Summary
concluding that delay of 76 days between state habeas petitions was unreasonable
Summary of this case from Peterson v. HubbardOpinion
No. 12-7328
10-16-2012
DWIGHT XAVIER JONES, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SERGEANT CLAWSON, Lexington County Detention Center; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOHNATHAN JEFFCOAT, Lexington County Detention Center; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER RANDLE, Lexington County Detention Center; JASON MERRILL, Cayce Public Safety, Defendants - Appellees.
Dwight Xavier Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel C. Plyler, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (5:11-cv-01533-RBH) Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dwight Xavier Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Daniel C. Plyler, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Dwight Xavier Jones appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Jones that failure to file timely and specific objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation.
The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). Jones has waived appellate review by failing to file specific objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED