at or near the time of they allegedly occurred.
We find no error in the district court's determination that Jones' witnesses on this issue were not credible. Thus we affirm the district court's determination that Jones did not meet his burden to establish the three factors laid out in Wells indicating a jury verdict must be impeached because of juror misconduct. The postconviction court therefore did not err in refusing to grant Jones' request for a new trial.