Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-1072 (RCL).
February 21, 2006.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or, in the Alternative, to Order Compliance with Rule 10(b) and to Provide a More Definite Statement under Rule 12(e) and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Having considered defendant's motions and Plaintiff's opposition, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Central Parking System of Virginia, Inc. ("Central Parking") employed plaintiff as a floater maintenance worker to whom it assigned three locations to clean. Complaint ("Compl.") at 1. When Central Parking assigned plaintiff four additional locations to clean, plaintiff refused to do so because defendant allegedly underpaid him by $.15 per hour. Id. Consequently, Central Parking issued two warnings. Id., Ex. (Employee Warning Notices for violations on May 30, and June 19, 2000). When given the option of cleaning all assigned locations or being fired, plaintiff opted to clean all the assigned locations as of June 2000. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff developed a hernia as a result of an on-the-job accident, and underwent surgery to repair it. Compl. at 2. Upon his return to work after surgery, defendant placed him on lay off status. Id. at 2 Ex. (July 13, 2001 letter from James I. McKnight, Employee Relations Manager). He contended that defendant discriminated against him in a manner not explained in pleadings, and that he pursued a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id., Ex. (Notice of Right to Sue dated October 17, 2003).
The Court keeps in mind that a complaint filed by a pro se litigant is held to a less stringent standard than that to which a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer is held. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Accordingly, the Court discerns a discrimination claim against Central Parking under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., stemming from the lay off in 2001. In addition, plaintiff brings a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., because Central Parking allegedly "placed Plaintiff['s] medical records in his personnel file" in violation of the Act. See Amd. Compl. He demands back pay and punitive damages, among other relief. Compl. at 4.
The Court construes plaintiff's "Amended Complaint Discrimination" [Dkt. #7] as a supplement to the original complaint.
DISCUSSION
A plaintiff must commence a civil action under both Title VII and the ADA in a federal court within 90 days after receipt of right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e- 5(f)(1), 12117(a). It is presumed that the right-to-sue letter was mailed on the same date of its issuance. See Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen, 886 F.Supp. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 1995). If the date on which a plaintiff received the letter is not stated in the record, it is presumed that he received the letter three days after its issuance. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 148 n. 1 (1984) (per curiam) (applying "3-day rule" of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e)); Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 578 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).
The record reflects that the EEOC issued plaintiff's right-to-sue letter on October 17, 2003. The date on which plaintiff received the right-to-sue letter is not stated in the record. In this circumstance, it is presumed that plaintiff received the letter three days later, on October 20, 2003. The official court record shows that the Clerk of the Court received plaintiff's complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis on May 3, 2005, approximately 19 months later.
The front of plaintiff's original complaint was stamped "received" by the Clerk of the Court on May 3, 2005. The Clerk officially filed plaintiff's complaint on May 27, 2005, after the Court reviewed and approved plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. #1-2.
Plaintiff offers no explanation for his delay in filing this civil action, and sets forth no reasons why the limitations period should be tolled. Because plaintiff failed to file his complaint within the 90-day limitations period, the complaint must be dismissed as untimely. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this same date.