Opinion
9655 305121/14
06-18-2019
Johanna Beltran JONES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ICAHN ASSOCIATES CORP., et al., Defendants, Inwood Opportunity LLC, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Pena & Kahn, PLLC, Bronx (Diane Welch Bando of counsel), for appellant. Gordon & Silber, PC, New York (Andrew B. Kaufman of counsel), for respondents.
Pena & Kahn, PLLC, Bronx (Diane Welch Bando of counsel), for appellant.
Gordon & Silber, PC, New York (Andrew B. Kaufman of counsel), for respondents.
Gische, J.P., Webber, Kahn, Kern, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Kenneth L. Thompson, Jr. J.), entered on or about May 18, 2018, which granted defendants Inwood Opportunity LLC and Icahn Charter School 3's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and any cross claims against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Defendants Inwood Opportunity LLC and Icahn Charter School 3 established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Weinberger v. 52 Duane Assoc., LLC , 102 A.D.3d 618, 619, 959 N.Y.S.2d 154 [1st Dept. 2013] ). Defendants submitted evidence sufficient to establish that a rainstorm had started prior to plaintiff's fall, and that the fall was the result of rainwater that had been tracked into the school building and onto the stairs by students descending the stairs toward a basement cafeteria within 10 minutes of the accident (see id. ; Richardson v. S.I.K. Assoc., L.P. , 102 A.D.3d 554, 958 N.Y.S.2d 144 [1st Dept. 2013] ; Hussein v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 266 A.D.2d 146, 699 N.Y.S.2d 27 [1st Dept. 1999] ; Abraham v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 29 A.D.3d 345, 347, 815 N.Y.S.2d 38 [1st Dept. 2006] ). Defendants also established that they did not create the hazard at issue, which had been present for approximately 10 minutes, and had no actual or constructive notice of it.
In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Defendants placed mats by the entryways, which were cleaned on a nightly basis, and an employee of defendants who informed people to be careful was stationed by the entryway. While defendants were aware that rainwater had been tracked into the building and onto the stairs in the past, a general awareness that the stairs could become wet during inclement weather is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants had constructive notice of the specific condition that caused the accident here (see Naulo v. New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 A.D.3d 651, 652, 896 N.Y.S.2d 155 [2d Dept. 2010] ; Abraham , 29 A.D.3d at 347, 815 N.Y.S.2d 38 ; Solazzo v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 21 A.D.3d 735, 736, 800 N.Y.S.2d 698 [1st Dept. 2005], affd 6 N.Y.3d 734, 810 N.Y.S.2d 121, 843 N.E.2d 748 [2005] ; Grib v. New York City Hous. Auth. , 132 A.D.3d 725, 18 N.Y.S.3d 109 [2d Dept. 2015] ). Defendants were not required to cover all of the school floors with mats nor were they required to continuously mop up all of the moisture resulting from the tracked-in rain ( Naulo at 651, 896 N.Y.S.2d 155 ; Hussein at 146–147, 699 N.Y.S.2d 27 ). Plaintiff's contention that she may have slipped on water that had been tracked up from the downstairs cafeteria is speculative and does not create an issue of fact warranting the denial of summary judgment (see generally Talamas v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. , 120 A.D.3d 1333, 1335, 993 N.Y.S.2d 102 [2d Dept. 2014] ). We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.