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considering a petitioner's access to a prison law library in denying a habeas petitioner's motion to appoint counsel
Summary of this case from Leisure v. CapozzaOpinion
Civil Action No. 99-834-GMS
December 15, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Ronnelle Jones ("Jones") is presently incarcerated in the Sussex County Correctional Institute ("SCCI"), located in Georgetown, Delaware. On April 17, 1996, Jones sold 4.17 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer at a residence in Coverdale Crossroads in Sussex County, Delaware. Jones was arrested and initially charged with trafficking in cocaine under Del. C. Ann. tit 16, § 4753A. He was subsequently reindicted on September 15, 1997 for one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of delivery of cocaine under Del. C. Ann. tit 16, § 4751. On February 11, 1998, Jones pled guilty to one count of delivery of cocaine and the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the trafficking charge. He was sentenced consistent with the plea agreement to a term of 30 years suspended after 15 years for probation.
Del. C. Ann. tit 16, § 4753A(a)(2) states: "Any person who, on any single occasion, knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 5 grams or more of cocaine or any mixture containing cocaine, as described in § 4716(b)(4) of this title, is guilty of a class B felony, which shall be known as 'trafficking in cocaine.'"
Del. C. Ann. tit 16, § 4751 states that "any person who manufactures, delivers or possesses with the intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a class C felony and shall be fined not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000."
Jones had a prior conviction for delivery of cocaine. Del. C. Ann. tit 16, § 4763(a)(3) states, in part, that "where a defendant has previously been convicted of any offense under this chapter, or any under statute of the United States or of any state relating to the delivery of a controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in Schedules I and II as a narcotic drug, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be 30 years and the maximum term for such conviction shall be 99 years and 15 years of such minimum term shall be a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and shall not be subject to suspension and no person shall be eligible for probation or parole during such portion of such minimum term."
On November 3, 1999 Jones, acting pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the court. He was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 6, 1999 (D.I. 1). Jones makes three arguments in support of his petition. First, he claims that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not conduct a pretrial investigation and subject the State's case to a meaningful adversarial testing. Second, Jones asserts that the plea colloquy was defective because he answered "yes" when asked if he had been promised anything outside the plea agreement. Finally, he claims that the guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered into because he was promised a five year sentence and the trafficking charges scared him into accepting the plea.
Before the court are three motions filed by Jones:
The petitioner also filed a motion seeking affirmative relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 27(a)(2) and (b) (D.I. 22). The rule Jones cites deals with depositions before action or pending appeal, and is not relevant to this case. Upon examination of the motion, it appears that Jones is re-asserting the grounds for his habeas petition and is requesting release pending review. Because the relief requested is similar in form and substance to the motion for release under Fed.R.App.P. 23(c), the court will treat it as such. The petitioner's motion for release pending review will be denied because the rule is not applicable to this case. See infra at note 7 and accompanying text.
1. Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (D.I. 10).
2. Motion for Default (D.I. 16).
3. Motion for Release Pending Review (D.I. 13).
For the reasons set forth below, the court will not appoint Jones counsel at this time. Petitioner's motions for default and for release pending review will also be denied.
I. MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Jones asserts that the issues of this case are complex and that he lacks both the skills and ability necessary to effectively prosecute his claims. He also contends that he needs the assistance of counsel because he is only allowed limited access to the prison law library. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.
As both the United States Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have stated, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991); see also Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263 (3d Cir. 1991); superseded on other grounds by statute 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); accord Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1133 (4th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the court may, in its discretion, appoint counsel to a habeas petitioner if it "determines that the interests of justice so require and [that the petitioner] is financially unable to obtain representation." See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g).
Pursuant to § 3006A(g), the court must first determine whether the petitioner has presented a non-frivolous claim. See Reese, 946 F.2d at 263-64; accord Abdullah v. Norris, 18 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1994). After finding the claim to be non-frivolous, the court examines whether the appointment of counsel will benefit both the petitioner and the court. See Reese, 946 F.2d at 264. In making this determination, the court must examine the factual and legal complexity of the case as well as the petitioner's ability to investigate the facts and present his claims. See id. (citing Battle v. Armontrout, 902 F.2d 701, 702 (8th Cir. 1990)); accord McCall v. Benson, 114 F.3d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1997). Where the issues are "straightforward and capable of resolution on the record," Ferguson v. Jones, 905 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1990), and when the petitioner has "a good understanding of the issues and the ability to present forcefully and coherently his contentions," La Mere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987), a district court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel. With these principles in mind, the court turns to Jones' motion.
On the face of the pleadings, it appears that Jones' claims have legal and factual merit. At a minimum, they seem to rise above the level of frivolity which would require the immediate dismissal of the case. See Roach v. Bennett, 392 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating the court should examine the face of the petition to determine if the contentions are frivolous); cf. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining a "frivolous" complaint in an action under § 1983 as one containing "inarguable legal conclusions" or "fanciful factual allegations"). The court therefore turns to an examination of the additional factors articulated in the Reese decision.
As an initial matter, since Jones is incarcerated and has restricted use of the law library, he has a limited ability to conduct a thorough investigation into the law of his case. It would appear from the allegations and the record before the court, however, that he does not need assistance gathering facts to support his claim. The court has recently received the state court record and believes that it provides a sufficient basis for resolving the issues raised in Jones' petition. See, e.g., Reese, 946 F.2d at 263 (citing Ferguson, 905 F.2d at 214); Hoggard, 29 F.3d at 471-72; Boyd v. Groose, 4 F.3d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, after reviewing the pleadings the court believes that Jones has a sufficient understanding of the issues raised by his petition and that he can present his case coherently. See Reese, 946 F.2d at 264 (citing La Mere, 827 F.2d at 626). The fact that he has relied on help from others to prepare his case thus far is not proof that the case is too complex nor that he is incapable of presenting his case effectively (D.I. 10). To date, he has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, replied to the State's allegations, has moved for release pending review, and has moved for default judgment. At the very least, these actions show that Jones is capable of prosecuting his case without the assistance of counsel.
Jones states that because he "has relied on others to help prepare his case," the court should appoint him counsel (D.I. 10).
For the aforementioned reasons, the court declines to appoint counsel at this stage in the litigation. Nonetheless, the court recognizes that, as this case progresses, the complexity of the factual issues or the need for additional legal briefing may require the appointment of counsel. See Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156 (recognizing that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d), the court may sua sponte appoint counsel at "any point in the litigation").
II. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGEMENT
The sole basis upon which Jones has moved for default is that the respondents did not file an answer by the original January 28, 2000 deadline but instead filed for two extensions. By his own admission, the respondents filed for both extensions prior to the respective deadline dates. The record supports this finding as well. The respondent's answers were filed on March 17, 2000, which was three days after the deadline of March 14, 2000. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay.
The first deadline was on January 27, 2000 and the respondent's motion for extension was granted on January 24, 2000. The second deadline was March 3, 2000 and the respondent's motion for extension was granted on February 28, 2000.
More important, granting the motion for default would result in Jones' release from custody; exactly the same result that his habeas petition seeks to achieve. Because of the significant public interest implicated in the erroneous release of a state prisoner, default judgments are disfavored in federal habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Lemons v. O'Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 364-65 (7th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the court will deny Jones' motion for a default judgment.
III. MOTION FOR RELEASE PENDING REVIEW
The petitioner's motion for release pending review under Fed.R.App.P. 23(c) will also be denied because the rule is inapplicable to this case. This rule governs procedures in appeals after habeas corpus has been granted. Since Jones' petition is not currently under appellate review, the court is not bound by the rule.
Fed.R.App.P. 23(c) states "While a decision ordering the release of a prisoner is under review, the prisoner must — unless the court or judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals, or the Supreme Court, or a judge or justice of either court orders otherwise — be released on personal recognizance, with or without surety."
Jones has requested that a time and date be set to hear his motion for release pending review (D.I. 14). Since the rule is not applicable to this case, the court will not schedule a hearing. The petitioner also proposed that he be released under this rule on an unsecured bond. Again, because the rule in question is not applicable to this case, the petitioner's request will be denied.
For the above reasons, IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Jones' motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED (D.I. 10).
2. Jones' motion for default is DENIED (D.I. 6).
3. Jones' motion for release pending review and his request for a hearing is DENIED (D.I. 13, 14).