Opinion
CASE NO. 19-3175-SAC
11-19-2019
LORENZO M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW PARKS, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility ("EDCF"), the claims giving rise to his Complaint occurred during his incarceration at the Lansing Correctional Facility in Lansing, Kansas ("LCF").
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff alleges that he worked as a laundry porter at LCF and acquired a hernia. He went to the clinic in 2017 and was given a blood test and a physical by the PA. Plaintiff kept complaining about his groin pain and after a year and a half he was taken to Providence in Lansing and was scheduled for surgery on August 18, 2018. LCF refused the doctor's orders and transferred Plaintiff to EDCF. Plaintiff complained to the nurse at sick call at EDCF and she sent him to the clinic where Nurse Ladwig and Nurse Son sent him to get a CAT scan. The scan showed that his internal organs were entangled in his hernia. Plaintiff now has to take medication to have a bowel movement and to help him urinate.
Plaintiff claims Defendant Parks violated Plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he denied the doctor's order to bring Plaintiff in for surgery on August 18, 2018. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Howlett's refusal to comply with his stair restriction constituted "depraved indifference gross medical negligence."
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Parks is the Unit Team Head at the LCF Clinic and makes the final decisions. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Howlett is the Unit Team Manager of C-1 Seg, and she instructed officers to place Plaintiff on the second tier despite his stair restriction. Plaintiff alleges that Howlett stated that she could not enforce the stair restriction because it was a security issue.
Plaintiff names as Defendants: Andrew Parks, Unit Team Head at LCF; (fnu) Howlett, Unit Team Manager at LCF; and Corizon. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained "that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). The Court finds that the proper processing of Plaintiff's claims cannot be achieved without additional information from appropriate officials of LCF. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court orders the appropriate officials of LCF to prepare and file a Martinez Report. Once the report has been received, the Court can properly screen Plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Plaintiff names Corizon as a defendant in the caption of his Complaint, but fails to mention Corizon in the body of his Complaint. In the Tenth Circuit, "to hold a corporation liable under § 1983 for employee misconduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of the same sort of custom or policy that permits imposition of liability against municipalities under Monell." Wishneski v. Andrade, 572 F. App'x 563, 567 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to mention Corizon in the body of his Complaint and has failed to allege the requisite causative custom or policy. This action is subject to dismissal as against Defendant Corizon. Plaintiff is directed to show good cause why his claims against Defendant Corizon should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3), arguing that he is indigent and unable to retain counsel to represent him. The Court has considered Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel. There is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1989); Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 616 (10th Cir. 1995). The decision whether to appoint counsel in a civil matter lies in the discretion of the district court. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991). "The burden is on the applicant to convince the court that there is sufficient merit to his claim to warrant the appointment of counsel." Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004)). It is not enough "that having counsel appointed would have assisted [the prisoner] in presenting his strongest possible case, [as] the same could be said in any case." Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Rucks v. Boergermann, 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir. 1995)).
In deciding whether to appoint counsel, courts must evaluate "the merits of a prisoner's claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, and the prisoner's ability to investigate the facts and present his claims." Hill, 393 F.3d at 1115 (citing Rucks, 57 F.3d at 979). The Court concludes in this case that (1) it is not clear at this juncture that Plaintiff has asserted a colorable claim against a named defendant; (2) the issues are not complex; and (3) Plaintiff appears capable of adequately presenting facts and arguments. The Court denies the motion without prejudice to refiling the motion if Plaintiff's Complaint survives screening.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until December 9, 2019, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Corizon should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
(1) The Clerk of Court shall serve Defendants Parks and Howlett under the e-service pilot program in effect with the Kansas Department of Corrections ("KDOC").
(2) Upon the electronic filing of the Waiver of Service Executed pursuant to the e-service program, KDOC shall have sixty (60) days to prepare the Martinez Report. Upon the filing of that report, the AG/Defendants shall have an additional sixty (60) days to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint.
(3) Officials responsible for the operation of LCF are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the Complaint:
a. To ascertain the facts and circumstances;
b. To consider whether any action can and should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the Complaint; and
c. To determine whether other like complaints, whether pending in this Court or elsewhere, are related to this Complaint and should be considered together.
(4) Upon completion of the review, a written report shall be compiled which shall be filed with the Court and served on Plaintiff. The KDOC must seek leave of the Court if it wishes to file certain exhibits or portions of the report under seal or without service on Plaintiff. Statements of all witnesses shall be in affidavit form. Copies of pertinent rules, regulations, official documents, and, wherever appropriate, the reports of medical or psychiatric examinations shall be included in the written report. Any recordings related to Plaintiff's claims shall also be included.
(5) Authorization is granted to the officials of LCF to interview all witnesses having knowledge of the facts, including Plaintiff.
(6) No answer or motion addressed to the Complaint shall be filed until the Martinez Report required herein has been prepared.
(7) Discovery by Plaintiff shall not commence until Plaintiff has received and reviewed Defendant's answer or response to the Complaint and the report ordered herein. This action is exempted from the requirements imposed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) and 26(f).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter KDOC as an interested party on the docket for the limited purpose of preparing the Martinez Report ordered herein. Upon the filing of that report, KDOC may move for termination from this action.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff, to Defendants, and to the Attorney General for the State of Kansas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated November 19, 2019, in Topeka, Kansas.
s/ Sam A. Crow
SAM A. CROW
U. S. Senior District Judge