Opinion
1:23-CV-1396-DII-ML
03-26-2024
WILLIAM CURTIS JONES, Plaintiff, v. LON HEUER, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTIONS AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS
MARK LANE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The Magistrate Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
Before the court is Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 3). Because Plaintiff is requesting permission to proceed in forma pauperis, this court must review and make a recommendation on the merits of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Also before the court are Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Motion to Admit Opinion From State Court Deemed as Unconstitutional and Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (Dkt. 5) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint to Attach Filed Motion for Change of Venue from Jefferson County to Travis County Pursuant to Federal Evidence 404 (Dkt. 6).
I. REQUEST TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The court has reviewed Plaintiff's financial affidavit and determined Plaintiff is indigent and should be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, the court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's request for in forma pauperis status. The Clerk of the Court shall file the complaint without payment of fees or costs or giving security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This indigent status is granted subject to a later determination the action should be dismissed if the allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is found frivolous or malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff is further advised, although Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a court may, in its discretion, impose costs of court at the conclusion of this lawsuit, as in other cases. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994).
As stated below, this court has made a § 1915(e) review of the claims made in this complaint and is recommending Plaintiff's claims be dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Therefore, service upon Defendant should be withheld pending the District Court's review of the recommendations made in this Report. If the District Court declines to adopt the recommendations, then service should be issued at that time upon Defendant.
II. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court is required by statute to review the Complaint. Section 1915(e)(2) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, (1989); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
Pro se complaints are liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 20-21 (1972). That said, Pro se status does not offer a plaintiff an “impenetrable shield, for one acting Pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
III. Motions to Amend
Plaintiff William Curtis Jones, proceeding Pro se, moves to amend his Complaint. See Dkt. 5 at 1. Jones also moves to amend his Complaint to append a motion he filed in Texas state court to his Complaint. Dkt. 6 at 1.
Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend shall be “freely” given “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). The language of the “rule ‘evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.'” Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Granting leave to amend is not required if the plaintiff has already pleaded her “best case.” Brewster, 587 F.3d at 768 (citing Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)). A plaintiff has pleaded her best case after she is “apprised of the insufficiency” of her complaint. Wiggins v. La. State Univ.-Health Care Servs. Div., 710 Fed.Appx. 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he plaintiffs in this case have been apprised of the insufficiency of their conclusory allegations . . . and have been afforded an opportunity to plead facts that would overcome the bar of Imbler immunity. We can assume, therefore, that the specific allegations of the amended complaint constitute the plaintiffs' best case ....”)). A plaintiff may indicate she has not pleaded her best case by stating material facts that she would include in an amended complaint to overcome the deficiencies identified by the court. See Brewster, 587 F.3d at 767-68. However, a district court need not grant a futile motion to amend. Legate, 822 F.3d at 211 (citing Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872-73 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Futility is determined under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, meaning an amendment is considered futile if it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Id.
As leave is to be freely granted in cases such as this, the undersigned will grant the Motion (Dkt. 5) to the extent it is a motion to amend. For the same reason, the undersigned will grant the Motion (Dkt. 6) to amend that requests Jones be permitted to append a motion from a state court proceeding to his Complaint. Subsequent references to the “Complaint” incorporate the Complaint (Dkt. 1) as well as the Motion (Dkt. 5) and the appended state court motion (Dkt. 6).
IV. Review of the Merits of the Claim
The lawsuit arises out of what Jones contends was a wrongful conviction and the litigation that followed. Jones purports to sue attorneys at the Jefferson County, Texas District Attorney's Office, a Texas Department of Public Safety agent, and a witness from the trial at which Jones was convicted of a felony in 2018. Dkt. 1 at 1. The body of the Complaint includes these other Defendants, who do not appear in the caption: “State of Texas; . . . Waylon Thompson; Quentin Dean Price, Manhattan Beach Police Department; Manhattan Beach, California; Jefferson County District Attorney's Office; Texas Department of Public Safety-Beaumont, Texas and et al.” Id. at 173 (internal quotations and emphases omitted). Liberally construing the Complaint, the court also understands Jones to be suing a Texas state district judge; the court arrived at that conclusion because Jones is seeking an order that sets aside a state district court's judgment declaring him a vexatious litigant. Id. at 1.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the following summary of Jones's underlying criminal conviction. “Jones was a projects management and projects development director for Management Resources Group Inc. (“MRGI”), his own company. In early 2018, he was convicted of fraud, money laundering, misappropriation and misapplication of fiduciary funds, and theft. Incarceration followed from February 2018 until March 2021, lasting approximately three years and two months. Plaintiff Jones believes that his guilty conviction, and subsequent incarceration, resulted from the crimes committed by some of the Defendants, and that these same Defendants participated in concealing exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff further certifies, under penalty of perjury, that he ‘working pro se was finally able to overturn his conviction and secure his release from prison based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence.' He states, that on or about January 5, 2021, Judge Raquel West of the 252nd Judicial District Court of Jefferson County issued a designate order for Plaintiff's conviction and released Jones immediately.... Plaintiff's response to the questions posed by the court reveals that Plaintiff has not, in fact, been exonerated.... Indeed, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Texas on October 5, 2021, civil action no.1:21-cv-514, in which he admitted he was released on parole in March 2021 and asserted he was seeking relief from his final conviction.” Jones v. Jefferson Cty. Dist. Atty., No. 1:21-CV-212, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100192, at *2-3, *9 (E.D. Tex. 2022) adopted by No. 1:21-CV-212, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100110, at *3 (E.D. Tex. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
In fourteen causes of action, he alleges at least 30 violations of his constitutional rights, including violations of his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, id. at 68, 92, 95, 103, and he alleges his actual innocence. Id. at 68-69. He asserts eight claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. at 156-160, 162-164, and one under 42 U.S.C.§ 1985, id. at 161; he asserts state-law claims for malicious prosecution, id. at 166, civil conspiracy, id. at 168, intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. at 169, respondeat superior, id. at 170, and indemnification. Id. at 171.
From the over 600 pages of documents comprising the Complaint, attached exhibits, and Motion, the undersigned understands Jones's claims fall into two primary categories. First, Jones objects to state district Judge Mitch Templeton's judgment designating him a vexatious litigant, which he contends was politically motivated, to keep him “silent.” Id. at 8, 13; Dkt. 5 at 2. Jones also alleges Judge Templeton has a conflict of interest with Jones's cases. Dkt. 1 at 8. His chief issue is his “request to commence new litigation, namely, Request for Discovery by the Local Administrative Judge in the 279th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas and the Ninth District Court of Appeals.” Dkt. 5 at 5. He claims “is merely trying to understand precisely what statutory laws were violated by [him] ....” Id. at 6.
Second, Jones complains that his conviction was wrongful, asserting that there was “no credible witness or evidence” presented at his trial. Dkt. 1 at 9. He argues the jury found him guilty based on “False Testimony and False Evidence, some of which were fabricated knowingly by the Prosecution Team.” Id. (capitals in original).
Jones also alleges prosecutorial misconduct, claiming he was denied access to the state's discovery files. Id. at 15. He also alleges that “most of the State Witnesses that testified at Trial indirectly implied alleged crimes were committed by some of the above-named Defendant [sic], in such a manner of Organized Crimes and Conspiracy , with the Prosecutor of the Case ‘Kenneth Bruce Florece' orchestrating the State Witnesses, by leading questions or coaching State Witnesses and concealing material facts of the case ‘Fraud on the Court,' to obtain a false conviction against the Plaintiff ....” Id. (quotations in original).
Jones complains that the writs of habeas corpus he filed in state court were rejected for noncompliance with court procedures in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. And he questions the three indictments in which he was named. He contends “[t]he principle of presumption of innocence is undermined, and the clarification of the Plaintiff's roles and responsibilities as the ‘Defendant' and the ‘Complainant Owner' becomes ambiguous, leading to unjust bias against the Plaintiff.” Dkt. 5 at 10.
Essentially, Jones seeks from this court an opportunity to prove his innocence and that his constitutional and civil rights were violated; he “is aggressively pursuing all legal avenues to overturn His [sic] wrongful conviction and securing His [sic] release from parole. Id. at 3, 24. Jones also requests that the court order Defendants “to produce and permit inspection and copying of” of various documents. Id. at 10. He also requests that the court declare Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code, which pertains to vexatious litigants, facially unconstitutional. Id. at 26.
The undersigned notes that many, if not all of the claims, Jones asserts in this case were rejected by other federal courts. Jones, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100110, at *2 (“Plaintiff's objections are a re-filing of the same previous filings concerning allegations of false evidence.”).
Additionally, Jones claims ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Id. at 49. And he mentions a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in relation to his ineffective assistance claims. Dkt. 5 at 41. Finally, Jones purports to seek relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, and 14141. Id.
A. Criminal Statutes
Jones makes brief mention of seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, and 14141. Dkt. 5 at 41. None of these statutes provide a basis for civil liability or give rise to civil causes of action; they are purely criminal provisions. Gill v. State of Tex., 153 Fed.Appx. 261, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). Jones “as a private citizen . . . has no standing to institute federal criminal prosecution and no power to enforce a criminal statute.” Id.
B. Section 2254 habeas petition
The Complaint and Motion state Jones seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. 5 at 41. Jones alleges “ineffective assistance of Trial and Appellate Legal Counsel claims is sufficient to warrant this Court's grant of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under ‘STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON.'” Dkt. 1 at 49 (capitals in original; bold omitted).
“Section 2254 ‘confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear collateral attacks on state court judgments.'” Carmona v. Andrews, 357 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 2000). Federal courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [from one] in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
A one-year statute of limitations applies to the filing of non-capital § 2254 habeas corpus petitions in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Section 2244(d)(1) sets forth the general rule that a federal habeas petition filed by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court must be filed within one year after the petitioner's conviction becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). The statute of limitations is tolled, however, while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Texas' Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction on July 24, 2019. Jones v. State, No. 09-18-00071-CR, 2019 Tex.App. LEXIS 6292, at *14 (Tex. App.-Beaumont July 24, 2019, pet. ref'd). And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his petition for discretionary review on October 23, 2019. In re Jones, No. PD-0861-19, 2019 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 1030, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2019). Thus, Jones's time to file a § 2254 petition expired on October 23, 2020. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Because Jones filed this action on November 8, 2023 and that date is after October 23, 2020, Jones's § 2254 petition is time barred.
The Supreme Court confirmed that the AEDPA statute of limitation is not a jurisdictional bar, and it is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). “A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing.” Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562). “Courts must consider the individual facts and circumstances of each case in determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate.” Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). Jones has not alleged an “extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” of timely filing. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562. In sum, Jones has made no showing that unconstitutional state action prevented him from seeking relief in a timely manner or that he is asserting a newly recognized constitutional right. Neither has he shown that he could not have discovered the factual predicates of his ineffective assistance claims through exercise of diligence until a later time. Furthermore, Jones may not rely on his status as an unskilled layperson to excuse the delay in filing this petition. It is well settled that ignorance of the law and lack of legal assistance, even for an incarcerated prisoner, generally do not excuse late filing. Loza v. Quarterman, No. H-06-3632, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78589, at *11 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (collecting cases); see United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1993) (inmate's pro se status, illiteracy, deafness, or lack of legal training do not amount to factors external to the inmate that excuse an abuse of the writ). “Proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional' circumstance that justifies the equitable tolling of limitations.” Id. at 11-12. Thus, Jones's pro se status does not present a rare and exceptional circumstance that excuses the delay in filing his federal habeas petition.
C. Jefferson County District Attorney's Office
The Complaint names the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office. E.g., Dkt. 1 at 1. But “a county district attorney's office is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued.” Williams v. Travis Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. 1:23-CV-00496-RP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154417, at *10-11 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 5, 2023) (Pitman, J.) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Defendant
Jefferson County District Attorney's Office should be dismissed from this case.
D. Immunities
1. Eleventh Amendment
Jones names “State of Texas” as a defendant. Dkt. 1 at 69. Jones requests the court order the “State of Texas to set aside judgment of declaring the Plaintiff a ‘vexatious litigant.'” Id. at 172-73 (cleaned up).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars suits in federal court against a state, or one of its agencies or departments, by anyone other than the federal government or another state, regardless of the nature of the relief requested. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Neuwirth v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1988).Thus, the State of Texas is entitled to sovereign immunity unless Jones can invoke one of two exceptions to sovereign immunity: abrogation or waiver. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Neither exception, however, applies here because Jones makes no substantive allegations against the State of Texas.
Accordingly, the State of Texas is immune from suit.
2. Judge Templeton
Construing Jones's Complaint liberally, he purports to sue Judge Mitch Templeton. Dkt. 1 at 13-14 (“Judge Mitch Templeton is not being sued in his judicial capacity, that is, in connection with any particular decision to grant or deny permission. Instead, he is sued in his official and administrative capacities in performing the ministerial task of deciding whether to permit a “vexatious litigants's” pro se filing ....”) (bold and italics in original).
“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff can overcome judicial immunity in two circumstances: (1) “a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity;” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991), and (2) “a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12. “A complaint suing a judge for actions taken as a judicial officer fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because judicial immunity protects the judge from suit.” Macfarlane v. Law, No. SA-08-CV-0162 FB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23379, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. 2008). “Under the test articulated in Adams v. McIlhany, deciding a petition to declare a plaintiff a vexatious litigant is plainly a judicial act.” Drake v. St. Paul Travelers Ins., No. 6:08-CV-301, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137762, at *12 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Accordingly, Judge Templeton enjoys judicial immunity from suit.
3. Assistant District Attorneys
The Complaint names Kenneth Bruce Florence and Quentin Dean Price of the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office as defendants. Dkt. 1 at 173. Jones alleges prosecutorial misconduct. See, E.g., Dkt. 1 at 15, 60.
Prosecutors have absolute immunity from suit for actions performed within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Walker v. Mississippi, No. 21-60442, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 30019, at *2 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976). “Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor's actions in initiating the prosecution and in carrying the case through the judicial process.” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1994). “[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993).
“Unpublished opinions issued in or after 1996 are ‘not controlling precedent' except in limited circumstances, but they ‘may be persuasive authority.'” Watt v. New Orleans City, No. 23-30050, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 27453, at *5 n.7 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
“Willful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct is egregious by definition, yet prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for such conduct if it occurs in the exercise of their advocatory function.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5thCir. 2003). Even suppression of exculpatory evidence is shielded by prosecutorial immunity. Id.; Prince v. Wallace, 568 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (5thCir. 1978) (prosecutorial immunity applicable “even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts casting doubt upon the state's testimony.”) (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420-24)).
Accordingly, Kenneth Bruce Florence and Quentin Dean Price have prosecutorial immunity from suit.
4. Witnesses
Jones asserts claims against trial witnesses Jennifer Doornbos and Charles Keith Hawkes. Dkt. 1 at 71, 60. In a § 1983 case, “a trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness' testimony.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 367 (2012); Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1982) (“a witness is entitled to absolute, unqualified immunity from liability under § 1983 for his trial testimony”).
Accordingly, Jennifer Doornbos and Charles Keith Hawkes are immune from suit.
E. Failure to State a Claim
Jones also names Waylon Thompson and “Manhattan Beach Police Department- Manhattan Beach, California” as defendants. Dkt. 1 at 173. But the Complaint contains no allegations against either.
The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Because the Complaint merely mentions Thompson and the Manhattan Beach Police Department in a list of purported defendants, it does not contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Similarly, the Complaint references the Texas Department of Public Safety seven times in relation to other purported defendants, but it alleges no conduct by the Department. Dkt. 1 at 42, 152, 173; Dkt. 1-3 at 2, 5, 6, 7. Thus, the Complaint does not state a claim against the Texas Department of Public Safety-Beaumont Division.
The Complaint mentions Brian Jagneaux with the Texas Department of Public Safety. Dkt. 1 at 42. But it does not contain any allegations sufficient to state a claim against him. Id. at 61 (alleging witness provided false statements to Jagneaux); Dkt. 1-8 at 8-10 (emails characterizing the efforts of people, including Jagneaux, to get in touch with Jones); Dkt. 1-18 at 6 (document alleging Jagneaux is “corrupt” and that he did not thoroughly investigate Jones's case and relied on hearsay); see Dkt. 1 at 173 (list of purported defendants); see also Dkt. 1-3 (exhibit list) at 2, 5, 7; Dkt. 1-30 (trial transcript) at 8, 11.
F. Improper Venue
A district court may raise the issue of venue sua sponte. Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1989). If a civil action is filed in an improper venue, the district court may dismiss the action or, if it is in the interests of justice, transfer the case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located or (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). If there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided by the statute, venue is proper in any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction over such action. Id. § 1391(b)(3).
Jones contends “[t]his Court enjoys personal jurisdiction over the above-named Defendants because the false and defamatory statements made by Defendants were published in the State of Texas and other States within the United States.” Dkt. 1 at 4. And he argues that “[t]his Court enjoys venue under 28 U.S.C. § 139 l(a)(2) because all or a substantial portion of the events that gave rise to Plaintiffs claims transpired in the State of Texas and other States within the United States, including the publication or republication of the defamatory falsehoods and the damage to Plaintiffs reputation.” Id. at 5.
Jones misapprehends the venue statute. “A civil action may be brought in . . . a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (emphasis added). The statute provides that venue is proper in the relevant district, not the relevant state.
The Complaint mentions “defamation” or “defamatory statements” some 22 times; some allegations refer to a particular Defendant and others refer to all Defendants. Jones contends that his conviction and imprisonment were defamatory, Dkt. 1 at 150, that some now-destroyed evidence in his criminal trial was defamatory, id. at 152, and that the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office's policy of pursuing false convictions is defamatory, id. at 153. He also alleges each “co-conspirator” committed “defamatory overt acts.” Id. at 163. Lastly, he characterizes the alleged violation of due process by the Jefferson County District Attorney's Office as a defamatory statement. Dkt. 1-17 at 2. The undersigned need not analyze whether the allegedly defamatory statements were defamatory or whether they were published; the gravamen of Jones's suit are (1) his classification as a vexatious litigant and (2) his many complaints relating to actual innocence.
Jones contends the publication of defamatory statements in Texas establishes this district as a proper venue. But all the events giving rise to Jones's defamation claim arose in Jefferson County, Texas, which is in the Eastern District of Texas. Further all the judicial and prosecutorial acts of which Jones complains as well as the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in Jefferson County. Thus, the Western District of Texas is not a proper venue for this lawsuit
Because venue is not proper in this court under any provision of Section 1391(b), the court must either dismiss this suit or transfer it to a judicial district in which venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Section 1406(a) “is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.” Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962).
If the District Court declines to adopt the undersigned's recommendation regarding immunity, the undersigned recommends dismissal based on improper venue. It is in the interest of justice to dismiss this case rather than to transfer it. It appears that Jones has sued Defendants who are immune from suit, failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and asserted state law claims over which this court should not exercise jurisdiction. Further, Jones has asserted many, if not all, of the claims in this suit in other actions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which dismissed them. It thus appears to the undersigned that transferring this action would waste judicial resources.
G. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In the event the District Court declines to adopt the undersigned recommendation regarding judicial immunity, the undersigned recommends the District Court dismiss the Complaint as it requests relief the court may not grant. Jones requests the court order “the State to set aside judgements (sic) of “Declaring [Plaintiff] A Vexatious Litigant” ....” Dkt. 1 at 4 (brackets in original, braces added). The court may not grant such relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and “‘holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments' except when authorized by Congress.” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)). “One hallmark of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry is what the federal court is being asked to review and reject.” Id. at 382. Federal district courts lack jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings.” D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). “A state court judgment is attacked for purposes of Rooker-Feldman when the federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a challenged state court judgment, or where the losing party in a state court action seeks what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment.” Weaver v. Texas Cap. Bank N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). “A federal complainant cannot circumvent this jurisdictional limitation by asserting claims not raised in the state court proceedings or claims framed as original claims for relief.” United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Fifth Circuit has described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as “comprising four elements: ‘(1) a state-court loser; (2) alleging harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the district court proceedings began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and reversal of the state-court judgment.'” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606 F. App'x. 725, 730 (5th Cir. 2015)).
The first three elements of Rooker-Feldman are easily satisfied in Jones's case-he lost in state court, alleges injuries caused by the state-court judgment against him, and the complained of judgment was rendered before he commenced this action. See Burciaga, 871 F.3d at 384. As to the fourth element of whether Jones's suit seeks review and reversal of the state-court judgment, Jones asks the court to set aside an order from a state court declaring him a vexatious litigant. Dkt. 1 at 172-73; Liptak v. Banner, 67 Fed.Appx. 252 (5th Cir. 2003) (constitutional challenge to Texas court's vexatious litigant order was intertwined with state judgment and thus barred by Rooker-Feldman in subsequent federal suit). Thus, Jones's suit requests review and reversal of the state-court judgments against him, and Rooker-Feldman applies. As a result, the court lacks jurisdiction.
Jones also requests the court issue a declaratory judgment that the Texas vexatious litigant statute is unconstitutional on its face. Dkt. 1 at 26. Notably, Rooker-Feldman bars as-applied constitutional challenges to a statute but does not bar facial challenges. Truong, 717 F.3d at 382. Jones's request that the court declare the Texas statute facially unconstitutional is cursory. An examination of Jones's Complaint “belies this contention.” Kastner v. Tex. Bd. of L. Exam'rs, 278 Fed.Appx. 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2008). All of Jones's allegations stem from the vexatious litigant statute's application to him. Thus, the Complaint does not “adequately set forth a general, facial challenge” to Texas's vexatious litigant statute. Kastner, 278 Fed.Appx. at 349. Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction.
H. State-Law Claims
Jones has not stated a valid claim under federal law. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the District Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Jones's alleged pendent state-law claims-malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, respondeat superior, and indemnity. Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2011) (state-law claims were more properly heard in the state courts after federal claims were found to lack merit); see Richards v. City of Weatherford, 145 F.Supp.2d 786, 793 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after determining that the plaintiff failed to state any federal law claim).
The undersigned takes judicial notice that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas adopted the same course action. Jones v. Jefferson Cty. Dist. Atty., No. 1:21-CV-212, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100192, at *11 (E.D. Tex. 2022).
V. Conclusion
Jones's lawsuit is problematic for several reasons. First, most of the defendants he purports to sue are immune from suit, and he fails to state claims against the defendants whose immunity is not immediately clear. Second, Jones's attempt to use this suit as a vehicle for a § 2254 habeas petition fails because his time to file a § 2254 petition is long expired. Third, even if relevant defendants were not immune from suit, Jones asks this court to substitute its judgment for a state court's; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs it may not do so. Finally, if the District Court concludes that the relevant defendants do not have immunity and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, Jones still brought his suit in the improper venue. Because this suit regurgitates lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, it is in the interest of justice to preserve judicial resources and dismiss this case rather than transfer it to a district where Jones's arguments have already been rejected.
VI. Orders and Recommendations
The Magistrate Court GRANTS in part and DENIES as MOOT in part Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Motion to Admit Opinion from State Court Deemed as Unconstitutional and Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (Dkt. 5). The Magistrate Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint to Attach Filed Motion for Change of Venue from Jefferson County to Travis County Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404 (Dkt. 6). The Magistrate Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 3). Because the Magistrate Court recommends dismissal of this case, the undersigned DENIES as MOOT Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (styled “Appointment of Attorney to Represent Plaintiff”) (Dkt. 2).
The Magistrate Court RECOMMENDS the District Court DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's causes of action against all Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). The undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the District Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's state-law claims.
The referral of this case to the Magistrate Court should now be canceled.
VII. Warning
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within 14 days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).