Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-1738-RMG-TER
12-19-2023
RONNIE JONES, Plaintiff, v. PEGASUS STEEL, LLC, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the South Carolina Human Affairs Law (SCHAL), SC Code Ann. § 1-13-10 et seq. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 8), and Defendant filed a Reply (ECF No. 9). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(g), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff, an African American, began working for Defendant on October 5, 2017, as a Welder/Fabricator. Compl. ¶ 10. He received good performance evaluations. Compl. ¶ 11. On February 24, 2021, Plaintiff's Supervisor, Mike Cavanaugh, and Defendant's Human Resources Director, Porsha Sisk, disciplined Plaintiff for performing a task incorrectly during an audit and suspended him for one week with out pay, and revoked his certification 90 days, which meant he would make $3.00 less per hour. To regain his $3.00 per hour Plaintiff would have to retake the certification class/test after 90 days. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. Caucasian coworkers, Brian Rogers and Greg Hamby, performed similar tasks incorrectly, but only received a reprimand and manager's warning with no suspension, reduction of pay. Compl. ¶ 13. Plaintiff pointed out the inequity in treatment. Compl. ¶ 14. He reported to Cavanaugh and Sisk that he did not agree with the discipline he received, but was told that he would be terminated if he did not execute the disciplinary forms. Compl. ¶ 15. “Plaintiff was retaliated against when Defendant reduced his pay, suspended Plaintiff for a week with no pay, and revoked his certification for 90 days, when other similarly situated Caucasian employees were only presented with a warning and were not suspended nor received a reduction in pay.” Compl. ¶ 16. Despite Plaintiff reporting the behavior, Defendant failed to take action to resolve the problem. Compl. ¶ 18.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's factual allegations are insufficient to give rise to claims for race discrimination or retaliation. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment on the basis of a protected trait like race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To establish a discriminatory discipline claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class under Title VII; (2) the prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class; and (3) he suffered more severe discipline for his misconduct as compared to those employees outside the protected class. Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993); Gairola v. Com. of Va. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting the standards applicable to suits under Title VII are also applicable to suits brought under Section 1981); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (evaluating Section 1981 racial discrimination claim and a Title VII racial discrimination claim under the same prima facie case framework). A Title VII plaintiff need not satisfy all of the prima facie elements set forth above to survive a motion to dismiss. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”). “Although a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case at this stage, reference to the elements of a claim is helpful to assess whether the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim.” Allgaier v. Microbiologics, Inc., No. 1:22-CV-01900-ELH, 2023 WL 2837336, at *7-8 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 2023) (citing Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761,765 (4th Cir. 2003); Young v. Giant Food Stores, LLC, 108 F.Supp.3d 301,314 (2015); Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F.Supp.3d 1290, 1300-01 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“When a plaintiff does not plead a prima facie case, courts still look to the elements of the prima facie case ‘to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'”)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's disparate discipline claim fails because he lacks sufficient factual allegations regarding comparators. Plaintiff alleges that he was disciplined for completing a task incorrectly and was suspended for one week, lost his certification for 90 days and, as a result, his pay was reduced by $3.00 per hour. He further alleges that his “similarly situated Caucasian coworkers” Hamby and Rogers also performed tasks incorrectly but they only received a reprimand and a manager's warning. Compl. ¶ 14. Factors rendering comparators similar include whether they “dealt with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and ... engaged in the same conduct ....” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Haywood v. Locke, 387 Fed.Appx. 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010)) (alterations in original).Plaintiff does not allege that Hamby and Rogers held the same position as him, had the same supervisor, or performed the same tasks incorrectly. Referring to Hamby and Rogers as “similarly situated” is a legal conclusion not supported by factual allegations. At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not prove the validity of his comparators, however, he must still allege facts that “ ‘satisfy the elements of a cause of action created by the [relevant] statute' in compliance with Iqbal.” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original). Plaintiff's factual allegations are insufficient to lead to a reasonable inference that similarly situated employees outside his protected class received more favorable treatment. Therefore, dismissal of his discrimination cause of action is appropriate. See, e.g., Aljizzani v. Middle E. Broad. Networks, Inc., No. 122CV01321RDAWEF, 2023 WL 5017969, at *4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss where the allegation that the employer failed to reprimand employees outside the protected class for violating “MBN's Journalistic Code of Ethics requires this Court to speculate that the investigative reporters engaged in the same conduct as Plaintiff'); Howard v. Blue Ridge Health Dist., No. 3:22-CV-00003, 2023 WL 2541132, at *7 (W.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2023) (“The lack of supporting factual allegations in her complaint renders it impossible to accept Plaintiff's legal argument that she and this unnamed coworker were indeed similarly situated.”); Lee v. Stegall, Inc., No. 7:21-cv-528, 2022 WL 3971042, at *6 (W.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2022) (dismissing Title VII discrimination claim where plaintiff “failed to identify a sufficiently similar comparator to give rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of race”).
Defendant also moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's retaliation cause of action. A prima facie case of retaliation requires that: (1) Plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer took an adverse action against him; and (3) a causal relationship existed between Plaintiff's protected activity and his employer's adverse action. See Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff alleges that he reported to Cavanaugh and Sisk that he did not agree with the suspension, loss of certification, and reduction in pay but was told if he did not sign the disciplinary forms he would be terminated. Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff then alleges Defendant retaliated against him by reducing his pay, suspending him, and revoking his certification when other, similarly situated Caucasian employees were only presented with a warning and were not suspended nor received a reduction in pay. Compl. ¶ 16. To adequately allege a causal connection, Plaintiff must plausibly plead that his protected activity was the “but-for” cause of the materially adverse employment action. Univ. Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The only complaint that Plaintiff specifically alleges is his report to Cavanaugh and Sisk that he “did not agree” with the suspension, loss of certification, and the loss of $3.00 per hour for 90 days. He then alleges that Defendant retaliated against him by reducing his pay, suspending him, and revoking his certification, the same discipline about which he initially complained. Because the discipline occurred before Plaintiff's complaint, it cannot be the but-for cause of the discipline. See Carr v. United States, No. 5:21-CV-245-D, 2023 WL 3635625, at *7 (E.D. N.C. May 24, 2023) (“Because General Gabbert decided to reassign Carr before Carr engaged in her protected activity on April 1, 2016, it is impossible that Carr's protected activity was the but-for cause of her reassignment.”) (citing Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc., 824 F.3d 103, 108 (4th Cir. 2016)). Therefore, his retaliation claim fails as well.
The court notes that Plaintiff does not allege that he told Cavanaugh or Sisk that he was being subjected to this discipline because of his race. See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Employees engage in protected oppositional activity when, inter alia, they complain to their superiors about suspected violations of Title VII.”).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) be granted. However, Plaintiff may cure the deficiencies in his complaint by providing further factual information. The undersigned therefore recommends that Plaintiff be given the opportunity to amend his complaint. To the extent the District Judge agrees, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be ordered to file an amended complaint within ten days of the Court's final disposition of the present motion.