Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James A. Bascue, Judge, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC084043
Law Offices of Richard A. Herman, Richard A. Herman; Law Office of David Alan Cooper and David Alan Cooper for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pollard Cranert Crawford & Stevens and Joyce L. Mavredakis for Defendant and Respondent.
MALLANO, Acting P. J.
Plaintiff joined a health club located in a hotel. She signed a membership agreement that released the hotel from claims for personal injuries while on its premises “whether using exercise equipment or not.” Subsequently, while walking on a sidewalk on hotel premises to gain access to the health club, plaintiff slipped and fell. She filed this action against the hotel, seeking damages for personal injuries.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the hotel based on the release. Because the language of the release is clear, unambiguous, and explicit, and because the hotel’s alleged liability is reasonably related to the purpose of the release, we affirm.
I
BACKGROUND
We accept as true the following facts and reasonable inferences supported by the parties’ undisputed evidence on the motion for summary judgment. (See Raghavan v. Boeing Co. ( 2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1125.)
On September 21, 2001, plaintiff Georja Jones became a member of the Pritikin Longevity Center and Spa (Spa), a health club located in the Loews Santa Monica Hotel. The hotel is owned by defendant Loews Santa Monica Hotel, Inc. (Hotel), erroneously sued as Loews Santa Monica Beach Hotel.
Jones signed a membership agreement that consisted of several numbered paragraphs. In an introductory paragraph, the Spa offered “the use of its services and facilities in conformance with the terms and conditions set forth below.” Paragraph 5 stated that Jones’s membership gave her “access to facilities and services during the designated hours of operation.”
Paragraph 7 was entitled “Waiver of Liability.” It initially recited that Jones “acknowledges and understands that [she] is using the facilities and services of the HOTEL and SPA at [her] own risk.” The paragraph continued: “The SPA and HOTEL . . . shall not be liable — and the MEMBER hereby expressly waives any claim of liability — for personal/bodily injury or damages — which occur to any MEMBER, or any guest of any MEMBER, or for any loss of or injury to person or property. This waiver includes, but is not limited to any loss, damage or destruction of the personal property of the MEMBER or the MEMBERS’ guest(s) and is intended to be a complete release of any responsibility for personal injuries and/or property loss/damage sustained by any MEMBER or any guest of any MEMBER while on the HOTEL and/or SPA premises, whether using exercise equipment or not.” (Underscoring in original.)
On October 14, 2003, Jones was walking on an outdoor sidewalk on Hotel property, approximately 50 to 75 feet from the entrance to the Spa, when she tripped on a hose and fell, sustaining injuries. On January 10, 2005, she filed this action against the Hotel, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability.
In August 2005, the Hotel filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release barred the action. Jones filed opposition. After hearing argument, the trial court granted the motion. Judgment was entered accordingly. Jones appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment must be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“‘“A defendant seeking summary judgment has met the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established [or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action]. . . . In reviewing the propriety of a summary judgment, the appellate court independently reviews the record that was before the trial court. . . . We must determine whether the facts as shown by the parties give rise to a triable issue of material fact. . . .” . . . We accept as undisputed facts only those portions of the moving party’s evidence that are not contradicted by the opposing party’s evidence.’” (Raghavan v. Boeing Co., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.)
In this appeal, our task is unusually straightforward because Division Five of our District previously construed the Hotel’s release in Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351 (Benedek). There, the plaintiff, Benedek, signed the identical release and filed suit against the Spa for injuries sustained while he tried to adjust the position of an overhead television set. The television started to slide off its rack, and Benedek attempted to hold it in place, resulting in injury to his knee. At the time of the injury, Benedek had not begun to exercise. In affirming summary judgment for the Spa, Division Five set forth the applicable law, as follows.
“A written release may exculpate a tortfeasor from future negligence or misconduct. . . . To be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.’ . . . The release need not achieve perfection. . . . Exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as against public policy. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“. . . If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any negligence of the defendant. ‘“It is only necessary that the act of negligence, which results in injury to the releasor, be reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release is given.”’ . . . The issue is not whether the particular risk of injury is inherent in the recreational activity to which the release applies, but rather the scope of the release. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356–1357, citations and fn. omitted.) “An act of negligence is reasonably related to the object or purpose for which the release was given if it is included within the express scope of the release.” (Id. at pp. 1357–1358.)
Applying these principles, the court explained: “The release Benedek signed was clear, unambiguous, and explicit. It released [the Spa] from liability for any personal injuries suffered while on [its] premises, ‘whether using exercise equipment or not.’ The purpose for which the release was given was to allow Benedek ‘access’ to [the Spa’s] ‘facilities and services.’ Benedek was injured while inside [the Spa’s] facilities.
“Benedek contends the release should be interpreted to apply only to injuries suffered while actively using [the Spa’s] exercise equipment. This, however, is not a ‘semantically reasonable’ interpretation of the release; indeed, it is contrary to the express language of the release. Given its unambiguous broad language, the release reached all personal injuries suffered by Benedek on [the Spa’s] premises, including the injury Benedek suffered because of the falling television.
“Benedek further contends the release cannot bar his action because, as a matter of law, a health club release is not effective to release claims for injuries arising out of circumstances unrelated to fitness. He argues that the negligence released must be ‘reasonably related to the purpose of the release,’ i.e., fitness. In other words, Benedek asserts that health clubs and their members are prohibited from reallocating by contract the risks of premises liability. This assertion is incorrect. ‘The general principle remains unaltered that “there is no public policy which ‘“opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other party . . . .”’ . . .”’ . . . A release of all premises liability in consideration for permission to enter recreational and social facilities for any purpose does not violate public policy.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359, italics added, citations and fn. omitted.)
In a concluding paragraph, the court stated: “The release signed by Benedek unambiguously, clearly, and explicitly released [the Spa] from liability for any injury Benedek suffered on hotel or spa premises, whether using exercise equipment or not. The purpose of the release included access to and entry on [the Spa’s] facilities; the injury suffered by Benedek was, therefore, reasonably related to the purpose of the release.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361, italics added.)
Jones’s attempt to limit Benedek to its facts is unconvincing. The release is no less unambiguous, clear, explicit, or reasonably related to its purpose in a lawsuit where a plaintiff was injured, as here, while walking on the Hotel’s premises to access and enter the Spa. As Jones correctly points out, she was not yet inside the Spa at the time of the accident. But that is precisely why the release expressly covers the Hotel’s premises — which includes the sidewalk — and makes no distinction between indoors and outdoors.
Nothing in Leon v. Family Fitness Center (#107), Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1227 (Leon) or Sweat v. Big Time Auto Racing, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1301 (Sweat) is to the contrary. In Leon, the release was inconspicuously buried in small print in the agreement, and it was also ambiguously worded. (See Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1359–1360, distinguishing Leon.) In Sweat, the use of the term “and/or” made the release ambiguous, and undisputed extrinsic evidence established that the plaintiff’s injury was not within the scope of the release. (See Sweat, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1305–1306.) None of those circumstances applies here.
In sum, under Benedek, the trial court properly granted the Hotel’s motion for summary judgment.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: VOGEL, J., JACKSON, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.